A Diary of the Reconstruction Period

IX. THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT

Thursday, December 12, 1867.
The President requested me by note to call on him at eleven to-day. Stanbery and Browning were also there by invitation. The President submitted a message to the Senate, communicating some of his reasons for suspending the Secretary of War; no removal has yet taken place. He first asked my opinion, and I stated it, but in view of the traits and peculiar attitude of Grant, in whom the President had not lost all confidence, suggested that it would be well to inform the Senate that the Secretary ad interim had performed the duties acceptably, and that the reforms he had made and the economy he had practiced were of benefit to the country. He says he has dismissed some forty supernumerary clerks. Both S[tanbery] and B[rowning] concurred in the suggestion. S[tanbery] said it was a wise suggestion. A brief statement was accordingly added to the close. I should have made it more full and declared that General Grant had my confidence thus far in administering the office, if such is the fact, and thus have hitched him to the administration. It would have made an issue between him and the Stanton radicals.

Tuesday, December 24, 1867.
A few members of Congress remain in the city but most have left for Christmas vacation. The adjournment and an interview with their constituents may do them and the country good. The elections of the year and the unmistakable evidence of condemnation by the people have annoyed them, but there is not among them the patriotism, ability, and independence to extricate themselves from the control of intriguing conspirators, who by secret caucuses have made it impossible for them to retrace their steps, and try to do right. Among the radicals there is little statesmanship. They are striying to retain their usurped power by outrageous measures and violence.
Chief Justice Chase still aspires to be the radical candidate for President, but few of the radicals are disposed to gratify his aspirations. Among bankers, speculators, and a certain class of capitalists he finds supporters, and he has a quasi strength among the Southern radicals and Negroes. The Republicans, or the conservative element of what was the Republican party, are favoring General Grant. Comprising the largest segment, they will be likely to control party action, to the disgust of the earnest radicals who, however, dare not oppose the movement. Grant himself is not only willing but grows daily more and more anxious. His aspirations, although he strives to conceal them, are equal and even surpass those of the Chief Justice. His reticence is all a matter of calculation. He fears to commit himself on anything lest he should lose votes. But popular opinion moves him. A year since he believed that the country was fully committed to radicalism, and under that conviction he became identified with the radicals — changing his previously expressed opinions — and acting with them until the recent fall elections. Those results astonished no man more than Grant, and he has felt uneasy under his hasty committals, while striving to be reserved.
Stanton, whom he dislikes, has managed to get him committed, which he would not have done had Grant better understood public sentiment. But in Washburne² and other little radicals he had had surroundings that controlled him.
I am becoming impressed with the idea that Grant may prove a dangerous man. In discussion, from time to time, in Cabinet, when he has been necessarily to some extent drawn out, this shadow of military absolutism has crossed my mind. It struck me more forcibly to-day when the military government of the South was under consideration.

Friday, January 3, 1868.
Little of interest in Cabinet. Dined with Mrs. W[elles] at the President’s. The dinner was complimentary to General Sherman. Only he and his daughter, his father-in-law, Thomas Ewing, and Stanbery and lady, who were old township acquaintances of Sherman’s, were present, except the President and his daughter. It was a pleasant party. General Sherman says it is the first time he has ever dined at the Executive mansion. The President is desirous of making close friendship with Sherman, and may succeed; but he cannot detach him from General Grant, even if disposed. Although the two men are unlike, there is between them close identification.

Tuesday, January 14, 1868.
General Grant attended the Cabinet meeting to-day, but stated it was by special request of the President. The Senate had notified him last evening that the reasons for suspending Mr. Stanton were insufficient, and he had therefore gone early to the War Department, locked the doors and given the keys to the Adjutant-General. Subsequently he had sent General Comstock to the President with a letter and a copy of the resolution of the Senate, and had received a request through General C[omstock] when he returned, to be present to-day, and had therefore come over, though he was now at the Headquarters and considered himself relieved of the duties of Secretary.
The President asked if this proceeding conformed to previous understanding, etc. General Grant, without answering directly, said he had promised some time ago that he would give the President notice before relinquishing the office; but that he had not then examined closely the second and fifth sections of the Tenure-of-Office bill. He was not willing to suffer five years’ imprisonment and pay ten thousand dollars fine, but preferred to give up the office.
The President asked why, when he had read the sections and come to the conclusion to leave, he had not informed him as agreed; and remarked that he would undergo the whole imprisonment and fine himself, which might be adjudged against General Grant; and said he so told Grant when he spoke of apprehensions on Saturday.
The General said he was not aware of the penalties in the Tenure-of-Office bill, until he saw the discussion in the papers, did not know of them when he had his first talk with the President, and he came over on Saturday expressly to take up this subject. Had spoken of these difficulties at that time, and expected to see the President again on Monday, but he was busy with General Sherman, and had a good many little matters to attend to. He did not suppose the Senate intended to act so soon.
‘Was it not our understanding, did you not assure me some time ago, and again on Saturday, that if you did not hold on to the office yourself, you would place it in my hands that I might select another?’ said the President.
‘That,’ said Grant, ‘was my intention. I thought some satisfactory arrangement would be made to dispose of the subject. Mr. [Reverdy] Johnson and General Sherman spent a great deal of time with me on Sunday. Did n’t Mr. Johnson come to see you? I sent General Sherman yesterday, after talking the matter over. Did n’t you see Sherman?’
The President said he saw each of them, but he did not see what the interview with either had to do with giving back into his hands the place, agreeably to the understanding.
‘Why did you give up the keys to Mr. Stanton and leave the Department?’
General Grant said he gave the key to the Adjutant-General and sent word to the President by General Comstock.‘Yes,’ said the President, ‘but that you know was not our understanding.’Grant attempted some further apologies about being very busy, stammered, hesitated, said Sherman had taken up a great deal of his time, but he had intended to call on the President on Monday, asked to be excused and left.
This is as nearly as I recollect the substance of the conversation as it occurred. I do not claim to give the precise words, though in many instances I probably have done so. My intention and wish is to do injustice to neither, but fairly present what took place and the remarks of both. I write this on the evening of Tuesday, the 14th, while the subject is fresh in my mind.
The President was calm and dignified, though manifestly disappointed and displeased. General Grant was humble, hesitating, and he evidently felt that his position was equivocal and not to his credit.
There was, I think, an impression on the minds of all present, there certainly was on mine, that a consciousness that he had acted with duplicity, [that he had] not been faithful and true to the man who had confided in and trusted him, oppressed General Grant. His manner, never very commanding, was almost abject, and he left the room with less respect, I apprehend, from those present than ever before.
The President, though disturbed and not wholly able to conceal his chagrin from those familiar with him, used no harsh expression, nor committed anything approaching incivility, yet Grant felt the few words put to him, and the cold and surprised disdain of the President, in all their force.
After Grant had left, the President remarked that it had been said no man was to be blamed for having been once deceived, but if the same person a second time imposed upon him, the fault and folly were his. He said that Reverdy Johnson and General Sherman had called on him, after the consultation with Grant alluded to, and wanted him to nominate Governor Cox of Ohio, whom they had selected to be his Secretary of War. They thought the Senate might be induced to consent that he might have Cox, and in that way dispose of Stanton.
There is no doubt that Grant has been in secret intrigue in this business, acting in concert with and under the direction of the chief conspirators. He did not put the office in the President’s hands on Saturday, because the Senate had not acted, but he anticipated, as I and others did, that they would. If therefore the subject was delayed until Monday it would be too late. But the Senate came to no conclusion on Saturday as he expected; he therefore avoided seeing the President on Monday as he promised. On Tuesday he yielded to Stanton.
All the members of the Cabinet present were astonished and declared themselves unqualifiedly against both Grant and Stanton, except Seward, who was very reticent, but expressed an opinion that no action should be taken hastily. On grave and important questions he always perferred to take a night’s sleep.

Wednesday, February 5, 1868.
Saw the President this evening. I took occasion to express my apprehensions of public affairs, and of threatening impending calamities which were to be met. I reminded him that it was a duty for us all, and particularly for him, to be prepared for approaching extraordinary emergencies. Reckless, unprincipled men in Congress had control of the government, were usurping executive authority, and would exercise these powers to extreme and evidently beyond constitutional limits.
I asked the President if he was prepared for that crisis. Should they attempt to seize the government, to arrest him? Had he determined the course he would pursue? Such a step is, I know, meditated by some of the extreme radicals. They have intended, by any measure, no matter how unprincipled and violent, to get possession of and to exercise the executive authority. Grant would help them. Congress, unmindful of the Constitution, will place the money at his disposal instead of the President’s. Who, I asked the President, had he got in whom he could confide if a collision took place?
The President became somewhat excited, arose, and walked the room. I had evidently touched on topics which had been in his mind. He spoke of Sherman as having been more emphatic in his language before he left, and suggested that Washington might be made a military Department and Sherman ordered to it. Sherman, he knew, would take it.
I expressed misgivings as to Sherman if Grant were to be his antagonist. He is friendly disposed, but would yield, I feared, and follow Grant rather than the President. I admitted that he was a man of superior intellect and of a higher sense of honor than Grant, but their military association and the ties and obligations of military fellowship and long personal intimacy and friendship would attach him to Grant, though I hoped not to the overthrow of the government.

Friday, February 21, 1868.
After disposing of regular Cabinet business, as we were about rising, the President informed us he had this morning removed Mr. Stanton. He had, he said, perhaps delayed the step too long. At all events it was time the difficulty was settled.
Some one, I believe myself, enquired who was to be his successor. The President said General Thomas, AdjutantGeneral, ad interim and until a regular Secretary was appointed.
I asked if Stanton had surrendered up the place and General Thomas taken possession. The President said General Thomas had called on S[tanton] and informed him of his appointment, that Stanton seemed calm and submissive, that some little conversation had passed between them as to removing his books and papers, and S[tanton] was willing that Thomas should act as his successor.
Browning said he had been informed that Stanton intended sending in his resignation to-day or to-morrow. A few remarks took place on this subject. I wholly discredited it, and expressed the belief he would under no circumstances resign, except on the single contingency of an assurance that he would not have radical support. I was surprised to hear that he had quietly surrendered to General Thomas and should be glad to hear that he had left, and that General T[homas] was in the room in possession. McCulloch said he doubted if Stanton had resigned, or intended to. He and I had once differed. He had thought Stanton would resign as soon as re-instated. I then said he would not. The result, McCulloch said, had proved that I was right and he was wrong. He now concurred with me. Browning said he gave no credit to the rumor which he had heard. It came to him through Cox, his Chief Clerk, who caught everything afloat.
The President said he had also brevetted Major-General G. H. Thomas to be Lt. General and General, or rather that he had sent in these brevets to the Senate. He had also nominated General McClellan as Minister to England, in place of Mr. Adams.
These acts of the President will excite the radicals, and the violent ones will undoubtedly improve the opportunity to press on impeachment. Impulse rather than reason or common sense governs them. The President is vigorous and active, but too late, and has attempted too much at once.

Saturday, February 22, 1868.
There was great excitement and many rumors last evening in regard to the President, and Congress, and others. Stanton, on getting notice of his removal, immediately sent it to the House of Representatives through the Speaker, and fire and wrath were exhibited.
The Senate were promptly informed by the President of the removal of Stanton, and the appointment of Thomas ³ad interim. That body at once stopped all business and went into Executive session, where a fierce and protracted debate took place, extending far into the night. A resolution was finally adopted by a strict party vote, except Edmunds, who though a strong partisan has a legal mind, that the President had no constitutional or legal power to remove the Secretary of War and appoint another, thus giving an opinion in advance of impeachment on a point for which the President may be presented to themselves for trial.
A committee was appointed in a radical caucus, hastily convened, while the Senate was in session, who proceeded to the War Department, and counselled and conferred with Stanton how to resist the Executive, and they afterwards called on General Grant, who was inclined to be ‘reticent.’
This morning General Thomas was arrested, on a writ issued by Judge Cartter, a tool of Stanton, on a complaint by Stanton, that General T[homas] had violated the Civil Tenure law in accepting office against the provisions of that law, which he, Stanton, had himself emphatically declared as unconstitutional.
General Thomas readily submitted to the arrest and gave bail to appear next Wednesday. Stanton remained at the Department all night with a parcel of radical senators and representatives, and is there now and has been all day, most of the time locked up.
It was impolitic for Thomas who is a subordinate and not an independent or self-reliant man to have given bail; better to have gone to jail and sued out a writ of habeas corpus. Better still, it seems to me, if he had first got out a process against Stanton. The people still have great deference to law and to legal proceedings.
I called about noon on the President. He was in the library with the Attorney-General. We had a brief conversation on affairs, when the Attorney-General proposed to the President to ask my opinion on the subject they were discussing when I entered. The President said that was his intention, and I was asked what I thought of Thomas Ewing, Senior, for Secretary of War. I asked if a person of his years was the man for the occasion; the crisis was important. The President said he was sound and right on the questions before us, trustworthy, and he believed reliable. I still hesitated and debated the subject; his former standing, his relationship to Sherman,⁴ his great age, etc. Stanbery said McClellan had just been nominated Minister to England from the Democratic side, if we now name Ewing from the old Whig ranks, the two will go well together. The President smiled assent. I remarked that I thought it would be well to get a nomination in early. The President said if we two approved, he would send in Mr. Ewing’s name at once. I said if that was his view, I should acquiesce cheerfully, he was unquestionably the man who should select his own advisers.
The President directed Colonel Moore to immediately write a nomination, which he at once signed and sent to the Senate. But the Senate, although it had assigned this day to a speech from Senator Doolittle, met and adjourned, without doing any business, so that when Colonel Moore reached the Capitol the Senate was not in session.
The President needs, at this time, resolute and energetic surroundings, men of intelligence and courage as well as of caution and prudence. With them he should counsel freely and without reserve. I apprehend he has not sufficiently fortified himself with such men. In his Cabinet, he has an honest lawyer in Mr. Stanbery, who will be faithful to him so long as he has law and precedent, but when new questions arise he is at sea and knows not how to steer. He will take no new step, or enter on any untrodden path. In the meantime the radicals are breaking over constitutional law and all legal restraints, and will, if they dare, arrest the President and his principal friends and imprison them. I do not anticipate this, yet the scheme is agitated by leading conspirators and I shall not be surprised at any movement they may make.
Returning from an evening ride, I called upon the President hoping to find him alone, but McCulloch and Jeffries⁵ were with him. Jeffries was advising strong measures, thought if the President were to send a communication to the Senate, or to Congress, saying he wished the constitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office bill and the reconstruction acts decided by the Courts, that he would submit the laws to them, and if they should decide against him, or that the laws were constitutional, he would resign.
Such a proposition J[effries] thought would carry the country with the President. If Congress would not acquiesce in such a submission or reference, but were to proceed to extremities, then resist, seize the principal conspirators, etc. Fifty armed men would be all that were necessary. The President made no reply, nor did he enter into any conversation with J[effries] on the subject. I merely observed that their theories would not be carried out, however plausible they might seem when not commenced.
Congress would consent to no reference of their laws and proceedings to any court — that would be a trial of the Legislature as well as the Executive by the Judiciary. It was the purpose of the Legislature to try the Executive themselves. And then, as to the fifty military men, what could they do? Here was the General of the armies in the conspiracy, secretly urging it on. He might be arrested if insubordinate, but who was to do it? Emory is in command of the District. Can the President depend on him in an emergency? I have but little confidence in him, but the President ought to know him, and I presume does. He should have the best friend he has got in the army in that place.
I called on the President this morning in consequence of an incident which took place at a party given by Mrs. Ray last evening. After the company assembled an orderly appeared, requiring all officers of the 5th Cavalry to appear at Headquarters. Shortly after, another orderly requiring all officers under General Emory’s command to appear at Headquarters. Both orders came from E[mory]. I asked the President if he had made preparations, had issued orders to E[mory]. He said he had not. Some one, said I, has. Who is it and what does it indicate? While you, Mr. President, are resorting to extreme measures, the conspirators have their spies, have command of the troops. Either Stanton or Grant or both issued orders which were proclaimed aloud and peremptorily at this large social gathering.
The President was disturbed, but said very little. It is an error with him that he does not more freely communicate with his Cabinet and friends. This whole movement of changing his Secretary of War has been incautiously and loosely performed, without preparation.

Monday, February 24, 1868.
I have sometimes been almost tempted to listen to the accusation of the President’s enemies that he desired and courted impeachment. Yet such is not the case. He is courageous and firm, with great sagacity and wide comprehension, yet is not in many respects wise and practical. It may be that he is willing the radicals should make themselves ridiculous by futile assaults, but he hardly could have expected this flurry for so peaceful and justifiable a movement.
The House this afternoon decided by a vote of 126 to 47 to impeach the President. The alleged cause of impeachment is the removal of a contumacious, treacherous and unprincipled officer, who intrudes himself into the War Department under the authority of a law, which he himself denounced as unconstitutional, a law to fetter the President and deprive the Executive of his rights.
The impeachment is a deed of extreme partisanship, a deliberate conspiracy, involving all the moral guilt of treason for which the members would, if fairly tried, be liable to conviction and condemnation. If the President has committed errors, he has done no act which justifies this proceeding. The President is innocent, of crime, his accusers and triers are culpably guilty. In this violent and vicious exercise of partyism, I see the liberties and happiness of the country and the stability of the government imperilled.
The President has a reception this evening, and though neither my wife nor myself are well, and the night is inclement, we shall, with all the family, be present.

Tuesday, February 25, 1868.
There is, I think, less excitement today. The weather, which is damp and dreary, perhaps contributes to it. A feeling of doubt and sadness pervades the minds of sensible men. Some of the less intense radicals are dissatisfied with their own doings.
John Bigelow, late Minister to France, spent an hour with me this P. M. He has been here some ten days, a lookeron and a good and honest observer. The proceedings at the Capitol have greatly interested him. He complains, and perhaps with reason, that the President was in fault in not communicating to his friends in Congress his purpose in removing Stanton, that they might have been prepared for the contest. The President’s measures, he thinks also, should have been taken with deliberation, that he should not have permitted himself to be foiled by Stanton; that Thomas, or the man who was to take the place of Stanton, should have ejected him at once. All this is very true. It is easy, now that the matter has passed, to say that so great a scoundrel, so treacherous, false and deceitful a man, should not have been treated like a gentleman. The President has, from the first, extended to Stanton a consideration and leniency that has surprised me, for he knew him to be false, remorseless, treacherous, and base. I expressed my disbelief in his quiet retirement last Friday, when the President announced his removal and the appointment of Thomas.
Bigelow is confident, or ratherhas high hopes, that impeachment will fail in the Senate. Says that the large conservative force in the Senate, with the Chief Justice, look with repugnance and horror to the accession of Wade, and would prefer to continue the President. Unless, therefore, Wade will resign and allow some good conservative Senator to be made President of the Senate, he thinks impeachment will be defeated.

Wednesday, February 26, 1868.
General Lorenzo Thomas was arrested last Saturday morning at the instigation of E. M. Stanton, on a writ, issued by Cartter, Chief Justice of the District Court. General T[homas] gave bail in $5,000, and the case came up today, when he was prepared to submit to imprisonment, with a view of suing out a writ of habeas corpus and getting a decision from the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Civil Tenure bill. This the radicals and Stanton dreaded, and after various twistings and turnings, General T[homas] was discharged.
Cartter in the whole proceeding, from its inception to the close, showed himself a most unfit judge. He has secretly visited Stanton at the War Department, and his associate, Fisher, has spent much of his time since Thomas’ arrest, with Stanton.
A summons was issued for Stanton to appear as a witness for Thomas today, and to produce his commission, but the quondam Secretary refused to appear.

Friday, February 28, 1868.
Some laughter took place, after Cabinet Council, over the fortification and entrenchment of the War Department, and the trepidation of Stanton, who has this morning doubled his guard. Kennedy, Chief of New York police, sent a letter to Speaker Colfax, that some nitro-glycerine had disappeared from New York, and that shrewd, sagacious and patriotic functionary knew not where it had gone, unless to Washington.
The chivalrous and timid Speaker at once laid this tremendous missive before the House, and the consternation of the gallant band of radicals became excessive. A large additional police force had been placed around the Capitol, but as it was still considered unsafe an immediate adjournment was called for. Stanton, unfortunate man, could not adjourn. There was no refuge for him save in the War Department, which is surrounded and filled with soldiers to protect him against an inroad from old General Thomas. As Stanton, Grant, and the Radical Congress have assumed the entire control of the military, to the exclusion of the President who is Commander-in-Chief, the apprehension seems to be that the Adjutant-General and his friends have resorted to nitro-glycerine.
Browning enquired whether there should not be more free communication and interchange of opinion among the members of the Cabinet in regard to the measure before Congress.
I regretted that we had not been more free in expressing our views to each other at all times — though it was felt we could not, so long as Stanton was with us, be frank and friendly. McCulloch took the same view. Browning said he had, perhaps, done wrong in bringing the subject forward; it was not his intention to intrude on the President, but the times demanded the united counsel of all. Seward, after remarking that ‘too many cooks usually spoiled the broth,’ expressed his readiness to meet and consult at all times. The subject of counsel in case of a trial was then introduced. Every man advised the retention of Judge Curtis. O’Conor was mentioned. McCulloch objected that he was counsel for Jeff Davis, and that party antipathy would [counteract?] his ability. Evarts was mentioned and rather pressed. I admitted his ability, but feared his want of heart in the cause. He had united with the radicals when their cause seemed strong; it must have been from no mental and moral workings of such a mind as his; in that act he was not true to his nature and to what he knew to be right.

Saturday, February 29,1868.
The impeachment committee have presented ten articles. Nine of them contain a mountain of words, but not. even a mouse of impeachment material. The tenth is even weaker than the other nine, and has a long tail from General Emory. I never had faith in the firmness and honest stability of this man, who was false in 1861, and whimpered back into the service which he had deserted. His willing, volunteered testimony has been evidently procured and manufactured, and yet is nothing. The President had sent for him on the 22nd in consequence of information and suggestions from myself, and questioned him. Emory puts the questions in the form of averments by the President, and throughout exhibits himself a radical partisan for the time being.
Mr. Stanbery says that Judge Curtis will be here on Tuesday evening next. There is, Stanbery thinks, an intention on the part of the managing radicals to exclude him (Stanbery) from taking part in defence of the President before the court of impeachment, because he is Attorney-General. He queries whether he had not better resign forthwith, and devote his whole time to the case. To this we were each and all opposed, or to any resignation unless he were compelled.
A writ of quo warranto is to be sued out, but with the court in the District wholly under the influence of the radical conspirators, action will be delayed as long as possible, for there is nothing they so much dread as a decision of the Supreme Court on their unconstitutional laws.
There is no ‘high crime or misdemeanor ’ in these articles that calls for impeachment, and those who may vote to convict upon these articles would as readily vote to impeach the President had he been accused of stepping on a dog’s tail. But any pretext will serve unprincipled, unscrupulous partisan vengeance.

Tuesday, March 3, 1868.
The journals of the day and the published proceedings will be a record of what occurs in matters of impeachment. I do not therefore record details of official transactions, but such only as seem to me proper together with individual movements. The spirit which has led to the impeachment movement and its consummation in the House is strange and varied. A considerable portion of those who voted for it did violence to their own convictions. There is another large element which had no convictions, but are mere shallow reckless partisans who would as readily have voted that the President should be hung in front of the White House as that he should be impeached in the Capitol, provided their leaders, Stevens, Boutwell, and others had presented papers in form for that purpose. Another and different class like Boutwell seek and expect notoriety and fame. They have read Macaulay’s interesting history of the trial of Warren Hastings, and flatter themselves they are to be the Burkes and Sheridans of some future historian. Malignant party hate, and unscrupulous party thirst for power stimulate others.

Wednesday, March 4, 1868.
Seward and I met in the Councilroom while waiting for the President; allusion was made to our meeting seven years ago yesterday, and of events which have since transpired. He says it is nineteen years this 4th of March since he entered the service of the United States, seven years since he became a Cabinet Minister. ‘How few of all the men,’said he, ‘with whom we have been associated have proved faithful, — how many have disappointed us.' This was said in connection with present transactions, and had particular reference to Stanton.
The Cabinet met last evening at half-past seven instead of at noon. But little official business was done. We had a two hours’ talk of the condition of public affairs, and especially of the great question now before the country. Judge Curtis was expected to-day. He is associated with Mr. Stanbery as one of the counsel of the President. Other names were talked of, but no conclusion come to.
McCulloch expressed a hope that the President would go to the Senate on the first day, but not afterwards. Seward said if he went the whole Cabinet ought to accompany him. I objected to either. It would give dignity and imposing form to the proceedings, which the conspirators wished, but we did not.

Tuesday, March 10, 1868.
Stanton is still making himself ridiculous by entrenching his person in the War Department, surrounded by a heavy guard. This is for effect. He is, it is true, an arrant coward, but can have no apprehension of personal danger requiring a military force to protect him. Some of his wise Senatorial advisers, doubtless, in their conspiracy t o defeat Executive action, counselled and advised the redoubtable Secretary to hold on to the War Department building, and to fortify himself in it.

Thursday, March 12, 1868.
At a special Cabinet meeting the matter of Stanbery’s resignation was considered. The general wish was that he should retain the office and act as counsel; but he prefers to be untrammelled, and has his heart much set on the trial. The President has recently had a conversation with a newspaper correspondent (The World’s) in which he disclosed Pinckney’s case, who was removed by John Adams, — a point on which the counsel were relying and which we all had studiously kept secret.
Stanbery, having presented his resignation and the matter being adjusted, was about leaving, when he stopped, addressed the President and resumed his seat. ‘You are now, Mr. President,’ said he, ‘in the hands of your lawyers who will speak and act for you, and I must begin by requesting that no further disclosures be made to newspaper correspondents. There was in the papers yesterday, or this morning, what purported to be a conversation between the President and a correspondent, in which the Pinckney correspondence was brought out and made public. This is all wrong, and I have to request that these talks or conversations be stopped. They injure your case and embarrass your counsel.’ Browning followed in the same vein and more at length. The President was taken aback. He attempted some apologetic remark. Said the correspondence was in the books, accessible to all, etc. But no one justified, apologized for, or attempted to excuse him. He saw that there was general disapproval.
Some of these proceedings of the President arc unaccountable and inexcusable. He seems to take pleasure in having these ‘talks’ of the President with this or that correspondent published. It is in his position hardly a pardonable weakness.

Friday, March 13, 1868.
Impeachment was the order of the day. The reports render the description and detail unnecessary. Of course, the President was not there, nor were any of his Cabinet. The hollow farce has no friends — hardly any with the radicals — beyond mere pretence. An attempt to proceed forthwith to trial was made, and the Senate had a Star Chamber sitting on the measure, from which all but Senators were excluded. Little of interest took place at the Cabinet meeting.

Saturday, March 14, 1868.
I was confined to my house in consequence of a severe cold which threatened congestion of the lungs, by order of Dr. H[orwitz], but went a short time this evening in a close carriage to the President. Browning and Randall were there. No others. The President indicated more uncomfortable and uncertain feeling than I had before witnessed. He has great calmness, great fortitude, great self-reliance, but it is evident these qualities are put to a severe test by late proceedings. Browning is also disquieted, though not prepared to confess it. Randall, who mixes more with all classes and has better opportunities of feeling the pulse of the public here in Washington than others of us, expresses the strongest conviction that the President will be sustained and that the impeachment will fail. I should have no doubt myself of such a result in an ordinary case in ordinary times — or were the Senators above fanatical partisan prejudice and influence, were they statesmen and independent patriots. But, I am sorry to say I have so little confidence in a majority of the Senators that I make no reliance upon an acquittal. Should a sufficient number evince moral principle and independence to discharge their duty honestly, he may not only be acquitted but have a majority in his favor.
I have seen none of the counsel since the session of yesterday. They asked for forty days to prepare. The Senate went into secret session and gave them nine. This has a bad look. Only nine days for so great a cause, affecting the Chief Magistrate and the Nation itself. Men who would so limit time in so grave a matter, even under secret caucus stimulants, can scarcely be considered worthy to sit in judgment in such a case. The charges are indeed frivolous — contemptible — but the House of Representatives having preferred them, the President should have been allowed ample time for his defence. But a majority of the Senators have prejudged the case, and are ready to pronounce judgment without testimony.
It is pretty evident that the radicals in Congress are in a conspiracy to overthrow not only the President but the Government. The impeachment is but a single act in the drama. Alabama is to be admitted by a breach of faith and by violence to honest, fair legislation. By trick, imposition and breach of courtesy an act was slipped through both Houses repealing the laws of 1867 and 1789 — the effect of which is to take from the Supreme Court certain powers, and [which] is designed to prevent a decision in the McCardle case. Should the Court in that case, as it is supposed they will, pronounce the reconstruction laws unconstitutional, the military governments will fall and the whole radical fabric will tumble with it. Only one course can prolong the miserable contrivance, and that is a President like Wade, who will maintain the military governments regardless of courts, or law or right. Hence I have very little expectation that the President will escape conviction. His deposition is a party necessity, and the Senators have not individually the strength, ability, nor honesty to resist the radical caucus decisions which Stevens, Ben Butler, and other chief conspirators sent out.

Tuesday, March 17, 1868.
The Cabinet met in the Library — the Council-room being occupied by the President’s lawyers preparing for the impeachment trial. There was little of interest. General Thomas was present as the ad interim Secretary of War. The President is anxious and more than usually abstracted. I trust he communicates freely with his counsel, though always inclined to be reserved. It has been, and is his misfortune that he has tried to and still does carry on this great government without confidants, without consulting or advising except to a very limited extent with anybody. It wears upon him, and his measures are not always taken with the caution and care that wisdom dictates.
In his movements the President is irregular. Sometimes he is inexcusably dilatory; sometimes he appears to act from impulse. His best friends expected the removal of Stanton two years earlier than it was made. So far as he communicated anything on the subject, I supposed on several occasions that change would take place. But he delayed until Congress passed a law to prevent Stanton’s removal and the President from acting.
The conduct of Stanton was not gratifying to the radicals or to one wing of the Republican party — the more moderate. They were becoming tired of him. A little skilful management would have made a permanent break in that party. But the President had no tact himself to effect it; he consulted with no others; the opportunity passed away, and by a final hasty move, without preparation, without advising with anybody, he took a step which consolidated the radicals of every stripe, strengthened Stanton, while it weakened his supporters, and brought down a mountain of trouble on himself. Had he unbosomed himself to his Cabinet, received their suggestions and canvassed fully and deliberately the subject, results would have been different.

(To be continued.)