Industrial Peace or War
THE strikes that destroyed the peace of England during 1911, the coal strike in this country, which lasted from May 12 to October 23, 1902, and its threatened renewal during 1912, the threatened strike of locomotive engineers and firemen, the Lawrence strike, the hotel-waiters’ strike in New York, the strike on the Boston Elevated Railroad, and the garment-makers’ strikes, have led thoughtful men to realize the danger to American prosperity and liberty from the unsettled relation between capital and labor.
The old conception that the laboring man was weak and needed protection, that he could not stand out and higgle for terms, and must therefore receive special consideration from philanthropic people, still lingers, but is no longer true. Laboring men in many vocations have organized. They have energetic leaders whose counsels in the main they follow loyally. These labor organizations confront organizations of capital. In many parts of the country the two face each other with mutual distrust and animosity, like hostile camps. When the skirmishers give the alarm the armies are ready for battle, and enter upon the fray with no consideration for the suffering caused thereby to the great majority who take no part in the particular industry threatened by the war, but who are in various ways dependent upon the results. Of course, in one sense, everybody is a capitalist and almost everybody is a laborer. But in this article I use the words in the ordinary sense. The capitalist, in our usual parlance, is the man who controls large accumulated capital, much of it his own, much of it that of stockholders who intrust their share to his care. The laborer is he who earns wages in some business carried on by the capitalist.
Let us consider what can be done to prevent these disastrous wars. The fundamental American principle is ‘Liberty, protected by law.’ Edward Everett said that the love of this ‘gave to Lafayette his spotless fame.’ It is the principle embodied in the American Constitution. The latter undertook to insure to each man liberty to use his talents and opportunities in the way that seemed wisest to him, provided he did not infringe upon the equal right of his neighbor. The whole machinery of government described in the Constitution has for its principal object the protection of the individual in the exercise of this right. The right of the capitalists to combine for any lawful purpose, and that of the laborers to combine for any lawful purpose, are equally sacred. But each combination should be subject to laws made for the general welfare.
How then shall the enjoyment of the rights of each be secured without infringing upon the rights of the other? In an uncivilized country men fight for their rights. Civilization should provide tribunals before which individuals must appear who cannot agree, and who claim rights that conflict with each other. It enforces the judgment of these tribunals by the sheriff or marshal, by the posse comitatus, and, if necessary, by the military. For it is an essential characteristic of a government really civilized, that the decision of the tribunal previously established, rendered after a full and fair hearing of both sides, must be obeyed.
One of the most familiar and accessible illustrations of the application of this principle is to be found in what is perhaps the earliest recorded account of a trade-union riot.1
‘A Silversmith named Demetrius, who made silver models of the shrine of Artemis, and so gave a great deal of work to the artisans, got these men together as well as the workmen engaged in similar occupations [a sympathetic strike] and said: “Men, you know that our prosperity depends upon this work, and you see and hear that, not only at Ephesus, but in almost the whole of Roman Asia, this Paul has convinced and won over great numbers of people, by his assertion that those Gods which are made by hands are not Gods at all, so that not only is this business of ours likely to fall into discredit, but there is the further danger that the Temple of the great Goddess Artemis will be thought nothing of, and that she herself will be deprived of her splendor, though all Roman Asia and the whole world worship her.” When they heard this, the men were greatly enraged, and began shouting, “Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!” The commotion spread through the whole city, and the people rushed together, dragging with them Gaius and Aristarchus, . . . who were Paul’s traveling companions. . . .
‘When the Recorder had succeeded in quieting the crowd, he said: “Men of Ephesus, who is there, I ask you, who needs to be told that this city of Ephesus is Warden of the Temple of the great Artemis and of the statue that fell down from Zeus? As these are undeniable facts you ought to keep calm and do nothing rash; for you have brought these men here, though they are neither robbers of Temples nor blasphemers of our Goddess. If, however, Demetrius and the artisans who are acting with him have a charge to make against any one, there are Court Days and there are Magistrates; let both parties take legal proceedings. But if you want anything more, it will have to be settled in the regular Assembly.”'
In short, there was, under the Roman law, in effect, a court of arbitration, and an assembly to which matters justiciable before this court could be referred. Violence and riot were unlawful, and were promptly suppressed.
How comes it, then, that in this twentieth century we have not machinery adequate to accomplish this result? Our method is that of Sangrado: ‘ Warm water and bleeding—the warm water of our mawkish policy, and the lancets of our military.’
The old English law dealt with this subject in a different way. On the one hand, it allowed a borough to prohibit the exercise of a particular craft except by those who belonged to the guild of that craft. This was the closed shop, and in fact it existed in many English boroughs. This exclusive privilege was abolished by one of the reform laws of 1835. This law was considered, and was in fact, an act of emancipation. The legalized closed shop had caused such grievous abuses that it was no longer tolerable.
On the other hand, by the old English law, strikes were unlawful, and heavy penalties were imposed upon workmen who refused to work for the rate of wages fixed by local law. This combination act was repealed in 1825. Since then, in England and America, we have been trying experiments. Capitalists have formed their combinations. Laborers have formed theirs. The power and wealth of each have increased. The wars between them have become more bitter and more injurious to the public.
Finally, came the great strike in the year 1894. This grew out of a controversy between the Pullman Company and the workmen in the model town of Pullman — a town that had the most perfect system of drainage and the most comfortable tenements in the world. Nevertheless, owners and tenants could not agree. The tenants procured a sympathetic strike. Railway trains on all the railways leading into Chicago were held up by force. The United States mails could not be transported. Governor Altgeld refused to interfere, and had it not been for the courage and determination of Grover Cleveland and of Richard Olney, we should have had chaos in Illinois. The Federal troops were ordered out. General Miles took command. He replied significantly to the threats of Altgeld: If you persist in defying the laws of your country we will give you another Appomattox. And the insurrection was suppressed.
In this case the judicial power was appealed to. The judges of the Federal Circuit Court granted an injunction against the rioters. This was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in the Debs Case.2 That injunction is sometimes cited as an instance of the hostility of the courts to organized labor. It was no more that than was the indictment of the McNamaras or of Darrow. It was hostility to murder and violence, and that hostility the judicial branch of the government should always manifest.
But this decision of the Court was not, and under our present system could not be, rendered until violence was threatened. In fact, neither that decision, nor its enforcement by the army, could have been obtained unless there had been actual riot and bloodshed. That is the defect of the present American system.
The suffering and loss of life caused by this strike led to the passage of the Erdman Act, June 1, 1898. This relates to carriers engaged in interstate commerce and their employees. It provides that when a dispute arises between them, either party may appeal to a tribunal of mediation consisting of the Commissioner of Labor and a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Since the organization of the United States Commerce Court, a judge of that Court may be called in. If this tribunal fails to secure an agreement it endeavors to induce the parties to submit the controversy to arbitration. If arbitration is agreed upon, each party selects one arbitrator, and these two choose an umpire. If they do not agree, the mediators name the umpire. The act provides ‘ that the respective parties to the award will each faithfully execute the same.’ During the pendency of the arbitration, both lockouts and strikes are unlawful. Discrimination against members of labor organizations and blacklisting are prohibited by the act.
This act has been invoked in nearly sixty controversies during the last five years, and in every instance both parties have executed the award. It does not, in terms, provide for compulsory arbitration. It is like a law which should enact that if two neighbors cannot agree as to the boundary-line between their property, they may submit the question to arbitration in a certain prescribed manner. Failing this, they may fight it out. That certainly would not be considered a civilized way of settling such a controversy. Unfortunately there is such a lack of mutual confidence between labor and capital that nothing better has yet obtained their joint approval. And the majority, the general public, have been so busy about their own affairs that they have let the thing alone.
Inadequate, however, as the Erdman Act is, it is better than nothing. When, in 1902, the great coal strike broke out in Pennsylvania, there was no machinery for voluntary arbitration provided for the coal trade. The cruelty of the strikers to all who did not coöperate with them, the absolute barbarity with which they persecuted even the wives and children of all in the anthracite district who would not join them, justified Wayne MacVeagh’s description: ‘The strike of 1902 was a foretaste of hell. Each workman feels it is his personal quarrel; in each breast there are kindled feelings of enmity against all arrayed on the side of the capitalists.’
The effect of this strike, as usual, was most grievous to the innocent poor. Hundreds of thousands of poor people in Eastern cities suffered from cold and hunger during that evil winter of 1902-03, because they had to pay double for their pailfuls of coal. It often happens that the organized strikers and the organized employers care as little for the sufferings of those outside their organizations as did the Genius of War and Famine in Coleridge’s famous poem: —
I had starved the one, and was starving the other.
They do not see these sufferings, and they ignore what is not under their eyes. All the more, therefore, is it the duty of the public to intervene and prevent the wars which cause the sufferings.
President Roosevelt never did a wiser thing than when he appointed a commission to ‘inquire into, consider, and pass upon the questions in controversy in connection with the strike in the anthracite region, and the causes out of which the controversy arose.’ A commission of seven was appointed, of which George Gray, presiding judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in the Third Circuit, was chairman. The mine owners and the ‘striking anthracite-mine workers’ appeared before the commission. The latter were represented by John Mitchell, who was also President of the United Mine Workers of America; but he did not appear officially in this capacity, because that organization included bituminous-mine workers, and it was claimed with some justice by the owners of anthracite mines, that the interests of the two groups were diverse.
The commission made its award March 18, 1903. This was observed by both parties, has been modified from time to time, but in its essential features has proved the basis of mutual agreement ever since it was made.
This award contains recommendations to which I now ask attention. They have been ignored for nine years. It is time to brush the dust from their leaves.
‘The Commission is led to the conviction, that the question of the recognition of the union and of dealing with the mine workers through their union, was considered by both operators and miners to be one of the most important involved in the controversy which culminated in the strike. . . .
‘The men employed in a certain line of work or branch of industry have similar feelings, aspirations, and convictions, the natural outgrowth of their common work and common trend or application of mind. The union, representing their community of interests, is the logical result of their community thought. It encourages calm and intelligent consideration of matters of common interest. In the absence of a union, the extremist gets a ready hearing for incendiary appeals to prejudice or passion, when a grievance, real or fancied, of a general nature, presents itself for consideration. . . .
‘Trade unionism is rapidly becoming a matter of business, and that employer who fails to give the same careful attention to the question of his relation to his labor or his employees, which he gives to the other factors which enter into the conduct of his business, makes a mistake, which sooner or later he will be obliged to correct. . . . Experience shows that the more full the recognition given to a trades union, the more businesslike and responsible it becomes. . . . If the energy of the employer is directed to discouragement and repression of the union, he need not be surprised if the more radically inclined members are the ones most frequently heard. . . .
‘In order to be entitled to such recognition, the labor organization or union must give the same recognition to the rights of the employer and of others, which it demands for itself and for its members. The worker has the right to quit or to strike in conjunction with his fellows, when by so doing he does not violate a contract made by or for him. He has neither right nor license to destroy or to damage the property of the employer; neither has he any right or license to intimidate or to use violence against the man who chooses to exercise his right to work, nor to interfere with those who do not feel that the union offers the best method for adjusting grievances. . . .
‘The non-union man assumes the whole responsibility which results from his being such, but his right and privilege of being a non-union man are sanctioned in law and morals. . . . The contention that a majority of the employees in an industry, by voluntarily associating themselves in a union, acquire authority over those who do not so associate themselves, is untenable. . . .
‘It, accordingly, hereby adjudges and awards: That any difficulty or disagreement arising under this award, either as to its interpretation or application, or in any way growing out of the relations of the employers and the employed, which cannot be settled or adjusted by consultation between the superintendent or manager of the mine or mines, and the miner or miners directly interested, or is of a scope too large to be so settled and adjusted, shall be referred to a permanent joint committee, to be called a board of conciliation, to consist of six persons, appointed as hereinafter provided. That is to say, if there shall be a division of the whole region into three districts, in each of which there shall exist an organization representing a majority of the mine workers of such district, one of said board of conciliation shall be appointed by the operators, the operators in each of said districts appointing one person. . . .
‘The right to remain at work where others have ceased to work, or to engage anew in work which others have abandoned, is part of the personal liberty of a citizen, that can never be surrendered, and every infringement thereof merits, and should receive, the stern denouncement of the law. . . . Approval of the subject of a strike, or persuasion that its purpose is high and noble, can not sanction an attempt to destroy the right of others to a different opinion in this respect, or to interfere with their conduct in choosing to work upon what terms and at what time and for whom it may please them so to do. . . .
‘It also becomes our duty to condemn another less violent, but not less reprehensible, form of attack upon those rights and liberties of the citizen, which the public opinion of civilized countries recognizes and protects. . . . What is popularly known as the boycott (a word of evil omen and unhappy origin) is a form of coercion by which a combination of many persons seek to work their will upon a single person, or upon a few persons, by compelling others to abstain from social or beneficial business intercourse with such person or persons. Carried to the extent sometimes practiced in aid of a strike, and as was in some instances practiced in connection with the late anthracite strike, it is a cruel weapon of aggression, and its use immoral and anti-social. . . .
‘The practices, which we are condemning, would be outside the pale of civilized war. In civilized warfare, women and children and the defenseless are safe from attack, and a code of honor controls the parties to such warfare, which cries out against the boycott we have in view. Cruel and cowardly are terms not too severe by which to characterize it.
‘Closely allied to the boycott is the blacklist, by which employers of labor sometimes prevent the employment by others, of men whom they have discharged. In other words, it is a combination among employers not to employ workmen discharged by any of the members of said combination. This system is as reprehensible and as cruel as the boycott, and should be frowned down by all humane men.’
The Commission finally recommended the substantial adoption of an act which was drawn by Charles Francis Adams. This is printed in the Appendix. It is entitled, ‘An Act to provide for the Investigation of Controversies affecting Interstate Commerce and for other Purposes.’
‘Section 1. Whenever within any State or States, Territory or Territories of the United States, a controversy concerning wages, hours of labor, or conditions of employment shall arise between an employer, being an individual, partnership, association, corporation or other combination, and the employees or association or combination of employees of such employer, by reason of which controversy the transportation of the United States mails, the operations, civil or military, of the Government of the United States, or the free and regular movement of commerce among the several States and with foreign nations is in the judgment of the President interrupted or directly affected, or threatened with being so interrupted or so directly affected, the President shall in his discretion inquire into the same and investigate the causes thereof.
‘Section 2. To this end the President may appoint a special Commission, not exceeding seven in number, of persons in his judgment specially qualified to conduct such an investigation.’
It then proceeds to provide for the organization of the Commission, for a full hearing of the parties to the controversy, authorizes the Commission to administer oaths, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers. To this end the Commission may invoke the aid of the courts of the United States, and is vested with all the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the courts of the United States are required to render it aid to the same extent as aid is rendered to the Interstate Commerce Commission. It authorizes the Commission to ‘enter and inspect any public institution, factory, workshop, or mine.’ After the investigation of the controversy, the Commission shall formulate its report thereon, setting forth the causes of the same, locating, as far as may be, the responsibilities thereof, and making such specifications and recommendations as shall in its judgment put an end to such controversy or disturbance, and prevent a recurrence thereof.
Unfortunately, this bill was not introduced in Congress. No state gave sufficient attention to the recommendation of the Commission to modify this bill so as to adapt its provisions to controversies within the state. It is true that some states have some legislation on the subject. But the best is insufficient because it fails to provide an adequate tribunal with adequate powers for the decision of these labor controversies. Apparently the American people prefer an occasional war to a continual peace. Is it not time to revise this conclusion and follow deliberately the things that make for peace? And how can there be peace without an arbitral tribunal, which is adequate to decide controversies without resort to war?
A bill to extend the provisions of the Erdman Act to the owners and lessees of coal mines, the produce of which enters into interstate or foreign commerce, and their employees, was introduced in the Sixty-second Congress by Mr. R. E. Lee of Pennyslvania,3 was amended and reported by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, but unfortunately did not become a law. It is a step in advance, and will, we hope, be pressed in the next Congress. It may lead to enactment of a more comprehensive measure, not only by Congress, but in every state. The need for this has never been better stated than by Governor Stone of Pennsylvania in 1902: —
‘A law that would settle labor disputes between employer and employed must of necessity be a compulsory arbitration law, and the award must be final and conclusive. The law must be drafted for the protection of society, and must not be drawn in the interest of employer or employee. Experience teaches that strikes endanger life and property. When life and property are in jeopardy, society is menaced. The right of the public, the right of society, is greater than the rights of the participants on both sides in any strike.’
The objections to compulsory arbitration might be urged with equal force against our whole judicial system. This has jurisdiction over the most sacred of human relations. If a man and his wife cannot agree as to the custody of their children, either may compel the other to submit the controversy to the arbitrament of a judge. The court decides disputes between partners. It compels the specific performance of contracts. Why, then, should not the majority of our people provide by law a tribunal with powers adequate to decide controversies between capital and labor, and with power if necessary to enforce its decision?
But forcible enforcement would be unnecessary. Not once in a thousand times is the power of sheriff or marshal invoked to enforce the judgment of a court. The awards of the arbitral committees of the various exchanges are obeyed without formal compulsion.
In labor controversies the most effectual compulsion is the indirect method of prohibiting strikes and lockouts pending the arbitration. This prohibition obviates controversy as to whether picketing is peaceful and as to whether persuasion has developed into physical violence. In short, it provides for peace and prohibits war, and substitutes for war a tribunal with powers to decide conflicting claims upon their merits.
This system of conciliation and arbitration has been tried by several of the governments which are federated in Australasia, and on the whole with success. That does not of itself prove that it would work well in America. But we should be foolish, indeed, if we did not profit by the experience of others. No better plan has been suggested. The present situation is intolerable. Let us then give heed to the report of the State Labor Bureau of New South Wales, for the year ending June 30, 1909: —
‘The Act has already lived down the bitter hostility of a section of the trade unions, the majority of them having already applied for the appointment of Wages Boards to determine rates of wages and conditions of labor in their particular industries. The opinion is fast gaining ground in industrial circles that greater benefits are likely to accrue from the operations of the Act than could be expected from the methods of a strike.’
The award of the Board of Arbitration, which a few months ago considered and decided the controversy as to wages between the locomotive engineers and the railroads of this country, had under consideration also the subject of arbitration. The facts presented to this board showed very clearly the great danger to the whole community incident to the possibility of a general railroad strike. It recommends a system of compulsory arbitration. The only dissent by one of the members of the board was on the ground that such a system would be impracticable. The answer to that is that it is competent for the legislature to declare that either a strike or a lockout is illegal until after a hearing before, and an award by, an arbitration tribunal. Such a system has succeeded in Canada and other countries where it has been tried. There seems to be no reason to doubt that it would be successful in the United States.