A Diary of the Reconstruction Period

VII. FRUSTRATING THE PRESIDENT’S POLICIES

Monday, February 18, 1867.
The session of the Senate on Saturday continued through the night and until 6.30 yesterday morning. The subject under consideration was the establishment of military governments over the Southern states. A bill to this effect was introduced by Thad Stevens from the Reconstruction committee, and was carried through the House under his management and dictation. Very few attempt to endorse or justify the measure, yet all the radicals and most of the Republicans voted for it. There is very little firmness or moral courage in the House. The members dare not speak nor act according to their convictions. Indeed their convictions are feeble, and there is little sincerity in them.
In the Senate, Wade, Sumner & Co. undertook to force through the bill at the Saturday’s session. A stand was made by the minority against such precipitate and unreasonable legislation on so important a measure. Various amendments were offered and voted down, but at length, on Sunday morning, Mr. Sherman offered a substitute which was adopted. It is in one or two respects less offensive than the House bill, but is still an outrage upon the Constitution, the rights of the people, and the rights of the states. Sumner was violent, and, Grimes tells me, more savage when Sherman’s substitute was adopted. He left the Senate in a rage. Grimes and Sumner, though both radicals, are not friends or on speaking terms. Of course, Grimes is enjoying Sumner’s disappointment.
Stevens, Boutwell, and the extreme radicals are as indignant as Sumner, and will make fight against the bill in its present shape and likely secure amendments. The Republicans, though disliking and mistrusting each other more and more each day, are not yet prepared to break. There is no shrewd man among the Democrats to take advantage of or manage their rising differences, or to lead his own party wisely.
Seward and Stanton confuse and bewilder the mind of the President, prevent him from pursuing a straightforward and correct course and from taking and maintaining a bold, decisive policy. They are weakening the executive power daily, and undermining the constitutional fabric. Seward acts as usual from no fixed principles, but from mere expediency; not with a design to injure the President or to help the radicals. He tries to resuscitate, vitalize, and perpetuate the old Whig party, and to undo and destroy the Democratic party, each for the glory of Seward. Stanton is deep in the radical intrigues, but contrives to get along with and to use Seward and his superficial wisdom, and is so far successful as to keep his place, although the President knows his mischievous designs and purposes.
The country is in poor legislative hands, and the prospect is sadly foreboding. The Constitution and the great principles of union and free government on a federal basis are disregarded.

Friday, February 22, 1867.
The politicians in and out of Congress have been busy for several days on the subject of governing the Southern states. Sherman’s amendment went down to the House, was disagreed to and some abominable additions were made. Partisans, and factions, and fanatics, and demagogues were each and all at work. Finally a bill was adopted, establishing military governments and martial law in and over those states. Where Congress gets the power to do these things no one attempts to point out. The Members of Congress evidently confound martial law with military law, and know no distinction. Congress has the undoubted right to enact military laws for the government of the land and naval forces; but martial law exists and is in operation where there is no law. The will of the military officer in command is supreme. He can order court-martials or military commissions to try citizens as well as soldiers, but citizens cannot be tried by military law.
Martial law abolishes jury trials; Congress cannot abolish them. Martial law may abridge freedom of speech and of the press, but Congress cannot. When there is a Congress or legislature to enact laws, there can be no martial law. It would be a solecism. Yet this radical Congress has undertaken to enact martial law. In other respects the bill is subversive of government, destroys titles, and introduces chaos.
The President as commander-in-chief of the army and navy exercised the power — which devolved upon him when the rebellion was suppressed, and the military forces occupied the rebel states; when there was no law, and chaos reigned — of appointing provisional governors and ordering other measures to establish order and system and re-introduce law. Congress could not do this. It had no authority or power. All its powers are derived from the Constitution, the organic law; but when martial law prevails municipal law is suspended.
To-day the President laid this bill, and also the one respecting the tenure of office, before the Cabinet. The bill for the military government of the states was the only one considered. On this there was the usual uncertainty. No one of the Cabinet advised the President to approve the bill but Stanton. He said that though he would have framed the bill differently and altered it in some respects, he should give it his sanction, and advised the President to give it his approval.
Following him, I wholly dissented, and plainly and directly advised the President to put his veto upon it.
Reverdv Johnson,² the senatorial trimmer, gave his vote in the Senate for this infamous bill.³ Stanton quoted him as an example and an authority. How long will the President be able to go on with such an opponent at his council board?

Monday, February 25, 1867.
I read some suggestions on the Tenure-of-Office bill to the President. They were prepared in response to an opinion of the Attorney-General some months since, but are applicable to the bill. The President was pleased with them. I also left with him some views on the bill for the military government of the Southern states. These views, which relate to the strange plan of enacting martial law by Congress, chimed in with his opinions.
On taking the paper the President alluded to the cabinet council on Friday and the pitiful exhibition which Stanton made of himself, and wondered if Stanton supposed he was not understood. The sparkle of the President’s eyes and his whole manner betokened intense though suppressed feeling. Few men have stronger feeling; still fewer have the power of restraining themselves when evidently excited.
I remarked that it was but part of the drama which had long been enacting and asked what was to be the condition of things, if impeachment were pressed and an attempt to arrest him was made. This subject the President himself had brought forward at the Friday meeting. Seward and Stanton wished to give it the go-by, though each had his own theory. Seward said it was not wise to anticipate such a thing, — to discuss it even among ourselves, — had an anecdote to tell, and his experience on the McCracken correspondence. I differed with him and thought it both wise and prudent to be prepared for an emergency which was threatened, and had been undoubtedly discussed. Others agreed with me, the President earnestly. Thus pressed, Seward said it might be considered a law question, coming particularly within the province of the AttorneyGeneral whenever it came up, but if the Attorney-General should advise the President to submit to an arrest before conviction he would demand the immediate dismissal of the AttorneyGeneral. I asked if the demand would be made on legal or political grounds.

Stanton tried to evade the matter; did not believe that impeachment would be pursued; the session is near its close, etc.
The President was evidently not satisfied with this treatment of the subject when we had our conversation on Saturday, and was now a good deal indignant. But whether he will make any demonstration in that direction remains to be seen. I have little expectation that he will, although had I not previously had similar strong intimations without any result, I should from his expressive manner have expected a change.

[The Tenure-of-Office Act, designed to frustrate President Johnson in any attempt to carry out the policies of his administration, provided that the consent of the Senate should be necessary to the dismissal of any officer who had been appointed by and with the con-, sent of that body.]

Tuesday, February 26, 1867.
At the Cabinet the subject of the Tenure-of-Office bill came up. It had been postponed at the request of the Attorney-General on Friday. He said he had not read it until to-day, but he required no time to express his unqualified condemnation of it. In this the whole Cabinet were united. Stanton was very emphatic, and seemed glad of an opportunity to be in accord with his colleagues. The President said he was overwhelmed with many pressing matters which must be disposed of, and he would be glad if Stanton would prepare a veto or make suggestions. Stanton asked to be excused, for he had not time. The Attorney-General said it was impossible for him to do the work. The President turned to Seward, who said he had not recently given these subjects attention, but he would take hold if Stanton would help him. The President suggested that both the war and navy must help in this matter, and McCulloch expressed a special desire that I should participate. I saw that Seward was not taken with that proposition. Some general discussion followed, and before we left, Seward spoke across the room to Stanton and requested him to call and enter upon their duties; but no invitation was extended to me. The President turned to me and in an undertone remarked that I had given this subject a good deal of thought and he reckoned I had better prepare a paper. I told him I would have no objection to contribute to the document, but it had gone into hands that seemed willing to grapple with it, and I apprehended after what had been said that they would do it justice. If, however, anything was wanted of me, I would be ready to contribute at any time.

Wednesday, February 27, 1867.
I called on the President to-day with a brief communication to the House of Representatives, declining to furnish certain information which had been called for at the instigation of a claim agent, which response I thought had better pass through the President. The ante-rooms were very much crowded. In the council room, at the President’s table, was a gentleman busily writing, who did not lift his head while I was in the room, but who, I am confident, was -Judge Jeremiah Black. My interview with the President was necessarily brief, for I saw he was engaged and none were admitted. I have no doubt that Black is assisting in preparing the veto message on the military government bill, stating some of the legal objections.

Friday, March 1, 1867.
Seward and Stanton have prepared and handed to the President the veto message on the bill for the Tenure of Office. They did not see fit to submit it to me, and I hesitated whether to inform the President of the fact. Amidst other multitudinous duties he supposes, I have no doubt, that I have participated in and revised the message. On the whole concluded to say nothing unasked.

[The Reconstruction Act, passed over the President’s veto, divided the ten Southern states into five military districts under military governors. The seceded states were to be restored to their place in the Union whenever a convention of delegates elected by the male citizens of whatever race or color, except those disfranchised for participation in the rebellion, should frame a constitution; provided that this constitution, being ratified by the people and approved by Congress, should be put into operation, and the legislature thereby elected should adopt the Fourteenth Amendment.]

Saturday, March 2, 1867.
The President is greatly pressed with business. Sent in to-day his two vetoes. That on the establishment of military governments over the ten states was received with deep interest. The opinions of a majority of the Republicans are undoubtedly against the principles of the bill, but they have not the independence and moral courage to act in conformity to their convictions and confront theradicals. Party subjection overpowers them. Thad Stevens and the discipline of the caucus is potent.
In the Senate, as in the House, party dominates over country. Fear comes over the feeble-minded who comprise nearly one-half of the SenateIf two or three hesitated, the recent extraordinary course of Reverdy Johnson decided them to submit to the demands of party. Johnson knows and says the bill is unconstitutional and wrong, yet he violates his oath and votes for it. His justification is that the radicals, in their fury, will impose harder terms if these are not accepted, and he wants the country to have repose. It is known, however, that his son-in-law is an earnest candidate for the office of district attorney of Maryland, and he could not, under existing circumstances, expect to be confirmed by this Senate were the President to nominate him. This apostasy of Johnson will insure the son-in-law’s confirmation, provided he gets the nomination; and Reverdy, to say nothing of other malign influences, fancies that his position as senator, and one of the judges of the President in case of impeachment, will secure the selection.

[The radicals had now a thoroughly disciplined two-thirds majority in Congress. The Reconstruction Act was, on this day, passed over the President’s veto; and on the following Monday the Tenure-of-Office Act was also passed.]

Sunday, March 3, 1867.
Spent two or three hours at the President’s this morning. McCulloch and Browning called for me. Seward and Randall were there. The President was calm, but I thought more dejected than I had almost ever seen him. Not that he expressed himself despondingly, but his air and manner were of that appearance, — perhaps it was because he had but little sleep, for he spoke of transactions past midnight.
While the President was absent for a short time in the library, Browning remarked that he felt disturbed by the state of things. How, said he, is Grant? Does any one know his opinions, and what stand he takes?
Seward said he would know to-morrow at two p. M., or perhaps at two p. M. on Tuesday. Browning pricked up his ears and opened his eyes. How, enquired he, shall I know? ‘Why,’ replied Seward, ‘Benjamin F. Butler will be sworn in by that time, and his animosity towards Grant is so much greater than it is towards the President that he will make his opinions known and understood upon the floor of the House. When that is done you will all understand where Grant stands.’
The President said he had last night, after one o’clock, a letter from Reverdy Johnson requesting that his sonin-law, Ridgely, might be nominated district attorney. This, the President remarked, was about as cool a piece of assurance as he had ever witnessed. It does not surprise me. What will the President do?

Monday, March 4, 1867.
Went at half-past nine to the Capitol. The President directed the Cabinet to meet at that time. I called at the Executive Mansion on my way and found the President very busy. He had signed all the bills sent him save three. One was the army appropriation bill, the second section of which, as well as some others, was objectionable, so much so that I could not advise him to sanction it. Another was the woolens bill, which I had not examined, but which McCulloch thought the President had better sign with a protest.

Wednesday, March 6, 1867.
I was with the President on a little business and Stanbery was present at the early part of our interview. The subject of yesterday’s decision on the powers of the brigadiers was introduced by S[tanbery], who said he had not a shadow of a doubt in regard to it, — he thinks Stanton and his friends have overshot the mark.
After Stanbery left, the President continued the conversation on the same topic, and if he intended to enforce an unconstitutional law in regard to the importance of selecting the right men for military governors, I urged him to be certain in regard to his men for those positions, and to have an interview with each before giving them orders. He assented fully.
I then alluded again to the condition of things here in Washington. In the event of the radical leaders succeeding in their intrigue to procure an impeachment, the first step, after impeachment should be voted, would be to order his arrest. If he was not prepared to submit to an arrest, was he prepared to meet it? Whom could he confide in? Who of the military men, or of the War Department, would stand by him, against an order issued by Congress, or the Senate as a court under the signature of the Chief Justice, commanding his arrest? I had on two or three occasions, I remarked, introduced this topic, not that it was pleasant or interesting to me, but it was important to him and the country. Once he had himself brought forward the subject, but a direct and positive answer by the Cabinet or some of the Cabinet had been evaded by some of the members.
The President said yes he was aware of it, but he would bring the subject to a decision next Friday. I told him that it was in my opinion due to himself, although Mr. Seward had said it was not best to anticipate.
But it has been the misfortune, the weakness, the great error of the President to delay,—hesitate before acting. It has weakened him in public estimation, and given the impression that he is not strong in his own opinions. Yet I know of no man who is more firm, when he has once taken a stand. But promptness, as well as firmness, is necessary to impress public confidence.

[The Thirty-ninth Congress expired by limitation on March 4 th. At its expiration the new Congress, in accordance with an act previously passed, assembled in extraordinary session.]

Thursday, March 7, 1867.
The radicals are divided in opinion on the subject of impeachment, and also as to the adjournment. Some wish a continuous session, some wish to adjourn to May, others until October or November. The Senate seem determined to adjourn over until the fall, while the extreme radicals wish to continue in session, although there is no business requiring their presence. But they desire to administer the government and impeach the President. Not that he has committed any wrong, or that any offense can be stated; but they have had a committee searching the country to find, if possible, some mistake, some error, some act, which can be construed into a political fault and thus justify his removal, because he is an obstacle in the way of radicalism.

Friday, March 8, 1867.
After the meeting, or the regular session, was over, McCulloch reached over the table, at the end of which the President was sitting, I being as usual on his left, and Browning came and seated himself on the opposite side and said something in a low tone which I did not hear, or which passed out of my mind in consequence of what subsequently occurred. He said it (his suggestion, whatever it was) would check the impeachment movement. The President replied hastily, ‘I will do nothing to check impeachment, if there is any wish to press it. I am tired of hearing allusions to impeachment. God Almighty knows I will not turn aside from my public duties to attend to these contemptible assaults which are got up to embarrass the administration. Let the House go forward and busy themselves in that matter if they wish.’
There are rumors as to the persons to be selected as military governors, and I think the President is, unfortunately for himself, consulting with General Grant. How far Grant confers with Stanton I know not, nor does the President, if he confers at all. That Grant may be biased by Stanton and [Advocate-General] Holt, with whom he has constant, intimate intercourse is not improbable. However, my impression has been that Grant is himself rightly disposed, though there are some things which indicate subtlety and duplicity.

Saturday, March 9, 1867.
Law of Indiana, who was a member of the Thirty-seventh and Thirtyeighth Congresses, called on me, being on a visit, to Washington. We have been good friends from our first acquaintance. He said he had just paid his respects to the President and reminded him of an incident. In the summer of 1861, he L[aw] was at the Burnett House in Cincinnati on his way to Washington in pursuance of the call of President Lincoln for an extra session. He had just finished his meal, breakfast I think, and came out on the piazza, when a troop of horse, both riders and animals somewhat jaded, rode up, and opening in line, a citizen, in dusty citizen’s dress, came forward and dismounted. That man, exhausted and covered with dust, was Andrew Johnson, a senator from Tennessee, on his way to Washington under the call of the President, and the military authorities had despatched a troop of horse to escort and guard him across the State of Kentucky. ‘I little thought,’ said Law, ‘that I should ever hear Andrew Johnson denounced as a rebel, or a sympathizer with rebels; that partisan malice would ever accuse him of want of fidelity to the Union; but God only knows what we are coming to in these radical times. Such a patriot as Johnson,’ said Law, with tears running down his cheeks, ‘a man who has suffered and done so much, deserves better treatment from his countrymen.’

Friday, April 5, 1867.
President called the Cabinet to a special session at nine A. M., relative to notice given him of a motion which was to be made to the Supreme Court for an injunction on him and general order to stay proceedings under the military bill for constructing the rebel states. Attorney-General was directed to object to the motion, — the President, as the representative of the United States, cannot be sued.
General Butler called on me yesterday, ostensibly on some little matter of business. When it was disposed of, he asked whether he was to congratulate or condole with me on the result of the Connecticut election. I replied that I was gratified at the result and, of course, had no need of consolation, that I congratulated myself and others on what had taken place. This opened the subject of our public affairs, on which we had a pretty free and apparently unreserved conversation, though he is neither frank nor reliable. He is not, I perceive, satisfied with his position, nor with his treatment by a portion of the radicals. I spoke of the election as being favorable to the President, whose policy I approved — the policy had commenced with Mr. Lincoln, and I believed it correct. I asked wherein he could except to it. He said that perhaps Congress should have been consulted; he thought so. I enquired by what authority Congress could intervene?— Congress was the legislative not the executive department of government. [It] had none but granted powers, and when was the power conferred on Congress to construct or destroy a state? He answered there is no grant, but it grew out of the war — the rebel states were conquered states. The President had no more power than Congress.
‘Therein,’ said I, ‘we differ. I hold, as did Mr. Lincoln and as does Mr. Johnson, that when Lee and Johnston surrendered, martial law prevailed from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, and the President, as commander-inchief, had the undoubted right under the war power to govern those states, temporarily, and to bring order out of chaos. He could have turned the matter over to General Grant and other military subordinates, but he preferred to do it himself. He appointed a provisional governor, first in North Carolina and subsequently in other states, as you, General Butler, being in chief command in the Gulf, appointed Deming provisional mayor in New Orleans. Mr. Lincoln had no intention of calling on Congress to assist in this matter. Every one knew this, who had any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Colfax was here on the day of his death to bid him good-bye, for he was intending to cross the plains and be absent until October. As Speaker he would not have absented himself had there been any intention of convening Congress.
‘Then,’ said I, ‘these military despotisms over the states — the assembling of the state governments — I don’t see, General, how you, if a democratic Republican, can sanction such measures.’
‘I had nothing to do with them,’ said he. ‘They were enacted before I took my seat.’
‘But,’ said I, ‘you are identified with that party and those acts.’
‘Begging your pardon, I do not endorse those acts nor approve them. I am not identified with them, nor responsible for them.’

I remarked that I was glad to hear him say so.
‘Why,’ he asked, ‘does not the President test, them? Why does he submit to such laws and attempt to carry them out? He declares them unconstitutional. If so, they are no laws. Why does he obey them?’
I called his attention to the constitutional requirement, that he should see all laws faithfully executed.
‘But it is no law,’ said Butler, ‘the President says it is no law. He is one of the departments of the government and must decide for himself. If, however, he wants to get a decision from the court, there is no difficulty. Let a suit be instituted in Virginia and brought at once before the Supreme Court now in session.’
He then went on to detail the modus operandi.
On the whole I am satisfied that Butler is dissatisfied.

Wednesday, April 17, 1867 .
My time has been so occupied that I could make no record of daily occurrences in this book. Important events have occurred; some of the details should have been jotted down.
The Senate continues in session, rejecting the nominations which the President sends in, not that the nominees are not competent, and faithful, but because they are his friends and support his measures. Some of the Senators declare they will vote to confirm no man who is not a radical. Dixon tells me that Sumner made his boast, in extra session, that he had allowed none but radicals to be appointed to any office in Massachusetts, where the Senate has a voice. I have little confidence in Randall as P[ost] M[aster] G[eneral], under such circumstances. He gives in, trims, lacks vim and strength if nothing else. I apprehend his course has some influence on McCulloch, who, loaded down with the financial difficulties, wants to conciliate. It requires some courage to meet a not overscrupulous body of men clothed with authority, and who, if they choose, can embarrass the government without financial accountability. The President has held his own very well, considering his surroundings. Seward he probably consults most, and Seward has, as Mr. Clay said of him, ‘no convictions.’ [He] is an egotist and selfish aspirant. Randall, whose confirmation is understood to have been secured by pledges to radical senators, is greatly under Seward’s influence, and the President cannot, with his reticence, avoid committing errors with such advisers. The result is that the President is appointing more enemies than friends, and his administration is thereby weakened.

Saturday, May 4, 1867.
The Judiciary Committee of the House has re-assembled in Washington to pursue enquiries and see if they cannot obtain something on which to impeach the President. No facts, no charges, no malconduct, are known or preferred, for the slip-slop of Ashley was long since discarded, but a standing committee is advertised and has assembled to ascertain whether something cannot be found which may be tortured or twisted against the President, whom they cannot induce to go with them in their revolutionary schemes, and who is, consequently, in their way. A more scandalous villainy never disgraced the country.

Tuesday, June 4, 1867.
The Judiciary Committee have, by a vote of five to four, decided against impeachment, but by a strict party vote passed a resolution of censure against the President . A more shameless and disgraceful proceeding than this whole impeachment conspiracy has never been enacted. For many months a committee, composed mostly of extreme partisans, has been in session with extraordinary powers to send for persons and papers, and with the public treasury and an army of public scavengers to assist them to find, if possible, some act or transaction, or expression, which would justify or excuse an arraignment of the chief magistrate. His public and his private acts have been scanned, his household affairs, his domestic life, his bankaccounts, his social intercourse, as well as all his speeches, conversations, and doings as a man and President have been scrutinized. Failing in their intrigue, scandal and defamation have been set to work to palliate these outrageous proceedings. Most of the members of the Cabinet, and I believe all but myself, have been summoned before this committee, as well as his private secretaries and members of his family. Why I was spared, I know not. I have an impression and intimations in fact that Stanton proposed and ordered I should not be called. Both he and Seward, in a conversation which took place as to disclosing proceedings in Cabinet, thought the matter might be got along with by answering pretty fully all questions that were put without any allusion to the fact whether it was or was not a cabinet subject. I doubted whether it was right to disclose what had occurred in Cabinet, to such a committee, — perhaps to any one at present.

Friday, June 7, 1867.
Admiral Farragut went home today. He has been my guest for a week. Gave him yesterday his orders to the European squadron and lie expects to sail within a fortnight. In bidding him good-bye I was more affected than he was aware, and I perceived that he was to some extent similarly affected. We have both reached that period of life when a parting of two years may be a parting forever on earth. Circumstances have brought us together and we are under mutual obligations. I selected him for important duties and he proved himself worthy of the trust and confidence. In addition to his great, unsurpassed service to the country, he has given just fame to my administration of the navy, and I honor him for his unnecessary modesty as well as for possessing the heroic qualities which I expected. I trust we may live to meet again on earth and enjoy memories of the past. If not, God’s will be done. I esteem the choice of Farragut to command the Gulf squadron the most judicious and best selection which could have been made in the entire service. I consider him the great hero of the war, and am happy in the thought that I was the means of carrying him to the head of his profession where he had an opportunity to develop his power and ability.

Saturday, June 8, 1867.
The President and party returned today from North Carolina. All appears to have passed off well.
There is much talk and feeling in regard to Sheridan’s movements, which are arbitrary, tyrannical, and despotic. His removal of Wells, the poor governor of Louisiana, is justified by most of the radicals, although it is an outrage on our laws and institutions. The trimming course of Wells and his want of honest character palliates Sheridan’s conduct, which, however, is wholly indefensible.

Thursday, June 27, 1867.
Montgomery Blair has become quite indifferent in regard to the fate of President Johnson. Says he is completely under the dominion of Seward and Stanton, who have demoralized him, that the President has listened to them until he has become nervous and apprehensive, without resolute courage to carry out or maintain his conviction, and that he is in constant dread of impeachment.
Blair is shrewd and observing, though of strong prejudices. He thinks it absolutely necessary to revive the Democratic party and its organization in order to rescue the government from centralizing hands. This has been the policy of himself and some others for some time past. The policy has its disadvantages as well as advantages. One cause of the failure of the Union movement ⁴ a year since was the attempt to bring forward as leaders and candidates those Democrats who had made themselves obnoxious for their extreme partisanship, and especially their opposition to the measures of the government for t he preservation of the Union. The people were not disposed to invest ‘ copperheads,’ rebel-sympathizers, and rebels, with power while the soil was yet wet with the blood of patriots; and Blair and others injure themselves at this time in pressing forward prematurely that class of persons. In the conversation to-day, we spoke of Grant in connection with the presidency, and from present indications I expressed the opinion that he was disposed to be a candidate, and if so, he would probably be elected. Blair said he could not be if he was the radical candidate. I said Grant would endeavor to be the army and union candidate; [that] without much political intelligence or principle, he had party cunning and would strive to be a candidate but not strictly a party candidate; that the radicals did not want. him, but they could not help themselves nor perhaps could Grant. They felt that they must nominate him in order that they might succeed; he felt that he could not reject their candidacy, if they took him up, but really prefers the Democrats to the Republicans.
Blair has been and still is friendly to Grant, but perceives that G[rant] is becoming alienated from old friends and getting in with new ones, and it rouses his opposition. I asked whom he would have for a candidate in opposition to Grant. He said he cared not who it was. ‘Nor I,’ was my reply, ‘but whom can you present?’ He said McClellan. ‘That,’ said I, ‘insures defeat. The people will not, and I think ought not to, rally under him.’

Friday, June 28, 1867.
A committee is in session to enquire into the ordnance transactions of the War and Navy Department, composed of as unprincipled a set of scoundrels, with scarcely an exception, as is in Congress. I have told Wise, Chief of Ordnance in Naval Bureau, to give them every facility for enquiry; if he, or any one, had done wrong I desired it should be exposed.

Saturday, June 29, 1867.
The President and party are expected home to-day. They have had, apparently, a pleasant tour. Too much speaking, but less than in the Chicago jaunt last year.

Sunday, June 30, 1867.
Called this morning on the President and congratulated him on his safe return, in apparently improved health. He was very cordial, disposed to talk. Was not fully posted on occurrences and events of the last ten days. Talked of Sheridan, of Congress, of Stanbery’s opinions, etc. In regard to Stanton, he expressed himself convinced that he had played a part for himself, had an understanding with the violent radicals, had embarrassed the administration and thwarted its policy — and he was surprised that Stanton should persist in holding on to his place, and mixing with us. I remarked it was now of little consequence. He had so managed with the radicals as to cripple the administration until it was powerless, and he might remain on to the close, or he might leave soon. The President assented, presumed Stanton intended to be a candidate.

Wednesday, July 10, 1867.
The loose, reckless violence, and inconsiderate action of Congress, make it irksome and painful for me to read their proceedings. How little regard have the members for their oaths and their country’s welfare! The worst principles of tyranny and outrage, they avow and encourage. The President is coarsely, falsely and vindictively assailed by leaders as well as by followers, who are secretly prompted. The Constitution and its limitations are ridiculed and contemned.
Senator Wade equivocates and backs down from his recent aggressive speech. Instead of a step in advance as he boasted, he takes a step to the rear.
A curious letter in the New York Herald, reciting a conversation and certain avowals of Thad Stevens, is attracting attention, and he, to-day, on the floor of the House, made remarks on the letter. Almost all which this vicious old man does is premeditated, dramatic, and for effect. The letter was, evidently, carefully prepared by himself. Not that he wrote it, but the correspondent had the catechism and answers furnished him. Stevens is perhaps a worthy leader for such a party — the ‘Great Commoner.’

(To be continued.)