A British View of American Naval Expenditure

I

IN spite of Hague conferences, peace and arbitration societies, diplomacy, trade relations, and last, but not least, Christianity and our boasted civilization, the navies of the world, instead of showing a substantial decrease in tonnage and expenditure, show, on the contrary, an alarming increase. In fact, it is only necessary to compare the naval estimates of to-day with those of twenty years ago, to come to the conclusion that in their race for sea power or naval supremacy, the maritime nations have gone navy, Dreadnought, and big-gun mad.

To those whose interests in general lie outside of naval matters, and whose active part in naval administration consists in finding the dollars, this annual voting away of millions is causing much alarm. Peaceful citizens are, it is true, mere outsiders, yet they have no personal axes to grind, and it may be that the onlookers see most of the game. Certain it is, anyway, that if reform ever does come to pass, it must be brought about by laymen. One cannot expect naval officers to take the initiative in condemning their profession. Professional opinion in the navy may fairly be said to be navy-mad. In democratic America, at least, the man in the street, being decidedly saner than his naval brother, has an increasing right to ask, ‘Is America’s naval expenditure justifiable?' If he takes the added trouble to look a little way below the surface, he may find matters which concern him almost as much as they do the naval officer.

The time has come for America to decide once for all whether to keep up the frantic pace of this unprofitable race or to drop astern, and allow European Powers to shape their naval programmes without her. To possess a few powerful squadrons for the mere sake of possession is neither sensible nor profitable. There can be no doubt about the matter: America must either require a much more powerful navy than she has to-day, or she has no vital need of any navy at all.

In her relations with European nations, her almost complete independence of them, her ability to support herself without their aid, and her general geographical position, enable her to view with equanimity political disturbances which the leading maritime nations of Europe cannot afford to ignore. Any move on the political chessboard of Europe affects to some extent every European nation. Hence the increase in tonnage and expenditure of European navies. America and her interests, on the other hand, are affected only in rare instances.

Turn to some of these moves, and see if America cannot afford to look on them as a disinterested spectator. Take first the case of Great Britain and Germany. Nowhere in the history of the expansion of the British navy has foolishness been more conspicuous than in British insistence upon regarding the development of the German navy as a menace to England. The Germans began to build a fleet for the same reason that every other power has: the protection of their coast and commerce. In answer to this development, we Englishmen began to build more than ever, and adopted a two-keel-to-one standard, in addition to striking up an effusive friendship with France — our enemy for hundreds of years. This friendship was especially warm at the time of the strain between France and Germany over the Moroccan question, when British sympathies took sides with France. It was even rumored in the press, and never denied officially, that should the quarrel end in war, Britain would land an army in Holstein.

What could be more natural, after this display of antagonism, than that the Germans should increase their natural strength still further? We in England proclaim it our duty to maintain a navy equal to a two-power standard plus a ten-per-cent margin, and yet we deny the right to Germany, who has greater reason to fear the attack of a combination of naval powers than we have. Our fear of a combination of two or more fleets attacking us is altogether visionary. On the other hand, with Germany it is a very possible situation. In addition to naval alliances, there is a military treaty between France and Russia. Imagine the position of Germany with a hostile army on each flank, with her coast at the mercy of attacking fleets which could cover the landing of an army at any point along its entire length. Yet with all the dangers confronting Germany and all the obligations she owes to herself, she cannot build a battleship without sending a thrill through the British Jingo press.

We in Britain seem to have a bad fit of nerves at present. If Germany lays down the keel of a battleship, we feel it our duty to lay one down also, and as a make-weight, perhaps, throw in an armored cruiser which costs almost as much. This persistence in viewing every increase of naval expenditure on Germany’s part as a menace to herself is mainly responsible for Great Britain’s voting a sum of $200,000,000 to be spent on her navy in 1910-1911, at a time when the exchequer shows a deficit of $142,500,000 for the financial year ending in March of 1910. Even $200,000,000 for one year is not enough for some who have the mania in its worst form. Admiral Lord Charles Beresford has, for the past two years, been agitating for $300,000,000. Three hundred million on the navy alone in one year, and that at a time when British pauper-houses are full to overflowing, and the unemployed number hundreds of thousands!

Again, we have the Minister of Marine of the Republic of France, with a sailor’s characteristic contempt for politics, asking the French Cabinet for forty-six ironclads of the largest modern type — Dreadnoughts — which, if both countries carried out their programmes, would give France in 1919 a superiority over Germany of eight ships, the French admiral’s idea being evidently to tackle Germany single-handed. Now notice the subtlety of European politics, which America can afford to ignore, as it in no way affects her. Instead of forty-six vessels, the admiral’s programme has been cut down by the Cabinet to twenty-eight vessels, on the ground that Britain can be relied upon to safeguard French interests in the Mediterranean, while the whole force granted can be held for service in the North Sea, where an alliance with a local British squadron would overwhelmingly dispose of the mythical German peril.

Thirteen of these vessels are already well under way, and several will be in commission by 1912. The remainder, along with minor auxiliary vessels, will cost France somewhere about $280,000,000, the money to be found within the next nine years, at a time when the normal sources of taxation are almost exhausted, and the French exchequer shows a deficit of more than 200,000,000 francs.

On account of Britain’s friendship with France, she is expected to make France’s quarrels her own, to protect French interests in the Mediterranean, to join forces in the North Sea against a country which has never yet fired a shot at her in anger, not to speak of taking sides with a nation which has warred against her for centuries. Such, in brief outline, is the political situation, so far as it affects the naval matters of the three principal maritime nations of Europe.

Through these political entanglements with no actual war, Great Britain’s annual naval expenditure has increased in twenty-one years from a trifle under $65,000,000 to the sum already quoted, $200,000,000. In other words, it has more than trebled. No sane person can view this increase with indifference. Too many, however, will quiet their minds with the reflection that it is inevitable. Is it?

Enough has been said on European politics to show that whatever movement may be on foot in Europe to disturb the peace, it can hardly affect America in the shaping of her relations with the Powers, or necessitate the strengthening of her navy. Her position as a neutral is a natural one, and no disturbances, however great, need affect her to such an extent that it is necessary for her to mix herself up with European politics and petty jealousies.

II

Turning from the European side of the question, let us bring the subject home to the United States, and see if America need have a navy at all. At the outset, I admit the obvious fact that the United States has the biggest navigable coastline in the world, about fourteen thousand miles exclusive of Great Lake shores. For this reason, it will seem to some men madness to question the necessity of a navy, but in my deliberate opinion, she could well afford to do without one altogether.

Let us begin by bringing forward all the arguments we can in favor of strengthening her navy, or even in justification of its existence. Of primary importance is the protection of her tremendous coastline, on both the Atlantic and Pacific; next come her over-sea possessions; after that her commerce; and after that, or perhaps before it, her position as a world-power. These seem to be the chief arguments which are to be brought forward to justify the existence of the American navy; after all, they are the principal reasons for the existence of any navy.

Let us speak first of the Atlantic coastline. From a strategical point of view, the Atlantic seaboard is admirably adapted to acting on the defensive against any combination of hostile fleets. The principal ports are for the most part situated at the head of winding channels, bays, and gulfs. It would be impossible for the largest naval guns made to do them any harm until the shore batteries with their more powerful and longer-range guns were silenced. No battleship yet built could stand up for half an hour against the fire of the latest United States garrison artillery 16-inch gun, let alone their 14inch. The 16-inch gun, though slow in firing, can hurl a projectile weighing twenty-four hundred pounds a distance of twenty miles or more. The latest naval gun — 13.5-inch, which has not yet been placed aboard any ship in commission, can only throw a projectile weighing twelve hundred and fifty pounds, and the 12-inch guns with which the Dreadnoughts are armed, a projectile weighing eight hundred and fifty pounds.

Again, the usual battle-range of battleships for accurate and destructive firing cannot be greater than six or seven miles, this again depending upon wind and weather and the state of the atmosphere. No naval officer, no matter how keen on victory, would be mad enough to tempt Providence by bringing his ship in range of the guns just spoken of. Then how are these monster guns going to be silenced? Only by guns of equal power and range on the land side of them, or by assault. In the case of America, it is impossible for guns of equal power to be transported behind the batteries. Invading armies, as a rule, do not carry with them garrison artillery guns, but only field, horse, and mountain batteries. Take the cases of New York and Boston. Both these ports are situated at the heads of inland waters strongly fortified, and well beyond range of hostile ships’ guns. Even suppose that through some assault, the land batteries had been put out of action, what would be the fate of their ports? Captured? I think not! Anybody who has entered them once from seaward can see at a glance, without any technical skill, that entry to them could be barred in many ways. What with submarine vessels, submarine mine-fields, floating mines, and the withdrawal or displacing of lights, buoys, and beacons, it would be impossible for a squadron to enter, should its presence be undesirable. What applies to New York and Boston will also apply in a greater or less degree to all the chief ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards. I have visited most American ports, and I know of none of importance situated on the shores of an unprotected bay.

Germany has made her coast defenses so formidable that no enemy is likely to assail them. Why cannot America do the same? Facing the Atlantic and about three thousand miles distant is Europe. From here it is possible for three powerful enemies to come — Britain, Germany, and France. To the north, there is also another conceivable enemy, — Canada, — with her growing desire for a navy. Suppose for the sake of argument that Germany alone were at war with the United States, what possible chance would she have of crippling or even seriously hurting America either on sea or on land, even if America did not possess a single third-class gunboat? True, the Germans could come over and play havoc with places weakly fortified. They dare not, however, attack the main defenses, nor dare they, if they observe the international rules of civilized warfare, open fire on unprotected towns situated along the coast, unless they are fired upon first. For wanton destruction or for the mere fun of the thing, they would not dare to destroy property. Again, Germany has no coaling stations of her own on the American side of the Atlantic, nor would any other country open its coaling stations to her in time of war. German fleets for coaling purposes would have to trust to colliers — a doubtful quantity even in time of peace; and, still more important, they would be operating at a distance of three thousand miles from their base. To land an invading army would be impossible, or to maintain a successful blockade either on the Atlantic or on the Pacific ocean, the coastline being too extensive. German fleets dare not blockade the Canadian coastline, nor could they steam over the land and blockade the Canadian frontier. If it were considered too dangerous to use American ports, America’s over-sea commerce could reach its destination in ships of other than German nationality via Canadian ports.

Turn now to Britain, whose navy might meet with better success. On the American side of the Atlantic her fleet could use as naval bases her possessions in the West Indies, in addition to Canada. Yet even with the vital support which these possessions could give, her fleets in the long run would be very little better off than the German. Probably they would waste more coal and consume more stores in cruising about, but the serious damage that they could do would be practically nil. England could no more maintain a successful blockade than Germany, even supposing her numerous fleets patrolled both oceans. For her to land an invading army, as in the case of the Germans, is out of the question. The nation which could fight a war like the Civil War without even a standing army worth speaking about, and divided against itself, has little to fear from any army of invasion, even though it should gain admittance into the country.

My arguments are logical, and therefore I ask: Is America justified in spending about $150,000,000 yearly on her navy, when the most powerful antagonist that we can put against her cannot do damage enough to require that sum to set it right again, in one year? I think not!

Thus far, to strengthen my argument, I have been assuming that America has no navy; but we cannot lose sight of the fact that America has a navy, and one that would give a good account of itself. At the same time, we must remember that the American navy is scattered over two oceans, and thereby loses too much of its striking power to fight successfully an overwhelmingly stronger British or German navy which might be brought against it. I remember the fighting qualities of ‘the man behind the gun,’ and the enormous advantage which the American navy would have of fighting close to its own shores; but I realize that in the end it would be annihilated by sheer weight of metal if the Atlantic and Pacific fleets were on their respective stations at the commencement of hostilities. But the question whether the American fleet could be destroyed or not, could not in the least affect the final result, when one takes into consideration the infinitesimal amount of damage which an enemy’s fleet could do, were there no American fleet on the spot to stop it. That small damage in no way justifies America’s present naval expenditure, or even the existence of her navy at all.

At the present time, America holds second place in total displacement of completed warships, and sixth in respect to number of vessels. Yet on the Atlantic alone, she cannot hope to possess or even dream of possessing a navy as strong in all its units as Britain’s or even Germany’s. Rather than suffer defeat, would it not be better if she acted entirely on the defensive and trusted to her formidable 14-inch and 16-inch batteries on shore?

III

What has been said about coast defenses on the Atlantic will apply also in a great measure to the Pacific; but, in certain issues, the case is there very different, for, instead of three possible enemies, we find but one — Japan. A war between America and any European power being such a remote possibility, we might with confidence ignore the chances altogether. It would be possible for American ships to act in concert with those of one of the powers against a common enemy,—Japan, for instance, — but hardly to act alone against a European power.

In the Pacific question, the danger may be more imaginary than real, or vice versa, according to how one looks at it. In my opinion, so long as America chooses to hold the Philippines, the danger is more real than imaginary. One need not be an alarmist to see trouble brewing in the future for the United States, or any other nation with Asiatic possessions. ‘Asia for the Asiatic,’ is a doctrine, or rather a religion, which the Japanese are preaching throughout Asia and India. The British in India know this to their cost. Since the overthrow of the Russians by the Japanese, the whole of Asia is in a state of unrest, and dreams of throwing off the white man’s yoke at no distant date.

America’s position as a colonizing power is a precarious one when it comes to owning colonies almost within the doors of a power which looks with longing eyes upon outlets for its surplus population. Putting sentiment aside, would it not be better if America, instead of holding on to the Philippines, neutralized them? She could do this honorably, not only without loss of prestige, but with the dignified attitude of taking the lead in the cause of peace. Were she to do this, the only danger of war likely to threaten her Pacific coast would be wiped out of existence. Her inability to hold the islands, should Japan care to take them from her, is a fact well recognized by both naval and military experts.¹

Compare for a moment the positions of America and Japan on the Pacific Ocean.

Japan has a powerful fleet of upto-date battleships equal in strength to those of any European power, — ship by ship, — while America at the time of this writing has not a single battleship in commission on the Pacific station, — only armored and protected cruisers. While the Japanese transport service is modern in all its units, and is of sufficient size to transport an army of over two hundred thousand men — with equipment — to any required distance, that of America is practically non-existent. The United States transport service, at the most, can boast of only a dozen fairly decent ships, which can carry only about ten thousand troops, leaving stores and munitions of war out of the question; while the Japanese service could land an army of two hundred thousand men in the Philippines, and a smaller one of one hundred thousand in Hawaii, in less than a month. To transport fifty thousand men to the Philippines would, under existing conditions, take the United States transport service exactly one year, while Hawaii, in time of war, would have to take pot-luck.

Japan, again, has more than half a million trained seamen to lay her hands on, while America has little more than a thousand on the Pacific. In case of war, the battleship squadrons of Japan could reach the Pacific seaboard two months sooner than America’s battleships could round Cape Horn and reach California to operate with the Pacific fleet — if it still existed. Cruisers, either armored or protected, stand no conceivable chance of scoring a success against battleships. A squadron of ships steaming a distance of about twelve thousand miles under full pressure would arrive at its destination in sad need of repair, especially in the engine-rooms.

Should America’s Atlantic fleet, after steaming twelve thousand miles, immediately engage a fleet of Japanese vessels which had been waiting two months for them, the Japanese ships would have an enormous advantage over the American. The speed of a squadron is the speed of the slowest ship in that squadron, and in action speed is as necessary as good tactics and good gunnery. While Japanese ships were waiting for the Atlantic fleet to appear, any repairs down below could be effected long before the time arrived for speed to be maintained at any cost.

Trouble, if it ever does come about, is likely to come before the opening of the Panama Canal, for it would be an object of prime importance to have the two American fleets separated by a distance of twelve thousand miles. Invasion by the Japanese is a likely probability in the event of war, in case Japan secures possession of a Pacific port; but a Japanese, or any other army, once in America could never get out again alive except by favor of the army of defense.

The great Moltke’s remark concerning the invasion of England applies also to America. Asked if an invasion of England were possible, he answered, ‘I know of three ways in, but not one out.’ There may be many ways into America, but how an invading army, even without a navy to stop it, would ever leave the country without the permission of the army of defense, cannot very well be made out.

Nothing in the world can justify America in building a fleet strong enough to tackle Japan single-handed on the Pacific, or a fleet strong enough to tackle single-handed any European naval power on the Atlantic. It would mean keeping her navy up to a two or three-power standard all the time. Will American extravagance run to this? If not, why play at owning a navy to satisfy vanity? Why pay away one hundred and fifty millions of dollars a year on the navy when it is practically helpless, because it lacks the vital support of a merchant marine? The allround-the-world trip which an American fleet made a couple of years ago would have been an impossibility without the help afforded by British and German colliers. Not one American merchant-Jack’s ensign could be seen in attendance on the naval ships during the whole cruise. This was commented upon by the chief in command — Admiral Evans. Not very palatable reading, is it? Remember, it applies to the country with the finest navigable coasts, harbors,and rivers in the world!

IV

Let us now consider the merchant shipping of the leading maritime nations, and see its bearing on the existence of an American navy.

According to Lloyd’s register, 1908— 1909, and excluding vessels under one hundred tons register, also wooden vessels trading on the Great Lakes, we find that the British merchant marine (including colonies) totals up to 18,709,537 tons; that of America (including the Philippines), 4,854,787 tons; of Germany,4,232,145 tons; of France, 1,883,894 tons; of Russia (excluding small sailing vessels trading in the Black Sea), 974,517 tons; of Japan, 1,142,468 tons (excluding sailing vessels under 300 tons net register not recorded in Lloyd’s).

Turn now to the naval expenditures of the countries mentioned, and see how they compare. The naval expenditure on Great Britain’s sea-going force in 1907 — that is, about the year the Dreadnought craze became general — was about $152,000,000; of America, $119,000,000; of Germany, $54,000,000; of France, $61,000,000; of Russia, $59,000,000; of Japan, $24,500,000. These figures, though not quite up to date, are still a sufficient guide for our purpose. Those of the merchant shipping will have increased a little, but not in comparison to those of naval expenditures. The year 1907 is quoted to show how the expenditure on a single battleship has increased, for we find that the first modern Dreadnought cost $8,538,110 to build, and the 1910 Super-Dreadnought about $12,000,000. The latest British armored cruiser to be laid down — Princess Royal — when completed will have cost $9,400,000. The latest United States battleships when completed wall cost $11,500,000 each at a moderate computation. Battleships, armored cruisers, protected cruisers, and, in fact, every type of naval vessel, have half again exceeded their former cost since the advent of the all-biggun, heavily-armored Dreadnought of 1906-07.

At first showing, the figures quoted will seem to justify America’s naval expenditure, but when gone into more closely, the opposite will prove to be the case. A little calculation wall show that the smaller nations are more extravagant than the bigger ones. It will also show that the British merchant marine is four times bigger than the American, and the protecting of it is only a little more than one fifth more expensive. If the British authorities were as extravagant as the American, they would have to vote a sum of some $600,000,000 a year on their navy in proportion; this, on their merchant shipping alone, and leaving their colonies without naval protection! Germany, whose merchant tonnage equals America’s, spends half the amount in protecting hers. Now, do the figures quoted justify America’s present naval expenditure?

There is still another important point of view to consider, and it is this: Britain’s and Germany’s merchant marines are chiefly composed of deep-water — foreign-going — ships, while American merchant ships are chiefly engaged in the coastal and inter-coastal trade. Again, Britain depends upon her merchant ships for the means to live; America does not. In case of war and blockade, her coasters could tie up in harbor, coil down their ropes, and wait for peace. The work they do could be carried on by railroads.

Turn now to American commerce. Here lies another great advantage of America. She can afford to stand by and snap her fingers at any nation, no matter what the size of its navy. In the first place, her position as a producer makes her absolutely independent of all nations: other nations must come to her, and not she to them, for necessities. This being the case, she is in a position to retaliate without firing a shot, should offensive measures be taken against her. Again, where two such countries as Britain and Germany depend upon America for the employment of a great part of their shipping, war with either is a remote possibility. America, not owning a deep-water merchant marine, need fear no captures or destruction in this direction. Should America carry on a war with Germany, what would happen to her over-sea commerce? Simply nothing! During these times of too much merchant tonnage, British ships would be only too glad to take American products anywhere; and so would German vessels in case of an Anglo-American war. Thus we see that if America went to war with either country, the damage would be confined to a few unimportant towns on the coast, and her oversea commerce would reach its destination just as merrily as ever. Peace also has its victories, and the country which warred with America would find that after war had ceased, her ships would have little left to pick up in the way of cargo. A revival of old trade relations would not come with the declaration of peace, but it would take years of keen competition to regain the lost ground.

v

We arrive now at America’s position as a world-power. Politically speaking, America from the days of its earliest settlement was destined to become a power in the world, without the assistance of any other country, and with none of the false show of power that Dreadnoughts, standing armies and 12-inch guns, give to other nations. Power, I think, means something greater and nobler than the slaughtering of thousands of innocent lives with the aid of guns. The power worth having ought to tend to make the world more Christian instead of more brutal. Right, and not might, is what we need to-day. Power cannot be reckoned by the number of guns and battleships a nation possesses. The power which lasts and is worth having is of the kind which America showed in bringing about peace between Russia and Japan.

That is one kind of power America possesses. She has also another which is more efficacious than ships and guns.

Britain may be top-hole man in the naval world, Germany top-hole man in the military world, but America is tophole man in the commercial world, which after all bosses the other two. Peace, as we all know, lasts longer than war; and a nation which can dictate to others, without bullying, in times of peace and war, using only trade as a weapon, needs no other. Such a country is America. While our civilization lasts, her position is assured. Therefore, I say again that she has no need of a navy at all, or at least, of no stronger one than she had ten years ago. A successful invasion of her shores is impossible, her geographical position is three thousand miles away from any possible enemy, her internal resources are unlimited and all sufficient, her over-sea commerce is carried by foreign ships; politically speaking, she is a free lance; and yet she has gone Dreadnoughtmad. In fact, she was the first to follow Britain’s lead. A fine sample of American independence!

Being able to boast of a strong navy does not give one that feeling of security which is commonly supposed. I belong to the country with the biggest navy in the world, and my feelings are not those of security, but rather the opposite. Like a good many other men in the naval reserve, I am watching for the bubble to burst, waiting to be sent, if required, aboard a man-o’war as food for 12 or 13.5-inch guns, whichever happens along my way first. We Britishers have to pay for our big navy in more ways than one. Beer and skittles are not on the national bill of fare of a fighting power.

But where, I ask, does the boasted American independence and initiative one hears so much about, come in? Just because a British Admiral — Sir John Fisher — introduced the modern Dreadnought, costing anywhere from $9,000,000 to $12,000,000, must America follow suit? By laying down the first modern Dreadnought, Admiral Fisher increased naval expenditure on a single battleship to enormously more than what it was before. That was not all he did. By his action he put all the battleships in the British navy out of date in a day, and made them fit only for the boneyard. So superior was his ship in armament and gun-fire to all others, that navies nowadays are classed only by the number of Dreadnoughts they possess. For this mistake, instead of being cashiered or hanged, he was raised to the British Peerage as a reward of merit. His folly is being repeated everywhere. Even Dreadnoughts and armored cruisers are going out of date fast. Nothing short of Super-Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought cruisers — the latter costing about $7,500,000 at the lowest — will satisfy our craze for that stupendous piece of folly called ‘naval power.’

Would it not be better if America voted less on naval ships and just a little on merchant ships? The latter would bring millions into the treasury, while the former only takes millions out. It would prove a profitable investment, I am sure.

VI

Not for a moment do I say that America should not own a navy of a sort. I only state that if she chooses to, she can, without much danger to herself, do without one. Her army and land defenses are quite capable of tackling any armed force which may attempt to gain admittance into the country. Certainly this is true, if all her main waterways are fortified with sufficient 14-inch and 16-inch guns. In addition to the guns, let all the navigable approaches be mined, and an adequate fleet of submarine vessels built. In wartime, if floating mines were scattered about the entrances to the various ports, or about any strategical position, these would guarantee immunity from attack. Germany has intimated that, in any future war, she will use floating mechanical mines on an extensive scale. The stock of mechanical mines owned by Germany a year ago was over seven thousand. A single mine is capable of destroying a modern battleship. Three large battleships, the Petropavlosk, Hatsuse, and Yashima, besides a large number of smaller craft, were sunk through striking floating mines in the Far East.

Supposing these precautions were taken, then the American navy of today need only consist of a few armored cruisers with a speed of twenty-eight knots, armed with 12-inch guns, and having also a large coal-carrying capacity, a few submarine vessels, minelaying vessels, and a group of minetrawlers. The cruisers need never act on the offensive unless cornered, but should be used simply for scout work and, if possible, to destroy an enemy’s commerce. Guerilla warfare, it must be remembered, is as possible on sea as on land.

The position of America at the time of the War of 1812 was such that her need of a strong navy was far greater than to-day. To a great extent she was dependent upon other countries. Struggling to maintain her independence, her position as a nation was in no wise secure. Her merchant ships required protection, and this was given by her smart frigates, and not, as to-day, by her enviable position. Her coasts were only weakly fortified, and naval guns of that date much more nearly equaled the power of shore batteries than they do to-day.

Has the Monroe Doctrine anything to do with America’s navy? Perhaps so! Well, in spite of the Monroe Doctrine and the American army and navy, if a strong European power chooses to make a permanent settlement in any of the South American republics, I cannot very well see how America is going to oust it. Such a possibility, however, calls for no consideration, in face of the growing strength of the South American republics.

Although I am a believer in disarmament, that is not my reason for wishing a reduction in America’s naval expenditure. No one expects her to disarm for the sake of posing as an example of Christian virtue and forbearance, though, were she to do this, her example would not be without its good effect. I think she would show Europe that, in spite of its boasted civilization, it is on the wrong tack — the ‘giveway’ tack, and not the ‘stand on.’

Smug politicians often remind us that a big navy makes for peace. In our private life we abhor pugilism, we can get along comfortably without it, and most people do not consider a knowledge of the art of pugilism a valuable personal asset. Then why, in our national life, should we delight in big navies, which after all only stand for national pugilism on a big scale? Consistent, are we not?

If in the march of civilization we need the help of battleships and 12inch guns, then I say that our civilization is rotten, and will not last. I am confident that the day is not far off when the people of America, at least, will oppose the needless waste of millions. The preparations for a war which need never come about, only suggest childish folly which must be thrown aside. America is not confronted with the same fears as are the countries of Europe. There, the nations which dread war most are yet at the same time wasting millions in preparations. Perhaps, after all, the common sense of the American people will come to the assistance of their less fortunate brethren in Europe.

The nation which could bring about an armistice during hostilities, and afterward an honorable peace, must possess a latent power capable, if exerted, of forcing other issues of equal importance without having to fire a shot in defense. America has that latent power, and is able to do this much for herself. And we in Europe, though not of the same nation, are yet of the same race, and for the sake of our race, we have the right to expect America to help us work out our salvation before it be too late.

‘Mailed fists’ and huge standing armies and navies are out of date, and are diametrically opposed to the progress of civilization and Christianity. As a plain sailor who has seen all the mighty navies of the world, I say in plain language that they stand only to mock us and prove our civilization a sham. As a man who took an active part in the Boer War of 1900, and who saw the effect of shot and shell on life and limb, I say that our skill and ingenuity of to-day, instead of tending to elevate us, tend only to draw us back into our ancient state of barbarism. The man in America, or even in Europe, who thinks that this craze can last, or is bound to culminate in a war, has a poorer opinion of his fellow men than I have.