A Diary of the Reconstruction Period: XII. The End of the Diary
Tuesday, July 14, 1868.
THE Democrats and conservatives do not yet get reconciled to the New York nominations. It was undoubtedly a mistake, but they must support it as preferable to Grant in his ignorance, and radicalism in its wickedness. It will not do to sacrifice the country from mere prejudice against or partiality for men. I judge from what I hear that Chase and his friends felt a degree of confidence that he would be the nominee. He had, I have no doubt, the money interest in his favor.
When I went to Cabinet to-day, only Seward was in the Council room. He said, jocosely, that he understood I was for the New York nominations and he opposed to them. Said the papers so stated. I observed that I had not seen the statement, but I had no hesitation in saying I was opposed to Grant and the radicals, and, consequently, I had, under the circumstances, no alternative but to go for Seymour. I tried to draw from him some expression, but without success.
Friday , July 17, 1868.
The President read a veto which he had prepared on the Edmunds bill excluding certain States from casting electoral votes, or preventing them from being counted. The veto is very well done and is the President’s own work.
He afterwards laid before us a message suggesting sundry alterations of the Constitution. I was uncomfortable while it was being read, and I could perceive it was a favored bantling which he had prepared with some care. Seward, at once, on its conclusion, met the subject frankly and candidly. Said he made no objection to the document as an exhibit, as the President’s own personal views, but he did object to its being given out as an administrative or Cabinet paper. He could readily assent to some of the propositions, to others he could not, and as a general thing did not admire changes of the fundamental law. He did not wish the Presidential term lengthened, nor did he wish there should be a prohibition to re-elect.
McCulloch said as a general thing he was against constitutional changes, but thought it well for the President to present his views. He rather liked extending the term. Browning had never given the subject much thought, but was favorably impressed with the suggestions that were made.
Schofield and Randall said very little. I concurred generally in the remarks of Seward, but excepted, which he did not, to the encroachments proposed to be made on the federation features of our system. I was not for taking from the States the single sovereign vote in case there was no election on the first trial.
Tuesday, July 21, 1868.
Mr. Evarts appeared in Cabinet Council to-day for the first time. He arrived in Washington on Sunday. This appointment makes Seward potent beyond what he has hitherto been with the President, but that fact will not strengthen the administration. Neither of the political parties likes Seward. He is disliked by both, has not public confidence, and there is no affection for him in any quarter. The President does not see this, nor will he; but from this time forward he will probably be too much under the combined influence of his Secretary of State and Attorney-General.
Monday, July 27, 1868.
There was little to interest during the closing hours of the session — less excitement than usual, and more of the great absorbing constitutional struggle, — such as I have sometimes seen in other years. Statesmanship was wanting. The members talked and acted as if in a village caucus. Petty intrigues, tricks, and contrivances to help the party were the great end and aim. Instead of the usual adjournment sine die to meet at the regular session in December, Congress took what they call a recess until the 21st of September. This was a scheme to cheat the Constitution and innovate on the executive prerogative, for it is the President’s duty to convene Congress, if public necessity requires. But it was not pretended there was any public necessity. The recess was to prolong the session, and watch and circumscribe the President in the discharge of his executive duties.
There being no cause for assembling, the radical members, before leaving, knowing that an extra session was unnecessary, signed a paper to the purport that they would not convene in September until called together by E. D. Morgan, Senator, and Schenck, Representative. These two men are chairmen of the radical party committees of their respective Houses, and on them was conferred the executive authority of calling an extra session for party purposes. Such is radical legislation and radical government.
Thursday, September 17, 1868.
The returns from Maine give a very decided victory to the radicals. The Democrats have, it is true, greatly increased their vote but so have the radicals also. All their members of Congress are elected.
Saturday, October 3, 1868.
The country is absorbed with politics and parties. More of the latter than the former. Speakers are overrunning the country with their hateful harangues and excitable trash. I read but few of the speeches. Those of the radicals are manufactured, so far as I have seen them, of the same material: hatred of the rebels, revenge, the evils of reconciliation, the dangers to be apprehended if the whites of the South are not kept under, the certainty that they will, if permitted to enjoy their legitimate constitutional rights, control the government, [in which event] the radicals will be deprived of power.
This is the stuff of which every radical oration is made, interlarded sometimes with anecdotes. No allusion to the really great questions before the country — the rights of man, — the rights of the States, — the grants and limitations of the Constitution.
Had the Democrats made a judicious nomination they would have enlisted the good sense and patriotism of the people, and had an easy victory. As it is they have given the radicals every advantage and, of course, are likely to suffer a terrible defeat. At all events things appear so to me.
Saturday, October 10, 1868.
A letter from General Schofield to General Grant, congratulating him on his nomination and hoping for his election, is published. It was written last May and confirms my impression that Grant was consulted by Fessenden and Grimes, and participated in making S[chofield] a Cabinet officer. Schofield, like Grant, is shrewd, and in the civil service acts with a view to his own interest in all he does. This is the fact as regards both. They each have astuteness — a certain kind of ability. Schofield is much the best informed of the two, but Grant has more obstinacy and self-will. It was natural enough for Schofield to ally himself to his superior in command. Most of the army officers would be apt to do it. There is not, however, much enthusiasm for Grant. He has not many warm personal friends. Sherman is quite devoted to him, — sincerely, I think, — others because he is the lucky man, in place, and the Democratic nomination renders Grant’s election almost certain.
The elections will, I think, be adverse to the Democrats next Tuesday — and also in November. If so, a sad fate, I fear, awaits our country. Sectional hate will be established.
Wednesday, October 14, 1868. The President says this P. M. that he has no definite news, nothing more than is in the papers. No one sends to him. Heretofore he has always had friendly telegrams giving results. He says Randall called just before I did, and was feeling very blue, and when he left said he would telegraph Tilden to get Seymour out of the way. It was pretty evident, the President said, that the present ticket could have little hope.
Although guarded in his remarks, I could perceive the President was not greatly displeased with the turn things were taking, and I think began to have hopes that attention may yet be turned to himself. But his intimacy with and support of Seward forecloses, if nothing else would, any such movement. On that rock he split. It was Seward who contributed to the retention of Stanton; it was Seward who counselled him to submit and yield to radical usurpation; and it was Seward who broke down his administration; it was Seward who drove from him the people. The President is bold and firm, when he has come to a decision, but is not always prompt in reaching it. The people would have stood by him against the usurping Congress, had he squarely met them at first and asserted the rights of the Executive and the Constitution.
Friday, October 23, 1868.
At the Cabinet meeting General Schofield read a letter from the Governor of Arkansas expressing great apprehension of trouble from the people who are armed, and requesting that he might have U. S. arms that are in the Arsenal to put in the hands of the militia. General Schofield was very earnest in this matter, said the opponents of the Governor were rebels who retained their arms when Kirby Smith surrendered, that they are organized, and unless something was done, the loyal men would be overpowered and killed by the Ku-Klux. After hearing him for some time and a few commonplace expressions of concern from others, I asked if the Governor of Arkansas was afraid of the people of Arkansas, if General S[chofield] advised the arming of the Governor’s [party] against their opponents, — the people of that State. In other words, is popular government a failure in Arkansas?
General S[chofield] said that he and the military gentlemen generally had believed there was but one way to establish the reconstruction of the states south, and that was by martial law. I asked how long martial law should be continued. He said until those governments were able to sustain themselves. ’Do you mean by that,’ I enquired, ‘ until the black and the ignorant element controls the intelligent white population?’ The General said he was not a politician, nor intending to discuss the subject politically; he was describing practically how these governments were to be maintained. ‘And you come to the conclusion that form is requisite?’ said I. Then he said he knew no other way to keep down the rebels.
‘Then,’ said McCulloch, ‘if I understand you, General S[chofield], the reconstruction laws are a failure. The people in those States are incapable of self-government.’
Browning said there must be a standing army to carry out the radical policy, and it would have to be kept up through all time. All agreed that it was not best to let the governor have the arms of his party.
Seward proposed U. S. troops to Arkansas. This Schofield thought would perhaps answer, if we had the troops, but we had not got them. He urged that General Smith, commanding, might be authorized to issue arms if he thought it necessary.
After a long and earnest, but not satisfactory discussion, the compromise of Seward was adopted by Schofield, who proposed to order the twelfth regiment, stationed here in Washington, to proceed to Memphis, and by the time they reached that point, it could be determined what disposition should be made of them.
Tuesday, November 17, 1868.
Exhausted and fatigued with office labor during the day and with preparing my annual report and receiving company evenings, I have been unable to make note in this book for some time.
But events of interest have transpired, and I regret that I did not from day to day make at least a brief memorandum. There was excitement over the election, but acquiescence in the declared result.
In New York and Philadelphia there was a great outcry of fraud by the radicals, who, as a party, now as in other days and under other names, are given to frauds. They denounce the vote of intelligent whites of foreign birth, while they illegally and by fraud polled hundreds of thousands of ignorant Negro votes.
The defeat of Seymour did not surprise me. There has been mismanagement and weakness on the part of the Democratic leaders, if nothing worse.
In nominating Seymour the war issue was unavoidably raised, and the Democrats have been busy in trying to make people believe Seymour to have been a good war man. They did not convince the voters, nor believe their own assertions.
Grant has returned to Washington after loitering away several months in Galena and the region round about, since he was nominated. Colfax has been back here also. He and Wade have again adjourned Congress, — a mockery upon the Constitution and honest government.
A dinner is given by the New York bar to Attorney-General Evarts this evening, to which all the Cabinet men were invited. I omitted writing the Committee until Saturday evening. McCulloch and Randall did not write until yesterday. The others wrote a week ago, declining. The papers state that Grant, who is in New York, declines to attend, if Secretaries McCulloch and Welles and P. M. General Randall are to be present. This announcement, publicly made, is from his factotum, Adam Badeau, but by Grant’s authority.
Wednesday, December 9, 1868.
As I anticipated, Congress ventilated its rage against the President. His message in its soundest portions annoyed them. They felt his rebuke and knew they deserved it. Conness, who is innately vulgar, Cameron, who is an unconscionable party trickster, and Howe, cunning and shrewd but not profound or wise, had their sensibilities aroused. The President had no business to insult Congress by communicating his opinions. It was indecorous to the Senate, and they would not permit it to be read. So they adjourned in a huff.
The House permitted the message to be read, and then denounced it as infamous, abominable, wicked. Schenck the leader was against printing, and others of about the same calibre ranted. They attacked most violently that part which suggests payment of the bonds, not in conformity with the original understanding. It is the most weak and indefensible [portion of the message].
Thursday, December 10, 1868.
The Senators have recovered their senses, and quietly submitted to the reading of the message after an exhibition of folly and weakness that would discredit a party caucus. All seemed ashamed. The House, however, prints only the legal number of the message and documents — no extras.
These displays of puerile anger by the legislative body are ridiculous.
Saturday, December 19, 1868.
There has been some discussion on the finances in Congress, and also in the newspapers. Almost the whole that I see is crude absurdity. Morton of Indiana has submitted propositions and made a speech which exhibit some ingenuity and talent, but, if sincere, they evince little financial knowledge or ability. There are some clever things, of course.
I do not, I confess, read much of the shallow, silly trash that appears in the debates, — there is not so far as I can perceive a single financial mind in Congress. Most of the editors are perfect blockheads on the subject. The more ignorant give us the most words.
Senator Doolittle is beginning to bestow attention on financial matters.He made some enquiries of me this evening. I told him I had given the subject very little thought for years. It has been painful for me to do so, from the time Chase commenced issuing irredeemable paper and making it a legal tender for debt. Where the crude, unwise and stupid management of party schemers and managers is to lead the country God only knows. We have no fixed standard of value. Everything is uncertain. There is a redundant currency, all of irredeemable paper, and the radical leaders may at any time increase it and make what is bad worse. There is no coin in circulation. In this, as in almost everything else, the country is drifting and the government and all sound principles are likely to be wrecked. Morton is said to be fishing for the Treasury, but it would be a source of regret to see him appointed Secretary, yet I know not who Grant can select. There is talk of E. B. Washburne, who has no capacity for the place. He can, and so could any thickheaded numskull, oppose appropriations without judgment or discrimination, but this affectation of economy from a notoriously mean man, is no qualification for a financier.
The whole pack of radicals are, as I expected they would be, fierce in their denunciations of the President for his suggestions, yet many of their leaders have made quite as exceptional propositions.
The President did not intend repudiation, although his financial scheme renders him liable to be so represented.
I was sorry he made it. His scheme is virtually a plan to extinguish the public debt by paying the interest for sixteen years and a fraction. But the creditors are entitled to the principal.
If our financiers will bring around specie payments the debt can be reduced; loans at reduced rates could be negotiated to advantage. But there is no proposition yet made to effect the first, and until that is done we cannot expect to accomplish the other.
So long as the Government discredits its own paper, there will be no resumption of specie payments. The first step to be taken is to stop the issuing of any more fractional currency. Call it in, burn it up. The vacuum will be supplied by specie, which will come when invited, treated respectfully and according to its worth. Let the second step be a prohibition against all paper money below five dollars. This might be gradual. Coin would take its place. Specie will come when demanded. Supply and demand in this as in other matters will regulate themselves.
These steps cannot be taken without an effort. Values are to be effected and prices brought to a proper standard. They are now inflated. We are not to get a return to specie payments without some embarrassment. But the movement can be made and carried much sooner and easier than is supposed. Senator Morton’s plan of hoarding specie until 1871 is ridiculously absurd. Instead of hoarding in the vaults of the Treasury and the banks, let it go into the pockets of the people when demanded for ordinary business transactions. Then [there] will be a basis for resumption. The gold and silver would be retained in the country, for here the demand would be greatest, until there was a supply.
To discredit its own paper, compel it to be received as money and in payment of debt, and sell the specie which it collects, is bad government. While this practice is pursued we cannot expect resumption. Our wise Congressmen think they can order resumption by law without any strain or pressure on the public, but they are careful to fix a distant day, and before it arrives they know and intend it shall be further postponed and abandoned. If they would forbear persecution, hate, and oppression of the South, let war cease when none but themselves make war, give us real peace, instead of constant strife, develop the resources of the country, that will contribute to the restoration of confidence and a stable currency.
Tuesday, December 29, 1868.
Quite a discussion took place on the subject of the currency at the Cabinet meeting. The President insisted, positively and with sincerity, that specie payment might be resumed to-morrow without difficulty or derangement. Although believing that gold and silver, like other commodities, are regulated by demand and supply, provided there were no paper substitute, I could not assent to the feasibility of an immediate resumption without causing some embarrassment. It might be less perhaps than was generally believed, but whenever we did return to a specie standard there would be suffering and hardship. Fasting is essential to restoration after a plethora. McCulloch came in while we were discussing the subject, and he and the President soon became engaged [in conversation] — the President laying down certain propositions which I did not perhaps fully comprehend, to the effect, if I understood him, that if twenty-five per cent of the greenbacks were redeemed at once, their place would be immediately supplied with gold. McCulloch controverted this, said the customs barely yielded sufficient coin to pay accruing interest and the requisitions of the State and Navy departments. To resume at once, therefore, he declared an impossibility. The greenbacks and paper must be gradually retired, and had not Congress improperly interfered and prevented the withdrawal of greenbacks, we should at this time have been near the point of resumption,
The President insisted resumption could just as well take place now as if the withdrawal had gone on. Schofield protested it would be most unjust to the whole debtor class to resume without previous notice. I asked if injustice had not been already done the whole creditor class by cheapening the currency by which they received really but seventy cents on the dollar. This view completely stumped Schofield, who evidently had thought and talked on only one side of the question.
This subject is one of absorbing interest, and its rightful solution is of the utmost importance. It must necessarily be attended with some hardships, but less I apprehend than is generally believed. The great body of the supporters of Grant are not hard-money men. They belong mostly to the old Whig party, and while full of expedients have no sound or fixed principles on currency, finance or any other subject. If Grant has any views in regard to currency or finance they are not avowed or declared. I doubt if he has any, and should feel quite as well satisfied to know that he had none as that he had, for he may, provided he is well advised, fall into a correct train, if not already committed to some one or more of the many wild and vague theories that are pressed. If he has any opinions on these subjects my apprehensions are that his notions are crude, and that from ignorant obstinacy he will be likely to aggravate existing evils.
The country needs at this time a firm, intelligent and able executive, and he should be sustained in wholesome efforts by a decisive congressional majority. A wise policy persistently adhered to is wanted. The standard or measure of value must be maintained to insure stability and confidence.
Wednesday, December 30, 1868.
There was, last evening, an interesting party of two or three hundred young folks at the Presidential mansion, called thither to meet the grandchildren of the President in a social dance. It was the President’s birthday; he being sixty years old that day. The gathering was irrespective of parties, and all were joyous and festive. General Grant, the President-elect, would not permit his children to attend this party of innocent youths, manifesting therein his rancorous and bitter personal and party animosity.
Saturday, January 2, 1869.
The weather is still unpleasant. Made a short business call on the President. He says General B. F. Butler called on him yesterday; Butler also called on me and I believe most of the Cabinet. It was impudent and vulgar to intrude himself on the President, — the man whom he had vilified, slandered, and abused, for the President could not, if so disposed, treat him as he deserved. Butler undertakes to discriminate between the man and the President; says he has no controversy or difference with Andrew Johnson, and the Senate, wiser than himself, have acquitted the President of official misconduct with which Butler and his co-conspirators deliberately and maliciously charged him.
The President while conversing freely on Butler’s call was careful to express no opinion as to its propriety or otherwise. He says the visit was entirely unexpected, and was prompted as much by the absence of Grant, as a desire to be courteous to him.
Tuesday, January 12, 1869.
Butler, who yesterday carried the repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Bill through the House, made his long-promised speech to-day in favor of paper money, and against specie; in plain words, a preference of false promises over truth. Irredeemable paper is a lie; gold is truth. He is a controlling spirit in this Congress, and with the radical party. He is strong-willed, when clothed with power, energetic, cunning, unscrupulous, and consequently, dangerous, potent for good sometimes, for evil often. There is very little true wisdom or good sense in the House on matters of currency or finance.
Seward had three or four treaties to send up to the Senate. He said with a self-complacent air of triumph that they completed the fifty-sixth which he had concluded; about as many as had been made during the whole previous existence of the government. I could not resist remarking ‘entangling alliances’ — our predecessors deemed it wise and prudent to have no more than were absolutely necessary. The remark vexed him.
Wednesday, February 10, 1869.
Congress to-day counted and declared the presidential votes. There was nothing novel or interesting in the proceeding, save that certain States were excluded. The truth is, Grant is elected by illegal votes and fraudulent and unconstitutional practices. He would not have had a vote south of Washington but for the usurping and inexcusable acts of Congress.
The folly of the Democrats north in nominating Seymour insured Grant’s election and gave encouragement to the outrageous legislation to help them.
Thursday, February 11, 1869.
It seems there were some not very creditable proceedings in Congress yesterday when the two Houses were in joint session, followed up by the House after the joint convention was dissolved. The subject has been continued and discussed to-day, though with less heat and rancor. Still there has been sufficient to show the antagonisms in the radical party which must break out before Grant shall have been long in office. The hate between Butler and Bingham is intense. Both are unscrupulous and unprincipled; both are cunning and adroit. Butler has most talent, most will, most daring and persistency; Bingham is more subtle and deceptive, has more suavity, is more snaky and timid, with less audacity. Most of the members are with Bingham at present. He has also Stanton and Grant, who are too afraid of Butler to support him. The difficulties yesterday grew out of the radical intrigue and villainy to exclude the vote of Georgia, and treat her as out of the Union.
These revolutionary and wicked proceedings are having their effect in more ways than one on their authors. I do not see how Grant — if he has the comprehension, which is doubtful — can reconcile these differences; and before his administration will be half served out, serious calamities are likely to befall the country.
Friday, February 19, 1869.
Seward says he intends to leave Washington on the 8th of March and go to Auburn. The President appears to think that the Cabinet should all go out at noon on the 4th of March. This is my wish, and I believe that of most of the members of the Cabinet, and yet there is an apparent impropriety, if not a positive wrong in abandoning our posts until there has been a seasonable time for our successors to qualify and to take upon themselves the duties.
Saturday, February 20, 1869.
Had some talk with the President in relation to Inauguration Day. Something was said a few days ago about his going to the Capitol and remaining to the close of the session to sign bills, etc. I advised him to do no such thing, but to remain at the White House and discharge his duties there. Unlike proceedings at inaugurals, the next Congress would assemble on the 4th; there would be no interruption of business. He should therefore put himself to no special inconvenience, and was not requested to do so.
Monday, February 22, 1869. I enquired how the President was to dispose of himself, if at the Capitol at 12 meridian on the 4th prox. Would he go on the platform with the man who had deceived him.
He assured me he would not; that he would close out his administration in the room where we were. I do not think he can be persuaded to a different course, though Seward and others, fond of show and parade, will urge him to form part of the pageant.
Tuesday, February 23, 1869.
I asked Seward, whom I found in the Council room alone this noon, when he proposed to leave the Cabinet and Washington. He said his resignation would take effect at noon on the 4th of March, and that he should leave Washington that day. This would be personally agreeable to me, but I queried as to the propriety of abandoning our posts before our successors appeared, and were qualified.
Monday, March 1, 1869.
The Committee have of course been embarrassed how to proceed, and have finally a programme studiously arranged, which is for the President and President-elect to proceed in separate carriages. The President will pass through Pennsylvania Avenue, on the right, the President-elect, on the left, etc., etc. Seward and Evarts opened the subject of the procession and our attendance, and had evidently had some understanding with each other and with the Committee in regard to it. Seward said he did not know but they had intended to shut us off entirely, but since they have been polite enough to provide us a place, he believed he would remain over another day to perform his part. Evarts thought it best we should go in the procession, and he made enquiry about carriages. The President brought out a letter he had from the Marshal, enquiring about carriages informally.
I expressed a hope the President would perform no part in the parade, and advised he should remain at the Mansion until meridian, ready to discharge any and all duties. At that time his functions would cease, and ours would cease with his.
I asked whenever before there had been such a programme. Two processions, one on each side of the street! What did it indicate, but division, and what would the effect be, but to irritate and promote hostility? I disclaimed any neglect, or want of courtesy; but on the other hand, I would submit to none. There was a decency and proper self-respect to be observed.
Tuesday, March 2, 1869.
At the Cabinet much time was consumed as to the course to be pursued on the 4th. Seward and Evarts were determined that the President and Cabinet should go to the Capitol and take part in the proceedings. I combatted this course, but no one sustained me except Randall, who, near the close, expressed a hope that the President would do nothing derogatory to himself and his position.
Mr. Evarts had the matter much at heart, and he and Seward proceeded to dispose of it as a matter of course and as if nothing further was to be said. They assumed for granted that things must be as they wished and directed.
Wednesday, March 3, 1869.
Went with the Chiefs of Bureaus and officers to the Executive Mansion to introduce each and give all an opportunity to bid the Chief Magistrate farewell. Rear Admiral Joe Smith, the senior officer, who eight years ago, as now, walked by my side, then addressed President Lincoln, with a few remarks, saying there were evidences of approaching convulsion, — that ‘ we [navy officers] will perform our duty, and expect you to do yours.’ I now introduced the officers to President Johnson with the remark, that these are the men who in war and peace have stood first by the Government and the Union. He received each cordially, took each by the hand and bade them farewell.
On returning to the Department, the Chiefs of Bureaus, the clerks, messengers and employees came successively to take their leave, and express their regard and kind wishes for me and my future welfare. It was something besides mere formality. Some, more sensitive perhaps than others, or possessed of deeper feelings, were unable to give utterance to their thoughts; others with tears expressed their regrets and spoke of lasting obligations. I, not less than they, was moved. Ties of friendship, formed and many of them continued through eight active and eventful years, cannot be easily and lightly severed or forgotten.
It was past four, when, probably for the last time and forever, I left the room and the building where I had labored earnestly and zealously, taken upon myself and carried forward great responsibilities, endured no small degree of abuse, much of it unmerited and undeserved, where also I have had many pleasant and happy hours in the enjoyment of the fruits of my works and of those associated with me.
Thursday, March 4, 1869.
I went at nine this morning to the Executive Mansion, agreeably to appointment at the last Cabinet meeting. There was quite a crowd on the porticoand walks as I drove up and entered. Schofield was already in the Council room, having preceded my arrival a few moments. The President was busy examining and signing bills. As I shook hands with him, he said quietly, ‘I think we will finish our work here without going to the Capitol.’
The President now said he thought it but right that the Congress should forward the bills to him here. This I knew would be a disappointment to my colleagues, and I had no doubt that a strong effort would be made to bring around a different result. Randall, who came next after me, was very well satisfied. Schofield discreetly said nothing, but I could perceive he was not pleased with the new phase of affairs. McCulloch was disappointed and disturbed. Browning said not a word. Evarts who did not come in until about ten was determined to change the programme; said the understanding was that we should go to the Capitol, that we were expected there. When the President accidentally left the room, McCulloch twice told E[varts] that the President would not go to the Capitol unless he put in strong for him to do so. Evarts would not take off his overcoat. Seward came in last, smoking his cigar. Asked if all were ready — meant to have come sooner — seemed to suppose we were waiting for him. The President continued busy at his desk, while Seward, Evarts and others talked. At length Seward, who sat on the opposite side of the room from the President asked aloud if we would not be late, ought we not to start immediately? The President said he was inclined to think we would finish up our work now by ourselves.
They were discomfited, of course, and it was easy to perceive they thought me the author of their disappointment.
A few minutes past twelve the President said we would part. As he was to leave, it was proposed that we should wait his departure. He then shook hands with each of us, and we with each other, and, descending to the portico, where our respective carriages were waiting, the President entered his. Mine followed, and we drove away.
At my house were the President’s daughter, Mrs. Patterson, and her children who had come over in the morning. They propose to remain with us a few days before going to Tennessee.
The proceedings at the Capitol are represented to have been without order or system, and the immense crowd swayed and pushed aside the dignitaries. I am more than ever gratified that we did not attend.
Friday, March 5, 1869.
It is obviously a Grant Cabinet. The members belong to the radical Republican party, but neither one, unless it be Creswell,2 would have been selected by that party. They are not the men the radicals wanted, but they are such men as Grant wants. Washburne 3 is coarse, comparatively illiterate, a demagogue without statesmanship or enlarged views, with none of the accomplishments or attributes that should belong to a Secretary of State. Jefferson is the first, Washburne is the last. Hamilton, a man of talents and genius, was the first Secretary of the Treasury. He had financial skill and ability to develop the resources of the nation. Stewart,4 the last Secretary of the Treasury, has made a princely fortune in the trade of silks, calicoes, laces, and stockings. So of the others. From first to last there is not an experienced politician or statesman among them. Most of them are party men. All are Grant men. Creswell was a secessionist in 1861, and, like Logan, raised a company to resist the Unionists. There is not now a more bitter and intolerant radical in the country, but his radicalism is obsequious and subservient to Grant.
The radicals are astounded, thunderstruck, mad, but after taking breath, try to reconcile themselves and be composed that things are no worse, that Grant has not, besides kicking them one side, selected Democrats. In this is consolation. They therefore try to praise the Cabinet and like it. The administration is to be Grant’s, based on radical usurpations. Both parties are to be bamboozled, and if Grant really has any policy, which I doubt, it is that the animosity of each is to be played off against the other.
Saturday, March 6, 1869.
There is disturbance and trouble in the radical camp. Mr. Stewart is not ready to give up his extensive business for the office of Secretary of the Treasury. Grant did not know that it was illegal for an extensive importer to be Secretary of the Treasury. A sagacious and honest-minded man would have seen the incompatibility of such a conjunction, even were there no legal objections. Had Grant been less secretive he would have been wiser. His friends, had he consulted them, would have advised him properly. Stewart of course knew no better. The Senate confirmed Stewart unanimously, supposing, probably, that it was arranged that he should give up his business to take the place. This was the general supposition. But to-day, Grant sends in a special message addressed to the Senate only, asking Congress to permit the newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury to be exempted from the law; that the most conspicuous case of the propriety and necessity of the law in the whole United States shall be relieved from the disabilities which the law imposes; that Mr. Stewart, the largest importer, shall have a privilege which the law was enacted to prevent and which is denied every other importer.
This message is a more conclusive evidence of unfitness, than the ignorance of appointing.
Tuesday, March 9, 1869.
The Intelligencer of this morning contained a very extraordinary leader — first under its head — double-leaded — laudatory of Stewart and Grant, because the former offers to give his income, some two millions a year, to the poor of New York, provided he can thereby be permitted to hold the office of Secretary of the Treasury and manage the finances. Every one on reading the article pronounced the paper purchased.
Wednesday, March 10, 1869.
The papers publish Stewart’s deed of trust, and also his letter declining the office of Secretary of the Treasury. It was found, after enquiry and consultation, that the arrangements would not work, and that the rich man could not buy the place.
Thursday, March 11, 1869.
Grant has finally surrendered and nominated Boutwell5 for the Treasury. He would not at the beginning give him the place, but has been humbled and subdued in a measure by the exposure of his ignorance in the first instance; by his readiness to cheat the law in the second; third, by his inability to procure a repeal of the enactment, and being finally compelled to withdraw his grossly improper proposition. The radicals have been very clamorous and violent for distinctive recognition as a power, which Grant has tried to evade, but he at last yields.
He yields in another respect from his repeated declarations and immovable principles that he would not have two members of his Cabinet from one State. But it is reported that this difficulty will soon be corrected. The Supreme Court is to be enlarged, and Hoar6 is to be got rid of by being transferred to the Bench. Bargains, intrigues, and arrangements are the order of the day; the country’s welfare is of little consideration. There is an inaccuracy and readiness in these vicious proceedings which is startling. But the ‘party of moral ideas’ seem to consider the whole thing proper.
Hamilton Fish of New York is appointed Secretary of State; Washburne held the office four days. He could not fill it. Grant told Farragut that he gave Washburne the place as a compliment. That was in character.
General Rawlins succeeds Schofield as Secretary of War. Of the three persons who figured not very largely eight years ago in the village of Galena 7 but who are now in the most prominent places in the Republic, I have always considered Rawlins as possessing the superior, though not great mind. His health is not good, but I think his influence will be, in the right direction, beneficial for Grant and the administration.
Wednesday, March 17, 1869.
A smart debate took place between Butler and Schenck, neither very scrupulous men. Schenck has perhaps more influence in the House, but Butler knows the most.
I, this evening, parted with ex-President Johnson and his family, who leave in the morning for Tennessee. No better persons have occupied the Executive Mansion, and I part from them, socially and personally, with sincere regret. Of the President, politically and officially, I need not here speak further than to say, he has been faithful to the Constitution, although his administrative capabilities and management may not equal some of his predecessors. Of measures he was a good judge, but not always of men.
Saturday, April 17, 1869.
McCulloch called on me last evening, and regretted that I leave Washington. Thinks I would be better satisfied here than in Hartford, — for eight years’ separation from old friends at the latter place has weakened and severed most of the ties which once endeared the place, while here I have formed new friendly associations, and am generally known and properly regarded. There is much truth in these remarks, and I feel that I have an ordeal and trial to pass through for a few weeks to come which I would be glad to avoid. Blair was here this evening and expressed himself even warmer and more feelingly on the subject of our approaching separation. I confess to the reluctance with which I part from the people and society of Washington, where I have experienced unremitting kindness, and especially from the circle of intimate personal and political friends and associates with whom, through storm and sunshine, through trials and vicissitudes in war and peace, under two administrations, I have had many pleasant and happy, as well as some sad and trying hours. But it is best that the brief span of life that remains to me should be passed in the land of my nativity.
I have employed the week in preparation for my departure, gathering up, with my wife and sons, our household effects and making ready to leave.
Not a feeling, or one single moment of regret has crossed my mind on relinquishing office. In leaving the cares, responsibilities and labors, which I have borne and tried faithfully to execute, I feel satisfying relief. I miss, it is true, the daily routine, which has become habitual, but the relief from many perplexities more than counterbalances it. My duties were honestly and fearlessly discharged; these facts are known by all who have any knowledge on the subject. They have passed into history. I look back upon the past eight years of my Washington official life with satisfaction, and a feeling that I have served my country usefully and well. My ambition has been gratified, and with it a consciousness that the labors I have performed, the anxieties I have experienced, the achievements I have been instrumental in organizing and bringing to glorious results, and the great events connected with them, will soon pass in a degree from remembrance, or be only slightly recollected. Transient are the deeds of men, and often sadly perverted and misunderstood.
(The End.)