Central Asia
WITHOUT detracting in the least from the merits of Dr. Lansdell’s book on Central Asia,1 it may be said that it is a curious as well as interesting work. The author, an English clergyman, animated by the desire of visiting prisons and hospitals and of placing there copies of the Bible, had no previous preparation for his journey except a similar one which he had taken through Siberia a year or two before.
He evidently made copious notes during his journey, and, on his return to England, studied up his subject as he had not done before, and submitted his manuscript to many persons well qualified to assist him. The scientific parts have been revised by competent authorities. The later chapters of the books were submitted to Mr. Lessar, who is for the moment the great authority on Turkmania, and it is easy for those acquainted with the subject to trace the influence of others equally well posted in different branches. Dr. Lansdell caters to many different tastes, for each of which he has a special index, but with the result of making his work seem rather fragmentary. There are chapters on the history and statistics of the various parts of Central Asia; there are lists of the beasts, birds, and insects as well as of the plants found there; there is a very excellent catalogue of books on Central Asia from the earliest times to the present; and there is also a list of the various texts of Scripture which the author thinks have been illustrated by what he has seen. These are all arranged in such a way, together with an index to the actual journey, that it is possible to read any of these parts separately without touching on the others. His indices are as good as a card catalogue to a library.
To recur to the Scripture texts, it is impossible for any one acquainted with the Old Testament to travel in Central Asia without noticing what a very oriental book it is, and how little Eastern life has changed since the time it was written. On re-reading the Old Testament one sees many passages in a very different light from that which was thrown on them previously, and many of them are more intelligible than they would be to one who had simply journeyed in the Holy Land, where from circumstances there has been more change. Owing to the reasons which prompted his journey, the author has, either consciously or unconsciously, imitated to a great extent one of his predecessors, — Dr. Joseph Wolff, whose travels are exceedingly curious and interesting. This gentleman was a converted Jew, who visited the greater portion of the known and unknown world in both hemispheres for the purpose of carrying the light of the gospel to those of his race. In so doing he had once visited Bokhara and Afghanistan; and subsequently, after the murders of Connolly and Stoddart, he went again to Bokhara, in order to ascertain their real fate. We may remark parenthetically that Dr. Wolff, owing to the singularity of his adventures, captivated and married Lady Georgiana Walpole, the daughter of the Earl of Orford, and became the father of the present Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, a now wellknown member of the conservative party. Dr. Lansdell constantly refers to Dr. Wolff’s journeys, and remembers that when that reverend gentleman went to Khiva and Bokhara on his self-imposed mission he dressed himself in a white surplice, — if it were white after a journey of so long a time, — and carried an English Prayer-Book open before him. Perhaps this to some extent accounted for the immunities which were accorded to him, for the Orientals have always a respect for men whom they believe to be idiotic or demented. In similar wise, when he was to be received by the Amir of Bokhara, Dr. Lansdell, wishing to appear as gorgeous as possible, wore a cassock, which, as he says, had previously done duty at a levee at St. James ; over that a gorgeous, gold-embroidered Serbian jacket; and over that his scarlet university hood, various Masonic collars and jewels, and his college cap. Feeling that his presents to the Amir were not sufficient, and on the ground that the Amir as well as himself was a Mullah, he graciously presented him with his hood, cap, and Masonic jewels, which were as graciously returned to him the next day by the Amir, who found no use for them. A similar odd vanity appears in the desire which has taken the author to intersperse among the excellent engravings which adorn his book pictures of himself in Khokand armor, in Bokharan robes, and in other curious Oriental attire.
But such reflections really do injustice to the merits of Dr. Lansdell, who made a long and interesting journey, visiting in succession Kuldja, Tashkent, Khokand, and Samarkand, going thence by the way of Shahr-i-sabz to Rarshi and Bokhara, and thence to Tchardjui on the Oxus, which he descended to the Russian outposts of Petro-Alexandrofsk, visited Khiva, and went from there on by a fatiguing and somewhat adventurous journey to Krosnovodsk on the Caspian. His stay in all places was too short to enable him thoroughly to study the country or to learn anything new ; but what he relates abundantly confirms the observations of his Western predecessors in that region. He distributed his Bibles everywhere, giving presents of them even to the Amir of Bokhara and the Khan of Khiva. But as was natural under the circumstances, he abstains from remark on the political condition of the countries through which he passed, and, except in his later chapters on Merv, — which he did not visit, — wrote no essays on the present vexed question of the relations between England and Russia with regard to Central Asia.
For full information on this subject we must turn to the latest English BlueBooks, which to the careful student will give much matter for reflection.2 Diplomatic documents are not always trustworthy. Even in reading those which now form material for history one must take into account by whom and to whom they were written, what the peculiar circumstances of the case were, and one must be sufficiently acquainted with the subject to he able to read between the lines. Now that it has become the habit to print a selection of dispatches for the information or misinformation of the public, it is still more difficult. It is possible, however, even though some documents may be missing, to learn in the Blue-Books referred to the whole course of the recent negotiations between England and Russia with regard to the Afghan frontier; a curious light is thrown on English policy, and the differences in the methods of the two governments are strongly contrasted.
For some years past, Englishmen, or rather the Indian officers who have guided English opinion, have had the habit of everywhere seeing “ keys ” in places which were near each other on the map. Having succeeded in making themselves believe that Herat was the key to India, they soon thought that Merv was the key to Herat, and that the Turkomans along the Attrek held the key to Merv. If, therefore, Russia were allowed to put down even one small Turkoman tribe on the shore of the Caspian, she would with these different keys open all these successive doors, and suddenly make her appearance in India. Being, however, unable to keep these various doors closed at such a long distance from her own frontier, England became exceedingly nervous, and as soon as one was opened pestered Russia with questions as to whether she had any purpose of opening the next. In other words, after every Russian expedition against the Turkomans the English government began to ask questions as to whether it was the intention of the Russians to proceed to Merv, which they would “ view with alarm.” These papers show how often such questions were repeated, and show also how consistent were the replies of Russia, that at that time there was no intention of advancing further, but that it was impossible to tell what might happen in case the Turkomans of Merv were unruly ; that in that case they would certainly put them down; and that they always reserve their freedom of action. The knot was cut at last in a different and unexpected way. The elders of Merv themselves asked to be taken under Russian protection. Whether this move were prepared or not by Russia makes little difference. The result was inevitable, and if General Komaroff had the skill to arrange for the peaceful surrender of Merv he succeeded in saving a large amount of life and treasure ; for the defense of Geak Tepi against Skobeleff had cost the Russians more men than all the previous battles and sieges in Central Asia.
When Merv was annexed the English were at first disposed to accuse the Russians of bad faith, which they would scarcely have done if they had read carefully their own previous dispatches. The Russians had no difficulty in showing their consistency, and we may imagine the smile on the Russian ambassador’s face when he informed Lord Granville that had the matter not been a surprise, and “ had it depended upon them, they would have endeavored to prevent a decision being taken at the moment when England was embarrassed by the affairs of the Soudan.” As usual, however, England asked Russia what she intended to do next. The Russians replied that they had no proposals to make, but at the same time reminded the English that two years before they had offered, in order to avoid difficulty, to survey and fix the still unsettled part of the boundary between Afghanistan and the Turkoman Steppe, which they claimed was under Russian influence. This offer they now renewed. Although the English had previously refused it, fearing to commit themselves, they now accepted it with pleasure, — with so much haste, indeed, that they appointed their commissioner and suggested the time and place for meeting before any agreement had been come to as to the basis on which the delimitation of the frontier was to be carried out. This gave rise to considerable dispute. The Russians had desired to begin the work at KhodjaSaleh, on the Oxus, where the boundary was already fixed, — a known point. The English, on the contrary, fearful perhaps that the Russians might advance nearer to Herat, wished first to arrange the extreme southern limit of Russian possessions in that quarter. Nor were they willing to lay down any principles on which to base the tracing of the frontier; they wished to leave it all to commissioners, desiring even that one of them should be an Afghan. The Russians refused to recognize any Afghan official in the matter, on the ground that if Afghanistan were really under English protection, and a treaty had indeed been made by which the Afghans were to hold no intercourse with foreign nations except through English officials, they preferred their arrangement to he with England alone. They also called the attention of the English government to the difficulties which might arise between commissioners who were ignorant of the country and unacquainted with each other, unless they were to conduct their surveys within a fixed zone in order to carry out an approximate line of frontier, in the same way in which the delimitation of the Persian and Greek frontiers had been made a few years before. Interminable quarrels might arise at each difference of opinion between the commissioners, which would always have to be referred to the home government for arrangement ; that in this way there would be the very delay which the English wished so much to avoid, and the two governments would then he obliged to agree upon principles which might as well be laid down at the beginning.
To make a long story short, Russia, after giving way on the point where the delimitation was to begin, and on various minor matters, proposed a zone within which the survey should be made, extending northward into a region which was incontestably Russian, and southward to what Colonel McGregor, in his reports some years before, had considered to be the true northern boundary of Afghanistan. The English consented to the northern limit of the zone, but refused to make a southern line. Meanwhile, the Russian commissioner had not started, owing to various unavoidable delays as well as to the desire of his government to settle principles beforehand, while Sir Peter Lumsden, the English commissioner, was on the spot, with an escort of four hundred men besides camp followers, which naturally induced the Afghans to believe that the English were going to support them in whatever they chose to undertake. Negotiations having come to this deadlock, the Russians then suggested, instead of a zone, an actual boundary line, to run somewhat to the north of the southern limit of the proposed zone. Lord Granville refused this, but was then willing to accept a zone, provided that this boundary line were made the southern limit. The Russians insisted on their boundary, and finally, after the Penjdeh affair, the English agreed to it. One or two slight concessions were made by the Emperor; but, practically, the boundary line originally proposed by Russia is the same as that accepted by Lord Granville in an agreement which was still unsigned when the liberal government went out of power.
The Penjdeh incident, although a sharp little fight, is important only as showing how two nations can nearly come to blows over a simple mistake. The Afghans had occupied Penjdeh in June, 1884, after the boundary commission had been proposed and in theory accepted. The Russians, finding their protests unavailing, had advanced on their side, and there were movements of troops, which caused excitement in the country and great uneasiness in London ; for there the slightest incident was greatly exaggerated by the press and in Parliament. In spite of entreaties, the Russians had refused to withdraw from their positions unless the Afghans also withdrew from Penjdeh, and claimed the right that as long as the Afghans held any part of the disputed territory they could move their
troops anywhere within the boundary line which they themselves had suggested ; further than this they would not go, and they promised to avoid as far as possible any conflict. Matters were in this state when Mr. Gladstone, on the 13th of March, after a hasty reading of the dispatches and a hazy recollection of them, announced in Parliament, much to the surprise of his colleagues, that the Russians had agreed not to advance. Lord Granville found it necessary to telegraph to St. Petersburg, asking the Russian ministry if they were willing to understand their previous assurances as constituting an agreement of this kind. There was a little demur, but there was a desire to help the liberal ministry out of the difficulty into which Mr. Gladstone had put them, and, after the English ambassador had recapitulated a number of points which he said were in Russian occupation, they agreed to advance no further. One of these points was Puli-Khisti in Persian, or in Turkoman Dash-kepri, the “ stone bridge ” over the river Kushk. The other side of the stream had been occupied for a long time by Afghans, and the Russians, although they had been in the neighborhood, had never actually held this point. The agreement was telegraphed from St. Petersburg to General Komaroff, and, finding these points mentioned, he understood that he was to be allowed to occupy them by the English. It was in his effort to maintain his position at Pul-i-Khisti that the conflict with the Afghans came on. England was indignant at what was assumed to be an intended breach of the “sacred covenant;” the views of the English government were telegraphed to their chief ambassadors, and every preparation was made for war. The statements of Sir Peter Lumsden, the English commissioner, who had, however, not been personally on the spot, were so diametrically opposed to those of General Komaroff that they greatly increased the excitement. It was, however, found, as soon as some one in the English ministry had leisure to look into the affair, — it is said that it was owing to one minister having a cold in his head, which kept him in the house over Sunday, — that the difficulty had all arisen through Sir Peter Lumsden. He had repeatedly stated that the Russians were at Pul-i-Khisti, and now he as positively denied this, saying that he had used that name only as being better known than the place some distance off, where the Russians had actually been. Of course there was little more
to do after this except to allow Sir Peter Lumsden to return, although before that he had received a sharp telegram, telling him “ to specify in each case what he knew for certain, what he had reason to believe, and what was merely based on hearsay.” The point of honor was saved by an agreement to refer to some foreign sovereign, as an arbitrator, “ any misunderstanding with regard to the interpretation of the agreement, if there shall still be found to subsist doubts or differences of opinion.”There is an obvious moral in this history, but we leave that to our readers.