The Speaker as Premier

DURING the last half dozen years American newspapers have fallen into the habit, half jocose and half complimentary, of calling the Secretary of State the Premier. At the same time, a small and very earnest band of men have urged upon the country the adoption of something resembling the English parliamentary system, with a prime minister at the head. Both the wits and the reformers have failed to observe that there has actually grown up within our system of government an officer who possesses and exercises the most important powers entrusted to the head of the administration of England. This insistence upon a development which has not taken place, and neglect to notice one of the most remarkable phenomena of our constitutional growth, perhaps is due to a confusion as to the real place and powers of the English prime minister. I shall attempt, therefore, to set forth what he may do, and how far the Speaker of the House of Representatives stands in his place.

The English Premier, or prime minister,— a title unknown to the law, — is the person acting as the official head of the party, or combination of parties, having a majority in the House of Commons. There is no formal election. The Queen summons the man whom she believes to be best possessed of the confidence of his party ; and if he succeed in inducing a sufficient number of his fellow-members in either house to take office with him, and if the other members of the party tacitly accept the ministry thus formed, the Premier remains in power until he is no longer able to command a majority in the Commons. The popular title of Premier is well applied, since its possessor is at the same time the head of the executive power of the nation and the leader of Parliament. In the first capacity he is responsible for the acts of all his colleagues, unless he disavows them. He takes counsel with the other ministers, and their resolutions upon certain subjects of detail have, under the name of Orders in Council, the force of law. The foreign policy of the nation, the maintenance of internal peace, the execution of laws, are subject to the ministry, and in the action of the ministry he must lead, or lose prestige.

The second great function of the Premier is that of leader of Parliament. The ministry bring forward a series of government propositions, which have precedence over bills introduced directly by private members. Not only are the important bills introduced by the ministry; the order in which they shall be brought forward and pressed to a vote is also decided by the ministry, who form, therefore, practically a committee of both houses on a legislative programme. The Premier is usually one of the best debaters in Parliament, able to defend his ministry against criticism upon their executive action and against attack upon their bills. Should the House of Commons at any time refuse to accept a government measure upon which the ministry insist, or should it adopt a different order of business from that laid down as a government programme, the ministry, by long-established custom, must immediately resign.

Under the American system of government, the two functions of the English ministry are also exercised, but by the deliberate action of the framers of the Constitution those duties are divided. Whether or no the parliamentary system is better than our own, it is certainly precluded by the Constitution as it stands, and does not obtain in any State of the Union. The executive duties performed in England by the Premier, in the United States are performed by the President. The Secretary of State is constitutionally a subordinate of the President, and stands upon the same footing as the other cabinet ministers, with the single exception that by the act of 1886 he is the first named in the succession to the presidency, in case of lapse, through death or disability, of the President and Vice-President. By long-established custom he is usually, although not invariably, a recognized leader of the party to which the President belongs. It is the President, however, through whom the unity of the administration is preserved; it is the President alone who can decide between conflicting policies or conflicting acts of his secretaries. Not only has Congress no power to interfere with the acts of the President or to cause his resignation ; it cannot cause the dismissal of any of his secretaries or their subordinates. On the other hand, the President and his secretaries have no powers of control or direction over either house of Congress. In accordance with an early and unfortunate custom, all communications between the cabinet ministers and Congress are made in writing. One day in August, 1789, President Washington appeared in the Senate with General Knox, the Secretary of War, and announced that the latter would explain to the Senate a scheme of Indian treaties. The Senate, uneasy at the presence both of President and Secretary, referred the matter to a committee. Knox returned alone, a few days later ; but since that time it does not appear that any cabinet officer has been heard in either house; and since 1801 the Presidents have made their communications in writing. Secretary Blaine is reported to have said that he would give two years of his life for an opportunity to debate in Congress a measure which he considered of prime importance. A rule of either house would at any time establish the custom of listening to ministers, and would thus prevent much jarring and disharmony. Neither house has ever shown any disposition to pass such a rule.

The congressional system has led to a great practical inconvenience. At the beginning both houses were small: the House had but sixty-five members, the Senate but twenty-two. They legislated for a people of four millions, for the most part in agricultural communities. The Senate now has eighty-eight members, the House three hundred and thirty-two. They represent a people of sixty-three millions, with many varied interests. The subjects of legislation have, therefore, steadily increased, and the quantity of legislation has grown even in greater proportion. In Washington’s first administration, 1789-93, 196 acts were presented for the President’s signature ; in Cleveland’s administration about 3700 acts went through both houses of Congress and were submitted for executive approval. This enormous mass of legislation has taxed to the utmost the digestive powers of Congress. Measures of great public moment have failed to be considered, or have failed to pass, on account of the confusion and crush of public business; and the closing days of each Congress have witnessed scenes of reckless voting on measures hardly read or not understood, which must be carried through within a few hours or fail altogether. An examination of the statute books shows that in the administrations of Hayes and Arthur about one fifth of the acts of Congress received the President’s signature in the last three days of the final sessions ; in Cleveland’s administration about one ninth. President Arthur signalized the last three days of his term by signing 217 bills. President Cleveland, on March 1 and 2, 1889, signed 162 bills.

Very early in the history of Congress it was seen that it was impossible for the House as a body to examine all the bills submitted. In the Continental Congress and the Confederation there had already been established a system of select and standing committees for the consideration of special branches of legislation, and for the preparation of bills. For instance, the celebrated Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was reported by a select committee. As the system of responsible ministers was not adopted, and as the houses deliberately chose to deprive themselves of the presence and voices of the President’s advisers, the committee system was continued without much consideration. For many years business was assigned usually to select committees. The first standing committee of the House was formed in 1789; in 1812 there were but nine. As the business of Congress increased, the number of the committees increased in like ratio. There are, in 1891, fortynine standing committees in the House and forty - two in the Senate, besides eleven so-called select committees in each, which do not essentially differ from the standing committees. Each Congress frames its own rules, but it is usual to adopt the classification of committees which has already been found convenient. Those members who are reëlected are likely again to receive appointment to the committees on which they have served in the previous Congresses. In this way there is established a certain continuity of service and of position. The chairmen of the committees and the majority of the members are always of the dominant party. So important is the committee work considered that there is a fierce strife among the members to secure valued appointments, and men have often won great reputation as successful administrators in important committees. Thus the late Samuel J. Randall was for many years chairman of the powerful Committee on Appropriations.

Although the business of Congress and the number and complexity of the committees have increased, the number of days in the year has remained constant. The committees have learned by long experience that a measure upon which they have spent much time in the perfection of details may at last fail for simple want of consideration in one of the houses. There is, therefore, a constant and increasing strife between the chairmen of committees for the possession of the floor and the opportunity to report their bills, although they are members of the same party, and usually not unfriendly to each other. The result is that a very appreciable portion of the time, especially of tlie House of Representatives, is spent in fighting for the floor. One committee and its measures stands in the way of another, and it is nearly impossible for the House to select between two rival measures that which it desires to consider first. When sweeping measures are reported, involving great party principles, and likely to affect approaching elections, Congress usually spends a considerable part of its time in discussing which shall be discussed. Days may pass without any appreciable advance in the business of the houses. The sixty committees have their own interests and their own favorite projects, which seem larger to them than great party measures. The result is confusion, waste of time, failure to consider bills, and a consequent legislative stampede at the end of the session, in which the good and deserving measures, in which the House is sincerely interested, are more apt to be trampled down than private measures, urged by a few persistent members.

With all its evils, the committee system, in two ways, relieves the House from the pressure of legislation. In the first place, no bill can be considered without having passed through a committee and having been reported by it. The result is the strangling of eight tenths of the bills presented to Congress. In the Fiftieth Congress, 1887-89, there were introduced into the House no less than 12,933 bills and joint resolutions. Of these, 9632 were never heard of again after having been referred to a committee, leaving 3301 which received some sort of consideration. Only 1605 passed the House, and of these only 1385 passed the Senate. Nearly nine tenths of the bills introduced had thus failed at some stage before presentation for the President’s signature. The pigeon-holes of the committees are the resting-places of many thousands of unfledged measures. In the second place, the committees digest and arrange the details of measures, and many important bills, especially those correcting defects found in the working of the government, go through Congress substantially as reported by the committees. It is here that the cabinet ministers exercise their only direct influence on legislation. They appear before the committees, urge and explain particular measures, and not infrequently submit drafts of bills, which are accepted almost verbatim by the committee, and afterward by Congress. The great difficulty has been the lack of some institution to unify legislation. The bill reported by Committee B might unwittingly repeal the bill passed yesterday on report of Committee A; or the House is called upon to spend its brief and valuable time in settling questions in dispute between committees — questions upon which an agreement ought to have been reached before any report was rendered.

That some relief must be obtained from such confusion and perplexity statesmen have long agreed. They have not seen so clearly that, by a process of silent development, there was being evolved a power which could simplify and unify the legislative process. That power is the Speaker, and he has reached his present importance by the absorption, based on the consent of the House, of five successive sets of powers.

The first Speaker, chosen in 1789, was simply a moderator. His duty was like that of other presiding officers, — to apply the rules of the House so as to give the fairest opportunity of discussion, and to permit the freest expression of the will of the House. The Speakers of some of the colonial assemblies had been distinctly party leaders ; and after national parties were organized, — that is, from about 1793,—the Speakers were chieftains of great influence in their party, but they still felt themselves simply to be moderators.

The first access of power came through the appointment of committees. The House for one year tried the experiment, which the Senate has successfully carried on to the present day, of choosing committees by ballot; but in January, 1790, they voted to give this power to the Speaker. So long as the number of committees was small and committee positions were little sought for, this was still rather an administrative than a political power. As committee government grew, the power of the Speaker to give opportunities of distinction to his party friends also increased. By about 1840 the great influence of the committees was distinctly recognized : first in shaping legislation, and then in preventing legislation, by refusing to report bills to which the committee was opposed, but which the House might have approved. The Speaker began to assert a control over legislation through his power to appoint committees. Thus, in the choice of Speaker in 1849, a candidate who was on the point of being chosen lost the election, because it appeared that he had promised to constitute certain committees to the dissatisfaction of some of his party. The principle once completely established made the Speaker next in dignity and power to the President. He could decide at the beginning of the session what measures should not be brought to the attention of Congress; and he could have great influence, through the committees, in the preliminary shaping of the measures which would be submitted. There were, however, two practical restrictions upon this power : it was to be exercised not for his personal advantage and advancement so much as for the party which made him Speaker; and the members of the committees, once appointed, felt no direct sense of responsibility to the Speaker, and thus might report measures to which he was personally opposed.

The period of the civil war did much to strengthen the powers of Congress at the expense of other departments; it also gave to the Speaker greater opportunities, both through the appointment of committees and through personal influence. The speakership became more and more desirable, not only for itself, but because it was an avenue to the presidency. Speaker Colfax was chosen Vice-President in 1868. His successor, Speaker Blaine, became a candidate for the nomination in 1876. But the third development of the Speaker’s power rose rather out of the increasing pressure of the " floor ; " that is, for the opportunity to take part in debate. There had been many cases in the history of Congress where members had been silenced, or the attempt had been made to silence them, by the infliction of some discipline. Such were the attempted censures of John Quincy Adams in 1832, 1837, and 1842. The rules had often been interpreted so as to cut off an obnoxious debater, as in the case of the first great abolition speech in Congress, in December, 1835. Somewhere between 1880 and 1890 there grew up the practice of the Speaker’s refusing to recognize members because they had some propositions to bring forward obnoxious to his party. When, in 1887, a member wrote to Speaker Carlisle, asking that he might be recognized to move a repeal of the tobacco tax, the Speaker replied that he could not consent to entertain a motion against which the caucus of the party having a majority in the House had pronounced itself. The Speaker assumed the right, sanctioned by precedent, to refuse to permit a hearing for a proposition contrary to the principles of his party. The history of the session shows that the minority was free to introduce propositions and amendments, and that the restriction was not invariably applied to members of the majority. The principle which Mr. Carlisle seems to lay down is that the Speaker is a party chief, bound, so far as members of his own party are concerned, to carry out the policy accepted by the party in caucus or by general agreement. Mr. Carlisle expressed his purpose more openly than any of his predecessors had done. The power was a familiar one, and has since been exercised.

From this point there is but a short step to a practice of refusing to recognize members because they are personally obnoxious to the Speaker. During the last thirty years members have sometimes sat through an entire session, or even through two sessions of Congress, without ever being able to catch the Speaker’s eye. Their only opportunity has been that of presenting bills on the call by States, or of discussion in committees. At the adjournment of Congress in 1887, a member from Nebraska, who had a bill for a public building in his district, and who could not obtain the Speaker’s recognition, walked for two hours up and down in front of the desk, entreating, cajoling, and ejaculating, and in the end tore his bill into fragments, and deposited them as a protest at the Speaker’s feet. In all formal discussions, no member, with the exception of the accepted party leaders, need expect to be heard unless he has previously requested the Speaker to recognize him; and arbitrary Speakers do not hesitate to deny the applications of men whom they personally dislike.

The powers of the Speaker as thus developed, as moderator, as party chief, as the appointer of committees, and as the dispenser of the right of taking part in debate, have made the Speaker’s place more and more important, and more and more desired. But his authority has been negative rather than positive ; the Speaker could prevent legislation, but he could secure none without a majority of the House. The Speaker might deny the floor, but he seldom occupied it. Henry Clay, the most distinguished and popular Speaker of the House, who was six times elected, and never had one of his decisions reversed, was accustomed to take active part in the debate. This practice has now become very rare. The Speaker has, however, had a large share in determining the policy of his party in caucus, and in holding the party to that policy. His power of appointing to committees has made his favor desirable. His prestige as Speaker, when backed by personal qualities of character and leadership, has made him by far the most important figure in Congress, and the second figure in the nation. The abler Speakers have had within their own party a political influence and predominance quite comparable with the party position of the English Premier.

The fifth and most important step in welding together the powers of the Speaker and in correcting the defects of the congressional system has been taken within the past two years. The Speaker, and a few other eminent members from his own party, have been constituted, by the consent of that party, an informal committee to decide upon an order of business. The commission of the Speaker rests simply upon the fact that he has been chosen by the members of his party in the House as their legislative leader. Without precisely intending to create a new or a more powerful authority, the present majority has thus committed itself to the practice of entrusting to a small body, in which the Speaker must be the predominant member, the direction not only of the policy of the party, but of the legislation of the House. The step is in no way connected with peculiar principles either of the Republican or of the Democratic party. It is a natural and a desirable solution of the difficulties which have long beset Congress. The Committee on Rules, which now exercises this power, is made up of the Speaker and four associates, of whom two belong to the minority, and are practically excluded even from the routine business of the committee. The code of rules for the immediate government of the House, which that committee has pressed and which has been the subject of so much discussion, is the least interesting part of its work, because it has no necessary force after the expiration of the present Congress. The important and the permanent service of that committee has been to point out a way in which the majority in Congress may present in succession those measures upon which it desires to have a vote. the committee is superior to all other standing committees in Congress, because it expresses the general will of the party as to whether the work of those standing committees shall or shall not be brought to the attention of the House. The man who controls or is most powerful in that committee is, therefore, a recognized political chief, a formulator of the policy of the party, a legislative Premier. That man is the Speaker.

The parallel between the English and the American Premiers is, of course, by no means exact. In the first place, our Speaker is powerful only in the blouse, while the Premier, through his majority in the House of Commons, may, and frequently does, overawe the House of Lords. The Senate is not bound to recognize the leadership of the Speaker of the House of Representatives ; but even here there is an evident convenience in having a party chief, capable of layingdown a policy of successive measures and of urging those measures through. Whenever hereafter the two houses are controlled by the same party, it is probable that some junto, of which the Speaker is the leading member, will arrange a programme of legislation for both houses. In the second place, the Speaker is chosen for a definite term of two years, unless by vote compelled sooner to resign. But parties in the United States are much more stable than in England. The party which elects the Speaker invariably holds its majority to the end of that Congress. Nothing, therefore, but the disregard of the wish of his own followers is likely to destroy the Speaker’s power; and when his followers no longer stand by him, his position is much like that of the Premier against whom the House of Commons has passed a vote of want of confidence. The Speaker must resign, and his political influence will be destroyed. The executive part of the Premier’s power is not within reach of the Speaker ; but if the tradition of party action through the Speaker continues, the general policy of the party will be formed so as to include executive action. A President who wishes to stand well with his party is likely to aid in carrying out the programme arranged by the junto of which the Speaker is the leading member.

This most recent addition to the Speaker’s power has not been conferred by the recent vote of the House in adopting rules, and in fact is not expressed in the Constitution, the acts of Congress, or the rules of the House. It is a natural growth, and part of the tendency throughout the national, state, and municipal systems to put responsibility upon individuals rather than upon boards. It is a wholesome reaction from the divided irresponsibility and wasteful system of conducting the business of legislation. It secures at least the consideration of the measures held by the leaders of the majority to be most important. Those measures may or may not be for the public good ; but under the new system the public has a better opportunity to place responsibility upon those members of Congress who, under any system, must control its operations, namely, the great leaders of the majority. The system is, therefore, likely to be continued in principle, if not in the same form, by each party when in the majority. The powers now exercised by the Speaker will probably be exercised by each succeeding Speaker, and will somewhat increase. Since the legislative department in every republic constantly tends to gain ground at the expense of the executive, the Speaker is likely to become, and perhaps is already, more powerful, both for good and for evil, than the President of the United States. He is Premier in legislation ; it is the business of his party that he be also Premier in character, in ability, in leadership, and in statesmanship.

Albert Bushnell Hart.