A Diary of the Reconstruction Period

V. TIIE PRESIDENT ‘SWINGS ROUND THE CIRCLE’

[Shortly after the adjournment of Congress a riot occurred in New Orleans in which thirty-seven Negroes were killed and one hundred and nineteen were wounded, while of their white assailants, supposed to have been protected by the local ex-Confederate authorities, only one was killed and but a handful were wounded. Sheridan, in military charge of the Department, in a despatch to Grant referred to the riot as ' an absolute massacre.’ The affair made an impression upon the North most harmful to the President’s conciliatory policy.]

Tuesday, August 7, 1866.
The President submitted two long telegrams, one from himself to General Sheridan enquiring as to the difficulties at New Orleans, and Sheridan’s reply, which was no answer.
Seward and Stanbery had much to say. The latter was very earnest to have the President send immediately to Sheridan, telling him the police must be dismissed. There was, he said, great excitement in the country and the President must at once respond.
I enquired to what he was to respond. On Friday he had directed Sheridan to keep the peace and pursue his investigations. Since that, enquiries had been made which had provoked a feeble and confused response, concluding with a request or suggestion that the Governor of the State and the Mayor of New Orleans be displaced. Sheridan might be told that the President had no authority to displace these officers; but I expressed a hope that he would not at this distance undertake to give detailed instructions to his generals or agents.
I asked who General Baird ²was, that he should be charged with this important matter, and how it came about that such a man as was now described, happened to be at such a place at this juncture. As for Sheridan I considered him an honest, bold, impulsive officer, without much knowledge of civil government, or administrative ability, who obeyed orders; but I apprehended him badly prompted after his first telegram, and regretted that we had not men of different calibre there at this time.
Seward said my estimate of Sheridan he thought correct. As for Baird, he knew nothing of him.
The President expressed dissatisfaction with what he heard of Baird. Stanton kept silent.
Stanbery was persistent that the President should instruct Sheridan in regard to the police of the city.
Stanton said application had been made to him for bunting for the building at Philadelphia where the convention was to meet, but he had none for them, and said, with a sneer, he would turn them over to the navy. I told him that my bunting had always been promptly shown, and it would be well were he now to let us have a sight of his.
Stanton, who had skulked, was taken aback, colored, and remarked he had no bunting for them.
‘ Oh,’ said I, ' show your flag.’
' You mean the convention,’ said he. ‘ I am against it.’
T am sorry to hear it, but glad to know your opinion,’ said I.
‘Yes, I am opposed to the convention,’ he continued.
’I did n’t know it. You did not answer the enquiry like the rest of us.’
‘ No,’ said he, ' I did not choose to have Doolittle and every other little fellow draw an answer from me.’
The conversation amused the others, as it did me. Seward looked troubled. Whether he knew Stanton’s position, I am in doubt. It is, I am satisfied, very recent that he has concluded to avow himself, although I have never doubted that he was as much opposed as any radical to t he union movement. I think he would rather have the government overthrown than that the real Unionists should come in power. He seems to have personal apprehensions.
I called on the President this evening to advise caution in his communications with New Orleans, expressed m v regret that he had not better officers for the business required at this time in that quarter. He concurred with me, and said Baird, so far as he could lea rn, had caused the trouble or might have prevented it.
Who, inquired I, placed Baird there? Was it not part of the radical scheme to bring this difficulty upon us? It certainly is unfortunate that we have these men there.
He said he believed Baird was attached to the Freedmen’s Bureau.

[The ' National Union ' Convention held in Philadelphia August 14, heartily supported President Johnson’s policy.]

Friday, August 17, 1866.
Doolittle and Browning called on me this evening fresh from the convention, and overflowing with their success and the achievements of that assemblage. They insisted that I should go with them to the President and hear their verbal, friendly, social report. It was made very gratifying and the President enjoyed it. On our way to the President both gentlemen insisted that Stanton must leave the Cabinet, and said it was the strong and emphatic voice of the convention; that there were committees to communicate with the President on the subject. I told them I would leave that matter with them and the Committee. While we were with the President the subject was alluded to by Browning, but Doolittle immediately took it up and said it would be proper for him, not being a member of the Cabinet, to make known to the President the sentiment of the Convention and the country, etc.

Thursday, August 23, 1866.
Seward is full, arranging for the excursion to Chicago. Wants General Grant and Admiral Farragut should be of the party, especially through Philadelphia, where he apprehends there may be trouble. I have little apprehensions of mischief in Philadelphia, but in these reckless and violent times some rash and ruffianly partisans may place obstruction on the railroad track in the more sparsely populated districts. I therefore suggested to the President several days since that it would be well to take Stanton along, who is in favor of the excursion and has urged it, as he is a favorite with the radicals who would not endanger or hurt him. Seward proposed some other naval officer than Farragut also, and I named Radford to him and also to the President, provided another was desired. The President was indifferent, — thought we should have plenty of company.

[The President’s famous electioneering journey, ‘ swinging round the circle ’ as he called it, from which he expected very favorable results, proved highly injurious to his cause.]

Monday , September 17, 1866.
Returned on Saturday, the 15th, from excursion with thePresident. Our route was via Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, West Point, Albany, Niagara Falls (where we spent our first Sunday), Buffalo, Cleveland, Toledo, Detroit, Chicago (where we remained Thursday the 6th inst.), Springfield, Ill., Alton, St. Louis (where we spent our second Sunday), Indianapolis, Louisville, Cincinnati, Columbus, Pittsburg, Harrisburg, Baltimore, home.
We only travelled by daylight, excepting when coming from Louisville to Cincinnati by steamer. I have not enumerated the intermediate places of our visit, but having special train, no stops were made except at places of importance.
The newspapers of the day give detailed statements of our journey, the places at which we stopped, the introductions that were made, and caricature statements of speeches which were delivered. Our party consisted of Secretary Seward and myself of the Cabinet. P. M. General Randall was with us part of the time. General Grant, Admiral Farragut, Admiral Radford, Generals Rousseau, Custer, Steadman, Stoneman, Crook, E. T. Welles, J. A. Welles, Mrs. Patterson, Mrs. Welles, Mrs. Farragut, Judge Patterson, Colonel Moore, and others.
The President made brief remarks at nearly every stopping-place to the crowds which assembled to meet and welcome him. In some instances party malignity showed itself, but it was rare, and the guilty few in numbers. It was evident in most of the cases, not exceeding half a dozen in all, that the hostile partisan manifestations were prearranged and prompted by sneaking leaders. The authorities in some of the cities — Baltimore, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Pittsburg — declined to extend courtesies or participate in the reception, but the people in all these cases took the matter in hand and were almost unanimous in the expression of their favorable regard and respect for the chief magistrate. The governors of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Pennsylvania were all absent. In Ohio and Pennsylvania the Secretary of State appeared, and each apologized for the absence of the executive, but extended formal courtesies.
Only one radical congressional representative, Mr. Blow of Missouri, called upon the President. Mr. Spaulding of Cleveland was boarding at the house where we stopped and we, therefore, saw him. But along the whole line of travel of over two thousand miles, and through, perhaps, thirty or forty congressional districts, the radical members absented themselves, evidently by pre-concert, and the radical state and municipal authorities acted in almost every case in concert with them.
The President spoke freely, frankly, and plainly. For the first three or four days, I apprehended he would, if he did not forbear, break down, for it seemed as though no one possessed the physical power to go through such extraordinary labor day after day for two or three weeks. I, therefore, remonstrated with and cautioned him, but he best knew his own system and powers of endurance. He felt moreover that he was performing a service and a duty in his appeals to his countrymen, and desired to address them face to face on the great issues before thecountry. It was the method to which he had been accustomed in Tennessee and the Southwest, and he believed it would be effective in the North.
I was apprehensive that the effect would be different, that his much talking would be misapprehended and misrepresented, that the partisan press and partisan leaders would avail themselves of it and decry him. I am still apprehensive that he may have injured his cause by many speeches; but it is undeniably true that his remarks were effective among his hearers, and that within that circle he won supporters.
To a great extent the radicals are opposed to him and his policy; yet when the true issue was stated the people were and are obviously with him. The President himself has sanguine belief that he has so aroused his countrymen that they will sanction his measures for re-establishing the Union on the constitutional lines, and oppose the radicals’ revolutionary measures. I have no doubt that the honest sentiments of the people are for the Union, but the radicals have the party organizations and have labored to make those organizations effective for almost a year, while the President has done comparatively nothing.
Speeches to a few crowds, or the same speech essentially to many crowds, are not in themselves, I fear, sufficient. In the meantime there is want of sagacity, judgment, and good common sense in managing the party which supports him. Candidates who are copperheads, i.e. who opposed the government during the war, cannot become earnestly engaged or really enthusiastic supporters, yet the radical Republicans hold back while this class is pushed forward. There is a kinder feeling among Republicans towards beaten rebels than towards copperheads. But these last pay court to the President in the absence of the greater part of the Republicans who have become radicals. It is not strange, while the radicals conspire against him, that he assimilates with those who, if they opposed his election, now doubtingly sustain his policy. It is out of sympathy and charity to them. They, however, are still selfish partisans, and are unpatriotic and in adherence to mere party policy and to a President they did not elect.
Seward, who during the whole session of Congress held off and gave the radical leaders full room for intrigue, yielded to their aggressive conduct and was unwilling to give up his party organization until that party had so fortified itself as to set him at. defiance, appears to have finally come to the conclusion that it is not best to repel the Democrats, for the administration must rely upon them. He has throughout the excursion generally seconded the President, assented to all his positions and rather encouraged his frequent speeches, which I opposed, for it was the same speech, sometimes slighly modified.
General Grant, whom the radicals have striven to use and to offset against the President, who generally received louder cheers and called out more attention than even the President himself, behaved on the whole discreetly. Of course he saw, as did all others, the partisan design and schemes of the radicals, but he did not, so far as I could perceive, permit it to move him from his propriety, at least during the first week or ten days. He gave me to understand in one or two conversations which we had that our views corresponded. He agreed with me that he is for re-establishing the Union at once in all its primitive vigor, is for immediate representation by all the states, etc.; but while he would forgive much to the rebels, he is unsparing towards those whom he denounces as copperheads. Mr. Hogan, the representative of the St. Louis district, accompanied us, by invitation of the President, on our way from St. Louis to Washington. He is a warm, earnest, zealous Democrat, an Irishman by birth, and a devoted friend and admirer of the President. It gave him pleasure with his strong lungs to introduce the President and his associates to the crowds at, the stopping-places. General Grant told me in Cincinnati that it was extremely distasteful to him to be introduced to the crowds assembled at the stations by Hogan, who was a copperhead, he said, and rebel sympathizer during the war. He had, he remarked to me, no desire for fellowship with such a man. A rebel he could forgive, but not a copperhead.
The reception was everywhere enthusiastic, and the demonstrations, especially at the principal cities, were in numbers most extraordinary and overwhelming. In Philadelphia, where the radical authorities would not participate, the people filled the streets so that it was difficult to get through them. This proceeding at Philadelphia was the beginning of a series of [manifestations of] petty spite on the part of the radical managers, which was advised and determined upon before we left Washington, and of which, I became satisfied, Stanton was cognizant. Between him and Grant there was, at that time, very little sympathy or friendly feeling, and until we had completed more than half of our journey, Grant clung to the President. Though usually reticent, he did not conceal from me his dislike of Seward. But, first at Detroit, then at Chicago, St. Louis, and finally at Cincinnati, it became obvious he had begun to listen to the seductive appeals of the radical conspirators. The influence of his father, who was by his special reejuest my companion and associate at Cincinnati in the procession, finally carried him into the radical ranks.
The Senate of New York, in session at Albany, deliberately struck Mr. Seward’s name from the list of those who were welcomed, and Governor Fenton, in the spirit of a narrow mind, undertook to overslaugh the Secretary of State when we were introduced at the capitol. When ushered through the crowd into the executive rooms, which were filled, Governor F[enton] introduced the President to the senators and the throng. Passing by Secretary Seward, who stood beside the President, he called for General Grant, who was in the rear, and presented him, and was then addressing himself to me; but Seward, who was aware of the action of the senate and Governor, felt the intentional discourtesy most keenly, waited for no further action of the Governor, but stepped to the table and said, ‘ I am here among old friends and familiar scenes and require no introduction from any one. Here are men and objects that I have known in other days, and have honored and been honored here.’ Taking one and another by the hand, with ‘How do you do,’ he exchanged courtesies with several. Governor F[enton] then introduced me and Admiral Farragut.
At Auburn, Seward’s home, where we were to remain overnight, there were little neighborhood bickerings and jealousies. Mr. Pomeroy, the representative of the district, was intensely radical, and had broken away from his old friend and neighbor in his party course. Naturally he carried many with him. There was also a jealous feeling of Mr. Seward himself on the part of the village aristocracy. At Cleveland there was evidently a concerted plan to prevent thePresident from speaking, or to embarrass him in his remarks. Grant, I think, had been advised of this and it affected him unfavorably. They did not succeed, but I regretted that he continued to address these crowds. Although it is consistent with his practice in Tennessee, I would rather the chief magistrate would be more reserved, and both Governor Tod and myself suggested to Seward that it was impolitic and injudicious, but Seward did not concur. He said thePresident was doing good, and was the best stump speaker in the country. The President should not be a stump speaker.
At Chicago and at St. Louis the reception was magnificent . There was in that of the latter place a cordiality and sincerity unsurpassed. We were met at Alton by thirty-six steamers crowded with people, and were escorted by them to St. Louis.
There was turbulence and premediitated violence at Indianapolis more than at any other and all other places. At Indianapolis I became convinced of what I had for some days suspected, that there was an extreme radical conspiracy to treat the President with disrespect and indignity,and to avoid him. Morton, who had early been obsequious to him and was opposed to Negro suffrage and radical demands, had become a radical convert. He fled from us as we entered Indiana, — so too the little governors of Ohio and Pennsylvania, who were purposely absent when we arrived at Columbus and Harrisburg.
Louisville gave us a grand reception.
Mr. Seward had an attack of the cholera on the steamboat, after we left Louisville, and was unable thereafter to participate with us. He had a car and a bed to himself from Cincinnati. At Pittsburg we parted, he going with the regular train in a car by himself, while we had a special train in advance. After reaching Harrisburg and while at supper, we were in a whisper informed that Mr. Seward was in a car at the depot, unable to be moved, and that. Doctor Norris was apprehensive he might not survive the night. The President and myself immediately but quietly withdrew from the table and went to the depot, where we found Mr. Seward very low and weak. On the following morning he was little, if any, better, and was certainly weaker than on the preceding evening. He was evidently apprehensive he should not survive, and I feared it was our last interview. His voice was gone and he spoke in whispers. Taking the President’s hand he said, ‘ My mind is clear, and I wish to say at this time that your course is right, that I have felt it my duty to sustain you in it, and if my life is spared I shall continue to do so. Pursue it for the sake of the country; it is correct.’ His family, which had been sent for, arrived and joined him at .Harrisburg, soon after, and he proceeded to Washington in advance of us and arrived there Saturday P. M. At Columbus we were reviewed by a large assemblage. Not only the residents of the place, but of the surrounding country, gathered to meet us. Ex-Postmaster-General Dennison, who called upon us in the evening, was in good health, though he says he has been unwell most of the time since he left Washington. One or two of his neighbors say that he was ill in consequence of his resignation and [its] acceptance.
There was here, as I had noted at some other places, some scheming to antagonize General Grant and the President, and make it appear that the interest was specially for the former. Great pains have been taken by partisans to misrepresent the President and misstate facts, and to deceive and prejudice the people against him. There is special vindictiveness and disregard of truth by members of Congress everywhere. Hateof the South and the whole people of the South is inculcated, constitutional obligations are wholly disregarded, a new constitution [is promulgated], or such changes in the present as will give us essentially a new central government which shall operate especially against, the states and people of the South, while the people there are denied all representation or participation in these changes.
The Democrats of the North and almost the whole South, who might benefit themselves and the country by taking advantage of these errors and follies of the radicals, are themselves demented and absurd in their action. They are devoted to party, regardless of country. Instead of openly and boldly supporting the President and the policy of the administration, showing moderation and wisdom in the selection of candidates, they are pressing forward men whom good unionists, remembering and feeling the recent calamities of the war, cannot willingly support. In this way they have put in jeopardy the success of the cause of the administration, which in most of the states is their own. Prudent and judicious management would have given us a different congress even in the free states, but I think it can scarcely be expected in view of the great mistakes committed in the nominations which have been made. It is to the Democrats and the South a lost opportunity.

Thursday, September 27, 1866.
Sam J. Tilden and De Wolf of Oswego spent the evening with me. Tilden has good sense, intelligence, and honesty, but is a strong party man, sees everything with partisan eyes, yet understandingly. In 1848 and for a time thereafter he was a ‘ barn-burner,’ going with the Van Burens, but very soon was homesick, sighed for the old organization, and continued to long for the ‘leeks and onions ’ of his political Egypt, until he got once more into the regular Democratic fold. From that time he has clung to the horns of party with undying tenacity. During the war he did not side with the rebels, but he disliked and abjured the administration.
At this time he supports the President, but I perceive he aims to do it as a Democrat rather than as a patriot, and that he is striving to identify the President with the Democratic party organization. I regret that he and other New York extremists should pursue this course. It will be likely to give strength to the radicals and defeat the administration in the coming elections. Tilden speaks of success, which I am confident he cannot feel. He and his party have, it appears to me, alienated, instead of recruiting, men who would have united with them, and thereby given victory to the radicals. The people of the North are not ready to place the government in the hands of the copperheads, or even of the Democrats who were cold and reserved during the war. This hostility to those who sympathized with the rebels is national. It is an honest feeling which Stevens, Boutwell, Butler, and other reckless partisans, are abusing and striving to work into frenzy. Had the Democrats given up their distinctive organization and worked in with the real Union men against the radical exclusionists, the President and his policy would have been triumphantly Vindicated and sustained.

Saturday, November 17, 1866.
Several weeks have elapsed and many interesting incidents have gone which I wished to note, but, employed through the days and until late at night, [I] have not had the time. The fall elections have passed and the radicals retain their strength in Congress. False issues have prevailed. Nowhere have the real political questions been discussed. Passion, prejudice, hate of the South, the whole South, were the radical element and aliment for re-establishing the Union. Equal political rights among the States is scouted; so is toleration to the people of the South. The papers and orators appealed to the Northern public to know if they would consent to have the rebels who had killed their fathers, brothers, sons, etc., brought into power. President Johnson was and is denounced as a traitor, because he does not repel and persecute the beaten rebels. The passions of the people are influenced to war heat against the whole South indiscriminately, while kindness, toleration, and reason are discarded, and the constitutional changes and all real political questions are ignored.
The Democrats, with equal folly and selfishness, strove to install their old party organization in force, regardless of the true interest of the country. They saw the weakness and wickedness of the radical majority in Congress and believed that they had committed suicide. The public was dissatisfied with the course pursued by Congress and rejoiced that t he Philadelphia convention was called. In that convention, so unfortunately mismanaged from its inception, and in subsequent meetings, the Democrats predominated, and they narrowed the contest down to an attempt to fortify and entrench their old organization, not aware that the once proud party had made itself odious by its anti-war conduct and record. The consequence has been that instead of reinstating themselves they have established the radicals more strongly in power.
Never was a political campaign so poorly managed. When the call was preparing for the Philadelphia convention, I urged that the real issues should be embraced, for otherwise the administration would be placed at disadvantage, and charged (in the absence of avowed principles) with a coalition with rebels for power; we were, I told them, throwing away an opportunity. We could, on the proposed revolutionary constitution changes, meet and whip the radical faction, whereas if we omitted any allusion to them and evaded the true test there would be a general scramble in which the radicals would have the advantage, for they had been organizing and preparing for the contest. But P[ost] M[aster] G[cneral] Randall and others, secretly prompted by Seward, were unwilling to take an open, bold stand. They wanted to satisfy Raymond and the calculating party trimmers, and so let themselves down.
We have, therefore, had elections without any test, statement, or advocacy of principles, except the false one that the radicals have forced, that the administration had united with rebels. It was a contention of partisans, striving for the ascendancy. The President’s friends were willing to support him and sustain his policy in the elections if they could get at the question, but a large portion of them would not vote to restore the old obnoxious Democrats to power on old issues.

Thursday, November 29, 1866.
A number of members of Congress have arrived. Thad Stevens and some of the ranting radicals are on the ground early, to block out work for their followers when they assemble on Monday next. Thad is a very domineering and exacting leader and has great control over the radicals, though many of them are unwilling to admit it, and in a cowardly way deny it. Lacking wellgrounded political principles, they want moral courage in the peculiar condition of affairs. Fearing Stevens, they shrink from the avowal of an honest policy. Stevens has genius and audacity, but not wisdom; imagination, but not sagacity; cunning, but not principle. Will ruin his party or country; doubtless injure both.
The threat of impeachment is less loud for the last few days, but the extreme radicals will press it if they have a shadow of hope that they can succeed. It is a deliberate conspiracy which should send the leaders to the penitentiary. If Thad Stevens can get his caucus machinery at work he will grind out the refractory and make the timid guilty participants.
Forney³ with his ‘two papers, both daily,’ and a scrub committee which he and the radical leaders have fixed, are trying to get up a great reception for the members of Congress. It is one of the revolutionary demonstrations, and the conspirators have been counting on tens of thousands to be present, but the people arc not all fools. These attempts to crowd forward extreme radicalism, embolden it and make it. despotic, but do not strengthen them or inspire confidence. Still, after the last long session and its works, the late wretched elections, the weak men of this Congress are not to be relied on for wise, patriotic and judicious legislation.
In the meantime the President is passive, leaningon Seward and Stanton, who are his weakness. Seward has no influence. Stanton has with the radicals, but with no others. Of course, the Executive grows weaker instead of stronger, with such friends.
As Congress has, by excluding two states, a sufficient majority to override any veto, there will, under the law of Stevens, Boutwell, Kelly, etc., be strange and extraordinary legislation. The power and rights of the Executive will be infringed upon, and every effort will be made to subordinate that department of the government, subject it to the legislative branch and deprive the Executive of its legitimate authority. Seward does not manage but will assist them. Stanton, though subtle, is a sly radical prompter and adviser. Yet there are no men in whom the President confides more than in those two men. I shall not be surprised, but disappointed, if Congress proceeds immediately to tie up the hands of the President in every conceivable way, taking from the President the appointments conferred by the Constitution and essential to an efficient executive, passing laws regardless of the Constitution, and in other ways turning down the government.
This is Thanksgiving Day. A fast, if either observance is religious and proper, would be more appropriate. We may thank Providence for His mercies and goodness, but we should fast, and lament the follies and wickedness of partisans and speculators who are afflicting and destroying the country.
I have given my annual report its final proof-reading. In it I have stated facts and expressed opinions which I might have avoided, indicating, unmistakably, my position and views. It would have been politic, in the usual acceptation of the term, to have omitted these passages; but I feel it a duty to my country, to the Constitution, to truth, to the President, to shrink from no honest expression of my opinion in times like these.

Friday, November 30, 1866.
At the Cabinet meeting the President. had his message read by Colonel Moore, his private secretary. All expressed their approval. Stanton said he would have been glad to see an approval of the amendment to the Constitution in it. I expressed my gratification that it was not, and that I had never supposed it possible that the President would approve it. browning and Randall were equally strong, particularly the former. I ought not to say Randall was equally strong, for there was a halting and hesitation that I did not like. Seward’s indorsement was formal from the teeth, not from the heart, but yet, on the whole, not against it. The document is sound, temperate, and fine. A sensible congress would receive it in a kind and right spirit.

Saturday, December 1, 1866.
Senator Sumner called on me to pay his usual visit preceding the session. I congratulated him on his marriage. On politics and public matters we said but little. He was subdued and almost dejected on account of the displacement of his brother-in-law, Dr. Hastings, from the post of physician at the marine hospital. Says it was conferred by Lincoln and Chase as a slight testimonial of regard for himself. Mrs. H. is his only surviving sister, and they two all that remain of nine children. Of course I know nothing on the subject, — had never heard it alluded to. Of this he was well aware. Said it was McCulloch’s doings, or the President’s, or both, as a hit at him after sixteen years faithful public service.

Friday, December 7, 1866.
The two Houses are passing resolutions of annoyance to the departments, calling for absurd information, often in an unwise and discourteous manner. The more ignorant and blatant, the more offensive and senseless is the call. Most of them that call on me say, ‘ Resolved that the Secretary of the Navy be directedto Stanton that he ‘be requested’; a designed discrimination made for a purpose. To-day the President showed one that had been sent to him, with a long preamble, insulting and false: whereas it is alleged that the President, etc., etc., with more resolutions appended. Thus far the extremists have been very violent, coarse, and abusive in their language in caucus, and often in regular session. The more discreet and considerate do not yield to this vulgarity, but they have not the stamina to rebuke it. They do not approve, but have not the power to be firm in disapproving.
Sumner has introduced some resolutions which are revolutionary and wholly regardless of the Constitution. There is manifest intention to pull the Republic to pieces, to destroy the union and make the government central and imperious. Partvism, fanaticism rule. No profound, comprehensive, or enlarged opinion, no sense of patriotism animat es the radicals. There are some patriotic and well disposed members, but they are timid, have no force or influence, no self-reliance or independence.
Fessenden is nominally one of the leaders in the Senate, yet he is a mere follower. Grimes controls him and has, without Fessenden’s dyspepsia, a much more vigorous intellect. Roth of them dislike Sumner and his extreme views, yet both are made to follow him and support his measures when pressed to a decision. Grimes is by nature jealous, suspicious, and strongly indoctrinated with many of the pernicious motives of old narrow-minded Whiggery, of which he seems incapable of divesting himself, although I think he feels that it narrows his mind and injures his usefulness. Fessenden, dyspeptic but well meaning, is more influenced by him than by any other man in the Senate, or out of it; more influenced by Grimes than Grimes is influenced by him, yet they act in concert and I am inclined to think with a purpose.
What will Congress do? is a question often put and never answered satisfactorily. The constitutional amendment cannot be adopted by the required majority of the States. But as States are excluded from Congress in disregard or defiance of the Constitution, the same radicals can with as much authority exclude them from satisfying or passing upon the constitutional changes. Sumner without any pretense of constitutional authority or right, has been, and is, for reducing the States of the South to territories or provinces. Fessenden and others have opposed this. But, at a dead lock, unable to go forward and not manly enough to retreat, there seems no alternative for Fessenden but to follow Sumner whom he dislikes and denounces as a scholastic pedant. These violent proceedings forebode disaster to the country. Such schemes must destroy confidence and break up the union, if attempted to be carried out to their full extent.
If the Southern States should be declared territories, the radicals will not. even then accomplish their purpose, for Mordecai the Jew will still be in the way. Andrew Johnson must be disposed of and impeachment must be effected. This the less radical portion are not yet prepared for, but when they have gone so far as to break down the Constitution and the States, they will follow the violent leaders the rest of the way.

(To be continued.)