The United States Navy
I
IN the following pages an attempt has been made to give a just estimate of the strength of the United States Navy, present and prospective, especially in relation to the navies of Germany and Japan. The facts and figures on which this estimate has been based have been drawn chiefly from official returns presented to Parliament by the British Admiralty: they may consequently be accepted as authoritative and impartial. The writer was personally interested in the designs of some of the earliest vessels built, about twenty-six years ago, for the modern fleet of the United States, and he has many friends in the American Navy. The same may be said respecting his relations to Japan. As regards German naval expansion, being an Englishman, he might be considered liable to prejudice; but many public utterances during the last five years furnish evidence to the contrary, and demonstrate his frank recognition of the undoubted right of the German government, and people to create a naval force which shall, in their judgment, be adequate for all purposes; even if that action should involve, as it undoubtedly has done, the necessity for large additional naval expenditure on the part of Great Britain.
The writer claims to have made an honest endeavor to place before nontechnical readers, in language that can be generally understood, a correct statement of the relative naval positions of the three powders as they stood about five years ago, as they stood in 1910, and as they will stand a few years hence when existing programmes of warship-building have been carried into effect. In this manner some indication will be furnished of the trend of warship-construction during the period named.
Certain technical terms must necessarily be employed in framing statements of relative naval strength, and it may be well at the outset to explain their meanings. The name ‘battleship’ has long been used to describe types of vessels which can be grouped in fleets and can work together in naval actions. The term ‘cruiser’ has been applied to vessels whose chief employments are service as ‘eyes of fleets’ (scouts) and for the protection of commerce and communications, but which are not regarded as adjuncts to battleships in sea-fights. In recent years large numbers of ‘armored cruisers’ have been built, and the distinction between the two types has thus become less marked than formerly. Admiral Togo, for example, used armored cruisers in the line-of-battle at Tsushima; and it is certain that many vessels of recent design, although officially classed as armored cruisers, would be similarly associated with battleships in case of war — the hybrid designation of ‘battle-cruiser’ having been invented to express that idea. Great Britain, Germany, and Japan are following that practice at present; in the United States the construction of great armored cruisers has ceased for some years. In these circumstances a reversion has been made of late to the old English designation ‘capital ship,’ as a fitting description for all classes of war-vessels which are likely to be employed as units in fleets in future naval engagements. In making use of that term in the following comparisons it will be understood that both battleships and armored cruisers are included.
Another term that will be frequently used is that of ‘ displacement ’ tonnage. For a given ship, ‘ displacement’simply means her total weight (in tons avoirdupois) when floating at the load-draught of water for which she was designed. That weight equals the weight of the water the ship ‘displaces’; hence the term. In the displacement tonnage of a fully laden war-ship are included the separate weights of her structure, armor, armament, propelling apparatus, fuel, stores, and equipment. Different navies adopt different regulations for the weights of ammunition, fuel, stores, and equipment to be carried at the designed load-draught of water: but, for present purposes, these differences may and will be neglected. Speaking broadly, the displacement tonnage of a proposed new war-ship may be described as the total ‘working capital’ of the naval architect; but it is obvious that the same total weight may be distributed in many different ways by competing ship-designers, whose views may differ as to the relative importance attaching to speed, armor, armament, and coalsupply.
Rival designers working contemporaneously in different countries have practically identical facilities for securing armor and guns of equal quality, propelling apparatus of the same efficiency, structural materials of the same nature, and equipment of practically uniform character. For contemporaneous work, therefore, if the ships built by one country are of greater individual displacement, they ought to be in some way or another superior to their smaller rivals: possessing, say, greater speed, or thicker armor, or heavier guns, or larger coal-supplies, or more extensive equipment.
Other considerations may and do impose limits upon the growth in dimensions and unit-costs of war-ships: but, roughly speaking, it remains true that, in comparing rival fleets, importance attaches to the average displacements of the capital ships in each fleet, as well as to the relative numbers. This average displacement is obtained by adding up the load-displacement tonnages of the capital ships, and dividing the total tonnage of the fleet by the number of ships.
In modern days the progress of invention has been rapid in connection with all departments of warshipbuilding. A few years suffice to secure great improvements in armor, guns, explosives, machinery, and structural materials. Consequently it becomes possible to secure better results on a given displacement tonnage for ships of later design; and when comparing rival fleets it is important to know the dates at which ships included in each navy list and reckoned effective were designed and built. That navy which contains the largest proportion of modern capital ships is likely to have the greatest fighting capability in proportion to numbers and aggregate displacement tonnage. In this respect the United States Navy formerly occupied a very favorable position, because its reconstruction on modern lines was begun at a later period than that at which corresponding action was taken by most maritime countries. At the present time Germany is well-placed in this respect, because great ship-building programmes have been undertaken and executed since the Navy Law of 1900 was passed. Japan also has advantages attaching to the comparatively recent date at which the construction of her navy was begun, her first modern battleships having been laid down in English shipyards only sixteen years ago.
The relative fighting powers of capital ships, and their value as units in a fleet, must necessarily diminish with age, as a consequence of the construction at later dates of other vessels in which new inventions and improvements have been embodied. It is noteworthy also that during the last six years there has been an enormous growth in the displacements of capital ships; which growth ought to be, and no doubt in most cases has been, accompanied by an increase in fighting capability. In the United States an advance has been made from 16,000 tons in the Connecticut, of 1904, to 27,000 tons in the battleships last laid down; during the same period Germany advanced from battleships of 13,000 to vessels of 22,000 tons; and Japan from capital ships of 15,000 tons to a ‘ battlecruiser’ of 27,000 tons ordered from an English firm last year. It does not follow, of course, because increased displacements enable fighting capability or speed to be developed, that an unlimited increase in dimensions of capital ships is desirable. Other considerations may and do impose limits on the size and cost of war-ships, but into a discussion of these matters it is not possible to enter. The fact to which attention must be directed is that a gradual growth of ‘ obsolescence ’ necessarily occurs in all war-ships, the passage of time being accompanied by an increasing diminution in their value as units in a fleet.
Ships may not wear out, but an ‘age-limit’ must be fixed for their service on the effective list. In regard to that age-limit., opinions naturally differ. For capital ships the German Navy Law of 1900 assumed twentyfive years as the age-limit: the amended law, passed by the Reichstag in 1908, reduced the period of effective service to twenty years; the Japanese are said to be contemplating fifteen years. In the comparisons of naval strength which follow, no capital ship has been reckoned as effective which was more than twenty years old at the date to which the comparative statement corresponds. In passing it may be remarked that, under the conditions of modern naval warfare, a ‘ reserve of ships ’ is as important as, and possibly may be more important than, a reserve of trained men. The responsible authorities of any navy ought, therefore, to consider carefully the possibility of using as ‘reserves’ ships removed from the effective list, before deciding to have them broken up.
Brief explanations will suffice in regard to the armaments of modern war-ships. It is usual to distinguish between ‘ principal ’ and ‘ secondary’ armaments. Heavy guns of large calibre are included in the former category, and guns of moderate calibre make up the ‘secondary’ group. In the comparisons made hereafter, ‘heavy’ guns have been assumed to include calibres exceeding 9 inches; guns of less calibre than 9 inches, down to 4 inches, have been classed as ‘light’; no account has been taken of guns less than 4 inches in calibre. This grouping is admittedly arbitrary, but it is not unreasonable; its application to the navies which are compared involves no unfairness.
The figures given in the following pages for ‘horse-powers’ of machinery installed in war-ships convey a general idea of the magnitude of the energy which can be developed and applied to the propulsion of the ships compared. Higher speeds than those accepted formerly for capital ships have been thought necessary in recent years. Speaking broadly, the larger the proportion of horse-power to displacement tonnage may be in ships of approximately equal dimensions, the higher will be their speed. Rivalry in speed exists between different fleets, but no great error is involved in the assumption that fleets of capital ships designed and built for different navies at or about the same date, will be capable of maintaining approximately equal speeds.
Fuel-supplies in ships built for the principal navies during recent years are also practically equal. In all fleets the use of oil-fuel as an auxiliary to coal now finds favor. Formerly the fuel-supplies of German capital ships were comparatively moderate, but in the ships built for that navy during its recent development a new departure has been made, and the radius of action and sea-keeping capability has been brought up to an equality with the corresponding features in British and American warships. The Japanese have always followed British practice in this respect. All modern capital ships are capable of ocean-going service at considerable distances from bases of operations.
Passing from the preliminary explanations, attention will be directed to the comparative strength, in capital ships, of the United States, Germany, and Japan, six years ago. Official returns prepared by the British Admiralty are made up to the end of the financial year, — March 31,— and it is convenient to accept that date in making the comparisons which follow.
II
In 1905 Japan was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia. At the outset of the war she had only 6 battleships of modern type available: the loss of one of these had been acknowledged at the date selected, and the Russians claimed that 2 Japanese battleships had been sunk by submarine mines. According to Japanese accounts, in April, 1905, that country possessed 5 battleships and 8 armored cruisers. The totals for her completed capital ships then stood as follows: 13 ships, of which the aggregate displacement tonnage was 153,000 tons, and the average displacement per ship 11,800 tons; with engines of 211,000 horse-power; armed with 21 heavy guns (12-inch and 10-inch) and 200 lighter guns (8-inch and 6-inch). Two firstclass battleships were then being built in England for the Japanese Navy, and their construction was pushed forward so that they were ready for service soon after the war ended. Each of these ships was of 16,200 tons displacement, with engines of 17,000 horsepower, and armed with 8 heavy guns (12-inch and 10-inch) as well as 12 6-inch guns. This was the heaviest armament then mounted in battleships. All of the Japanese capital ships had been less than twelve years afloat in April, 1905.
At the same date Germany — which had been working for five years at the development of her navy in accordance with the law of 1900 — had available for service 16 battleships and 4 armored cruisers. These 20 completed capital ships had an aggregate displacement tonnage of 213,000 tons, and an average displacement per ship of 10,650 tons; their engines developed 246,000 horse-power, and they were armed with 78 heavy guns (11-inch and 9.4-inch) and 290 fighter guns (8.2-inch to 4.1inch). A large programme of shipbuilding was also in process of execution, including 8 battle-ships and 4 armored cruisers. These 12 new capital ships had an aggregate displacement exceeding 145,000 tons, and an average displacement of 12,100 tons: their engines were to develop 240,000 horse-power; their armament included 32 11-inch guns and 168 lighter guns (8.2-inch to 5.9-inch). No capital ship in the German list had been launched before 1896, except four vessels of the Brandenburg class which had been set afloat in 1891-92. Most of the completed ships had been launched within the period 1900-04. The German fleet was therefore essentially modern in type, and the ships building constituted a formidable addition to the force already available for service.
The United States Navy in April, 1905, occupied a very strong position relatively to Germany and Japan, both in regard to completed capital ships, and to ships building. In the former category were included 12 battleships and 6 large armored cruisers: these 18 capital ships had an aggregate displacement tonnage of 211,000 tons, and an average displacement per ship exceeding 11,700 tons; their engines developed 300,000 horse-power; they were armed with 48 heavy guns (13-inch and 12inch) and 274 lighter guns (8-inch to 4-inch). Although the American completed capital ships were slightly inferior in numbers to the German, the foregoing figures indicate that the American fleet was more powerful, because the ships were of greater average displacement and were more heavily armed.
In capital ships then building the American superiority was marked. The list included 13 battleships and 9 armored cruisers; these 22 new ships had an aggregate displacement tonnage of 313,000 tons, an average displacement per ship of 14,200 tons, engines of 500,000 horse-power, and an armament of 68 heavy guns (12-inch and 10-inch) in addition to 394 lighter guns (8-inch to 6-inch). The American ships in process of construction, therefore, exceeded in numbers and strength the American fleet available for service, and the United States Navy occupied a favorable position in relation to the German Navy for the immediate future. In fact, the United States was then able to claim the reversion to the second place among the war-fleets of the world — a place which France had long occupied but was then letting slip in consequence of lessened relative expenditure on her fleet. This will be seen by comparing the grand totals for the capital ships built and building in 1905 for the three navies: —
United States: 40 ships, 524,000 tons aggregate displacement; 13,100 tons average displacement per ship; 800,000 total horse-power; 116 heavy guns (13inch to 10-inch), 668 lighter guns (8inch to 4-inch).
Germany: 32 ships, 360,000 tons aggregate displacement; 11,200 tons average displacement per ship; 488,000 total horse-power; 110 heavy guns (11inch to 9.4-inch), 458 lighter guns (8.2inch to 4-inch).
Japan: 15 ships, 186,000 tons aggregate displacement; 12,400 tons average displacement per ship; 246,000 total horse-power; 37 heavy guns (12-inch and 10-inch), 224 lighter guns (8-inch and 6-inch).
These figures illustrate also the remarkable influence which the war with Spain had exercised upon American national sentiment in favor of a strong navy, as well as the wonderful development of warship-building capability that had taken place in the United States within a comparatively short time.
In the autumn of 1904 the writer (by the courtesy of the Secretary of the United States Navy) had an opportunity of visiting most of the principal shipyards, engine-works, and metallurgical establishments in the Eastern States. Having been in responsible charge of great British shipbuilding programmes from 1885 to 1902, and having organized and managed one of the chief private warship-building yards in Great Britain, he could look upon what was doing in America with instructed, as well as sympathetic, eyes. On returning to England he put his impressions on record, and subsequent visits to the United States have confirmed the opinions formed in 1904. In his judgment, the United States possesses resources for shipbuilding and engineering, as well as for the manufacture of steel, armor, and armaments, which are ample to meet any probable or possible requirements. This position has been attained almost entirely as the result of private enterprise, although a satisfactory return can hardly have been secured on the capital invested in these great establishments. Even when the American programme of warship-building was exceptionally large, in 1904-05, — so large that it could bear comparison as to magnitude with the greatest British programmes, — the full capacity of American private establishments was not laid under contribution. In subsequent years, orders have been few in comparison with capability for output.
No one would suggest that programmes of shipbuilding should be regulated by considerations of the possible output from the ship-yards and factories in any maritime country. On the other hand, the existence of a great reserve of productive power in the United States is undoubtedly a valuable national asset. Six years ago Germany stood much behind the United States in this respect; much has been done since 1905 to increase her possible output of modern war-ships and armaments; but, notwithstanding these efforts, the United States, in the writer’s judgment, still compares favorably with Germany in warship-building capacity, and in that respect is second only to Great Britain.
American naval architects, in 1905, were giving proof of their capacity to rival European designers of war-ships by producing designs for battleships and armored cruisers which compared favorably with the latest European types, which equalled in dimensions, speed, and fighting power the most recent British and Japanese war-ships, and surpassed contemporaneous German war-ships. The Connecticut and her sister ships had displacements of 16,000 tons, and propelling machinery of 20,000 horse-power, each vessel carrying 4 12-inch, 8 8-inch and 12 7-inch guns, well protected by armor. The German Deutschland class, building simultaneously, had displacements of only 13,000 tons, engines of about 18.500 horse-power, and armaments including 4 11-inch and 14 6.7-inch guns. In armored cruisers the American lead was still greater. The Tennessee class were of 14,700 tons displacement and 27.500 horse-power, and each carried 4 10-inch and 16 6-inch guns; whereas the largest German armored cruisers then building (Schernhorst type) were of 11,500 tons, with engines of 28,000 horse-power, and armaments including 8 8.2-inch and 6 5.9-inch guns.
No detailed comparison need be made between either the American or the German war-fleet of 1905 and the Japanese fleet of that date. The figures given above demonstrate the enormous superiority in numbers of ships and total fighting power of the former fleets. No one at that time regarded the Japanese Navy as having any claim to stand in the first rank, much less to be a possible rival to the United States for naval supremacy in the Pacific; although the events of the war with Russia had shown how well organized and efficient was the navy of Japan, how brave and capable was the personnel, and how formidable a foe she was to any enemy making an attack upon her in home waters.
Passing to the consideration of progress made by these three navies since 1905, a brief summary of the principal facts and events may be of service. Germany has continued to work steadily at the execution of the shipbuilding programme laid down in the Navy Law of 1900; but by two successive laws (passed in 1906 and 1908) has introduced important modifications in the numbers and types of ships, and the dates at which vessels were to be laid down and completed. The law of 1906 provided a reply to the British challenge involved in laying down the Dreadnought and Invincible classes: it embodied proposals for a considerable increase in size, cost, speed, and offensive and defensive powers of future battleships and armored cruisers; and for the construction of six additional cruisers. The law of 1908 shortened the ‘age-limit’ on the effective list for capital ships from twenty-five to twenty years, and sensibly accelerated the dates at which ships should be laid down. As matters now stand, the German programme for its war-fleet — its ‘Establishment’, to use an old English word — includes 38 battleships and 20 large armored cruisers: that is to say, 58 capital ships, all of which are to be less than 20 years old. This great force is to have as accessories 38 small cruisers, 144 destroyers, and a considerable number of submarines. In short, Germany has resolved to create and possess a war-fleet of the first class, complete in all necessary types, and capable of playing its part against the most powerful enemy.
France has not yet responded to the effort made by Germany, although there is a widespread conviction among Frenchmen that such response ought to be made without delay. In 1909 the Superior Council of the French Navy recommended the following standard of future strength: 45 battleships, 12 scouts, 60 sea-going destroyers, 20 coastal destroyers, 64 submarines. This scheme was not adopted, because of financial considerations, and a more modest ‘Establishment’ for the French Navy is contained in a loi organique now before the Chambers, and likely to be approved. This law provides for 28 battleships, 10 scouts, 10 vessels specially designed for foreign service, 52 sea-going destroyers, 45 coastal destroyers, and 94 submarines. Its adoption by the French government and Parliament is probable, and it will mark a definite abandonment of the position which has been long maintained, as second greatest naval power. That abandonment, one may be sure, would not have been accepted except on the ground of financial necessity, due in great measure to enormous expenditure required for the army and land defenses.
Japan has not declared its intentions for the future in the same formal detail as Germany and France have done. According to the best available information, existing programmes of shipbuilding, which are still incomplete, provide for 6 additional capital ships — 3 battleships and 3 armored cruisers — being finished within the next six years. It has been stated also that an ‘agelimit’ of fifteen years may be adopted by Japan, as against twenty years adopted by Germany and France. On the basis of this reduced period of service on the effective list, it has been estimated that 25 new capital ships will have to be built during the next nine or ten years; and the total cost is estimated at more than $200,000,000. This scheme would involve a practical reconstruction of the Japanese fleet, and an unprecedented financial effort for shipbuilding purposes. Past experience, however, leads to the belief that, while caution is a marked quality of Japanese administration, if the government and people should become convinced that a certain course of action was essential to the national existence or well-being, that action would certainly be attempted, and there is a high probability that it would be accomplished.
The Finance Minister is reported to have said recently that increased expenditure on the navy was called for ‘in order to avoid criticism of neglect in face of tremendous advances made by other powers.’ He also dwelt upon ‘conspicuous innovations’ in types of war-ships which had been adopted by other powers: but was careful to add that any increase of expenditure which might be made would not be due to existing or threatened differences with other powers, but would be incurred because the government, ‘while not endeavoring to compete with or surpass [the navies] of other countries, had to keep [the Navy of Japan] up to a modern standard.’ In connection with the programme for supplementing and improving the Japanese Navy now in course of execution, it has been proposed to spend $7,500,000 in the next financial year; the total expenditure on that programme during the remaining six years is estimated at $40,000,000. Japan is working on a smaller scale than the United States or the great European powers, but she has resolved to take her share in the burden of armaments, of which the pressure continually increases, and she will not shrink therefrom.
During the last six years considerable additions have been made to the United States Navy, but programmes of shipbuilding have not been governed by any ‘ Establishment’ or definite scheme like that of Germany. So far as an outsider can judge, no standard of strength has been fixed for various classes of war-ships to be included in the navy, nor has any legal ‘age-limit’ been laid down for service on the effective list. The general impression which has been formed by the writer, after a careful study of official reports and congressional debates, is that recent shipbuilding programmes have been largely influenced by political considerations of the moment, rather than by definite schemes of naval operations, which would have to be performed in case of war if American interests and over-sea possessions are to be protected adequately against possible and probable attacks. It is well-known that this important subject has been considered and reported upon from time to time by special boards or committees appointed for that purpose by secretaries of the Navy. These reports, however, have not led to any settled policy or definite establishment for the Navy. No better fate has befallen suggestions made by secretaries of the Navy and presidential messages urging the necessity for a stronger fleet.
For several years the accepted formula has been to lay down each year two battleships, and a few vessels of minor types; but that formula does not represent any well-founded shipbuilding policy. Hitherto the ‘wastage’ of capital ships consequent on the attainment of an ‘age-limit’ has been almost negligible; but vessels of the Oregon class, launched in 1893, are acknowledged to be approaching the noneffective condition, and others will soon follow them. It is not surprising, in these circumstances, to find Mr. Meyer, in his report as Secretary of the Navy (dated November 30,1910), saying, ‘It is of great importance that the construction of the Navy should proceed on a regular and systematic plan’; or insisting upon the necessity of maintaining the relative ‘position [of the United States] as a naval power in the interest of the preservation of peace.’ These are wise words, and the caution contained therein deserves the attention of all American citizens.
The latest and most authoritative official statement respecting the future standard of strength contemplated for the United States Navy is also to be found in this report. Mr. Meyer suggests that there should be 40 battleships less than twenty years old; one half of them — less than ten years old — constituting a ‘first-line,’ and the other half taking rankas a ‘second line.’ No practical importance can be attached to this proposed subdivision into first and second lines; the essential points are that there are to be 40 battleships, and that the German ‘age-limit’ is to be accepted.
No definite pronouncement is made in regard to the future status of armored cruisers, or as to the numbers of cruisers, destroyers, submarines and fleet-auxiliaries which should be associated with the 40 battleships. The omission is important: it leaves the question of the future ‘Establishment’ of the United States Navy still open. Nor is it clear upon what basis the decision has been made that 40 battleships will suffice. Mr. Meyer, it is true, makes reference to the maintenance of the relative position of the United States Navy, and says that the standard of strength to be adopted must from year to year ‘be considered in relation to that of other Powers.’ Such an annual stock-taking is desirable, no doubt, and there is no necessity for publication of the full programme of shipbuilding which it may be contemplated to undertake over a period of years, as has been done by Germany. On the other hand, it cannot, be denied that efficient and economical administration of any navy can only be achieved when annual estimates form parts of a complete scheme embracing the creation and maintenance of a warfleet adequate for the defense of the country to which it belongs. That scheme may be modified from time to time, but it should be always in existence.
Mr. Meyer may have based his proposals for battleships on some definite plan of naval operations in case of war, but it is not clear from his statement that such a plan has been worked out. Moreover it must be noted that, if 40 battleships, ranged in two lines, are to represent the total future force of the American Navy in capital ships, that decision involves a deliberate acceptance of inferiority to the German Navy, which is to include 58 capital ships less than twenty years old. It is true that 20 of these German ships are to be classed as ‘large cruisers,’ but recent events demonstrate that they will certainly be capital ships in both offensive and defensive powers, and in addition they will be remarkably swift. These ‘ battle-cruisers ’ therefore cannot be treated as negligible quantities when comparing the strength of the two navies in the immediate future; nor can the 10 large modern armored cruisers, which are now in the effective list of the United States Navy, be set against the more numerous and powerful vessels which Germany has built and is building in accordance with the Navy Law. These American cruisers will be capable of rendering useful service for many years to come, as they were launched in 1904-06: but their designs date from an earlier period than that of the German cruisers, for which they are no match in speed or gunpower.
III
Turning aside from the consideration of recent progress and standards of naval strength, an endeavor will be made to show briefly how the Navy of the United States now compares with the navies of Germany and Japan, in respect of capital ships available for service and in process of construction. The lines of comparison adopted are similar to those used above; and the British Admiralty returns for March 31, 1910, have been used as the basis of the figures and facts.
At the date mentioned, the Japanese possessed 13 completed battleships (5 of which had been captured from the Russians), and 13 completed armored cruisers, of which 4 were of recent construction. These 26 capital ships available for service had an aggregate displacement of 330,000 tons, and 12,700 tons average displacement per ship; engines of 460,000 horse-power, and armaments including 101 heavy guns (12-inch and 10-inch) and 386 lighter guns (8-inch to 4.7-inch). There were building in Japan 2 battle-ships, each exceeding 20,000 tons in displacement, with engines of 26,500 horsepower; to be armed with 12 12-inch guns and 22 6-inch and 4.7-inch guns. Late in 1910 an order was given to an English firm to build an enormous armored cruiser of which the displacement is reported to be 27,000 tons, the engines to be of 70,000 horse-power, and the armament 8 13.5-inch guns and 20 4.7-inch. It has been reported recently that two similar vessels are to be laid down in Japan. If these figures are compared with those given for the Japanese Navy in 1905, it will be seen that the number of capital ships has been practically doubled, and that the power of the armaments has been increased in a still greater proportion.
Germany possessed 26 completed battleships and 10 armored cruisers at the date named. These 36 capital ships had an aggregate displacement-tonnage of 446,000 tons, an average displacement of 12,400 tons, engines of 655,000 horse-power, and armaments including 154 heavy guns (11-inch and 9.4-inch) and 500 lighter guns (8.2-inch to 4.1-inch). There were building at the end of March, 1910, 8 battleships and large armored cruisers of 172,000 tons aggregate displacement, 21,500 tons average displacement, with engines of 270,000 horse-power, to be armed with 90 heavy guns (12-inch and 11-inch) and 92 6.7-inch and 5.9-inch guns. In accordance with the provisions of the Navy Law, 4 capital ships have since been laid down, probably representing at least 50 per cent of the total tonnage, horse-power and armament of the 8 other ships which were building at the end of March. Particulars for the latest German ships have not been published with official authority, but it may be assumed that the grand totals for the 48 capital ships now built and building will probably represent an aggregate displacement exceeding 700,000 tons, a total engine-power approaching 1,100,000 horse-power, and armaments including nearly 300 heavy guns and 650 lighter guns. Here again is an enormous increase in naval power as compared with 1905.
The United States Navy in 1910 possessed 44 completed capital ships (of which 15 were armored cruisers) less than twenty years old, with an aggregate displacement of 593,000 tons, an average displacement of nearly 13,500 tons, engines developing 900,000 horsepower, armed with 152 heavy guns (13-inch to 10-inch) and 696 lighter guns (8-inch to 4-inch). Comparing these figures with those given above for completed German capital ships, it will be seen that the United States had 8 more ships available for service, that the average displacement of her capital ships was 1,100 tons greater, and that the armaments were more powerful. The superiority in heavy guns was even greater than it appears to be by mere comparison of totals, as the American ships mounted 32 13-inch, 104 12-inch and 16 10-inch guns, against 108 11-inch and 46 9.4-inch guns carried by the German ships. For lighter guns the American superiority was relatively greater.
In regard to ships building and projected, the comparison is much less favorable to the United States. Only 4 capital ships were building at the period selected, with an aggregate displacement of 96,000 tons, an average displacement of 24,000 tons, engines developing about 120,000 horse-power, to be armed with 44 12-inch guns and 74 5-inch. It has been decided to lay down only 2 capital ships in 1910-11, whereas Germany has laid down 4. Consequently the United States will have 6 ships building this year, and Germany 12 ships — a relative gain of 6 ships for Germany, representing about 120,000 tons in aggregate tonnage, 200,000 horse-power, 70 to 75 heavy guns, and a considerable number of lighter guns.
Apart from withdrawals of older ships from the two navy lists during the next three years, or the completion of any other vessels which may be laid down, Germany will therefore have practically overtaken the United States in capital ships when the vessels now building or decided upon in both countries are completed. Germany will then possess 17 vessels of the so-called Dreadnought type, as against 10 belonging to the United States; but it must be stated that the latter group will be of larger average displacement and will individually carry more powerful armaments. In vessels of ‘preDreadnought’ types, the United States will still possess marked superiority both in numbers and in individual strength. Another fact should be noted: Germany will lay down 4 more capital ships in 1911, as against 2 contemplated for the United States. At the end of 1914, therefore, Germany will have sensibly increased her relative strength.
The situation is clearly one which demands serious consideration if the United States authorities desire to maintain their naval position relatively to Germany, because a period is approaching when ships will have to be struck off the list on account of age. In Germany similar removals will be made under the provisions of the Navy Law, but that law also ensures that ‘substitute’ ships shall be automatically taken in hand at dates which will insure their completion in time to take the places vacated on the effective list. No corresponding legislation exists in the United States, nor does it seem probable that it will be passed.
Mr. Meyer, in the report already quoted, shows by a table how the proposed ‘age-limit’ of twenty years for battleships will create wastage amongst existing ships, and thence draws the important conclusion that ‘ if we are to maintain a fleet of 20 ships in the first line — and this should be regarded as a minimum—there must be authorized in addition to 2 ships per year after 1912, a sufficient number to prevent the first line from falling below 20.’ Inspection of his table, however, shows that in 1911 the total number of effective American battleships will be only 31, as compared with the 40 ships stated to be necessary; and that, if 2 battleships per annum continue to be laid down, there will be only 34 effective capital ships in 1914. If the standard set up by the Secretary is right, it follows that in the opinion of that responsible Cabinet Minister the United States Navy will be kept permanently below its proper strength unless important additions are authorized immediately. It will be interesting to see whether this serious official warning produces any result.
IV
The foregoing comparisons have been limited to capital ships, although passing reference has been made to other classes of war-vessels. Command of the sea undoubtedly depends upon the action of groups of capital ships: but in all ages it has been found necessary to associate with capital ships, cruisers, scouts and other auxiliary war-vessels, in order to constitute efficient fleets, and that necessity still exists. In the operations of modern naval warfare important duties will also devolve on torpedo vessels, destroyers, and submarines, although these classes may not be attached to fleets. The protection of over-sea commerce and communications will demand the employment of cruisers as heretofore, and the need will exist for using small, lightlyarmed vessels in the performance of duties, which are commonly described as ‘consular’ or ‘showing the dag,’ on distant foreign stations. In order to complete the picture of the three fleets to which attention has been directed, it is necessary, therefore, to summarize the facts in regard to these subordinate but valuable classes of war-vessels.
Taking first ‘protected ’ cruisers and scouts less than fifteen years old, — that being the ‘age-limit’ accepted for such vessels, — the comparison stood as follows in April, 1910: —
Germany: 29 vessels completed, 5 building; totals, 34 vessels, 124,000 tons displacement, 450,000 horse-power, 346 guns (8.2-inch to 4.1-inch).
Japan: 8 vessels completed, 3 building; totals, 11 vessels, 52,000 tons displacement, 170,000 horse-power, 114 guns (8-inch to 4-inch).
United States: 11 vessels, 37,000 tons displacement, about 100,000 horsepower, 86 5-inch guns.
Two of the American vessels are approaching the ‘age-limit’ and their removal from the effective list ought soon to take place. No new vessels are building, only three scouts have been built during the last five years, and it is now proposed to lay down two gunboats. The German Establishment of the Navy, it will be remembered, provides for 38 small cruisers; 2 new vessels of the class are laid down each year, the size, speed and fighting power being gradually increased. It is a singular fact that the United States, which has taken a distinguished part in the development of protected cruisers, and within the last five years has created a successful type of ‘scout-cruiser,’ should have practically abandoned systematic cruiser-construction, and left its battlefleets poorly provided with ‘eyes.’ This question may well engage the serious attention of the responsible authorities. Memories are short in these days, but the incidents of the war with Spain are not forgotten. Vessels of all classes were then hurriedly purchased, adapted and armed, and enormous expenditure was incurred in providing (in many cases unsatisfactorily) for the performance of duties properly assigned to cruisers.
In regard to torpedo vessels and submarines, the action of the United States has been intermittent as compared with what has been done by Germany and Japan. Recently there has been greater activity in respect to destroyers. According to official returns of the British Admiralty, the comparative numbers of destroyers in April, 1910, stood as follows: Germany, 85 completed, 12 building: Japan, 57 completed, 2 building: United States, 25 completed, 15 building. In this department of warship-construction, as in others, American ship-designers and builders have proved themselves capable competitors with foreign rivals, although their opportunities have been less.
American inventors have played a great part in the development of submarines. The names of Bushnell and Fulton represent the work of pioneers in this department; the name of Holland will always remain associated with the introduction of types of submarines adopted by the United States and British navies. After the good start on submarine construction made by the United States twelve years ago it is remarkable to note the present position of affairs. Great Britain had not then made a beginning, and it seemed doubtful if she would embark on a large programme of submarine construction, although France was pushing forward and the Holland type had been favorably reported upon in the United States.
In 1901 five submarines of the Holland type were begun in England, and after the start had been made progress became rapid. Germany hesitated for some years longer before following the lead. Japan did not move until the war with Russia threatened, and then ordered Holland and Lay submarines from the United States, which was meanwhile proceeding slowly and intermittently with its own construction of similar vessels. In April, 1910, according to returns of the British Admiralty, the following were the numbers of submarines completed and building: United States, 18 completed, 10 building: Germany, 8 completed, 10 building: Japan, 9 completed, 3 building: Great Britain, 63 completed, 11 building: France, 56 completed, 23 building. At present Great Britain and Germany are each spending about $3,750,000 annually on submarines, and France about $2,000,000. Germany is straining every nerve to make up arrears, and, if her present rate of expenditure is continued, will speedily attain a much stronger relative position.
There is a consensus of opinion that every first-class navy must possess a powerful flotilla of submarines, although opinions differ in regard to the range and character of their effective operations, and the most suitable types to be built. With her great length of coast-lines on two oceans, and her numerous as well as splendid seaports, it would seem that submarines might play a great part in protecting American interests. Recent increase of activity in submarine construction appears to indicate an acceptance of that view by the responsible authorities.
In conclusion, the views held by the writer in regard to the United States Navy as it stands to-day may be briefly summarized. In his judgment the United States possesses ample capability for building, arming and equipping all the war-ships which can possibly be required. American designers of warships and armaments have given proof that their capacity is in no respect inferior to that possessed by foreign competitors. As regards capital ships the United States Navy is well provided at present, in comparison with Germany and Japan; but the relatively small numbers of new ships laid down in the States makes it possible that Germany will have a distinctly superior force within a few years unless corresponding action is speedily taken and greater additions are made to the American fleet. It is true that the German Navy Law contemplates the laying down of only 2 capital ships each year from 1912 to 1917; but there is no certainty that further programmes of shipbuilding may not be superposed on that law, and it has been shown that present circumstances point to a strong lead being taken by Germany. In the subordinate classes of war-vessels Germany has a great superiority.
It will, of course, be understood that the writer is not laying down the principle that the United States Navy ought to be superior to that of Germany. He is simply dealing with facts. As compared with the Navy of Japan the capital ships built and budding in the United States represent an overwhelming force in numbers, aggregate displacement tonnages and armaments. In the subordinate classes of war-vessels the comparison is not favorable to the United States. Mere comparisons of numbers and types of ships do not, however, fully represent the relative conditions.
V
The naval requirements of the United States are governed by their geographical situation, and must be adequate to meet demands that may arise in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. Hitherto the task of moving a portion of the fleet from one coast to the other has been formidable, because of the great distances to be traversed. Now that the opening of the Panama Canal in 1915 is regarded as a certainty, some of the most difficult problems in American naval strategy will be simplified, if not completely solved; because it will be possible promptly to reinforce fleets stationed in either ocean should the necessity arise for doing so. The decision to fortify the Canal indicates the great importance attached to the continued maintenance of its free passage by United States vessels in case of war.
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, one of the most distinguished officers of the British Navy, and equally distinguished as a student of naval history, has written on the subject lately (see Times, November 29, 1910). Strongly opposed as he is to large expenditure on land fortifications considered as auxiliaries to the operations of fleets, Admiral Bridge admits that, in this case, it is desirable to protect the Canal against raids, especially those which may come overland, and so to preserve the power of speedy reinforcement to the fleet stationed on either side of the Isthmus. His broad conclusion is that ‘the completion of the Panama Canal will be strategically beneficial to the United States,’ and that ‘the benefit is as important as, perhaps more important, than, that which would be conferred by expending the money-cost of the Canal on an increase in the number of ships.’ This last statement is most striking when it is remembered that the present estimated cost of the Canal is $360,000,000 to $370,000,000, representing the cost of 36 or 37 capital ships of the largest size and most powerful character now in process of construction. The American tax-paver may find comfort in this authoritative utterance from such a well-informed and impartial person.
At present the principal fleet of American battleships is massed in the Atlantic, a few battleships and a powerful squadron of armored cruisers being stationed in the Pacific. This distribution of the fleet naturally does not find universal favor, especially on the Pacific coast, but it may be regarded as good evidence that the highest authorities feel no apprehensions of serious difficulties arising on that side, and consider it preferable to retain the main naval force nearer to European waters. The actual position in the Pacific has been declared most unsatisfactory, if not alarming, by American writers, who have indulged in predictions of a successful invasion by a Japanese army and have described in detail methods by which, in their judgment, such an operation could be accomplished, the American Pacific fleet annihilated, and the insular possessions of the United States captured. In England we have grown accustomed to imaginative pictures of invasions by Continental armies; but the English Channel and the North Sea are but trivial obstacles when compared with the broad Pacific.
It causes some surprise to find the transport of a great army, with its equipment and stores, over an ocean many thousands of miles across, discussed on lines very similar to those which might hold good for transport across narrow seas. Japanese soldiers were closely packed, no doubt, when they were conveyed from home ports to the mainland during the war with Russia; but similar conditions could not possibly be accepted for a long ocean voyage. Consequently estimates which have been put forward for the number and tonnage of ships sufficient for a Japanese invasion of the Pacific coast, and of the time required for the voyage have, in the writer’s opinion, been far too sanguine.
Far more weighty reasons for treating these imaginations lightly are to be found in considerations of a general character. The sagacious statesmen who guide the destinies of Japan have their heads and hands fully occupied with weighty matters nearer home, in Korea and Manchuria; they have never given cause for believing that they would dream of undertaking such an adventure, or of indulging an insensate ambition of which the advantages would be problematical, while the risks would be enormous. These statesmen have shown repeatedly, and are still showing, their recognition of the necessity for avoiding an overstrain of the financial resources of the Empire. In recent years they have been so greatly influenced by that consideration as to lengthen the period over which current programmes of shipbuilding were originally intended to extend. Alarmists may and do ignore the financial side of the subject, and convince themselves that war can be waged on credit; but that is a fallacy.
Finally, the naval policy of Japan, and its main source of sea-power, has been and is still based on the resolve to be able to resist attacks which might be made in home waters or the China Seas, even by the greatest maritime powers. It is inconceivable that this sane policy will ever be abandoned in favor of some ‘wild-cat’ scheme for winning the ‘over-lordship ’ of the Pacific, and establishing Japanese domination on the Pacific slope of the North American Continent. But while this is true, it is equally true that the United States ought to possess a fleet adequate for the protection of its possessions and interests in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic: and that, in the distribution of the fleet, the defense of the coast on both sides must receive equal and due consideration. As remarked above, the completion of the Panama Canal will greatly simplify this problem.
Renewed interest in the United States Navy has been awakened in Europe by the visit paid recently to British and French ports by the Atlantic fleet. Sixteen modern battleships composed that fleet, and it could not have been surpassed in fighting power by any fleet of equal numbers which any maritime power except Great Britain could have assembled. Its coming impressed on all who have a knowledge of naval affairs and have seen the fleet, a sense of the high place which the United States Navy has attained, the efficiency of both ships and seamen, the capacity of the fleet for distant sea-service, and the important influence which the existence of such a force must have on the protection of American interests and the preservation of peace. The previous cruise round the world (in 1908) of an American fleet of battleships was more experimental in character, although it resulted in a large addition to the sea-experience and training of officers and men. On the later cruise the fleet was regularly organized in divisions, and its voyage may be regarded as a practice cruise such as will in future be repeated, although other ports and other countries may be visited. The fraternization which took place between American and British seamen was most pleasant to witness, and the behavior of the Americans on their visits to London and other centres of population was excellent.
Those who have followed the development of the United States Navy and were fortunate enough — as the writer was — to see the international parade of seamen at the Hudson-Fulton celebrations in New York in 1909, have been deeply impressed by the great advances that have been made in training and discipline of the rank and file of the American fleet. In regard to the training and efficiency of officers in the United States Navy, it is unnecessary to say anything. By universal consent they stand high among their professional contemporaries in other countries; and the manner in which they have met the new and great demands made upon them by the rapid development of the fleet has commanded general admiration.
VI
Every great maritime country which intends to maintain and protect its commerce and interests must possess clear views respecting the duties which its navy is expected to perform in case of war. In other words, there must exist a definite ‘ plan of campaign,’ as well as a scheme for the numbers and types of ships constituting the navy; the number and localities of the bases of operations ought to be determined with reference to the strategical operations which are contemplated. No other procedure can secure efficiency and sufficiency for a war-fleet. Casual and spasmodic action can lead only to wasteful expenditure and unsatisfactory results. Preparation for war on sea or on land is a very serious and special business, not to be entrusted to mere amateurs. It requires the services of trained experts, who shall study the many and difficult problems which arise, and advise the government as to the action likely to produce good results and secure the national defense. These experts must not be allowed to run riot, of course; they should be treated as trusted advisers on, not as full masters of, the situation. The subjects with which they would deal are technical and professional; and the great features of national policy, as well as international relations must be dealt with by the Government.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that programmes of shipbuilding, the provision of naval bases, methods of training seamen, strategical plans, and all other matters incidental to preparation for war, cannot possibly be dealt with satisfactorily by politicians, parliamentary bodies, or congressional committees. These persons have not the necessary technical or professional knowledge or training required, and must therefore be regarded as amateurs. Having the ‘power of the purse,’ Congress naturally and properly demands to have reasons given for proposed expenditure, before grants are made; but when the action of Congress, or of any other parliamentary body, intrudes into the detailed work of departments dealing with technical or professional subjects, harm is certain to be done.
The Army and Navy of any country should be kept absolutely clear of politics. One of the greatest benefits that could be secured for the United States Navy, in the opinion of the writer, would be a decision as to the ‘Establishment’ which ought to be maintained as a minimum in order that the Navy may be adequate for the performance of its intended duties in case of war: and the settlement of that Establishment depends upon the arrangement of a scheme of naval operations, which is a highly technical matter.
To a sympathetic onlooker like the writer, the methods of Congress in connection with naval matters seem to make it impossible for the American government to deal with preparation for war on equal terms with Germany or Japan, or even with Great Britain, where the power of Parliament is supreme. During a long official career the writer can recall no instance in which the British Parliament has refused to grant supplies asked for the Navy, when the government of the day has declared them to be essential to the defense of the Empire. On the other hand, it was his fortune to be in Washington not many years ago when a programme of shipbuilding for the United States Navy, which had been declared publicly by the President and his Cabinet to be absolutely necessary to the national defense, was reduced by Congress to about one-half of what had been demanded, and the decision was accepted by the government. In such circumstances it may be asked, upon whom does the responsibility rest for the naval defense of the United States and its dominions over-sea? There should be no question in regard to a matter of such vital importance; but the answer seems to be that Congress in the case described assumed the responsibility of dealing with a subject on which it could not possibly be thoroughly informed or competent to decide.
These remarks on past events and methods of procedure are made by the writer in no spirit of unfriendly criticism, but with the honest intention of indicating what appears to him to be a weak spot in American naval administration. The possession of an ideal establishment for the fleet of every maritime country is admittedly essential to its safety: the establishment must be based upon a settled plan of campaign. In the case of the United States, new conditions have been introduced by the acquisition of important over-sea possessions and the rapid increase in population and production. Admiral Mahan has recently dealt with the ‘ Interests of America in International Conditions’ in a book which cannot fail to attract the attention of his countrymen, and which forms a notable addition to his previous writings on the ‘Influence of Sea-Power.’ The gallant officer makes it clear that the future of the great Republic, its continued development and prosperity, must chiefly depend upon the provision and maintenance of an adequate navy and of well-equipped naval bases.
As to what are necessary requirements for an adequate American navy the writer proposes to say nothing: it would indeed be an impertinence for him to discuss the subject. The United States is fortunate is possessing men like Admiral Mahan and others, whose studies of past naval history have been profound, while their knowledge of present conditions is complete; from such men the best possible advice can be obtained in dealing with a difficult problem.
From the foregoing statements and comparisons, readers can form opinions in regard to the present position and prospects in the immediate future of the United State Navy in relation to the navies of Germany and Japan. No comparison has been made with the British Navy, and that course has been taken advisedly, because the writer is one of those — happily a large and ever-increasing number in both countries — who regard the question of war between the great English speaking people as lying beyond the region of probability, and therefore requiring no discussion. The recent satisfactory settlement at the Hague of the only important differences which existed between the two countries emphasizes this belief. Both countries share the desire for the maintenance of an ‘ open ocean,’ across which commerce and communications can proceed in safety; of an ‘open door’ for entry of their manufactures into the great markets of China; and their supreme interest is centred in the maintenance of the peace of the world. By united action it lies in their power to insure the continuance of peace to an extent which is possible to no other combination of powers, and they wish to attain that desirable result without injury to the interests of other nations. In these circumstances it appears to be not only undesirable, but useless, to make comparisons of their naval strength.