Canada and the British Connection

SIR FRANCIS HINCKS summed up his conclusions upon the Future of Canada, in an article printed last summer in a Montreal newspaper, by saying that " at the present time there is not the slightest ground for believing that the subsisting connection with Great Britain is in the least danger of being dissolved.” Sweeping as the statement is, it is probably quite true. Were any intelligent Canadian to be requested to name the most distinguishing national trait of his countrymen, the chances are that he would instantly respond, “ Loyalty to the Crown.” The people of the Dominion are never weary of repeating, in public and in private, at meetings, in the newspapers, and in conversation with casual acquaintances, their expressions of attachment to the mother country, and their unwillingness even to discuss the possibility of a weakening of the bonds between the dependency and the imperial government.

Nor is this a case of protesting too much. There are known to be some Canadians who are persuaded that their country is not working out the highest destiny of which it is capable, but those who favor a change in the relation with Great Britain are very few in number and uninfluential. Moreover, there are sporadic and local outbreaks, like that in British Columbia a few years ago, and like the more recent one in Manitoba, which might lead superficial observers to think that no very strong provocation would be needed to bring about a general movement in favor of the independence of Canada. But these ebullitions have slight significance. The newspapers on the American side of the line make all that is possible out of them, which is not much. The men who participate in these movements are for the most part recent immigrants, who are neither strongly attached to Canada, nor burdened with a sense of responsibility for her past, present, or future government. The facility with which, when their real or their fancied grievances have been redressed, they become obstreperously loyal suggests that their solemn threats of secession and revolution were not meant to be taken seriously. If we allow, however, to such outbreaks all the importance that might be claimed for them, it still remains true, so far as an outsider can discover, that not one Canadian out of a hundred has ever brought himself to the belief that a change in the relations between Great Britain and the Dominion would be desirable under any circumstances which may be classed as probable.

So much being admitted, it may be deemed presumptuous to maintain, nevertheless, that the imperial connection is an injury rather than a benefit to Canada. It seems to imply that a whole people, including statesmen and private citizens, are laboring under a delusion. It does not, however, really imply so much as that; for the willingness of men to adhere, conservatively, to things as they are causes them frequently to undervalue the arguments in favor of a change, if not to refuse to listen to such arguments; and the chance that this particular bond might not he snapped except by war may have disinclined Canadians even to consider what they might gain by separation.

What a Canadian may not do without forfeiting something as a penalty of his temerity, an American may do. Of course it is permitted to the people of the Dominion to believe that the motive that prompts a writer on this side of the line to present the argument is territorial cupidity. But annexation, or union, which is the better term, is no longer considered as a probable event of the future by our most flighty orators. There would inevitably be a strong opposition to the acquisition of Canada, were the Dominion to solicit admission ; and the least symptom of unwillingness to join us would reduce the number of those who would favor the acquisition to the merest handful. No wise statesman could support the measure. We have had experience enough with a group of States which, having tried to sever the ties which united them to the rest of the country, resumed their allegiance with great reluctance. To assume responsibility for the government of what would be the Ireland of America, should Canada become a part of the American Union except of her own free and unanimous choice, would be rash and imprudent to the last degree.

It is, however, no part of the present purpose to consider what the ultimate future of Canada should be, but to examine the effect upon her material interests of the relation in which she stands toward Great Britain, the limitations it imposes upon her freedom and her progress, and, briefly, the possibilities which a career as an independent country might open before her.

Canada is, with exceptions to be noted, a self-governing dependency of Great Britain. In the conduct of its domestic affairs but two restrictions are placed upon its sovereignty and supremacy. A Governor-General is sent out by the home government, which also reserves a right to disallow — that is, to give an absolute veto to — any act of the

Dominien Parliament. Under existing circumstances, under any circumstances which are likely to arise, neither of these features of the Canadian constitution impedes the progress of the Dominion. The Governor-General represents the sovereign, and bears substantially the same relation to the Canadian legislature that the queen bears to the Parliament of Great Britain. Though he is governor, he does not govern. He accepts the advice of his ministers, who are responsible only to Parliament, in all matters of administration, and would act unconstitutionally if he acted otherwise. The government of the day and the Parliament exercise complete authority, and the Governor-General merely gives to their doings his official sanction. That authority is nominally unlimited. The government raises money at its discretion in any amount, by taxation or by loan, and expends it for such objects as seem desirable. It establishes courts for the enforcement of its own civil, social, and criminal laws. As between its own citizens, it is conscious of no superior authority ; for although the right of veto exists, the power is rarely exercised, and will never be employed in a way to cause irritation between the authorities at Ottawa and those at Westminster, until one government or the other is desirous of an excuse for separation. Canada will attempt to pass no law distinctly hostile to Great Britain, nor any which it expects to be disallowed, unless it is ready to dispense with British approval altogether by declaring its independence. On the other hand, so long as the imperial government sets a proper value upon its richest colony it will not exercise the veto power capriciously. It may be said, therefore, that if the British connection is of no value in domestic affairs — and it would be difficult to specify wherein it is of value — it has not been, and is not likely to be, a hindrance.

The right of self-government at home, which has been, in the main, wisely employed, has made Canada a nation. But the privilege which independent nations prize more than any other, and which is more valuable than any other, Canada has not. Sovereign in all internal affairs, she has no voice whatever in regulating her foreign affairs. She is a part of the British empire. She is governed by all treaties made in the name of the sovereign, but really made by the prime minister and the foreign secretary of England, who are no more responsible to Canada for what they do or leave undone than they are to the people of Chicago. The very fact that Great Britain asks no help from Canada in men or money for the support of its army and navy, contributes nothing to the defense of the Dominion, and shapes its general foreign policy without consulting Canadian wishes is proof enough that the foreign interests of the empire and of the colony are distinct, though they may not be adverse to each other. For Canada has interests abroad separable from those of the empire. Were it a free and independent government, it would make treaties with other powers different from those which are made, partly for her alone and partly for the whole empire, by the home government. It would not be doing justice to themselves for Canadian statesmen to assert that a British foreign minister could understand what Canada needs as well as they do, or that he would enter into a negotiation with as great spirit as would they, and with the same singleness of purpose which would animate them.

It is in the virtual prohibition upon Canada to have and pursue a foreign policy of its own, and to adopt such measures as from time to time might be expedient for the promotion of its own interests, regardless of the wishes of Great Britain, and in the ability of England to use the Dominion as a pawn in its own great game, that the weakness of the position of Canada chiefly consists. No doubt the people are aware of the resources which their country possesses. The subject is with them a frequent and a favorite theme. But if they know, also, what an advantage these resources, by their character as well as by their magnitude, might give them in dealing with other powers, they must be conscious of making a great sacrifice for the sake of the British connection. Their peculiar treasures are the finest fisheries in the world, immense tracts of valuable forest, and an unsurpassed wheat country. As Canada is at present situated, it derives no benefit whatever from these advantages, except the money return from the sale of its products. If it were an independent power, it might easily adopt measures which would give to it certain advantages which it does not now possess.

For example, no Canadian is unaware that Americans desire fishing privileges in British waters, which the sovereign authority has the right to concede or to withhold. These privileges have been the subject of discussion, of negotiation, of treaty, of compensation, for nearly a century. The present arrangement — which will soon come to an end — is thoroughly unsatisfactory to Americans, but not so much on account of the amount as by reason of the form of compensation which this country pays, during a short term of years, for the privileges it has purchased. The Treaty of Washington was concluded under circumstances peculiarly favorable for Canadian interests. The government of the United States, having the Alabama claims on hand, was disposed to yield more than it would ordinarily, certainly more than it would after its recent experience, concede on this minor point of the fisheries; and Canada was directly represented in the joint high commission. It is not difficult to see that, when the subject comes up for discussion again, Canada’s position will be less advantageous in each aspect of the matter. There is no other question than this, of any moment, between Great Britain and the United States. Should the imperial government treat this matter by itself, and yield to Canada all the benefits and compensation which may be made the price of a share in the fisheries, it can obtain no more than a Canadian minister might obtain; it is likely to get much less. For the British foreign secretary, or the British minister at Washington, is not to be expected to place as much value upon the privilege as a Canadian would set upon it; and the British government, with its manifold concerns of trade and commerce in all parts of the world, would be willing to concede more, and be more ready to come to terms, than would independent Canada, in order to have no questions at issue with a country whose cordial friendship is so useful to it as is that of the United States.

It is not necessary to carry out this line of thought, for it is quite obvious that Canada itself knows its own interests best. To assert that the British foreign office can promote them better than they could be promoted by a Canadian statesman would be uncomplimentary to the latter. To assert that they would be more zealously advanced by a British minister would imply either a lack of patriotism on the part of Canadians, or a disposition on the part of the home government to sacrifice something of value to England to secure an advantage for one of its colonies ; and the latter supposition involves a degree of selfabnegation on the part of the mother country which even the most loyal of Canadians will never expect.

But it is in the relations of Canada toward Great Britain itself that the chief objection to the existing connection lies, so far as commercial interests are concerned. Roughly stated, nine tenths of her foreign trade is with the United States and Great Britain, and this amount is almost equally divided between the two. At the best she can make a commercial treaty with the United States only with the consent of the mother country ; in making and changing her relations with Great Britain she has no voice and no share. If one may draw any conclusion from the numerous attempts made, it was for many years desired, on the part of Canada, that there should be a reciprocity treaty between the Dominion and the United States. Whether the desire continues or not does not matter. Canada invariably met with complete indifference on the subject on this side of the line, but not because American merchants did not appreciate the value of a trade with Canada, nor because they would not advocate a treaty which would promote that trade; on the contrary, they would do much to secure a more extensive commerce over the frontier. The reason was because Canada had nothing to offer in exchange for the admission of Canadian products into the United States free of duty. She might agree to reduce her tariff on certain articles of American manufacture, or to remove the duty altogether. But if she had done that she must have included in the same measure, and admitted on the same terms, the similar manufactures of Great Britain, and of all countries with which England had treaties of commerce. The only benefit America would derive from such a treaty would be the sale of a slightly larger amount, but not a larger percentage, of the whole quantity of goods carried into Canada, in case the lower duty stimulated imports.

To be specific : a reciprocity treaty would naturally admit free at United States custom-houses bread-stuffs, wood, unmanufactured lumber, fish, and coal. Though we were to place all these articles on the free list, as regards all countries, the benefit would go exclusively to Canada, which is the only large producer of either class of articles that could compete with our home supplies. On the other hand, we might sell in the maritime provinces a few more barrels of flour, and in Ontario a few tons of anthracite coal. What we wish to sell in Canada is our manufactured goods. To have even a slight advantage in that respect over Great Britain might be worth paying for by deranging our own revenue laws. But if the Canadian tariff is to be the same on English and American pianos, on cotton cloth from either Manchester, on cutlery from Massachusetts or from Sheffield, why should we care much whether that tariff be high or low ? Canada, having found a state of perfect indifference on the subject of reciprocity in the United States, has turned its attention in another direction, and has adopted a “ national policy ” of protection to its own manufactures, with an avowed purpose of retaliating upon the United States, and of recompensing this country for its illiberal commercial policy. The result has not been specially injurious to American trade, and no disposition to modify our sentiments on the subject of a reciprocity treaty has yet appeared.

Sir Francis Hincks, in the newspaper article already referred to, dismisses the idea that the power to make treaties for itself would be useful to Canada, in the most offhand manner. “ The policy of civilized nations, with few exceptions,” he remarks, “ is to incorporate in their commercial treaties a clause known as the most favored nation clause. Were Canada independent it could not avoid agreeing to a similar proviso, and would therefore be unable to adopt the policy which has found favor with some of her prominent politicians.” The statement is altogether too sweeping. If Canada, being independent, and putting the most favored nation clause into her treaties, were to agree with the United Slates to admit “ coal ” free of duty, no doubt it would be necessary for her to admit English coal free, also. But if she were to admit “anthracite coal” free, who would profit by it ? The United States admits “ Hawaiian sugar ” free of duty without giving offense to Spain or to the Netherlands, upon whose Cuban and Javan sugar there is a heavy duty. Should Canada, as an independent power, desire to grant special trade privileges to the United States in compensation for other privileges received, she would find no practical difficulty in the way. In her present position she can do nothing whatever; but as a part of the British empire is required to observe the most favored nation clause, which has been imposed upon her without consulting any special interests she may have. The inability to regulate her own foreign affairs, or to change in any respect her trade regulations with Great Britain, is a real and serious disadvantage. It will continue as long as the right to conclude treaties is withheld, and that right will never be conceded as long as the British connection is maintained.

Still another class of disadvantages must be mentioned as a result of this connection. It is certainly not regarded in Canada as a misfortune that the Dominion is enabled, by being a dependency of Great Britain, to borrow large sums of money on favorable terms ; but there is too good reason to think that it is a misfortune, nevertheless. At all events, no candid Canadian statesman will deny that a huge and burdensome debt has been created, nor would he assert that it would have been incurred but for the facilities which the situation of Canada with respect to Great Britain conferred. A brief study of Canadian finances will be interesting.

On the 1st of July, 1867, when the act of confederation went into effect, the net debt was $75,728,641. On the 1st of July, 1883, the last date to which the accounts have been published, the net debt was $158,466,714. The net interest during the last year reported was $6,603,387, being an average of $1.52 per annum upon each inhabitant of Canada, according to the census of 1881. The expenditure for interest on the public debt by the United States during the same year was $59,160,131, or an average of $1.17 per annum for each person, according to the census of 1880. The following figures compare the situation of the two countries, as respects their debts, in the middle of 1883. The difference of a year in the time of the census is to the advantage of Canada in the comparison : —

Canada. United States.

Population 4,324,810 50,419,933

Net debt $158,466,714 $1,538,781,825

Debt per caput $36.64 $30.52

Net interest $6,603,387 $59,160,131

Interest per caput $1.52 $1.17

Canada had thus, at the date specified, created a debt, and was forced to pay interest upon it, imposing a heavier burden, both of principal and of interest, than rests upon the American people. To say nothing of the fact that the relative wealth and resources of the United States are so much greater than those of Canada that the nominal difference expresses only partially the real difference in the weight of the burden, the debt of the Dominion is still constantly augmenting. About one half of the twenty-five million subsidy to the Canadian Pacific Railway Company remained to be paid over to the company in the middle of 1883. Last year, in addition to all that had been done before, a further loan of $22,500,000 to the same company was authorized; and the end of the grand system of public works has not yet been reached.

Let us pause here, and consider that, while the American debt was necessarily incurred for the purpose of national self-preservation in war, the debt of Canada represents for the most part expenditures for public improvements in a time of peace. What are the works to which this vast fund has been devoted? Chiefly railways and canals which do not pay the bare expenses of operation. During the fiscal year 1882— 83 the revenues of all the government canals were $346,768; the expenses of operation were $487,205. The revenues of all the government railways were $2,541,205 ; the current expenses were $2,636,552. The combined deficit was $235,784. But to this deficiency should be added the sum of $1,833,422, expended and charged to capital cost of the canals, and $1,683,819, expenditure in construction and equipment of railways owned by the government. The Intercolonial Railway, 946 miles long, connecting the maritime provinces with Quebec, has cost the Dominion government more than forty-one million dollars. During the year 1882-83 its revenue exceeded its ordinary operating expenses by the insignificant sum of $10,547.83, which would have been applicable toward interest on the forty-one millions of cost, had not the Dominion spent more than a million and a half dollars in extensions, side-tracks, stations, rolling stock, and other capital charges.

The liberality of the government toward the Pacific Railway has been unbounded. A gift of twenty-five million dollars, and as many acres of land ; a guarantee of three per cent, per annum for ten years upon its capital stock, now sixty-five millions, and to be increased to one hundred millions ; and a loan of $22,500,000, — these are the favors of the government granted to the company up to the present time. It is true that security has been given for the guarantee and for the loan ; but that does not prevent the loss, in case the railroad should be unsuccessful, from falling altogether upon the Dominion government.

The object of incurring these enormous obligations was to cement the political union of the provinces and to consolidate the Dominion. That is an intelligible and a praiseworthy motive. But has not Canada paid an excessive price for what it has gained ? Were it looking forward to an independent existence, perhaps not, for no one can blame a free and public-spirited people for assuming great burdens in order to insure their unity and strength. Canada, however, is still a dependency, and has no thought of separate national life. What it has accomplished and hopes yet to achieve by its magnificent extravagance in public works is surely of great value to Great Britain, but what is to be its value to Canada? The expenditure for the Pacific Railway — at all events, for that part of it beyond Manitoba— is the price paid for the union of British Columbia with the Dominion. Of what advantage is that union to the eastern provinces ? In a commercial point of view, the benefit is as nothing compared with the cost of the railway. Is it then a political advantage, and if so in what sense ? Whether the union exists or not, the whole territory included within the Dominion and all the people inhabiting it are British. The prestige of Great Britain may be increased by the possession of a great country stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the railroad is to it a benefit strategically. But how does the railroad improve the political standing of Canada ? Her fame in the world is not increased by it, and she is always remembered as a dependency. She gains nothing in her relations to England ; she has no relations with foreign powers; she is not stronger or richer at home.

In short, Canada has expended vast sums to promote and cement a union which is beneficial to Great Britain, but not especially so to Canada. The statesmen of the Dominion, holding the views they profess, will hardly maintain that to be Canadian-British is something better than to be British. But if the political union which they have expended much money to secure is so valuable, should they not have all the advantages of it, instead of paying all the price and allowing Great Britain to derive all the profit ?

As has been remarked, the creation of this debt has been assented to by the Canadian public in great measure because the British connection made it easy to borrow. It would be interesting to analyze the ideas of borrowers and lenders with respect to these loans. On the part of the Canadians there is, no doubt, an abiding faith in the richness of their country, and in their ability to bear even greater burdens than they have assumed. But there is something beyond this. There is a feeling that in case of need, and as the last resort, they can appeal successfully to England for help. That is what the imperial guarantee of a large part of the Canadian debt means, and it explains the readiness of the Dominion government to incur obligations recklessly. But however good may be the prospect that Great Britain might afford temporary assistance to her colony, in case of urgent need, not only must the responsibility for all Canadian obligations rest finally upon Canada itself, but the imperial government will, as it has the power, enforce payment. No doubt the creditors of Canada have a confidence which is justified in the large resources and the good faith of the Dominion. But it is the power of Great Britain over Canada which they rely upon as their ultimate security, and it is that which explains the ease with which loan after loan has been taken on favorable terms. Had the case been different Canada would not have been able to borrow at such a prodigious rate, and a much more cautious and economical policy would have been necessary.

Turning to the effects of the British connection upon the growth of Canada, we can trace nothing beneficial to that connection. The Dominion has no trade which it would not have as an independent power. It has attracted no immigrants who have gone thither because it was a British dependency, except immigrants of the least desirable class. It has gained nothing in wealth by the connection. On the contrary, the habit of regarding England as “ home ” influences many persons to return to Great Britain with the wealth which they have acquired by trade in Canada. The result of the connection is to make the people British rather than Canadian. The sentiment of national pride is not destroyed, but it is weakened. Attachment to the country is a secondary matter, and the tendency is unfavorable to vigorous growth, because there are so many persons who regard residence in Canada as, not exactly an evil, but as something which is to be endured with good grace until a lucky stroke of fortune enables them to return “ home.”

The population of Canada has increased at a good rate, but not so rapidly that any part of the increase can be attributed to the fact that the Dominion is British territory. Its growth, indeed, has been less, proportionately, than that of the adjoining territory on the American side. To illustrate this compare the population of Canada in 1871 and 1881 with that of a strip of territory on the south side of the border in 1870 and 1880. Take the three northern States of New England; that part of New York north of a line drawn from Troy to Binghamton, but including neither of those cities; the State of Michigan ; the Territory of Dakota ; and the Territory of Washington. The aggregate population of this imaginary district in 1870 was 4,487,290 ; in 1880 it was 5,357,520, an increase of 19.4 percent. The population of what is now Canada was 3,670,676 in 1871, and 4,324,810 in 1881, an increase of 17.8 per cent. So that, although we have included in the American district the most sluggish States in the couutry, so far as growth of population is concerned, — because there is a constant drain from them into the newer States, — and although the district is formed so as to include no commercial city of the first class, the growth of that district has been more rapid than that of Canada. Washington Territory tripled its population in the decade, adding more than fifty thousand to the number of its inhabitants ; British Columbia, according to the census, was stationary. Dakota increased nearly tenfold, and added 120,000 to her numbers ; Manitoba increased a little less than sixfold, and added less than 55,000 to her population. Michigan’s percentage of increase was thirtyeight per cent., while that of Ontario was only eighteen per cent. It is true that in the east the Canadian growth has been more rapid than has that of the corresponding territory in the United States, but even there the population is barely more than one third as dense as it is in Northern New England. The average population to the square mile in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont is 27.5 ; in the four eastern provinces of Canada it is but 9.7.

The trade of Canada has not shown any remarkable growth during the last ten years. The exports of the Dominion in 1883 were but ten per cent, higher than they were in 1874. A more proper comparison, and one more favorable to it, is between the exports of 1879, the lowest in ten years, which were valued at 71 1/2 millions, and those of 1882, the highest in the decade, valued at 102 millions, — an increase of nearly forty-three per cent. The imports of 1883 were three per cent, more than those of 1874. The increase from 1879 to 1883, when the lowest and the highest amounts respectively were recorded, was from 82 millions to 132 1/4 millions,—sixty-one per cent. Compared with the much more steady growth of the trade of this country, the above figures are not favorable. Our imports in 1883 were twenty-seven per cent, and our exports forty per cent, higher than in 1874, and the increase from the poorest year to the best was in each case sixty-eight per cent.

Perhaps these comparisons, and others of the same class which might be made, are “ odious.” They are made, of course, not for the sake of depreciating Canada or of glorifying America, but merely to show that Canada derives no advantage in these respects from the British connection which is not possessed in a greater degree by her neighbor, which is independent. The inference is very strong that Canada herself would gain in population, in wealth, and in commerce by cutting herself loose.

Let us very briefly consider what would be the situation of Canada, starting out on an independent career. Can anything to be desired by a nation proposing such a destiny for itself be conceived which Canada has not? It has, in the first place, a perfectly defined boundary : the sea on three sides, and on the fourth a line accurately determined by treaty, arbitration, and survey, — a line, moreover, which is accepted through its whole length by the only government whose territory adjoins its own. Its people, more than four fifths of them natives, and more than one half of them members of families which are occupiers of land, are attached to the soil. They have been accustomed to self-government, and for seventeen years have been living together as a quasi nation. Their institutions are excellent in form and well administered ; their laws form an intelligible and well-digested code, and public sentiment sustains their just and impartial enforcement. Canada is furthermore as well situated as is the United States to maintain itself free of entangling foreign alliances. It has the most peaceable and the least covetous of neighbors, and only one. The country has large wealth and varied resources, of which Canadians are even now justly proud and boastful, and of which, were they sole possessors of those resources, they could make much more than they have yet made of them. It has a foreign commerce of no mean importance, extensive shipping, admirable harbors, and well-lighted coasts and rivers. Having all these things, it has no enemy anywhere, and but one question — that of the fisheries

— on which it finds it necessary to come to an early understanding with any other power ; and even that question is only for how much it can sell an eagerly sought privilege.

Should it be said that, while it might be for the present advantage of Canada, in material things, to be free, the chances of a war are to be considered, the answer is easy. England’s interests might force Canada to participate in a war with other countries ; Canada’s own interests could hardly bring her into collision with any country except the United States. But whereas Canada would inevitably be involved in any war between this country and Great Britain, no matter what the occasion of it might be, her independence would secure her against hostilities on any account except her own. It would be insulting to Canada to suppose that she would reject independence on account of a fear that the changed relation would leave her defenseless against the attacks of a powerful neighbor ; but it would be no less unjust to the United States to think that this country covets more territory, or has any but the most friendly feelings toward Canada, or cherishes the most remote thought of assailing the Dominion. Unless this is an untrue statement, the danger of being involved in war is far greater under existing circumstances than it would be if Canada were independent.

What remains ? A sentiment, and certainly a very high and noble sentiment. That which wo call patriotism, and which in monarchical countries includes loyalty to the sovereign, is one of the most elevating emotions of which the human heart is capable; and the deep loyalty of the Canadians is altogether to their credit. Yet it is by no means true that the highest manifestation of loyalty consists, necessarily, in devotion to the government as it is. History proves abundantly that, while conquests and revolutions and treaties have developed new nations and altered the map of the world times without number, the sentiment of patriotism has survived through all these changes. Indeed, it has never been displayed in greater fervor and intensity than on occasions when it has employed itself in breaking down existing institutions and in rupturing existing national relations.

It is, therefore, — without offense be it said,— merely an accident that causes Canadian patriotism to assume the form of loyalty to the British crown. Should the national interest — for, after all, Canada is a nation — point in the direction of a dissolution of the political bands which have connected it with Great Britain, it would be the aim of the highest patriotism to effect that dissolution. The watchword, “ Canada first! ” is an assertion of the priority of Canadian interests. Were the time ever to come when the people of the provinces must choose between devotion to the crown and devotion to themselves, they would be highly unpatriotic not to act upon the principle, Canada before all!

In the present temper which prevails both at Westminster and at Ottawa the question cannot be presented in a form which will excite ill-feeling in Canada. Doubtless it would be extremely difficult, in the absence of an intolerable grievance, to persuade the people of the Dominion even to consider the advantages of separation. But that condition of the public mind is entirely consistent with the existence of overpowering reasons why it would be for the best interest of Canada to become an independent nation.

Edward Stanwood.