A Diary of the Reconstruction Period

IV. THE WAR ON THE PRESIDENT

Tuesday, May 1, 1866.
IN Cabinet the President brought forward the subject of reconstruction as now before Congress in the report of the Committee of fifteen. He said his purpose was to know the opinions of the several members of the Cabinet in regard to these propositions of the Committee, and his own policy, which was different.
Seward in a very long talk expressed himself opposed to the plan of the Committee. Stanton broke in upon the President before Seward, was very glad the President had brought the matter before the Cabinet in this formal manner. He had, like all the members of the Cabinet, approved the policy of the President from the beginning. With one or two others he had, he said, taken at the inception a different view of Negro suffrage, or, as he expressed it, of allowing all the people of the state to vote. But in all his talk, which was very loud and emphatic, he expressed no opinion on the subject before us, either of sustaining or opposing the scheme of Thad Stevens and his Committee.
Mr. McCulloch was very decided in his opposition to the plan of the Committee, and equally decided in favor of the President’s policy. He declared himself not so hopeful as Mr. Seward, especially since reading the scheme of the committee.
Dennison, who interposed out of the
usual order, thought it premature to express any opinion, for it was not yet certain what course Congress would take.
Stanton, who should have followed McCulloch, was silent, evidently intending to be passed as having already spoken, though really giving no opinion. I was not disposed to permit any such get off and, therefore, waited. The President, whose feelings were very intense, spoke at some length in regard to the condition of the country, [and] the effect which these schemes must have on the efforts to reestablish the Union.
Mr. Dennison again spoke at some length, expressing himself opposed to many things in the programme of the Committee, and was not prepared to say how long representation should be denied to the Southern States. Thought four years too long.
Mr. McCulloch, who has important business at his department almost always when we have grave and important questions, obtained permission to leave, having stated his views.
The President, holding the paper in his hand, said he had brought the subject forward, that he might know how each one viewed it. I remarked that was very proper and I trusted each would state his opinion, that I thought it due to him, and I then turned towards Stanton. Thus appealed to, and the President turning towards him also, Stanton said he did not approve the propositions of the Committee in the present form, he believed they might be amended and essentially improved, and thought it worth the attempt to reconcile action between the President and Congress.
I declared myself unequivocally opposed to the whole scheme which I considered an outrage and a wrong. That I was not in favor of any constitutional amendment in the present condition of the country, that I knew not what right Congress had to pass amnesty laws or prescribe terms to the States.
Stanton interrupted to say that I was opposed to any terms with Congress, that I was ironclad on this subject of reconstruction, and had not only fifteen-inch guns levelled against Congress, but was for running my prow into them.
I replied that I was not aware that I was unreasonable, but my convictions were that Congess had no authority to prescribe terms on which states should be represented, that the Constitution had done this, that each House was entitled to pass on the election and qualifications of each member of its own body.
Stanton said that the convictions of Congress were exactly opposed to mine, and, therefore, I could make no compromise with them. I told him I could compromise no principle, nor consent to any usurpation.
Dennison again said he was opposed to the plan, but repeated that he did not know how soon the people or States should be represented. I said immediately, if the representatives were loyal, — I wish they could be sworn in tomorrow.
Harlan was very reserved. He agreed, he said, with Mr. Stanton in pretty much all he had said, and had no doubt a majority of Congress wanted to be in harmony with the President.
The session was very long, extending over nearly four hours. Most of the time [was spent] on the subject of reconstruction, the President speaking twice at considerable length, and objecting to all conditions precedent to admitting loyal members to the seats.

Wednesday, May 2, 1866.
The papers to-day contain a synopsis of what took place yesterday in the Cabinet on the subject of reconstruction. I have no doubt that the President himself furnished the information, and probably the report, precisely as it is published. He has shown tact and sagacity in doing it. The report of the position of each member is accurate, although I think Stanton was less decided than stated. Nevertheless he intended that the President should take that impression, and I appreciate the adroitness of the President in giving publicity to Stanton’s position as he represented himself in the Cabinet. The radical friends of Stanton will be incredulous as to his position in the Cabinet. He must, however, content himself with exposition made or openly deny it. He can no longer equivocate or dissemble.
In a conversation which I had with the President yesterday after the other members left, he remarked that the time had come when we must know whether we had a united or divided Cabinet, that the radicals had strengthened themselves by constant representations that portions of the Cabinet were with them.
To-day Seward remarked to me that while he should say nothing in regard to the opinion of his associates, he had said and should repeat to others that he was not misrepresented in the report. I told him I was glad that Stanton’s position was so clearly defined, for I had not so understood him. Seward said Stanton had gone along with us so far, that Stanton had come into Mr. Lincoln’s Cabinet under peculiar circumstances, and had said to him (Seward) that he should stand by his (Seward’s) policy while he remained in the Cabinet and go with him on all essential questions.

Friday, May 18, 1866.
Seward has gone home. He told me he intended to make a speech while absent in favor of the President and his policy. Originating no measure himself, and cautious and calculating in adopting the plans of others, he, nevertheless, supposes that what he says has wonderful influence. I do not think he has ever made a speech which gave shape or character to a party. Often his remarks have been more harmful than beneficial. His harangues at Auburn are studied orations, perhaps after consultation with his confidants, and he is now pregnant with one. If it is a quiet baby, passive and pliant, I shall be satisfied, — if it has some deformities I shall not be surprised.

Tuesday, May 29, 1866.
The Senate, after much debate and many caucuses on the part of the Republican members, have an amendment of the Constitution modified from that reported by the construction or obstruction committee. This amendment may be less offensive than that which passed the House by [means of] excluding some of the States from any voice or participation, but it ought not to receive the sanction of the Senate. Yet I have little doubt that it will, and that the canvassing has been a process of drilling the weak and better-minded members into its support. Disgraceful as it may seem, there is no doubt that secret party caucus machinery has been in operation to carry through a constitutional amendment. Senators have committed themselves to it without hearing opposing arguments, or having any other discourse than that of a strictly party character in a strictly private meeting. Of course this grave and important matter is prejudged, predetermined. Eleven states are precluded from all representation in either House, and of the senators in Washington, all not pledged to a faction are excluded from the caucus when the decision is made. This is the statesmanship, the legislation, the enlightened political action of the present Congress. Such doctrines, management and principles, or want of principles, would sooner or later ruin any country.
I happen to know that Fessenden had long interviews with Stanton last week, though I know not the subject matter of their conferences. Fessenden sometimes hesitates to support a wrong man. Seward has a personal party in Congress, men who seldom act on important questions in opposition to him and his views. All of these men vote in opposition to the President’s policy. Raymond alone vacillates, but this is with an understanding, for Raymond and Seward could, if necessary, carry others with them, provided they were earnestly disposed to do so.

Wednesday, June 6, 1866.
Montgomery Blair still persists that Seward is false to the President and that he and Stanton have an understanding. There are many strange things in Seward’s course and he is a strange man. I am inclined to think he is less false to the President than an adherent of the Secretary of State. He does not like Johnson less, but Seward more. Seward is afraid of the Democrats and does not love the Republicans. But he feels that he is identified with the Republicans, thinks he has rendered them service, and considers himself under the tutoring of Thurlow Weed as, more than any one else, the father of the party. The managers of the party dislike him and distrust him, fear that he will by some subtlety injure them, and do not give him their confidence. The Democrats look upon him as a puzzle, a Mephistopheles, a budget of uncertainties, and never have and never will trust him.
The President believes Seward a true supporter of his administration. I think he means to support it. The President finds him a convenience, but does not always rely upon his judgment. His trust in Seward begets general distrust of the administration. It is remarkable that none of Seward’s devoted friends, men who under Weed breathe through his nostrils, sustain the President on his great measures. Raymond has been a whiffler on public measures, but no others have ever doubted or dared express a doubt of the radical policy. This puzzles me.
Stanton is very anxious to retain his place, and yet he has a more intimate relation with the radical leaders than with the President or any member of the Cabinet. His opinion and judgment I think the President values more than he does Seward’s, yet he distrusts him more, feels that he is insincere. But Stanton studies to conform to the President’s decisions and determinations when he cannot change them, apparently unaware that he occupies an equivocal position, both with the President and the public.

Friday, June 8, 1866.
But little of information at the Cabinet. I had some conversation with the President after adjournment, and in the evening McCulloch and myself called upon him by appointment. Our conversation was frank, extending over more than an hour. We all concurred that it was not possible to go on much longer with a view of preserving the integrity of the Republican party, for the radicals are using the organization to injure the President. There is direct antagonism between the leaders who control Congress and the administration. The Democrats in Congress are more in harmony with the administration than are the radicals; — then why repel the Democrats and favor the radicals?
We, McCulloch and myself, spoke of the want of cordial and free intercourse among the members of the Cabinet; that important questions touching differences in the Republican party were never discussed at our meetings; that it was obvious we did not concur in opinion, and, therefore, the really important topics were avoided. The President admitted and lamented this, as he has done to me repeatedly. He expressed his surprise that Harlan and Speed should, with these understood views, desire to remain. I asked if there were not others among us as objectionable and more harmful. McCulloch, he said, could not believe Seward faithless, that he fully agreed with him whenever they had conversed. I admitted the same as regarded Seward and myself, — still there were some things I could not reconcile. He is not treacherous to the President, but is under the influence of Stanton and acts with him. His intimates, as well as Stanton’s, in Congress voted steadily with the radicals; his speech at Auburn was a whistle for the Republicans to keep united, and repelled Democrats.

Wednesday, June 20, 1866.
The President and myself had a little conversation. I expressed my apprehension that there were some persons acting in bad faith with him. Some men of position were declaring that he and Congress were assimilating, especially on the constitutional change. He interrupted me, to repeat what he had said to McCulloch and me, that he was opposed to them and opposed to any change while any portion of the states were excluded. I assured him I well knew his views, but that others near, who professed to speak for him, held out other opinions. I instanced the New York Times, the well known organ of a particular set, which was constantly giving out that the President and Congress were almost agreed, and that the Republican party must and would be united. Yet the facts that every Republican representative had voted for the changes, that the State Department had hastened off authenticated copies to the State Executives before submitting to the President, promulgated the idea that special sessions of the legislatures in the States were to be called, to immediately ratify the amendment.
[The results of the fall elections of 1866 were the subject of such anxious thought by both parties that the proceedings resembled those of a presidential year. Four national conventions were held. The first of these conventions was held in Philadelphia during the month of August, in the interest of the Johnson policies.]

Thursday, June 21, 1866.
Senator Doolittle took tea with me. He wished me to go with him to the President, when some friends were to assemble to consider and decide in relation to the proposed call for a national convention. Senator Cowan, Browning,¹ Randall,² and three other persons whom I did not know, but who seemed attaches of Randall, and who, I understood, belonged to the National Union Johnson Club, composed the sitting. The call, which had been modified in
slight respects, still omitted any allusion to the constitutional changes, the really important question before the country. This I thought a great and radical defect, and Cowan and Browning concurred with me, as did McCulloch. Randall, who is flattered and used by Seward, opposed this, and his principal reason was that he would leave something for the convention to do.
I asked why the convention was called, if not on this great issue which stood prominent beyond any other. Well, he said, it would hasten the calling of the state legislatures to pass upon it. That, I told him, if properly used might be made to weaken them and strengthen us; we would demand an expression of popular sentiment through the instrumentality of an election, and thereby expose the recent hasty action which was intended to stifle public opinion.
Much of the conversation between eight and eleven o’clock was on this point, during which I became satisfied that Randall was prompted by Seward and used for the party purposes of Weed and Seward. The President evidently was with me in his convictions, but forebore taking an active part. My impressions are that Randall is aware of it. The President finds that R[andall] agrees with Seward and it carries him in that direction. While R[andall] means to reflect the President’s wishes, he is really the tool of Seward and Weed, and is doing harm to the cause and to the President himself. But this matter cannot be corrected and will, I fear, prove ruinous.
I left soon after eleven and came home, desponding and unhappy. The cause is in bad and over-cunning, if not treacherous hands, I fear. The proposed convention has no basis of principles. It will be denounced as a mere union with rebels.
[Congress had recently passed the measure embodying the Fourteenth Amendment.]

Friday, June 22, 1866.
When I went to Cabinet meeting only Seward was there with the President. I was prompt to time; Seward was in advance. Directly on entering, the President handed me a message which he had prepared, with an accompanying letter from Seward, relative to the proposed constitutional changes which Congress had requested him to forward to the State Executives. The whole was very well done. As Seward had sent off authenticated copies to the governors, the officious act was very well gotten over by a declaration in the message that it was a ministerial act which was not to be understood as giving the sanction of the Executive or of the Cabinet to the proceeding.
I made a complimentary remark on the message, with my regret that there had not been more time and consideration in sending off copies to the States. Seward was annoyed by the remark and said he had followed the precedent of 1865, but the President was, I saw, not at all displeased with my criticism.
Subsequently when all the Cabinet were present, except Stanton and Speed, the message and papers were read. McCulloch expressed his approval of the message, and said he should have been glad to have had it more full and explicit. In this I concurred.
Dennison took exception, which served to show that he had been consulted by the radicals and had advised or consented to the course previously adopted. He and Seward each made some remarks, and Dennison showed much indignation because Seward had used the word ‘trick’ on the part of Congress in sending this resolution to the President. Seward disclaimed the word and denied he had used it. I was not aware he had done so.
Dennison proceeded to say that Bingham introduced, or had been the means of introducing, the resolution; had consulted with him; that his object was pure; that he approved; that although the proposed amendment was not in the precise shape he wished, he, nevertheless, gave it his support; that it had been approved by the Republicans of Ohio and were he at home in October he should vote for candidates who favored it.
I assured him that therein he and I differed, for that I would not vote for the amendment, nor knowingly vote for any man who supported it.
Seward said he had no doubt that the Republicans of the Auburn District would oppose it very generally, and that if he was at home in November he expected to vote for men who would oppose it.
I took higher ground. I cared not what parties favored or what parties opposed it, my convictions and opinions were in my own keeping, and I would vote for no man or any party who favored that amendment.
Dennison said that with the explanations of Mr. Seward he took no exceptions, but he expected to act with the Union party of Ohio. Harlan said he thought the views of each would be reconciled. I doubted if we were a unit. Party seemed to have a stronger hold than country.
When the others had left, the President told McCulloch and myself that he had struck from the message the concurrence of his Cabinet. This I regretted, but he said Dennison’s assent even with his explanation was not full and gave him an opportunity to evade, if convenient hereafter. He, therefore, chose to stand alone, not trammelled by others. Before sending off the message, which he had done while we were there, he had erased the words referred to.
Dennison has evidently been tampered with and has made up his mind to go with his party, though aware that the party organization is being committed against measures of the administration. He certainly does not yet anticipate leaving the Cabinet on that account, but will soon come to it. How the President is to get along with such a Cabinet I do not see. McCulloch spoke of it and said there were four in opposition. “Yes,” said the President, “ from what we now see of Dennison, and if we count Stanton after his patched-up speech; but it is uncertain where he wishes to place himself.” There is no uncertainty on the part of any but the President. Speed and Harlan should from a sense of propriety and decent self-respect resign. This the President has repeated to me many times. Why he should cling to Stanton, who is working insidiously against him, and to Seward, who works with and shields Stanton, either doing more against him than the two feeble men of whom he speaks so freely, I do not understand. Stanton he knows is not in accord with him, though he does not avow it; and if Seward is presumably friendly, the fact that all the influence he can exercise is dumb, or hostile, is obvious.

Saturday, June 23, 1866.
The President sent me a note this A. M. to call upon him this evening at eight. Although under the doctor’s care and ordered to remain perfectly quiet, I rode over at the time. Doolittle called and went with me. Seward soon came in, followed by McCulloch, Cowan, Browning, and Randall. We went into the library, where the proposed call for a national convention was finished up. Seward, who with Weed and Raymond, drew up or arranged this call which Doolittle fathers, now suggested two or three verbal alterations, most of which were adopted. It is intended that these “suggestions” shall cover up Weed’s tracks.
In all that was said and done Seward fully agreed. He intends to keep within the movement, which has becomea New York scheme, in order to control it. His belief is that the Republicans, of New York at least, will respond promptly to the call and make the President’s cause (which he means shall be his and the old Whigs ’) theirown. How this is to be done, and the course of the senators and representatives of that State be sustained by the administration, he does not disclose. The Democrats, who, in their way, are the chief supporters of the President’s measures, are snubbed. I perceive Seward is satisfied with both the President’s and his and Weed’s positions. The President, I think, is aware of this discrepancy, yet tries to believe all is right.

Saturday, June 30, 1866.
Had a long talk this afternoon with the President on the condition of affairs, and especially in regard to the proposed national convention. He does not like the composition of the Cabinet, yet does not, in my opinion, perceive the most questionable feature in it. Harlan and Speed, he does not conceal from me, are in the way. The course and position of Dennison do not suit him. Dennison, like others, has been drawn into the radical circle against his better judgment, is committed to the Republican party, and is appointing extreme radicals to local post-offices, carrying out the views of the radical members and strengthening them by displacing friends of the President. In this I do not think D[ennison] intends antagonism to the President, although it is that and nothing else. But he does not permit himself to believe that the President and the party, which is now a mere machine of Thad Stevens, are not identical.
Seward knows the distinction and yet contrives to persuade the President to acquiesce, while favoring the radicals. It is curious, but by no means pleasant, to witness this proceeding. The President, usually sagacious, seems not to discern the management and ultimate purpose of the Secretary of State, who is prompted by Stanton, one of the radical chiefs. Stanton has an assumed frankness, but his coarse manner covers a good deal of subtle duplicity. Seward never differs with the President. If he has taken an opposite view from or with others, or before the President’s opinion is known, it disappears forever when the sentiments of the latter are ascertained. His knowledge and estimate of men are weak and erroneous in the extreme.
The President understands the political dexterity of Seward, and yet does not apprehend that it may even operate adversely to himself, nor does Seward intend to antagonize his chief. Some recent proceedings, connected with the schemes of the radicals, are to me inexplicable, and in our talk I so informed the President. I could not understand how all the Republican members from New York, a considerable portion of whom are under the influence of Seward and Weed, should vote steadily with the radicals and against him, if Seward and Weed are his true friends.
The New York Times, Raymond’s paper, controlled by Weed, declared that the President and radicals were pretty much reconciled on the constitutional changes, and by this representation multitudes were entrapped into the measure.

Wednesday, July 11 , 1866.
Although Stanton has been fully with the radicals in all their extreme measures from the beginning, he has proposed to abandon them when the President made a distinct stand on any subject. I am, therefore, uncertain what course he will take; but if he leaves he will be likely to be malevolent. He is selfish, insincere, a dissembler, and treacherous. Dennison,³ however, is honorable and manly. If his radical friends have finally succeeded in persuading him to go with them, he will do it openly and leave the Cabinet, not remain to embarrass and counteract the President, or, like them, strive to retain place and seek the confidence of his chief to betray him.
I read to Blair my answer to Doolittle concerning the national convention. He is highly pleased with it, and suggested I should make a point on the imminent danger of another civil war. Blair repeats a conversation with Boutwell, a Massachusetts fanatic, who avows that the radicals are preparing for another war.
Blair says the radical programme is to make Wade President of the Senate, then to impeach the President. Having done this the radicals will be prepared to exclude the Southern members from the next Congress, and the Southern States from the next Presidential election.

Thursday, July 12, 1866.
The radicals held a caucus last evening at the capitol to determine in relation to their future course, and also in regard to the adjournment of Congress. It was resolved that their proceedings should be secret, but the doings are published. They appear to have come as yet to no conclusion. The plan, or conspiracy, for it is nothing else, seems to be some contrivance first of all to embarrass and hamper the Executive, some scheme to evade an honest, straightforward discharge of duty, some trick to cheat the President out of his prerogative and to arrogate to themselves an unauthorized Executive power.
Raymond is reported to have played the harlequin and again deserted. Although it is difficult to believe that one of his culture and information could make such an exhibit of himself, I am prepared to credit any folly of his. He has clearly no principles, no integrity, and is unconscious how contemptible he appears. Under Weed’s teaching he has destroyed himself.
The President informs me that Dennison has handed in his resignation. His reasons are his adherence to the Republican party. He was President of the National Convention which nominated Lincoln and Johnson and has imbibed the impression that his character is involved, that his party obligations are paramount to all other considerations. He has been trained and disciplined. In due time he will be a wise man.

Friday, July 13, 1866.
The morning papers contain my letter to Senator Doolittle, in response to his inquiry, conveying my views of the Republican convention. It is very explicit and much complimented.
Seward read to the President and myself a letter which he had written on the same subject. I told the President I ought, perhaps, to apologize for not having read my letter to him also, that I had thought of it, but concluded I ought not to make him in any way responsible for my unofficial acts. He said he would cheerfully assume the responsibility of every sentiment of my letter, which he had twice read and heartily approved.

Sunday, July 15, 1866.
There are flying rumors that Speed and Harlan, and some say Stanton, have sent in their resignations. It is excessively warm and I have not thought proper to call on the President and enquire. Possibly Speed has resigned, though I have some doubts, — more as regards Harlan, — and I am incredulous as regards Stanton.

Monday, July 16, 1866.
We are having, I think, as warm weather as I have ever experienced. The papers have a curt letter from Speed resigning his office. He has also written an elaborate but not very profound letter to Doolittle, dissenting from the Philadelphia convention.
The President sent in a veto on the new bill establishing the Freedman’s Bureau, or prolonging it. His reasons against it were strong and vigorous, but the two houses, without discussing or considering them, immediately passed the bill over the veto, as was agreed and arranged by the leaders, Stevens and others. Very few of the members know anything of the principle involved, or even the provisions of the bill, nor if informed had they the independence to act; but they could under the lash of party vote against the President. Two or three of the members, in telling me the result, spoke of it as a great triumph in the manner of the final hasty passage without any consideration.

Tuesday, July 17, 1866.
Still excessively warm. Not much at the Cabinet to note. Stanton read a strange despatch from General George H. Thomas at Nashville, stating that some of the Tennessee members of the legislature would not attend the sessions and asking if he should not arrest them. The President promptly and with point said that if General Thomas had nothing else to do but to intermeddle in local controversies, he had better be detached and ordered elsewhere. Stanton, who should have rebuked Thomas, had, I thought, a design in bringing the subject to the President, who has warm personal friendship for the General. On hearing the emphatic remark and witnessing the decided manner of the President against Thomas’s proposition, Stanton dropped his tone and said he had proposed to say to T[homas] that he should avoid mixing up in this question. But shall I add your remark, said he. My wish is, replied the President, that the answer should be emphatic and decisive, not to meddle with local parties and politics. The military are not [our] superior masters.

Wednesday, July 18, 1866.
The President tells me that Dennison did not intend to leave, — that his purpose was to maintain his party relations but conform to the administration in his action. He did not want nor expect his resignation to be accepted. These were the President’s impressions. He looked upon it as a refined partyism to which he would give no attention. Speed, he says, meant to be very short, and he, therefore, did not reply to Speed’s note resigning, but considered it a fact in conformity with the terms of the note.
The authentic published proceedings of the radical leaders are disgraceful to the members who were present and took part. It shows their incapacity as statesmen, and their unfitness as legislators.
Montgomery Blair is possessed of the sentiment thatanother civil war is pending and that the radical leaders design and are preparing for it. I am unwilling to believe that a majority of Congress is prepared for such a step, but the majority is weak in intellect, easily led into rashness and error by the few designing leaders, who move and control the party machinery. There is no individuality and very little statesmanship or wise legislation, and as little in the Senate. The war on the President and on the Constitution, as well as on the whole of the people South, except the Negroes, is revolutionary.
The President, while he has a sound and patriotic heart, has erred in not making himself and his office felt as a power. He should long since have manifested his determination to maintain and exercise his executive rights, and as soon as the spirit and hostility of the radical leaders was apparent, have drawn the lines and made his own position known and felt. I so said to him on more than one occasion.

Saturday, August 4, 1866.
The Philadelphia movement is gaining strength, but at the same time encountering tremendous and violent opposition from the radicals. I trust and think it will be successful, but the convention will be composed of various elements, some of them antagonistic heretofore, and the error is in not having distinctive principles on which these prevailing opposing elements can center. The time has arrived when our countrymen must sacrifice personal and mere organized party hostility for the general welfare. Either the radicals or the Government are to be overthrown. The two are in conflict.
I have confidence that all will come out right, for I rely on an over-ruling Providence and the good sense and intelligence of the people. Hatred, deadly animosity towards the whole South, a determination to deny them their constitutional rights, and to oppress and govern them, not allow them to govern themselves, are the features of radicalism. It is an unsavory, intolerant and persecuting spirit, disgraceful to the country and age. Defeat in the elections will temper and subdue its ferocity, while success at the polls will kindle it to flames which will consume every sentiment of tolerance, justice, and constitutional freedom.

(To be continued.)