Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, June and July, 1863

AFTER the battle of Chancellorsville the Confederates were much encouraged by the general condition of affairs. The army of the Potomac kept losing men by expiration of enlistment, until we had less than eighty-five thousand effectives, and these were badly organized, when General Lee commenced his movement the last of May, 1863. Our forces were distributed into eight army corps, necessarily of small size: the first under John F. Reynolds; second, Hancock; third, Sickles; fifth, Meade; sixth, Sedgwick; eleventh, Howard; twelfth, Slocum, and the cavalry under Pleasanton, making an average for each corps of less than eleven thousand men. The largest corps, Sedgwick’s, was about fifteen thousand strong; the smallest, Reynolds’s, numbered not more than eight thousand combatants. General Lee seems to have actually commenced the northward movement the 3d of June. It was always difficult for us to procure information of the movements of the enemy; more difficult than for him to gather corresponding information concerning us, because we were in the hostile country. I remember with what apparent ease and self-possession, during this northward march, farmers would be riding in pairs or threes, each with a bag of grain behind the saddle, apparently going to the neighboring mill; and how surprised beyond expression they were when their counterfeit character was revealed. With few exceptions the Southern households, when opportunity rendered it possible, as at Chancellorsville, gave constant and full information to the enemy of our strength, position, and movements. However, in spite of difficulties, General Hooker had discovered and reported to Washington, as early as the 28th of May, the collection of a large body of the enemy’s cavalry at Culpepper and Jefferson. He justly concluded that a general movement was on foot, and presumed it would be the same substantially as that of the year before. Still, everything seemed to be conjecture till after the cavalry action of General Pleasanton, the 9th of June, at Brandy Station. This was, of course, merely a grand reconnoissance in force. It resulted in giving us this desired information: the corps of Longstreet and Ewell, having turned our right flank, were already en route towards the north; and the enemy’s cavalry surely, and his whole force probably, was destined for Maryland and Pennsylvania.

HOOKER’S PLANS AND INSTRUCTIONS.

From the information gathered from the prisoners and dispatches captured during this reconnoissance, and from scouts who had noted the time it took the enemy’s column to pass a given point, it was plain to our commander that there was need of prompt action: either to cross the river and fall upon Lee’s rear, or to follow up his movement upon the inner lines, ready to resist any flank movement he might make, or, if an opportunity should offer at some favorable moment, to strike him in flank. General Hooker seems to have meditated the first course, and to judge from his correspondence with Washington he deemed it feasible. Doubtless, if he had had sufficient force, he might have cut off Hill’s corps, fallen upon and crushed it after the departure of Ewell and Longstreet, and afterwards, if Lee had not turned back, made as good time as Lee himself in reaching Central Pennsylvania; but his general instructions to cover Washington, always a matter of vital importance, and the specific objection of the president made at the time in a letter to him, caused him to restrict himself to a reconnoissance by the sixth corps, while the other corps were marching parallel with Lee’s column. Each army in motion was covered in flank by its own cavalry. General Hooker kept steadily to his object, namely, to take positions of observation, protect the capital against sudden movements in that direction, and be ready to concentrate rapidly for any possible emergency. I belonged to the right wing, temporarily constituted under the immediate charge of General John F. Reynolds. It consisted of the first, third, and eleventh corps, and marched by the way of Bealeton, Manassas Junction (the old battle-field of Bull Run), Centreville, Gum Spring, and Goose Creek. Our three corps habitually encamped within five or six miles of each other, seldom following in precisely the same track except when forced to do so. The corps kept up constant intercommunication. There were frequent cavalry combats with Stuart’s cavalry at the gaps in the Bull Run range and the Blue Ridge, but few that drew into action any considerable infantry force, though a regiment, a brigade, or sometimes a division was detached in support. Mosby’s cavalry, guerrillas, scouts, and spies penetrated our lines in spite of every precaution, picked off our aids and messengers on their swift journeyings from corps to corps, and circulated every sort of false story that might be made use of to mislead us.

The major part of the army of the Potomac was on the 22d of June not far from Edward’s Ferry, the place selected for crossing the Potomac.

General Lee had rightly interpreted our movements, namely, the reconnoissance at Falmouth and at Beverly Ford, and the pressure of cavalry supported by infantry at the gaps of the mountain ridges which run parallel with the Potomac; and he had scarcely been checked for an hour in the execution of his main purpose. He did encounter a force, of about seven thousand men under General R. H. Milroy, at Winchester, Virginia, which force, in an isolated position, without support, could not afford to wait for Lee’s arrival. But it was difficult for General Milroy, with his brave heart, to make up his mind to retreat till the enemy was actually upon him. He remained one day too long, his retreat was cut off, and it is a wonderful fact that nearly half of his command escaped and succeeded in getting upon the other side of the Potomac, leaving the remainder of his men, twenty-nine gnus, upwards of two hundred wagons, and four hundred horses and mules in the hands of the enemy. This unfortunate affair, ending the 15th of June, served to depress us and inspirit the enemy. He pressed on rapidly to Harper’s Ferry, where doubtless he hoped to repeat the tactics of a former occasion, that is, of seizing the commanding points on the Virginia shore, and forcing a surrender. But this time we were fortunate in having in command there General Tyler, an officer as quick of apprehension and as fertile in expedients as Lee’s commanders. Tyler carefully withdrew to the almost impregnable position of Maryland Heights, a range of hills, on the eastern shore of the Potomac, which completely command the ground at Harper’s Ferry; thus saving his command and taking an excellent post of observation. General Hooker was entirely right when he asked the control of this force. Had Milroy’s and Tyler’s troops been under his command, Milroy would have held merely an outpost for Tyler, and would doubtless have retired upon him on Lee’s approach. In such emergencies independent wills work at cross - purposes. For war, you must get the best will you can, and trust it wholly.

I was ordered to cross the Potomac with my corps on the 24th of June, at Edward’s Ferry. The uncertainty of the enemy’s movements, and correspondingly of our own, multiplied orders in an unusual manner. After my orders to cross the river and proceed to Sandy Hook, in the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry, General Butterfield, the chief of Hooker’s staff, signaled, “Have you received orders not to cross at Edward’s Ferry till further orders, but to camp near the telegraph office there ? You report from there to head - quarters army of Potomac.” Another order was to cross and march to Harper’s Ferry via Edward’s. Then came a dispatch from Hooker himself, to put my corps in camp on the south side of the Potomac; next, one from General Seth Williams, A, A. G., that I should guard the bridge and depots at Edward’s Ferry on the north side of the Potomac at that place.

THE ENEMY’S CROSSING.

General Seth Williams writes, “ General Tyler telegraphs from Maryland Heights, ‘ Longstreet’s corps, which camped last night between Berryville and Charlestown, is to-day in motion, and before six o’clock this morning commenced crossing by the ford, one mile below Shepherdstown, to Sharpsburg. I have reports from reliable parties that at least fifteen thousand have crossed the ford this morning, mostly infantry and artillery. The troops are halted, and the wagon train at ten o’clock (this morning) was moving.’ ” General Hooker’s letter of this same date, probably written early in the morning, to General Halleck, explains that Ewell is already over the Potomac, and that if he can do so without observation he proposes to send to Harper’s Ferry “a corps or two to sever Ewell from the balance of the rebel army, in case he should make a protracted sojourn with his Pennsylvania neighbors,”

I presume that just as soon as General Hooker knew that Longstreet was also crossing the Potomac in force, he gave up the idea of the enemy’s intention to make a single corps raid. Also he surrendered the hope of dividing Lee’s army by way of Harper’s Ferry. In keeping with this view, the next day, the 25th of June, came new instructions to me: “ The commanding general directs that you at once send a staff officer to report to General Reynolds, at or near the vicinity of Edward’s Ferry, and that you move your own command in the direction of Middletown instead of Sandy Hook.” This movement was executed in conjunction with the first and third corps; “with a view,” General Hooker says, “to seize the passes of South Mountain . . . and confine him [Lee] to one line of invasion.” These objects were fully accomplished. It was easy to concentrate at any one of the three points, Frederick, Middletown, or South Mountain, in a day. I do not wonder at General Hooker’s disappointment that the left at Harper’s Ferry should be absolutely anchored by keeping ten thousand men there to defend Maryland Heights. This was in effect the decision of General Halleck, generalin-chief, telegraphed from Washington the 27th of June to General Hooker, who in person had gone to Harper’s Ferry to reconnoitre. General Hooker’s prompt and well - known reply to Halleck’s message was, “My original instructions were to cover Harper’s Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal; and I earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy.”

HOOKER RELIEVED; ARMY FEELING.

On the 28th, after his arrival at Frederick, General Hooker was relieved from the command, and General George G. Meade was appointed to succeed him. I was not, at this time, familiar with the points at issue between Generals Halleck and Hooker, but I was somewhat acquainted with the feeling towards General Hooker among certain officers of rank in our army. President Lincoln wrote him on the subject in a letter dated the 14th of June. He says, “ I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence.” One of these officers, about the 18th or 19th of June, quite fiercely assailed me for “ constantly sustaining General Hooker,” saying in substance that I was the only corps commander that spoke always in Hooker’s defense. I replied that “ I was always loyal to the officer the government saw fit to place over me.” Though I believed, and do so still, that my dispositions at Chancellorsville were as good as the position permitted, and that the defeat there was not due to any neglect on my part, willful or otherwise, but to other causes (as I could have explained, had I ever been called upon by the committee on the conduct of the war or by General Hooker), nevertheless I was made to feel soon after that battle that General Hooker blamed me, and was against me. This made me so much the more careful in what I said, particularly after General Schurz wrote me to the same effect, with a view to prevail on me to withdraw from the corps. And whatever private grievance I might have, I trod it under my feet, for I believed that General Hooker had grand qualities. He was cool and brave in action, clearheaded in council, and of a popular turn with the troops, and probably as able in matters purely military — in forming and executing plans of campaign embracing tactics and strategy — as General Lee. His great fault was that he was unmerciful in his criticism of senior and rival commanders. Judging of the army feeling as exhibited in private interviews, and in the usual canvassing of reputations and characters around the camp-fires, I believe the change of commanders, ill-timed as it seemed, was acceptable to the officers.

MEADE’S OPERATIONS.

After the telegrams between General Hooker and the government, Meade concentrated his army towards his right flank at Frederick, on the evening of the 28th, saying, “I propose to move this army to-morrow in the direction of York.” After a little further consideration he set in execution, to be completed the evening of the 30th (really finished the 29th), a movement upon Emmettsburg and Westminster: first and eleventh corps to Emmettsburg, third and twelfth to Taneytown, second to Frizelburg, fifth to Union, and sixth to New Windsor. He drew French (now properly placed under his command) from Harper’s Ferry to Frederick, as a reserve and protection to his line of communication with Washington. He protected his flank with cavalry.

This dispersed the army considerably, grouping two corps at Emmettsburg, two at Taneytown, and three around Westminster, on a line from right to left of about twenty-five miles’ frontage. General Meade’s object, explained at the time, was, “If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch [at Harrisburg] holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle.”

A part of Stuart’s cavalry had crossed the Potomac in our rear, and made a raid around us. Ewell was at this time believed to be in the vicinity of York and Harrisburg. So that with Lee’s army apparently scattered from Hagerstown to Carlisle, Harrisburg, and York, Meade hoped, as be said, to fall upon some portion of it in detail. But on the evening of the 30th, all our information showed that Lee was drawing in his divisions and brigades to locations between Chambersburg and Gettysburg.

The part my corps took in these grand movements of preparation was very simple. I marched on the afternoon of the 28th of June from the beautiful, fertile, loyal, hospitable valley of which Middletown is the centre, to the north of Frederick. The next day, the 29th, my notes say, “ The day was rainy, the roads heavy, and the march wearisome, yet the troops were in camp at Emmettsburg, having made about twenty miles, by seven P. M.” Orders June 30th sent Reynolds with first corps to Marsh Run, half-way from Emmettsburg to Gettysburg, about six miles on. I changed position from the right to the left of the town, and the third corps (Sickles’s) encamped between Taneytown and my position. Slocum went to Littlestown. The cavalry kept in advance; Buford’s division was already in Gettysburg. The rest of the army remained substantially as on the day before. The Confederate corps of A. P. Hill, or a large portion of it, was at Wingard’s farm, on the road from Funkstown to the Chambersburg pike, the night before.

Just at night I received a note from General Reynolds requesting me to ride up to Marsh Run and see him. He was stopping at a house on the right of the road when I reached there, occupying a back room on the south side. He said he was glad to see me, and immediately gave me General Meade’s confidential address, just issued, in which he required the officers in command fitly to address the troops, and appealed to every patriotic sentiment to stimulate his command on the approach of a great battle. He (Reynolds) showed me, in a bundle of dispatches, — the information brought to him during the day, — evidence of the nearness, position, and designs of the enemy. He sat down with me to study the maps of the country, and we consulted upon these matters till eleven o’clock at night, the last night of his life. He impressed me as unusually sad; perhaps not more so than any clear-headed officer would be on the eve of an important battle. I took leave of him and rode rapidly back, six miles, to my command.

It seemed that I was hardly asleep before a messenger from army headquarters at Taneytown waked me with orders for General Reynolds as the wing commander. They were the orders of march for the day. I opened the dispatch and noted its contents (we read all dispatches, however directed, lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy and be lost), but did not attempt to execute the orders directed to another till sufficient time had been allowed him to give his own instructions based on them. But these orders of march, so soon known, enabled me to be in readiness. From them I quote the following:—

“ Orders. Headquarters at Taney - town. Third corps to Emmettsburg; second corps to Taneytown; fifth corps to Hanover; twelfth corps to Two Taverns; first corps to Gettysburg; eleventh corps to Gettysburg (in supporting distance) ; sixth corps to Manchester. Cavalry to front and flanks, well out in all directions, giving timely notice of positions and movements of the enemy.”

After indicating the probable position of Longstreet and Hill between Chambersburg and Gettysburg, and Ewell at Carlisle and York, and expressing the opinion that movements favored a disposition on Lee’s part to advance from Chambersburg, to Gettysburg, General Meade concludes, “ The general believes he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army and assume position for offensive or defensive, or for rest to the troops.”

GENERAL HOWARD'S MOVEMENT AND OBSERVATION.

I will now ask the reader to narrow his view, and accompany me while I play the small part assigned to me, and note what I observed, remembering that if I write more fully of my own work it is no disparagement to others who distinguished themselves.

At 8.30 A. M., at Emmettsburg, I received the order of march from Reynolds, for the time my immediate commander, and at once set in motion two columns then in readiness. One, Barlow’s division, with a battery, was put upon the direct road from Emmettsburg to Gettysburg (eleven miles); the other two divisions, Schurz’s and Steinwehr’s, with four batteries remaining, upon an indirect road (thirteen miles) by Horner’s mill, coming into Gettysburg by the Taneytown road. An average of two and one half miles per hour on a hot July day, with the load of supplies each soldier had to carry, would be enough, and would bring Barlow’s division into Gettysburg a little after one P. M. (His road was already cut up by Reynolds’s wagons, and much obstructed all the way by trains and artillery carriages.) Schurz and Steinwehr, upon an unobstructed road, would do well to make an average of three miles per hour, and might come in about the same time with Barlow.

THE BATTLE: FIRST DAY.

As soon as the columns were in motion, accompanied by my staff I took the shortest route, riding rapidly by the side of the road, in the woods, in the fields, anywhere to get past the impedimenta and Reynolds’s moving columns, and reached the vicinity of Gettysburg by 10.30 A. M. (All the time I give was by my own watch. I notice variations in the time from a half to three quarters of an hour, as different officers have recorded the same event.) A staff officer met me from Reynolds as I came in sight of town, and said that General Wadsworth had come suddenly upon the enemy and was engaged beyond the seminary; and it was very evident from the sound and smoke that there was artillery firing and some musketry. Reynolds’s column had left the road towards the west; one division seemed on the ground and another was skirting the Oak or Seminary Ridge, closing up.

My orders to keep within supporting distance, with a corps, would mean four or five miles back, if no combat was at hand. But Reynolds’s word to me now by his aid was, “ Come quite up to Gettysburg. ” And as I asked where he wished to place me, the aid said, in substance, “ Encamp anywhere about here, according to your judgment at present.” But circumstances change rapidly when an action has already begun. After his aid had gone and the firing seemed to increase, I became very anxious to see General Reynolds himself, that I might act with him to the best advantage. I sent an aid and orderlies to different places to look for him and report to me. Meanwhile, with the remainder of my staff I reconnoitred for the best position in which to locate my command. I went to the west of Sherfy’s peach-orchard, to a little rising ground there, then across the field, and ascended Cemetery Ridge. While there looking at the broad expanse of country over and beyond the little town at my feet, I distinctly remember turning to Colonel Meizenburg, the corps adjutant general, and saying, “ This seems to be a good position, colonel.” He answered briefly, “ It is the only position, general.”

I now passed rapidly into the town and at first tried to get into the belfry of the court-house, but found no ladder; some one recommended another place, across the street, through a store, up a stairway, through a lumber-room, then up another flight of stairs, and out upon a balcony. It was probably the work of two minutes, when from what is now called Fahnestock’s observatory I had a fine post of observation. What could we see? The roads, now so familiar, from Bonnaughtown, York, Harrisburg, Carlisle, Shippensburg, Chambersburg, and Hagerstown; roads emerging from Gettysburg like tlie spokes from the hub of a wheel; roads which are exceedingly important for the soldier in command to have engraven on his memory. I saw Buford’s division of cavalry perhaps two miles off towards the northwest, seeming, in the distance and in the largeness of the field beyond the college, but a handful. I got glimpses of Wadsworth’s division of infantry, fighting near the Oak Ridge railroad cut. Success was then attending him, and prisoners in gray were being conducted into the town. I saw Doubleday’s division beyond the Lutheran seminary, filing out of sight beyond the Oak Ridge to the south of west, a mile away.

REYNOLDS’S DEATH.

As I stood there, and looked and heard and thought, of a sudden a young officer rode rapidly up the street from the west, touched his hat as he halted, and said, “ General Reynolds is wounded, sir.” I replied, “ I am very sorry; I hope he will be able to keep the field.” A few minutes after (about 11.30 A.M.), his aid-de-camp, Major Biddle, brought me news of his death. His words were, “ General Reynolds is dead, and you are the senior officer on the field.”

Is it confessing weakness to say that when the responsibility of my position flashed upon me I was penetrated with an emotion never experienced before or since? I realized that we had close to us a large part of Lee’s army, and that we ourselves had on the field now less than ten thousand men all told, and it seemed almost hopeless that Meade could gather his scattered forces in time for any considerable success to attend our arms. “ But,” I thought, “ God helping us, we will stay here till the army comes.” I assumed the command of the field, giving to General Schurz command of the eleventh corps. Doubleday succeeded to Reynolds, and Buford continued with his cavalry. I had sent an earnest call from Reynolds, received just before his death, back to the columns of Schurz and Barlow. It was his last order to me: “I am hardly pressed; have your troops move up at double-quick.” Immediately I sent the news to General Sickles, who must have been at Emmettsburg before that hour, urging him to come up as quickly as possible; and through him on to General Meade at or near Taneytown, back to Slocum along the Baltimore pike to the vicinity of the Two Taverns, where he was supposed to be; and again to the commanders of the eleventh corps on both roads of approach.

I then rode slowly to the position Meizenburg and I had agreed upon us a good one, near the cemetery gate, where very soon I met General Carl Schurz in person, who had hastened on to see me; and I instructed him, as soon as the troops should arrive, to place his reserve batteries and Steinwehr’s division in support on those heights, and to send his other two divisions, Barlow’s and his own, now Schimmelpfennig’s, to the right of Doubleday’s corps, as relief.

Several writers have criticised this disposition, one set asserting substantially that it was a lame attempt on my part to carry out the instructions of General Reynolds, which he himself would have modified had he lived; another, that I scattered my troops too much, and should have concentrated them at once; and another still, that the disposition was well enough, but that I should have intrenched or barricaded more than was done.

The first objection is simply not true. General Reynolds, as a true soldier and a military man of good capacity, met the enemy with his troops, which were but the advance of the main army, and attacked at once with boldness, as the wisest course to make the enemy more careful and slower in developing his forces; but he fell before he had informed me of any plan for a subsequent arrangement of troops. The second objection would be of value provided there had been time to take and fortify prominent points in the enemy’s front; but it was better to interpose a weak line to Ewell’s corps than to let the flanking operation of Chancellorsville be repeated upon our exposed right flank. A well organized skirmish-line is better than nothing. The alternative would have been to occupy, at once and fully, Cemetery Ridge and vicinage, and draw back the first corps. But this could not be done safely so early in the morning. The repulse of the Oak Ridge line would surely have fallen upon the new line at the cemetery, for the enemy’s numbers present were at least two to our one. Possibly more barricading and intrenching might have been done, even in the presence of actual firing; I had it done in Georgia afterwards, under similar circumstances, but more was effected at Gettysburg than is usually believed. The batteries on the cemetery heights were many of them covered. The walls and fences were taken possession of, and the houses towards the north and west of the town, as I ordered and as I am informed, were prepared and used as barricades.

FURTHER MOVEMENTS.

As soon as General Schurz had received his instructions near the cemetery gate, he met his column that appeared first on the Taneytown road, and detached the brave and prompt Captain Dilger with his first Ohio battery in advance, which passed through Gettysburg at a trot and went at once to a good position on the right of Robinson’s division. I insert a short extract from General Schurz’s report to me. He says, “The right of the first corps seemed to extend across the Cashtown road and the railroad northeast of it. It was at this time difficult to see how far the ground was in our possession. Of the enemy we saw but little, and had no means of forming a just estimate of his strength. Either the enemy was before us in small force, and then we had to push him with all possible vigor, or he had the principal part of his army there, and then we had to establish ourselves in a position which would enable us to maintain ourselves until the arrival of reënforcements. Either of these cases being possible, provision was made for both.

“ Accordingly you ordered me to take the third and first divisions of the eleventh corps through the town, to endeavor to gain possession of the eastern prolongation of the ridge partly held by the first corps, while you intended to establish the second division and the artillery (the reserve batteries, Major T. W. Osborne, commanding), except the batteries attached to the first and third divisions, on the cemetery and the eminence east of it, as a reserve.

“ The third division arrived at 12.45 P. M. [probably, time blank in my copy], at a double-quick. The weather was sultry, and the troops, that had marched several hours without halting a single time, were much out of breath. I ordered General Schimmelpfennig ... to advance briskly through the town, and to deploy on the right of the first corps in two lines. This order was executed with promptness and spirit. Shortly afterwards the first division, under General Barlow, arrived by the Emmettsburg road proper, advanced through the town, and was ordered by me to form on the right of the third division.”

Meanwhile, as General Schurz was conducting his third division to battle, I left orders for Steinwehr and Osborne to halt and form upon Cemetery Ridge, and also directed my chief of staff to remain there with all that pertained to my head-quarters, namely, clerks, orderlies, servants, horses, and the small cavalry detachment. I set forth with two or three officers for a personal reconnoissance of the troops engaged at the front. I was just in time to meet the head of Barlow’s division, and accompanied it through the town along the street that is nearest the extension of the Emmettsburg road. He detached Captain Wheeler’s battery in advance. It moved with the utmost rapidity to join Captain Dilger. The infantry marched more slowly, that they might come fresher into battle. As the column passed along, the street and houses seemed almost deserted. But for the occasional firing beyond the seminary, echoing through the town, they were at this time as silent and undemonstrative as were the streets of Baltimore when we came through that city a few days after the riot in 1861. One beautiful exception greeted our eyes. A young lady, standing upon a piazza near a street corner upon our right, waved her handkerchief continuously as the men passed by. It gave them heart, reminding them of the true and loved ones for whom they were fighting. The soldiers answered with cheers, prolonged as the regiments came and went.

My senior aid-de-camp, Major C. H. Howard, was sent with orderlies to the position of General Buford to consult with him, reconnoitre, and bring me information. I then rode rapidly along our line from our right to the position of General Doubleday on the left. General Wadsworth in his testimony says: “ General Howard had ridden over to see me about two o’clock, and told me to hold the position as long as I could and then to retire.” Probably, as he was subordinate to General Doubleday, I told him those would be the instructions; my record of this visit is, “ I found General Doubleday about a quarter of a mile beyond the seminary. His third division was drawn up with its front and left facing towards the northwest, making a large angle with the ridge; the artillery of this division was engaging the enemy at this time. His first division [Wadsworth’s] was located a little to the right of the railroad [merely a railroad cut running from Gettysburg towards Chambersburg], and his second division [Robinson’s] on Wadsworth’s right.” The left of Doubleday’s line, resting on a small stream called Willoughby’s Run, extended to an elevation north of the Chambersburg road and was then refused. Then there was an interval, occupied after one P. M. by Wheeler’s and Dilger’s batteries belonging to the eleventh corps. From this place to Rock Creek, almost at right angles with the first corps line, were the two divisions of the eleventh corps, Barlow’s and Schimmelpfennig’s.

Such was the position of the troops. Now, with a view to relieve a constant pressure upon Doubleday’s division, I directed General Schurz to move forward and seize a woody height in front of his left, on the prolongation of Oak Ridge. But before he had advanced many steps, the report of Ewell’s corps advancing between the York and Harrisburg roads was brought in by Major Howard, and confirmed by reports from Generals Buford and Schurz. I saw at once that my right would be completely enveloped if I pressed on for the woody height referred to, so I ordered the line to be halted, and skirmishers to be sent to try to get upon and occupy that position. Before their arrival the enemy had it in force.

From this time, about two, till four P. M., General Schurz with the advance division stood mainly on the defensive, constantly firing and receiving fire of artillery and infantry. General Barlow made one bold advance that for a few minutes broke the continuity of the line. The enemy’s batteries could be distinctly seen on a prominent slope north of Gettysburg, between the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads. To these batteries we constantly replied from the three batteries at the front (Lieutenant Wilkeson’s, of the fourth artillery, being with Barlow hotly engaged), and from Wildrick’s three-inch rifle guns on the cemetery heights near my head - quarters. A sad complaint came from General Buford that our shots from the latter, Wildrick’s battery, fell short, and only reached his line. Fortunately nobody on our side was killed by this fire. The accident arose from the poorness of the ammunition, and not from want of skill in the artillery officers. Not long after my return from Doubleday’s, about 2.45 P. M., perceiving that a severe attack had actually been begun upon the eleventh corps and right of the first, I sent again to General Slocum, stating that my right flank was attacked and asking him if he was moving up to my relief. I stated that I was in danger of being turned and driven back. As to another message, owing to some difficulty in finding General Sickles’s head-quarters, my aid-decamp, Captain Pearson, did not deliver it to him till 3.30 P. M., so that it was vain to expect help from that quarter short of two hours and a half. The first corps really did more fighting than the eleventh. It began early, when Wadsworth’s two brigades, Cutler’s and Meredith’s, came into position. Doubleday says, “ General Reynolds took Cutler’s brigade and Hall’s battery to hold his part of the line, and directed the other brigade to be placed on a line with the first in a piece of woods which lay between the two roads [probably the Chambersburg and the next road to the south]. These roads were already occupied by the enemy, who opened fire upon us, killing General Reynolds almost on the first volley.” The result of this first combat, thus begun, was to dislodge the enemy from the woods and take a large number of prisoners, his force being driven beyond Willoughby’s Run. Here is where Colonel Fairchild so distinguished himself at the head of a Wisconsin regiment. Wadsworth’s right being turned and a battery (Hall’s) being nearly disabled, all the horses and men at one gun either killed or wounded, he fell back with a part of Cutler’s brigade along the railroad cut towards town. Doubleday now assumed the offensive with a reserve regiment and some others at hand, and attacked the enemy’s advance in flank, enabling Wadsworth to catch in the railroad cut General Archer, of North Carolina, with part of his brigade and part of Davis’s (rebel) brigade, and make them prisoners. General Doubleday now extended his line with Robinson’s division and supported his right with proper reserves.

This seems to have been the position of things when I went along his line. There was constant, skirmishing and some artillery firing kept up all this time, but no vigorous attack again till it came along the whole line. My record is; “At 3.20 P. M. the enemy renewed his attack upon the first corps, hotly pressing the first and second divisions.” This was simultaneous with Ewell’s movement against Schurz on the right. Earnest requests came to me from both corps for reënforcements; Schurz must have another brigade on his right. My report says truly, “ I had then only two small brigades of Steinwehr’s in reserve, and had already placed three regiments from these (Costar’s brigade) in the north edge of the town, with a view to cover the eleventh corps should it be forced to retire.” I feared the consequence of sparing another man from the cemetery. It was not a time to lose the nucleus for a new line that must soon be formed. I did, however, give General Schurz another battery from the reserve, and requested General Buford with his cavalry to retire from his advanced position , to support as well as he could the right of Doubleday’s line.

At 3.45 Generals Doubleday and Wadsworth besought me again for reënforcements. I directed General Schurz if he could possibly spare a regiment to send one immediately to Wadsworth, for I deemed his front the ground which General George H. Thomas used to call “ the hitch ” (where the enemy is most obstinate). I have no record as to whether Schurz sent this regiment or not. In fact, fifteen minutes after this order left me, the musketry fire on the right and left became terrific, seemingly all along the line, and Doubleday was outflanked toward the left. I then sent an aid (I think it must have been Captain Hall) to General Doubleday with these words: “If you cannot hold out longer, you must fall back to the cemetery and take position on the left of the Baltimore pike.” The general, and I believe him a true man, does not give me credit for this order. It is possible the aid may have said, “ We must hold on to the seminary as long as possible,” in the excitement using seminary for cemetery; or he may have failed to reach him with the order.

ORDERS FOR RETREAT.

A few minutes later, being satisfied I could hold the front no longer, at 4.10 P. M. I sent a positive order (General Schurz names this order in his report) to Generals Schurz and Doubleday to fall back gradually, disputing the ground obstinately, and to form near my position, the eleventh corps on the right and the first corps on the left of the Baltimore pike; and, as I knew our line would necessarily be short, and appear so to General Lee’s observation, I asked General Buford to make all the show he could on our left, fronting the enemy’s right. This he promptly did. Now let it be remembered, when the staff officers left me with orders, our troops were already giving way. Soon the division of the eleventh corps nearest Doubleday was flying to the shelter of the town, widening the gap there; and the enemy in line pressed rapidly through the interval. Of course Robinson and Wadsworth had to give way. General Doubleday says, “ I think the retreat would have been a very successful one if it had not been unfortunately the case that a portion of the eleventh corps, which had held out very well on the extreme right, had been surrounded and had fallen back at the same time that my right flank fell back. These two bodies of men became entangled in the streets of the town, and quite a number were captured.” This was literally the case. The provisions made to cover the retirement of the troops, namely, the sending of Costar’s brigade to the edge and front of the town, and the proper location and service of batteries by my chief of artillery, Major T. W. Osborne, checked the eager advance of the enemy, and broke and flung back a column of his in the act of turning the right flank of our new position. As the troops came up the Baltimore pike, very much broken, Schimmelpfennig, the commander of the leading division, lost his way, and to avoid falling into the enemy’s hands hid himself among some piles of lumber, and did not succeed in joining his command until after the battle of the third day. Generals Schurz and Doubleday were in front of the town till the last minute, doing everything to inspirit their troops engaged, and save what they could of their broken columns.

I received the first regiment arriving, and, leading the way with the corps flag, placed it in position on the right of Steinwehr’s line. Its colonel, Von Amsburg, seemed at the time utterly crestfallen and broken, but the German soldiers answered my action and followed my signal with a shout. General Adelbert Ames, who succeeded General Barlow in command of his division after Barlow was badly wounded, came to me about this time and said, “ I have no division: it is all cut to pieces.” I replied, “Do what you can, Ames, to gather the fragments and extend the line to the right.” He did so, and succeeded better than he had feared. The firing of the enemy now measurably subsided ; only an occasional cannon shot and scattering musketry reached us.

HANCOCK’S ARRIVAL.

At this moment, 4.30 P. M., according to the time I had gone by all day, General Hancock appeared. (He reports to the committee on the conduct of the war that he was at Cemetery Hill by 3.30 P. M.) General Doubleday states that his troops did not commence to give way till a quarter before four; and surely it was half an hour later than this that he was leading his corps into position on Cemetery Ridge, where he and I first met Hancock. General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner, and used these words: “ General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.” I replied, “ All right, Hancock. This is no time for talking. You take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the right.” He said no more, and moved off in his peculiar gallant style to gather scattered brigades and put them into position. I noticed that he sent Wadsworth’s division, without consulting me, to the right of the eleventh corps, to Culp’s Hill; but as it was just the thing to do, I made no objection, — probably would not have made any in any event, — but worked away, assisted by my officers, organizing and arranging batteries and infantry along the stone wall and fences toward Gettysburg, and along the northern crest of the ridge. It did not strike me then that Hancock, without troops, was doing more than directing matters as a temporary chief of staff for Meade.

MEADE’S ORDER SUPERSEDING HOWARD.

But just before night, when the order from General Meade came to me, superseding me in command of the field by a junior in rank, I was of course deeply mortified, and immediately sought General Hancock and appealed to his magnanimity to represent to General Meade how I had performed my duty on that memorable day, which I think he then did. I know that afterward General Hancock said in substance to Vice-President Hamlin, concerning this battle, “ The country will never know how much it owes to your Maine general, Howard.” At seven I turned over the command to General Slocum, whom I saw in company with Hancock for the first time. He had placed his two divisions as I had requested, one at the extreme right, and the other at the left, some time before I saw him. Slocum answered me roughly that evening, and feeling that for some unaccountable reason I was blamed where I ought to be commended, I sat down and wrote a letter to General Meade.

HEAD-QUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS, July 1, 1863. }

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, commanding Army of the Potomac:

GENERAL, — General Hancock’s order to assume command reached here in writing at seven (P. M.). At that time, General Slocum being present, having just arrived at this point, I turned over the command to him. This evening I have read an order stating that if General Slocum was present he would assume command.

I believe I have handled these two corps to-day from a little past eleven until four o’clock,—when General Hancock assisted me in carrying out orders which I had already issued, — as well as any of your corps commanders could have done. Had we received reënforcements a little sooner, the first position assumed by General Reynolds and held by General Doubleday till my corps came up might have been maintained; but the position was not a good one because both flanks were exposed, and a heavy force approaching from the north roads rendered it untenable, being already turned, so that I was forced to retire the command to the position now occupied, which I regard as a very strong one.

The above has mortified and will disgrace me. Please inform me frankly if you disapprove my conduct to-day, that I may know what to do.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, O. O. HOWARD,

Major-General Commanding.

General Sickles had meanwhile arrived with the third corps, and placed his command on our left, extending the line, heartily approving the position and distribution of the troops.

CLOSE OF FIRST DAY’S BATTLE.

Thus ended the first day’s battle, a rough, hard, bloody day. No sane man expected a victory over Lee’s army to be gained with an advance guard; twenty-two thousand infantry against sixty thousand of the same blue-eyed Saxon race, in an open country, where there was no pass to be defended, no mountain or river to be used as an auxiliary obstacle. The first and eleventh corps and Buford’s small division of cavalry did wonders: held the vast army of General Lee in check all day; took up a strong position; fought themselves into it, and kept it for the approaching army of the Potomac to occupy with them, so as to meet the foe with better prospects of victory. General Lee saw our position, was deceived as to our numbers, and therefore waited for the remainder of his army before re-attacking. But the battle cost us many valuable lives.

Doubleday fixes his loss at upwards of five thousand. General Buford’s and Schurz’s would probably reach four thousand, killed, wounded, and prisoners; so that twenty-two thousand effectives engaged were reduced to within thirteen thousand.

Barlow with more than a thousand other wounded men was left in the hands of the enemy. Mrs. Barlow generally kept near the field of battle where her husband was engaged, for he seldom escaped a shot. He was wounded in many battles. After Antietam he recovered with great difficulty and many drawbacks, under his wife’s most careful nursing. I shall never forget Mrs. Barlow’s coming up to the cemetery and saying she must go to her husband. She started at once down the Baltimore pike into the town, but the skirmishers would not cease firing to enable her to pass that way; then she returned and took another course, going west across the fields, where everybody could see her to be a non - combatant. This time she passed through both lines unharmed, and reached her husband.

General Slocum, with whom I had been acquainted at West Point, and with whom I had become better acquainted during our service together in the army of the Potomac, sometimes serving under his temporary command, to my astonishment declined to come up to Gettysburg to participate in the action, and only sent his troops late in the afternoon at my request. He explained the course he took by showing that it was contrary to the plan and purpose of General Meade to bring on the battle at Gettysburg, he having arranged for another defensive position at Pipe Clay Creek. I think he did wrong to delay, and was hardly justified under the circumstances, even by the written orders of General Meade; still, in all his previous history and subsequent lengthy service by my side in the West and South he showed himself a patriot in spirit, a brave man, and an able commander. As the result proved, it is perhaps as well that he did not come earlier, for he and his troops were fresh for the very hardest fighting on subsequent days. I must speak of General Steinwehr. He came upon the field with a hearty spirit, ready to do his part. During the retreat he kept his men steadily in position on the Cemetery Ridge, as a nucleus on which the line of battle, probably the most important in the annals of our war, was formed.

SECOND DAY’S BATTLE; MEADE’S ARRIVAL.

Generals Slocum and Sickles and myself took up our quarters for the night near the cemetery gate. About three o’clock on the morning of the 2d, General Meade and staff appeared at the cemetery. The first words he said to me were in substance that “he was very sorry to have seemed to cast any discredit upon me; he had no blame to affix.”

General Butterfield, it seems (according to his own testimony), as soon as Reynolds’s death was known at Taneytown, had urged General Meade to go to Gettysburg himself, or send there his chief of staff. Meade not thinking this best, Butterfield said he ought to send some one on the field fully possessed of his views and intentions; adding, “ I should entrust that duty to General Hancock.” Meade assented, and Butterfield then drew the order accordingly, which did not take from me my corps, but placed me under the general command of an officer my senior in years and service in the old army, but my junior in the volunteer appointment. From these statements it is now easy to understand General Meade’s attitude toward me. He may have been prejudiced, but certainly, as I understood the matter at the time, General Meade really intended, and Hancock so implied in his conversation with me, that he (Hancock) was to represent Meade as Butterfield, the chief of staff, would have done on the field of battle. Of course it will make very little difference to posterity whether I served under Hancock unwittingly for two hours and a half, or not. But it is of importance to me and to mine to explain the facts of the case.

General Meade then asked me concerning the position. I said, “ I am confident we can hold this position.” “ I am glad to hear you say so,” he replied, “for it is too late to leave it.” General Sickles remarked, “ It is a good place to fight from, general.”

After a brief conversation concerning the location of the troops, as the dawn was just appearing in the east, we rode along the lines in rear of the sleeping soldiers, and the general saw for himself how much these lines needed strengthening and extension. The different corps, except the sixth, were near at hand for this work. General Meade, stationed near where the soldiers’ monument now is, took an officer’s survey of the whole field, as the sun was rising at his back. The cannonade, which began and continued for an hour from a Confederate battery situated near Blochor’s house beyond our right, and was replied to by our own guns, and the rattling of musketry along the picket-lines, intensified every faculty of observation. He could see Cemetery Ridge almost like a bastioned fort on his right, where it was broken by the valley of Rock Creek, with Culp’s Hill fringed with trees for the flank, and the ridge thence to its crossing of the Baltimore pike for its face. This ridge, turning near the town, passed in front of him, gradually diminishing in elevation, till, just beyond Zeigler’s Grove, on his left, it is scarcely higher than the ground for a quarter of a mile in its front. He noticed then, a little farther to the south, what we called at the time Little Round Top, a small rocky spur rising abruptly, and beyond this a higher hill of the same nature, more wooded and more extended, called Big Round Top. Beginning at the crossing of Rock Creek, off to the right and rear of Meade’s post of observation, near McAllister’s mill, and letting the eye sweep around westward by Culp’s Hill to the highest point of Cemetery Hill, thence southward to the farthest end of Big Round Top, General Meade beheld the natural formation destined to be covered by his lines of infantry. It was shaped like a fishing-hook (to which several writers have aptly compared it), the point resting at McAllister’s mill, the convex bend at the Cemetery Hill near Gettysburg, and the shank representing the remainder of the line.

The position of the enemy could be divined only by glimpses of batteries, location of skirmish lines, and general probabilities. Meade could see Oak or Seminary Ridge running north and south a mile to the westward, partially covered with trees. He caught the motion of a column of infantry far to the north, moving towards our right. He saw the several roads converging toward the town, the rolling interval to the northwest, the detached hills to the north and beyond Rock Creek, which were in view, and evidently afforded excellent positions to the enemy for placing artillery on our front and flank, so as to bring a concentrated fire upon the cemetery. The general stood here in this magnificent morning light with a panorama spread before him of hill and valley and mountain, of woodland and cultivated farms, of orchard and grassland, as beautiful as nature anywhere furnishes. But he saw not the beauty; he was planning for Lee and planning for himself; plan against plan, move against move. In a few minutes he turned away slowly and thoughtfully, rode back to the gate, and soon after, the army lines began to take new form. Geary’s division of Slocum’s corps passed from the left, near Zeigler’s Grove, to the east of Culp’s Hill, and Williams’s division extended thence to McAllister’s mill; this located the twelfth corps line, partially intrenched or covered by rocks and trees, on the extreme right. Wadsworth’s division of the first corps stayed and fortified Culp’s Hill, where Hancock placed it the evening before. Ames’s division of the eleventh corps carried on the line to the steep part of Cemetery Ridge, facing northwest. There were Schurz’s and Steinwehr’s divisions behind the famous stone wall and the apple orchard near town. Doubleday’s and Robinson’s divisions, first corps, came next in order, strengthened by Stannard’s brigade of Vermont troops, newly arrived. Hancock’s second corps, which had marched up from Taneytown the night before, under General Gibbon, to within three miles of the battle-field, now filed into place, extending south over the lower land, from and beyond Zeigler’s Grove. Then Sickles’s third corps was moved to the left and farther west than Hancock’s, a part being in front of Little Round Top. About eight o’clock A. M., the fifth corps, commanded by General Sykes, coming in along the Hanover road, marched through the fields to a position as a temporary reserve in rear of Little Round Top. General Pleasanton’s cavalry corps was disposed beyond Rock Creek to protect our flanks, General Gregg commanding a division operating on the extreme right, near the Bonnaughtown road, and General Kilpatrick’s division, on the extreme left beyond Big Round Top, pushing towards the Emmettsburg road. General Buford’s division of cavalry, that had served so faithfully during the preliminary operations, was withdrawn from Sickles’s left, where I had placed it, and sent on the 2d of July to guard our main trains at Westminster. General Sedgwick, as soon as he received his orders on the night of the 1st, set his sixth corps in motion from Westminster about nine o’clock P. M. , and marched all night and the next day, with scarcely a halt, making thirty-four or thirty-five miles in seventeen hours. At two P. M. I saw this corps move to the rear of the first and second corps, forming each brigade in line in rear of the preceding. As soon as a brigade had reached its position the officers and men unslung their blankets and lay down, covering themselves for rest; they were soon sleeping soundly.

General Meade’s head-quarters were established at Mrs. Leister’s house, situated on the Taneytown road not far to the southeast of Zeigler’s Grove, a point that proved to be more exposed to the enemy’s artillery fire than any other within our lines, except the cemetery itself.

LEE’S POSITION.

In rear of and near the middle of his own lines, where the Chambersburg road crosses the Oak or Seminary Ridge, at the stone house of Mrs. Mary Marshall, General Robert E. Lee made his headquarters. They had an advantage over General Meade’s, being less exposed to the fire and more commanding as a post of observation. His troops after getting into place were situated as follows: Ewell with three divisions opposite our right, Johnston’s division having his left beyond Rock Creek at Benner’s Hill, and Early’s division extending the line to near town, the two confronting Slocum, Wadsworth, and Ames. Then Rhodes’s line, passing through Gettysburg along Middle Street, stretched out toward the Seminary Hill or Oak Ridge. Hill’s corps of three divisions faced the eleventh corps (my own), the first (General Newton commanding), and the second (Hancock’s), extending from the Shippensburg road to and a little beyond the Hagerstown road; his divisions were commanded by Heath, Pender, and Anderson, in the order named. Longstreet’s corps continued the line along the Oak Ridge and across the fields to the Emmettsburg road, Hood’s division being located at the right of McLaws’s, and Pickett’s in reserve. Lee’s cavalry was not much used till near the close of the engagements at Gettysburg, being allowed to rest after its arduous service in the preliminary campaign and long raids around our right flank. General Lee’s artillery officers had placed their guns on every favorable position, as I have intimated, on front and flanks, having for use two hundred and seventyfive guns. General Hunt, Meade’s chief of artillery, saw to the posting of our batteries. Cemetery Ridge was covered with them, and batteries or parts of batteries were placed wherever there was an available point. I took my head-quarters in the cemetery at the highest point, where the ridge slopes to the eastward, very near the place where the monument now is. The officers and men were rested and encouraged by the usual influence of complete arrangement, confident movements, and large auxiliaries.

OPENING OF THE BATTLE.

My record of the opening of this battle is as follows: “ Very little occurred while the other corps were moving into position until about four P. M. Just before this, orders had been issued to the [my] divisions to make ready for battle, as the enemy was reported advancing on our left. Now the enemy opened fire from some dozen batteries [Hunt says one hundred and twenty guns], to our right and front, bringing a concentrated fire upon our position.” Osborne and Wainwright replied with spirit. Projectiles filled the air; they went over us and set ambulances, spare wagons, and a host of army followers into rapid motion farther to the rear, for shelter. A part fell short and were harmless, or occasionally exploded, throwing out their fragments to trouble the artillery men and horses, or to rattle among the tombstones. Seldom did a shell explode on the crest where the infantry was lying; but now and then one more murderous than the rest would strike a regiment. One such shell, I remember, killed in a single regiment of ours twenty-seven men.

There was a battery directly in front of me that kept very actively at work during this cannonade. My attention was called to a young artilleryman who ran backward and forward from the gun to the limber, carrying ammunition. He was singing and whistling, and very active. As a shot or shell came near, the horses would spring to one side or pull back. He would then run to their heads and straighten the team, and return to his work, exhibiting no impatience. Just as I was remarking him for his heartiness and lively conduct, a solid shot struck him on his thigh; he gave one sharp cry, and was no more. One who stood near me at this time writes, " Then came a storm of shot and shell; marble slabs were broken, iron fences shattered, horses disemboweled. The air was full of wild, hideous noises, the low buzz of round shot, the whizzing of elongated bolts, and the stunning explosion of shells overhead and all around . . . . In three minutes [after our batteries opened] the earth shook with the tremendous concussion of two hundred pieces of artillery.”

Undoubtedly General Lee made up his mind from careful observation that the hills, Little and Big Round Top, afforded the key to our position. Could he get a lodgment on these heights, a single battery might be so placed as to paralyze our whole centre and right. There would be an enfilading fire, sweeping the troops of Hancock, Newton, and myself, and a reverse fire — or fire from the rear — upon the rest of our line.

LONGSTREET’S ATTACK ON SICKLES.

General Sickles, for the time constituting our left, had moved his corps forward to the slight ridge of land that runs obliquely from the cemetery southwest towards Oak Ridge, taking ground considerably in advance of Hancock’s left. The position itself was doubtless intrinsically better for meeting an assault than the continuation of Hancock’s line at that time, but it isolated the third corps and exposed its flank to be turned. While Longstreet made the main attack here, Ewell was to attack in his front, and Hill to threaten, each to work opposite his own place in the general line, that Meade might not reënforce. In perhaps three quarters of an hour after the batteries began, there was for a few minutes a lull in the firing, when it again opened with redoubled violence on our left. Hood and McLaws in line moved to the attack. The division on Sickles’s left, extending back from the peach orchard, rested its flank on Big Round Top. The brigades of Wood and De Trobriand on that flank received the first onslaught, but, being posted as well as could be under the circumstances in that advanced position, returned the enemy’s fire with vigor and effect. Graham’s brigade, making an angle just north of the orchard, and with little cover, met a fearfully destructive fire almost simultaneous with that on the left; it did not hold its ground long, though the contest at the peach orchard, and at Rose’s house, a little to the south of it, was somewhat prolonged. Sickles’s batteries here did wonderfully effective service: Bigelow’s fired rapidly from a position near A. Trostle’s barn, and when forced to retire, did so with the prolonge, keeping up the fire. The Confederates, pressing back the broken infantry line, came upon this battery with a rush. Bigelow is said to have blown them from the muzzles of his guns, but still they came on, and clambered over his limbers and shot his horses. Five of his non - commissioned officers and twenty-two of his men were killed or wounded, and he himself wounded in the side. Still he held on and fired till the corps chief of artillery, McGilvery, had brought up his reserve battery to the high ground in his rear. These brave men brought off only two guns, but they had done their part in delaying Longstreet’s advance.

General Humphreys’s division, being opposite A. P. Hill’s men, was not hotly engaged till our troops on his left had been for some time in the fight; but by six P. M. the fierce battle rolled along to his front, and after making all possible resistance he retired slowly and in very good order to the position of Hancock. During this fearful conflict between the Hound Tops and the Emmettsburg road, groves, orchards, trees, knolls, stone walls, large rocks, and every natural obstacle or cover had been taken advantage of by our men in retiring, and by the enemy in advancing, so that the necessary delay was effected to enable General Meade to do what it would of course have been wise to do before, namely, get the fifth corps upon the heights at the left. Birney had called for this corps as reënforcement before the action began. General Sykes is said to have replied " that he would be up in time, that his men were making coffee and were tired.” The spirit of the men going into battle is all important. The coffee and the resting are often absolutely necessary to the soldier, to enable him to keep on his feet and bear his part. General Meade and not General Birney was Sykes’s commander, and the latter was clearly in position to reënforce Birney, in case of need, in a very few minutes. But to my mind there is a remarkable providence in the fact so much complained of, namely, that “General Sickles had taken up an advanced position; ” for thus he caused the delay of Longstreet, and enabled Meade to put Sykes into position to save his extreme left, which was the very high ground that Lee made his main attack to secure. General Sickles was severely wounded, losing his leg. He called upon Meade for reënforcements, and turned over his command to Birney.

While the fifth corps was moving into position, General Warren, Meade’s chief engineer, kept the signal flags waving on Little Round Top, detached Hazlett’s battery and supported it by Vincent’s brigade of Barnes’s division, and undertook to secure this vital point. He was just in time, for Hood’s men were upon them in five minutes; but they had our best troops to meet. They came with their fearful yell up the rough steeps, over the precipitous crags, only to be hurled back again.

“ Never was there a wilder place for combat, and never was there a combat more fierce than was seen there on that hot July evening, with blazing musketry and hand-to-hand struggles, with clubbed fire-arms and jagged stones. For half an hour this conflict went on, when a charge from the twentieth Maine, under Colonel Chamberlain, hurled the Texans from the hill.” ¹ Chamberlain occupied the left of the line, while Vincent’s brigade and Weed’s brigade of Ayer’s division and Crawford’s division broke Hood’s and McLaws’s advance farther to the right. General Hancock, after Sickles’s wound, was given the care of the two corps, the second and third. He pressed forward reënforcements as they were needed. From my post of observation I could see brigades and divisions move out westward, with their flags flying and their bayonets gleaming in the sunlight; then the fearful rattling of the musketry would follow, and the brigades and even divisions would melt away. When Humphreys, on retiring, reached the open space at his rear, he thought for a moment the day was lost, and the enemy thought their victory sure. But in a few moments Meade had sent forward Wheaton’s division of the sixth corps, and the other fresh troops just named; the new line was complete; then, as soon as Humphreys’s men were out of the way, a sheet of fire opened from Zeigler’s Grove to Little Round Top, and the enemy were repulsed.

Histories, reports, testimonies, and letters are crowded with thrilling incidents in the battle I have outlined. General Weed fell at Hazlett’s battery on Little Round Top. Lieutenant Hazlett saw his commander fall, and as he hastened to him to catch his last words, he was struck by a bullet and fell dead across the body of his general. General Vincent, commanding the supporting brigade of Hazlett’s battery, fell while standing in an elevated position where he could see and be seen, cheering on his men. Colonel Edward E. Cross, in Caldwell’s division of Hancock’s corps, commanded the brigade that I had led during McClellan’s campaign. His regiment was the fifth New Hampshire. He was tall, handsome, with a clear, black, restless eye, and a warm heart. Nothing seemed to please him better than the excitement of battle. He is said to have been wounded nine times in previous combats. He exclaimed, a few hours after the fatal shot had struck, “ I did hope I would live to see peace and our country restored!” General Zook, of New York, in the same division, was another that I counted as a personal friend. He fell in Caldwell’s advance. I remember distinctly his high character, pleasant face, and genial companionship, and can hardly realize that he is gone. My brother, who is a minister, having been sent by the Christian Commission, was moving around relieving the wounded, and found his own cousin, Major S. P. Lee, with his right arm shattered, and at first quite unconscious. He took charge of him and carefully nursed him till he became convalescent.

NIGHT ENGAGEMENT.

After the struggle had closed, and when we supposed we should have a rest for the night, some troops in our front, said to be the “ Louisiana Tigers,” sprang from their cover under the steep hill on the north end of Cemetery Ridge, broke through Ames’s division, and in three minutes were upon our batteries, Wiedrick’s and others, almost without firing a shot. General Schurz by my order sent a part of a brigade under Colonel Krizanowski to the batteries’ immediate relief; the artillerymen left their guns, and used sponge - staffs, handspikes, or anything they could lay hold of, to beat back the enemy, and as soon as help came the batteries were cleared. Schurz also sent a brigade farther to the right to help General Green, who requested reënforcements. I sent to Meade for more troops, as a part of Ames’s division was forced back and a gap made. But Hancock, hearing the firing, had detached Colonel S. S. Carroll, with his spirited brigade, to my aid. His men formed at right angles to the general line, and swept swiftly over the highest ground northward, carrying everything before them.

Generals Steinwehr and Newton immediately filled any gaps made on my left by sudden withdrawals. This night engagement extended as far as Slocum had any troops. It was Ewell’s effort on our right to assist Lee’s main attack after Williams’s and a part of Geary’s divisions had been withdrawn, and ordered off to reënforce the right. The enemy’s troops took quiet possession of the points vacated, and really slept within our lines, but the ground was so rough, and the woods so thick, that their generals did not realize till morning what they had gained.

This then was the condition of things at the close of the second day. Lee held Sickles’s advance position of the morning, and part of our rifle-pits or barricades between McAllister’s mill and Culp’s Hill. Lee modestly says, “ These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day.”

THIRD DAY’S BATTLE.

The detachments of the twelfth corps (Williams’s division strengthened by Lockwood’s brigade) that had given efficient help on the left during the 2d of July, and two brigades of Geary’s division, which Meade says did not reach the scene of action from having mistaken the road, attempted after night to return to their breastworks on the extreme right of our line; but, as I have intimated, they found them already occupied by Johnston’s Confederates. General Slocum was at this time in command of more troops than the twelfth corps, and General A. S. Williams had the latter. Williams made arrangements to attack the enemy at daylight and regain the position formerly occupied by the corps.²

I slept with others inside of a family lot in the cemetery, beside an iron fence, with a grave mound for a pillow. Being very weary, for want of rest on previous nights, I was not awakened till five A. M., when I heard quick and sharp musketry firing, with an occasional sound of artillery. It began like the pattering of rain on a flat roof, only louder, and was at first intermitted. Then it would increase in volume of sound till it attained a continuous roar. Of course I sent at once to the right and to headquarters to ascertain what the firing meant. The reply came shortly, “ The twelfth corps is regaining its lines.” By seven o’clock the battle was fully joined. The Confederates were determined to hold on, and disputed the ground with great obstinacy. But after a lively contest of five hours, Ewell was driven beyond Rock Creek, and the breastworks were reoccupied and held. I went over this ground five years after the battle, and marks of the struggle were still to be observed: the moss on the rocks was discolored in hundreds of places where the bullets had struck; the trees, as cut off, lopped down, or shivered, were still there; stumps and trees were perforated with holes where leaden balls had since been dug out, and remnants of the rough breastworks remained. I did not wonder that General Geary, who was in the thickest of this fight, thought the main battle of Gettysburg must have been fought there.

CAVALRY COMBATS ON THE FLANK.

Stuart’s cavalry made a demonstration at this time beyond Ewell. General Gregg’s division, by Pleasanton’s direction, engaged the enemy in an artillery duel near the Bonnaughtown road, and checked his advance so as to prevent mischief from that quarter. About this time our bold, sanguine Kilpatrick moved his division of cavalry over beyond the enemy’s right, near the Emmettsburg road, where Pleasanton later in the day directed him “to pitch in with all his might on Longstreet’s right.” In these combats of Kilpatrick several valuable officers lost their lives; among them was General Farnsworth, in command of a brigade, near the time of Pickett’s repulse. Pleasanton speaks of this work on the enemy’s right as follows: “I have always been of the opinion that the demonstration of cavalry on our left materially checked the attack of the enemy on the 3d of July; for General Hood, the rebel general, was attempting to turn our flank when he met these two brigades of cavalry, and the officers reported to me that at least two divisions of the rebel infantry and a number of batteries were held back, expecting an attack from us on that flank.”

LAST CANNONADE AND ASSAULT.

The last bloody contest at Gettysburg opened about one P. M. by a cannonade. Lee’s plan of attack was the same as that of the day before, except that Longstreet now had Pickett’s division, and Lee added one division and two brigades of A. P. Hill to the attacking column. Also there was a different massing of the artillery. Longstreet is said to have brought together in his front, opposite the low ground north of Little Round Top, fifty-five long-range guns, and Hill massed some sixty more a little farther towards and opposite to our centre.

The signal-gun was fired by the enemy, and from the southwest, west, north, and northeast, his batteries opened, hurling into the cemetery grounds missiles of every description. Shells burst in the air, on the ground, at our right and left, and in front, killing men and horses, exploding caissons, overturning tombstones, and smashing fences. The troops hugged their cover, when they had any, as well as they could. One regiment of Steinwehr’s was fearfully cut to pieces by a shell. Several officers passing a certain path within a stone’s - throw of my position were either killed or wounded. The German boy holding our horses under the cover of the Cemetery Hill, on the eastern slope, near a large rock, had his left arm clipt off with a fragment of a shell. Men fell while eating, or while the food was in their hands, and some with cigars in their mouths. As there seemed to be actually no place of safety, my staff officers sat by me nearly in front of four twelve - pound Parrott guns that played over our heads, almost every available space being covered with artillery. As the sabots (the pieces of wood that are placed between the cartridges and the elongated shot) would sometimes fly off and hit us when the guns fired, we made large piles of hard-bread boxes, and sat in front of them, watching the operations of the enemy with our glasses; thus protected against our own guns, but exposed to the enemy’s.

At half past two P. M. we ceased to reply. We had ammunition and were not silenced, but we knew that this cannonade preceded an attack, and we thought it possible the enemy would conclude that we had been stopped by their effective shots, and would proceed to the contemplated assault; then we should need batteries in readiness, and plenty of ammunition.

We were right. The firing of the enemy lulled, and I could see, better than the day before, their infantry in line; at least a quarter of a mile of it was exposed to my view, as it started from Oak Ridge, opposite our left. It was like an extensive parade; the flags were flying and the line steadily advancing. As I now know, these were Pickett’s and Petegrew’s divisions and part of Anderson’s. On, on they came. As soon as they were near enough Osborne, Wainwright, McElvery, and other artillery chiefs started the fire of their batteries; first with solid shot, making hardly any impression, soon with shells exploding near and over and beyond the advancing line. Now gaps were plainly made, but quickly filled. When nearer, the canister was freely used, and the gaps in the enemy’s line grew bigger and harder to close. Soon this array came within short musketry range of our full long line in their front, all concealed by temporary cover, breastworks, stone walls, and trenches. As if by some simultaneous impulse, the whole line fired and continued to fire rapidly for perhaps five or ten minutes. As the smoke rose I saw no longer any enemy’s line. There was running in every direction. Regiments of ours from Steinwehr’s position to Round Top were moving into the valley with their flags flying and apparently without much order, taking flags, guns, and prisoners, and bringing them in. General Hancock commanded the majority of the troops on that front of attack, namely, the first, second, and third corps; Newton having the first, Gibbon the second, and Birney the third, during this day’s combat. Hancock says:—

“ The shock of the assault fell on the second and third divisions of the second corps; and those were the troops, assisted by a small brigade of Vermont troops, together with the artillery of our line, which fired from Round Top to Cemetery Hill at the enemy, all the way as they advanced, whenever they had the opportunity . . . . No doubt there were other troops that fired a little, but these were the troops that really withstood the shock of the assault . . . . I was wounded at the close of the assault, and that ended my operations with the army for that campaign.”

General Hancock mentions the fact that General Gibbon was also wounded during this assault, and thinks that the absence of two commanders who knew thoroughly the circumstances at such a moment as this was a great detriment; otherwise, advantage would have been taken of the enemy’s repulse by our making a decisive advance.

Longstreet’s troops on the right of his attacking column attempted to turn our left, as I have previously stated, and such of them as were beyond our infantry were held in check by Kilpatrick’s cavalry, while the remainder made nothing more than a demonstration against Big Round Top. But it is represented in the reports that as Ayer’s regulars were disputing with the foe the possession of the ground near Little Round Top, General Meade himself made a visit to that point, accompanied by several general officers. He asked what command that was occupying the stone wall. When told it was Crawford’s division of Sykes’s corps, he directed Sykes to order Crawford to advance and clear the woods in his front. General Crawford says: “I directed the command at once to advance. Hardly had the men unmasked from the hill before a battery of the enemy, stationed on a ridge beyond the wheat field, opened with grape and canister.” Crawford’s skirmishers pushed forward, and began to fire upon the cannoneers. The battery limbered up and fled. Crawford adjusted his line and charged across the wheat field and into the piece of wood beyond, driving a brigade of Georgia troops, of Hood’s division, before him, capturing 260 prisoners, a gun, caisson, 7000 stand of arms, and all the wounded that had been there for some time uncared for. Crawford in this gallant charge, initiated by General Meade himself, retook the ground that had been lost the day before, and ended the battle.

Our entire loss is reported at 23,186, of whom 2834 were killed, 13,709 wounded, and 6643 missing. It is difficult to ascertain Lee’s losses. We had in our hands upwards of 7000 wounded Confederates, the most of whom were so severely injured that they could not accompany the retiring army. The hospital record gives the number 7262. If we deduct this from the whole number of prisoners, which I believe is understated by General Meade at 13,621, it gives us 6359 well prisoners. The most moderate estimate that I have seen of the enemy’s loss in killed is 5500. Now, if we place the number who were not so severely wounded as to be left behind, and those who escaped from the field and did not fall into our hands but were lost to the enemy, at 10,000 (probably the number was much greater), we have 29,121 for the aggregate of Lee’s losses.

Another classmate of mine besides Weed was killed during this engagement, but on the other side, General Pender. He had a division in Hill’s corps. The Richmond Enquirer blamed him for too strictly obeying his orders, and not pushing into action sooner. He was of rather small stature, full of quaint humor when a cadet, and quite popular. Our mathematical professor at West Point, Guy Peck, used to say to him, in his inimitable style, as he would ask some queer question during recitation: “Don’t be facetious, Mr. Pender.”

It was told me at this time that General Armistead, one of Pickett’s brigade commanders, started with his brigade, and moved straight forward till he reached our batteries. He had his hat on the point of his sword, pressing forward with his men diminishing in number till his surrender, when he had less than ten left. He was several times wounded, and died within our lines.

AFTER THE BATTLE.

Nothing can ever give an adequate picture of that field of battle during the night of Friday and the two following days. There is an exhilaration in the preparation for conflict, there is spirited excitement during the storm of the heated engagement; but who can bear the sight of the blackened corpses, of the distorted faces of the dying, or of the pale, quiet sufferers who he for hours and sometimes days for their turn to lose an arm or a leg at the hands of the overtasked surgeon ?

I saw, just before leaving the cemetery on the 5th of July, a large plat of ground covered with wounded Confederates, some of whom had been struck on the first and some on the second day’s battle, not yet attended to. The army surgeons, and the physicians who now flocked to their aid by every incoming railroad train from the North, were doing their best, yet it took time and unremitting labor to go through the mass. The dirt and blood and pallor of this bruised mass of humanity affected me in a manner I can never forget, pleading pathetically for peace and good-will toward men.

A story is told by Hon. E. P. Smith of an army chaplain (William R. Eastman, seventy - second New York regiment) , the son of the secretary of the American Tract Society. The incident probably occurred during Friday night. “His horse, plunging during the battle, struck him on the knee-pan; . . . the pain became almost unendurable. As he lay suffering and thinking, he heard a voice: ‘ Oh my God! ’ He thought, Can anybody be swearing in such a place as this! He listened again: a prayer began. He tried to draw up his stiffened limb, but he could not rise. He then thought, I can roll; and over and over he rolled, in pain and blood, and by dead bodies, till he reached the dying man, and prayed with him. At length one of the line officers came up and said, ‘ Where’s the chaplain? One of the staff officers is dying.’ ' Here he is!’ cried out the sufferer. ‘Can you come and see a dying officer ? ’ ' I cannot move.’ ‘ If I detail two men to carry you, can you go?’ ‘ Yes.’ They took him gently up and carried him, and that livelong night the two men bore him over the field and laid him down beside bleeding, dying men, while he preached Christ, and prayed.”

Would that every regiment at Gettysburg had had such a true hero for a chaplain, and that he had been desired and permitted thus to do his lawful work! The annals of the celebrated Christian Commission, of which the noble, indefatigable George H. Stuart was president, show the truly Christian work that was done through this channel at Gettysburg, in the alleviation of human suffering and the lifting up of human hearts into perennial joy. These facts relieve the gloom somewhat.

SLOWNESS OF PURSUIT.

I have never been able satisfactorily to account for General Meade’s apparent reluctance to push in his reserves promptly, after the repulse of the third day. He could have struck Lee’s right flank vigorously with twenty thousand fresh men before Lee could have recovered from the shock of his defeat, and before Ewell could with safety have brought reënforcements from his left. General Hancock testifies that Meade said, before the fight, that he intended to put the fifth and sixth corps on the enemy’s flank. He (Meade) said “ he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and moved so slowly that nothing was done before night,” except what I have related of the division of General Crawford, who commanded the Pennsylvania reserves. I have thought that the fearful exposure of General Meade’s head-quarters, where so many of his general and staff officers were wounded, and where so much havoc was occasioned by the enemy’s artillery, had so impressed General Meade that he did not at first realize the victory he had won. This he would have done from some other post of observation. Had he thus realized the situation, he would not at such a time have tolerated slowness on the part of any of his lieutenants. Still, it is well for our countrymen to remember that this was the end of three days of extraordinary anxiety and excitement. Officers and men were quite ready to be satisfied with the success which was apparent, for the sake of the much-needed rest, and were fearful of losing, by a too sudden advance, what had already been gained. And doubtless the greater sense of responsibility felt by the commanding general had the effect to increase his natural conservatism.

As soon as the news of Lee’s defeat reached General French at Frederick, he reoccupied Harper’s Ferry and destroyed Lee’s bridge across the Potomac; so that it would seem that his defeated army was almost at our disposal. He withdrew from our front, during the night of the 4th of July, by the way of Fairfield and Cashtown, and pushed on as rapidly as he could to Williamsport.

The circumstance of the retreat and our slow pursuit, the stand of Lee at the river, our council of war, where Wadsworth, Pleasanton, and myself urged an immediate attack, and our failure to attack, are familiar to all who were connected with the army.

THE THANKS OF CONGRESS ; PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

When General Meade and his army received the thanks of Congress, Senator Grimes, of Iowa, said on the floor of the Senate, “ As I have read the history of that campaign, the man who selected the position where the battle of Gettysburg was fought, and who, indeed, Tought it on the first day, was General Howard; and to him the country is indebted as much for the credit of securing that victory as to any other person. I wish, therefore, as a recognition of his merits, to couple his name with that of General Meade in the vote of thanks.” It was so done. And surely I had a right to be glad and proud of this unsought and unexpected testimonial. But as it was intimated to me, after Lee’s escape, that it was believed that I was ambitious for the command, for Meade’s place, I wrote to Mr. Lincoln a letter which drew from him a characteristic answer. Since neither of these letters has ever been in print, I insert them both at length.

HEAD-QUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, NEAR BERLIN, July 18, 1863. }

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

SIR, —Having noticed in the newspapers certain statements bearing upon the battle of Gettysburg and subsequent operations which I deem calculated to convey a wrong impression to your mind, I wish to submit a few statements. The successful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due mainly to the energetic operations of our present commanding general prior to the engagement, and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the field. The reserves have never before, during this war, been thrown in at just the right moment; in many cases when points were just being carried by the enemy, a regiment or brigade appeared, to stop his progress and hurl him back.

Moreover, I have never seen a more hearty coöperation on the part of general officers than since General Meade took command. As to not attacking the enemy prior to leaving his stronghold beyond the Antietam, it is by no means certain that the repulse of Gettysburg might not have been turned upon us. At any rate, the commanding general was in favor of an immediate attack; but with the evident difficulties in our way, the uncertainty of a success, and the strong conviction of our best military minds against the risks, I must say that I think the general acted wisely. As to my request to make a reconnoissance on the morning of the 14th, which the papers state was refused, the facts are that the general had required me to reconnoitre the evening before, and give my opinion as to the practicability of making a lodgment on the enemy’s left; and his answer to my subsequent request was that the movements be had already ordered would subserve the same purpose. We have, if I may he allowed to say it, a commanding general in whom all the officers with whom I have come in contact express complete confidence.

I have said thus much because of the censure and of the misrepresentations which have grown out of the escape of Lee’s army.

Very respectfully your obedient servant, O. O. HOWARD,

Major-General.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, 21 st July, 1863. }

MY DEAR GENERAL HOWARD, - Your letter of the 18th is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed such destruction was perfectly easy; believed that General Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed — making my belief a hobby, possibly— that the main rebel army, going north of the Potomac, could never return if well attended to, and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. General Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer and a true man.

Yours very truly, A. LINCOLN.

The main hindrance to our concentrating at Gettysburg as rapidly as Lee was a strategic one. Meade threw forward the left flank of his general line, so that Lee was able to strike it. Had Gettysburg, and not Taneytown or Pipe Clay Creek, been Meade’s objective point, his general line on the 30th of June would have been more nearly parallel to that of Lee. But a kind providence overruled even this mistake to our advantage, inducing as it did undue confidence on the part of General Lee.

For myself, I am content with the work accomplished at Gettysburg, and avoid aiming any bitter criticism whatever at those true-hearted officers and men, in any corps or division of our army, who there acted to the best of their ability.

O. O. Howard.