The Diminishing Increase of Population

THE forces which have operated in the past to restrict population have had their origin principally in turbulence and ignorance. In this age, the population of civilized nations is chiefly affected by two factors, migration and decreasing fecundity, both of which are essentially economic in character.

The effect of migration upon population is less pronounced than that of decreasing birth-rate. Emigration in the twentieth century is largely a practical matter. Ambitious or discontented men and women in every community of Europe are offered continual opportunity to migrate at small expense, and without delay, hardship, or danger, to countries in which the labor market or natural resources appear to be especially inviting. To nations developing great industries, labor is furnished by others in which industry is inactive and labor plentiful. Hence the United States — still the leader in industrial development — thus far has been the highest bidder; but the facility with which the present-day emigrant passes from his native land to the United States or elsewhere, is no greater than that with which he can return, or move on to other lands more to his liking.

As the century advances, emigration may be expected to become even more a matter of business, governed by the inducements offered by this or that nation, no matter where located. There is likely to be less stability to alien population, and little probability that migration will continue to flow in definite streams or directions. A German writer has recently asserted that the nations fall into two classes: emigration states and immigration states. In which class a nation remains is likely in the future to depend upon its enterprise, and thus upon its ability to offer greater inducements to aliens than those offered by other nations. A condition such as this is doubtless new in the world’s history, but it is only one of the innumerable ways in which our age is breaking from all precedent and proving itself unique.

General and continued decrease in fecundity — hence decrease in the proportion of children in the community — is apparently another new factor in population change, new at least in certain aspects. Many causes have been assigned for this present tendency of civilized nations. Most of these relate directly or indirectly to modern conditions — social and educational — and to modes of living. There is, however, a cause of far greater consequence. From the earliest ages until within the last twenty years, population increase has been largely a matter of instinct, reproduction resulting as nature determined. Voluntary restriction of family, however, is now well understood and widely practiced in civilized nations. The ultimate effect upon population of such control cannot thus early be measured or even predicted, but it is a fact which economists must confront, that in the future the proportion of instinctive or accidental births will constantly decrease, and that of deliberately predetermined births will increase. It is obvious that this knowledge tends toward decreasing fecundity; hence, as already suggested, its effect must be more farreaching upon increase of population than that of migration.

It is not possible to foretell the effect of making the world a vast labor market such as it is fast becoming, nor is it possible fully to determine the cause of the decreasing size of families which seems to be characteristic of this period, and possibly due, in the final analysis, to some great natural law made operative by modern conditions. These conditions, indeed, differ so radically from those existing in earlier periods that they may be expected to produce results along unfamiliar lines. Our age is comparable with no preceding age. Statistics, the stars which men in this century read to forecast the future, merely suggest the mighty economic changes which are in progress, and often light but dim trails.

Changes in the Population of Europe.

In 1860 the population of Europe, including the British Isles, but exclusive of Russia and Turkey in Europe (the former having made but one enumeration and the latter none at all), according to the censuses nearest the date mentioned, was 207,572,650. In 1900 the aggregate population of the nations previously included was 265,851,708, an absolute increase of 58,279,158, or slightly more than 25 per cent in 40 years. The increase in population during the decade from 1860 to 1870 was practically nothing, the direct result of the Franco-German war, as both France and Germany reported decreased population in 1870. In 1880 the percentage of increase for the previous decade was approximately 8 per cent; in 1890, slightly less than 8 per cent; and in 1900 slightly more. The population of Europe, including Great Britain, has thus increased at a slow but practically uniform rate for the past 30 years, although a continued drain, due to emigration, has been in progress.

The Latin, or southern nations of Europe,¹ are increasing in number of inhabitants less rapidly than most of the other nations of the continent. During the last two decades of record, the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon nations² increased 8.8 per cent from 1880 to 1890, and 11.4 per cent from 1890 to 1900, while the Latin nations (including Greece) increased but 6 per cent during the former, and 3.8 per cent during the latter decade. This noteworthy difference between the two groups is not explained by proportionately greater immigration to the United States from the southern nations, since the natives of those countries living in the United States represented but 0.2 per cent of the aggregate population of the Latin nations in 1880, and 0.6 per cent in 1900; on the other hand, the residents of the United States native in the Germanic and British group were equivalent to 3.9 per cent and 4.2 per cent, respectively, of the total population of those countries.

In absolute figures, the nine nations in the Germanic and British group aggregated 138,722,939 population in 1880, and 168,185,537 in 1900, thus recording an increase of approximately thirty millions ; while that of the five nations in the Latin group was 88,741,312 in 1880, and 97,666,171 in 1900, showing an increase of nearly nine millions. The population disparity between the two groups in 1880 was 50,000,000, but in 1900 it had increased to 70,500,000.

If existing tendencies thus indicated shall continue, it is evident that the population of the Latin nations will speedily reach a stationary or declining condition, while the other group continues to increase, even though much less rapidly than at present.

It must be remembered that each of the nations here considered relies almost wholly upon native stock for its increase. The total number of aliens or persons of foreign birth reported at the censuses of the various nations in 1900, or at the nearest census thereto, was slightly more than two and a half millions, or but one per cent of the total; therefore the increase reported represents the growth of the native population.

The important fact brought out by this brief analysis is the virility of Europe’s population, its reproductive power after many centuries of existence. It is probable, indeed, that the increase has been greater during the past century than in any previous period. This is the more significant when it is remembered that the states of Europe without exception have contributed freely of their inhabitants, not only to the United States, but to South America and to the various colonies and commercial centres of the world.

Changes in the Population of the United States.

In 1790, at the beginning of our constitutional government, the young republic found itself possessed of 3,929,214 inhabitants, composed of 3,172,006 white, and 757,208 negro, or 80.7 and 19.3 per cent respectively. This may be termed native stock, since the immigrant, as we know him, did not then exist.

From 1790 to 1860 the percentage of increase remained roughly uniform, that reported from 1850 to 1860 (35.6 per cent) being almost the same as the rate of increase shown from 1790 to 1800 (35.1 per cent). After 1860, with some variation due to the Civil War, the rate of increase steadily diminished, shrinking to 20.7 in the deçade 1890 to 1900, with the probability that the percentage of increase from 1900 to 1910 will approximate but 18 per cent.

Of the two racial elements of population, the increase in the number of negroes has declined from 32.3 per cent, reported from 1790 to 1800, to 18 per cent from 1890 to 1900. The increase in the number of whites, from 35.8 per cent reported in 1800, declined with irregular changes to 21.2 per cent in 1900, although reinforced during the century by increasing throngs of immigrants, to which must be added the mighty company of their descendants.

It is impossible to determine to what extent the colonial stock, if unassisted, would have increased the population of the United States. Children born in this country of immigrants are added to the native-born; their children are classed as native-born of native parents; thus the foreign element becomes so woven into the national fabric that the strands are statistically indistinguishable.

In 1890 the classification of “ nativeborn of native parents ” was introduced in Census analysis,³ the effect of which was to separate the native and foreign elements one generation farther back than “ native-born.” Use of this classification reveals the fact that the increase in the number of persons in the United States born of native parents, computed upon the total native white population, declined nearly one-third from 1880 to 1900 (20.5 per cent to 14.5 per cent).

By a slightly different process the increase of the native-born was computed at the census of 1900 to have been 16 per cent for the previous decade, and in the North Atlantic division not more than 9.5 per cent. While the results of computations of increase in the various elements of the population may thus vary slightly, they confirm the general fact of material diminution of increase.

In 1820 the proportion of white children under ten years of age to the total native white population was 32.7 per cent, or almost one-third. In fact, twelve of the twenty-six states and territories reported more than one-third of their white population as being under the age of ten.

In 1900 the proportion which children formed of the total population classed as native white of native parents, was 26 per cent; but two out of 50 states and territories reported a proportion of children exceeding one-third of the population. Moreover, in the majority of states and territories the proportion declined from 1890 to 1900. If the states in existence in 1800 be considered, so that the figures may be strictly comparable for a century, the proportion of children to the entire white population was 34.4 per cent in 1800 (28.1 per cent in 1850) and 24.6 per cent (native white of native parents) in 1900. In New England, indeed, the proportion has shrunk almost half, from 32.2 per cent to 17.9 per cent.

In 1820 no state reported the proportion of white children under 10 years so low as one-quarter of the total white population, but in 1900, more than twofifths of the states reported the proportion of native white children as being less than one-quarter of the total native white inhabitants. This number included all the Pacific Coast states (in each of which the proportion declined from 1890 to 1900), three Western states, Montana, Nevada, and Colorado, which perhaps may be disregarded because of the disturbing influence of mining communities, and fourteen, comprising all the Eastern, Northern, and Middle states as far west as the Illinois line. It is significant that these fourteen form the manufacturing centre of the United States. They contributed, in 1900, 71 per cent of the total value of all manufactured product, and contained 46.2 per cent of the total population. The decrease in the proportion of native children thus appears to be most pronounced in the wealthiest and most populous sections, conspicuous for urban communities and the most extensive industrial interests.

While, as shown, it is impossible to separate the early native element and the later foreign element so as to measure the contribution of each to the total population, it is obvious that the United States, in the face of ever-increasing reinforcements from abroad, has recorded a declining rate of increase and a decreasing proportion of children. Having accomplished an extremely rapid and somewhat artificial growth, the American Republic appears to be approaching a condition in which, were the ship of state to cast off the towline of immigration, she would make very slow population headway.

The Effect of Diminishing Increase in the United States.

Were the present rate of alien arrivals in the United States to continue, that fact, in the light of the census record, would merely justify expectation of continued diminution of increase. Were such diminution to continue to the middle of the twentieth century, at the same rate per decade as shown from 1860 to 1900. the population of continental United States in 1950 would not exceed 130 millions, and after that date would tend to become stationary. This figure is far below the forecasts of population, sensational in their liberality, made by newspaper and magazine writers from time to time. There is, indeed, a popular tendency to overestimate future population. Predictions concerning the number of inhabitants likely to be living in the United States in 1900, which were made early in the nineteenth century, or within the last fifty years, whether by students or statesmen (the latter including even President Lincoln ⁴), greatly exceeded the total actually reported for that year.

Three nations only now have more than one hundred million inhabitants, — Russia, India, and China. They are largely agricultural, and are composed of communities having limited and simple requirements. Industrial nations (which have more active and restless communities) in general are small in area, and have relatively small populations, which are thus easily subject to control.

The United States will soon join the three nations exceeding one hundred millions of inhabitants, but differs radically from them, since manufacturing, mining, and other industries are steadily outstripping agriculture. Urban population is increasing four times as rapidly as that of the country districts (the increase in the former in 1900 was 36.8 per cent, and in the latter but 9.5 per cent). These facts suggest a tendency toward instability, and become increasingly important as population assumes colossal proportions. It is not in government alone that the United States is an experiment.

National considerations, however, are by no means the only ones involved in great population increase. There is a point at which the citizen must alter his mode of life. In densely populated countries the liberty of the individual is necessarily restricted, and economy of agricultural and other resources becomes imperative. In the United States the improvident habits contracted by the newcomers of a century ago still prevail, A population materially in excess of one hundred millions, living as wastefully as Americans now live, would soon confront the necessity for federal and state regulation, the creation of many of the limitations which prevail in the more populous states of Europe. Preservation in any form, however, of soil or natural resources, is accomplished by restriction; restriction means that large numbers of the more restless and eager will drift to newer lands.

Population and Industrial Activity.

Malthus, in his famous treatise upon principles of population, declared that the natural tendency toward increase is checked by inadequacy of means of subsistence; but in our time this statement should be modified; new industries, the development of mines and extension of commerce, directly or indirectly, furnish means of support for increasing numbers and seem to create a demand for human beings, — causing what may be termed a population vacuum.

The population of England and Wales, for example, in 1701, was 6,121,525; ⁵ in 1751 the total number of inhabitants had increased but 214,315, or 3.5 per cent in fifty years. After the middle of the eighteenth century, however, continuous increase occurred, amounting to three millions in 1801, nine millions in 1851, and fourteen and a half millions in 1901. This change was coincident with the creation of British industry and trade.

But if it be true that the quickening of industrial life has tended to increase population, the present stationary condition of population in parts of Europe, previously pointed out, and the diminishing increase of population in the United States, suggest the possibility that what may be termed the drawing power of natural and industrial resources upon population has culminated. We are justified at least in asking what influences upon increase of population, if any, are being exerted by the marvelous economic changes now in progress.

The discovery and exploitation of the world’s stored-up natural resources have made this age conspicuous among all ages. It might be said, indeed, that the human race is now living upon principal, whereas through all previous periods of history it existed upon income. Prior to 1840, upon the sea all transportation was accomplished by utilizing the winds of heaven as motive power to drive ships to their desired harbors, and upon land by the use of beasts of burden. Witbin tbe short space of 67 years, — less than the allotted lifetime of a man, — transportation on sea and land has been revolutionized; the steamer and the locomotive are now supreme. In 1905 there were 20,746 ⁶ ocean-going steamships plying between the ports of the world, and nearly 163,000 locomotives ⁷ in all lands and climes drawing innumerable freight and passenger cars. To propel these steamers against wind and current, approximately 75,000,000 tons of coal are required annually, while the locomotives of the world consume approximately 133,000,000 tons.

Thus during many thousand years the commerce and passenger traffic of the world were conducted without the expenditure of a pound of the natural resources of the earth, but in our time practically all transportation, although possessing capacity beyond the comprehension of earlier generations, is secured by burning up annually more than 200,000,000 tons of coal. The production of coal, iron, petroleum, copper, and gold in America practically began — at least so far as a modern commercial basis is concerned — within the lifetime of many men now living. Coal production in the United States dates approximately from 1820. Eighty-five years later (in 1905) the product of American coal mines was 392,000,000 tons annually, practically twofifths of the coal production of the world. Advancing into the future from 1905 as far as that date is distant from 1820, we should reach 1990. In that year, according to the estimates which have been made by the leading student of coal production, thp output of American coal mines would approximate 2,077,000,000 tons each year.⁸

Such staples as coal, iron, petroleum, copper, and gold, were left practically untouched by the successive generations of men who peopled the earth prior to the nineteenth century; but within fifty years the world-old attitude of the race toward these and other natural resources has been completely reversed. This brief period has witnessed a mighty attack upon most of the known deposits of metal and minerals. In order to increase the vigor of the onslaught which the civilized nations have made upon natural resources stored up through countless ages, human strength has been supplemented by ingenious mining machinery.

The world’s coal product in 1850 was 220,535 tons; in 1900, 846,041,848 tons; in 1905, 1,033,125,971 tons. English writers of half a century ago estimated the maximum annual production likely to be reached in the future from the British coal-fields at 100,000,000 tons. The actual product, however, in 1905 was 235,000,000 tons.

In the production of pig iron a similar striking increase has occurred. The world’s product advanced from 1,585,000 tons in 1830, to 54,054,783 tons in 1905. Petroleum, discovered in the United States in 1859, and aided later by extensive wells in Russia, was produced to the amount of 3,296,162,482 gallons in 1890, but the product was increased to 9,004,723,854 gallons in 1905. Of copper, the product was 117,040,000 pounds in 1850; but the mines of the world, spurred by the demand of electrical requirements, yielded 1,570,804,480 pounds in 1905. Production of gold increased from $94,000,000 in 1850, to $376,289,200 in 1905.

PER CAPITA⁹ PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF COAL, IRON, PETROLEUM, COPPER, AND GOLD IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1905.

With the exception of the production of coal in Great Britain, mining in European countries is not characterized by the feverish activity which attends such operations in the United States. Here, however, not only are the per capitas of production and home consumption very large, but it is evident that this nation is also supplying much of the European requirement. While gratifying as evidence of Nature’s liberality to us, and also of American enterprise, is there no limit to the supply under such unparalleled demand?

This age is preëminently a coal age; industry and commerce depend upon and follow coal supply. “ In those localities both in Europe and America where coal is found, it has completely changed the face of the country. It has created great hives of industry in previously uninhabited valleys and lonely plains, drawn the population from the agricultural districts into manufacturing centres; it has altogether modified the relative importance of cities, and has peopled colonies.” ¹³

Jevons, the English economist, discussing in 1865 the relation of wealth and political power in England to the coal supply, declared that the industrial preeminence of the English people was due to coal; that future development depended upon a continuance of cheap fuel supply; but that it was not reasonable to expect indefinite commercial expansion at the then rate of progress. He predicted that well within a century from the date mentioned, a perceptible check in the rate of growth would be experienced and that the premonitory symptom would be a higher price for fuel.¹⁴ This economic prophecy in some particulars is already being fulfilled. Not the least ominous fact is the decided increase in the price of British coal. It is stated that at the present rate of production the cream of the South Wales coal-fields will have been skimmed in another half-century.

The United States is now the greatest coal-producing nation in the world. Even should the annual product attain to the enormous total predicted for the close of the century, the coal reserve would not be seriously impaired for many centuries to come. In fact, it is not likely ever to become completely exhausted. The crisis in the maintenance of national prosperity, however, does not await coal exhaustion, but it must be expected when the slowly increasing difficulty and expense of mining coal result in prices easily beaten by newer fields. The price, therefore, of early extravagance in production, or in use, or both, is the ultimate creation of irresistible industrial rivals. The United States is becoming more and more industrial, hence both prosperity and population constantly lean more heavily upon coal; the greater the annual output, the earlier may be expected the era of materially advancing prices. Even if it be conceded that such a result would not seriously impair the industrial efficiency of the United States, it must exert a direct influence upon population, because decided increase in the cost of coal means increased cost of living and of production in all lines of industry. Moreover, an increased proportion of labor and capital must be devoted to the extraction of coal, thereby diminishing the proportion of both available under more favorable conditions for other productive activities.

Old settlers and newcomers have reveled in the fertility of virgin soil and seemingly unbounded space and resources. Waste has been rampant. If land ran out, the farmer made scant attempt to renew it, — he merely moved on to the West or South. If the timber, coal, or iron supply of forest and mine was depleted, no thought of economy arose — there were greater forests and richer mines elsewhere. Thus like a spendthrift heir, the inhabitants of the United States have dipped deep into the riches of their mighty inheritance, while from other lands millions of immigrants, glad to escape the restrictions of intensive forms of existence, have flocked to assist the American in exploiting his resources.

How long can these resources, though some of them are seemingly limitless, withstand this attack ? ¹⁵

The present age is differentiated from all others principally by this exploitation of natural resources, and by its reflex influence upon men. Had this onslaught begun, with equal vigor, a few hundred years earlier, conditions in the present age would have differed so radically from what they actually are, that even speculation concerning our state in such a contingency is futile.

Supremely serious are the questions which arise from consideration of the unprecedented advancement of our time: Has Nature no penalties in store for her children who draw too liberally from her breast ? Burning the fires of life so fiercely, shall they not burn out ? If, on the one hand, phenomenal population increase resulted from the quickening of industrial and commercial life in the civilized nations during the past century, — due in the last analysis to natural resources, — and on the other, instinct, manifested in a score of local forms, is now tending to restrict population while the momentum of national prosperity is apparently at its height,¹⁶ may there not be in operation some hitherto unexecuted law of nature, to prevent too great a drain upon the inheritance of future generations ?

Invention and discovery may be expected to continue. It may well be that the men of the future will succeed in their time, as we have in ours, but the problems which arise are likely to be increasingly serious, as “ the great world spins for ever down the ringing grooves of change.”