Wanted: An American Minister of Marine
I
IN view of the lamentable state of the American mercantile marine and the probable early opening of the Panama Canal, one is forced to the conclusion that American legislative efforts, instead of fostering the growth of foreign-going shipping, are a positive encumbrance to it and subject it to hardships such as no maritime nation of Europe would be guilty of imposing upon its own merchant shipping.
In certain directions, it is true, American maritime efforts have been equal in value to those of any nation. A cruise along the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, a sail up a few of the many navigable rivers, and a call at many of the principal seaports, will soon convince the observer that the lighthouse service of America cannot be excelled, that the channels in the navigable rivers lack for nothing in the way of dredging and buoyage, and that harbor and port facilities provide a quick dispatch when loading or discharging freight. Everything that assists navigation and the quick handling of cargoes is guaranteed to the shipping industry, irrespective of class of vessel or nationality. A fair field and no favor is offered to all who obey port laws and follow a legitimate trade.
Within a very short time America will throw open the Panama Canal to the world’s shipping. With certain equitable modifications in favor of American coastal vessels, all shipping will operate on an equal footing. What this will mean to the world’s shipping industry, it is too early to predict. However we look at it, it means at least progress. But progress for whom? The early future, with no uncertain voice, will speak for itself. Conditions for American deep-water ships must alter rapidly if the boon, soon to be conferred on the shipping world, is to benefit ocean-going vessels under the American flag.
The proceedings of the last Congress prove once more that America is too self-centred and cannot see beyond the horizon of her domestic trade. To allow her coastal vessels to ply the Panama Canal free of tolls seems in many ways a wise measure. It may mean, however, that the coastal trade will prove so profitable that capital will fight shy of deep-water ships. If America’s ocean-going tonnage is left to paddle its own canoe in view of the concessions granted to coastal vessels, then its plight will be worse than before. As matters stand, its many grievances and handicaps seem to attract but little official notice, while, on the other hand, coastal vessels, already protected by tariff laws, loom large on the official horizon and benefit accordingly. A man used to shipping problems is taken completely aback when confronted with the paradoxical genius of a people who can build a Panama Canal, maintain a chain of efficient ports in two oceans, discover a North Pole, but who have not the wit to own a fleet of ships employed exclusively in the foreign carrying trade. One hardly knows where to search, or where to turn, for an explanation of this inconsistency. I think myself that the explanation lies in some such whimsical freak of evolution as that which the eugenists describe as a ‘throw back.’
The dead speak! It would seem as if the dead hands of American legislators who were in power as far back as 1792 still grip as in a vice the ocean carrying trade of the United States. Laws which a century ago were designed to compass the exclusion of foreign-built tonnage from the American registry are now quite out of date and positively harmful under the absolutely different economic conditions of the present day. These antiquated tonnage laws frighten capital from the American merchant marine, for it is safe to assume that investors fight shy of an industry that is heavily handicapped by irksome restrictions which breed stagnation.
At the British inquiry into the loss of the Titanic Mr. Ismay, in his evidence, admitted that, in substance, the Titanic was an American vessel flying the British flag. The trust which owned the Titanic — the International Mercantile Marine Company—also owns or controls a million tons of shipping represented by five British lines and two American lines. What is the object of an American trust managing its ships under British laws? Economy in building, running, and manning expenses appears to be the reason. If it is true, as Senator Cummins of Iowa recently pointed out, that the American makers of iron and steel products are taking from the public a hundred million dollars a year more than is needed to maintain present wages and pay a reasonable profit upon the capital invested in the business, then the leakage in the economy of building is easily accounted for and can as easily be rectified. Were economy in building the only question at issue, we should soon see the Stars and Stripes once more flying in foreign harbors as of old. But obviously it is not the only question. Economy in the running and manning of ships represents a factor quite beyond the control of trusts or individuals. These expenses come directly within the jurisdiction of the National government.
It seems to have escaped official notice that the evolution of maritime law must keep pace with the evolution of ship-building. If the pace of ship-building is forced, the pace of legal reform must be forced. Types of vessels, methods of propulsion, dock, harbor, river, and canal facilities, shipping problems, and the volume of ocean traffic, have all passed through many forms of evolution. During the past sixty years the progress of maritime evolution has been steadily and well maintained. One need not be much of a sailor to know that the laws enacted for the benefit of hard-case Yankee main-skysail-yarders cannot serve the requirements of modern leviathans and toiling tramps. The naval strategy of 1792 will scarcely do for a squadron of 1914 dreadnoughts, so why should the marine laws of a century and a quarter ago be allowed to hamper the movements, and stultify the growth, of modern shipping? Yet America, with certain inadequate modifications, still clings to the tonnage laws of 1792, laws which, obviously, penalize American ocean shipping and are in open conflict with modern business methods and requirements.
The repeal of the enervating marine laws of 1792 appears to be the only way of beginning to resuscitate the American merchant marine so far as ocean-borne commerce is concerned. Repeal is necessary but not sufficient. It must be backed by other measures framed by legal experts and shipping specialists who have shipping problems at their fingers’ ends. Taking into consideration America’s great maritime wealth and her natural fitness to fill the rôle of a great maritime power, one is inclined to believe that if, instead of remaining satisfied with her present spirit of Oriental fatalism which manacles her to the marine laws of 1792, she were to follow Canada’s lead and appoint a Minister of Marine, much valuable legislation would ensue. A country so rich in seaports, coastline, and rivers, a country which controls the Panama Canal, has no right to be subjected to the unguided whims and idiosyncracies of the legislative branch of a government composed for the most part of men wholly ignorant of the sea. Its case is a special case calling for special legislation, and this can be best secured by the appointment of a Minister of Marine. No cowpuncher, soldier, lawyer, or parson — no matter what his official position in the government may be — is capable of knowing how to set about forcing the American shipping industry into its rightful place. The case is one for a group of specialists formed into an administrative body piloted by a Minister of Marine. No nation can be truly great without an efficient navy, and no navy can be efficient without a merchant marine to support it in time of war.
II
At the present time, the Panama Canal is looming above the horizon and great things are expected of it in the way of redeeming the errors of the past. The control of the Canal is to be vested in a governor and such other officials as the President may deem necessary to discharge the various duties connected with the completion, care, maintenance, and operation of the Canal and the Canal Zone, For the time being this will serve the purpose, provided that, later, the Governor is placed under the orders of the Minister of Marine, and provided, also, that this office is placed beyond the curse of party politics. In the early days of its career no doubt the Canal will be played with as a child plays with a new toy. This is inevitable. However, of itself, the Canal will not force the pace of shipbuilding. Here, too, wise legislation is essential. It must not be forgotten that, whatever advantages the Canal may confer upon American tonnage, foreign tonnage, also, will reap its share.
President Wilson is in favor of intrusting the management of the Panama Canal to the administrative rather than to the legislative branch of the government. So far, good! If the management of the Canal calls for special favors in the way of administrative control, surely the crying needs of the American merchant marine have a lien on the affections of those in a position to distribute administrative favors. When navigation through the Canal is an accomplished fact, so tremendous will America’s maritime interests be that they will require specialized control. It would be absurd to jumble them together with those of the vast American continent.
In America, as in most countries, the need of the day is a business government. Were private industries handled with the same lack of business enterprise that most governments show, chaos would result. From time immemorial, sailors and ships have been the playthings of some landsman holding office, whose only qualification for his position is veneration for the official tradition which insists upon treating sailors and ships as irresponsibles. I trust we are nearing the end of this era. If we are, reform when it comes must come from within the government.
Many public-spirited Americans view with justifiable concern the almost total disappearance of the Stars and Stripes from ships engaged in the deep-water trade. Time, instead of improving matters, only aggravates the evil. Conditions for American ships grow no better. American sailors, like their flag on deep-water ships, are disappearing. And all for the lack of what? American business enterprise? No! American business enterprise is sane enough to keep capital out of ships because it can see only chagrin and loss under the present alarming state of affairs.
There are four factors responsible for the decline of America’s merchant service — the Civil War, the substitution of iron and steam for wood and sail, the development of America’s internal resources, and the lack of official enterprise, which includes the operation of the navigation laws of 1792 in the year 1914. To-day only one of these adverse factors remains in existence, —America’s antiquated and harmful maritime law.
III
At this point in our discussion a comparison between the United States and Germany may prove instructive and leave us with a moral to digest. Harking back to 1860, we find that Germany had no merchant ships, while as a maritime power America was at the zenith of her career. In those days hard-case Yankee main-skysail-yarders ploughed every ocean and haunted every harbor and creek in the world. Yankee seamanship was unsurpassed and Yankee ships made the smartest passages. It is even doubtful whether Germany’s shipping at this time equaled half the tonnage of deep-water ships now flying the American flag.
In the early sixties America fought her Civil War, while in the early seventies Germany was at death grips with France. From about 1860 to the present time both the United States and Germany have been developing their internal resources, but, with this difference: The United States lost sight of her external industries — shipping, for instance — while Germany included in her forward policy the building of a merchant marine of sufficient tonnage to carry her own products from sea to sea. From a position of obscurity in the shipping world Germany has forced herself into the front rank, while America has fallen from her lofty position, and at present seems indifferent to her state of dry rot and insignificance. In sailor vernacular, American merchant marine is stripped to a gantline.
America seems inclined to charge her decline to the losses sustained during the Civil War and to her inability to develop internally and externally at the same time; but the excuse does not cover the facts. What of the FrancoPrussian War? What of Germany’s internal developments? And what of Germany’s present magnificent merchant marine? History tells us that both nations fought devastating wars, that both passed from the dependent to the independent stage through the development of national resources, and that both built for themselves mighty navies. But during the period under review Germany built a merchant marine and America lost one. Explain this away who can! Remember that Germany’s coastline, navigable rivers, harbors, seaports, cannot compare with America’s immense endowment in these essentials of sea-power. America too has wealth of her own to fall back on, while Germany’s economic fabric is mainly supported by credit. It is only logical to suppose that if America, during the years mentioned, could, in spite of competition, force herself into a position of prominence in the world of industry and commerce, she could, if interested, reclaim some of her lost glory and move again in the front rank of shipping nations. A fair field and no favor is all that she requires, and a fair field implies freedom from legislative handicaps which discourage enterprise and the investment of capital in ships.
To a plain sailor — not a sea-lawyer — it seems that the Federal government of America cannot devote the necessary time to shipping when such a vast continent demands all its efforts and time. The marine interests of America are so enormous that their requirements cannot be fairly studied and met by a Board of Trade department also held responsible for the safe working of mines, factories, and railroads. The very fact that America is self-supporting may be the cause of the decline of her shipping. But Germany is self-supporting, too, and yet she keeps guard over her merchant tonnage. It is true that Germany is not possessed of a Minister of Marine, but, to all intents and purposes her Emperor fills that office. When a nation is self-supporting the need of a Minister of Marine is imperative, for, in the nature of things, external industries, such as shipping, when not absolutely essential to life and well-being, are apt to be cold-shouldered, and left to work out their own salvation. We find for instance that in 1855 the shipbuilding yards of America turned out three hundred and eighty-one full-rigged ships, barques, and barquentines, together with six hundred fore-and-afters. In 1905 the output included not a single square-rigger and less than two hundred fore-and-aft schooners. With respect to steamship construction, America is not a whit more favorably placed as compared with European nations, for in 1869 she built but one hundred and thirty-four screw steamers, and in 1909 the total increased to only six hundred and forty-two for that year. Furthermore, the great majority of these vessels were built to ply in the coastal and inter-coastal trades. Very few of those added to the American registry, of late years, are intended to serve the purpose of deep-water commerce. Owing to foreign competition and unwise national maritime laws, they could not if they would, and would not if they could. Coming down to 1902, the FryeHanna-Payne bill, designed to afford subsidies to American ships, passed the Senate, and seventeen ships for the transoceanic trade were built in American yards in anticipation that the provisions of that bill would become law. The House of Representatives threw out the bill. Since that day not another steamer of the class contemplated by the framers of the bill has been built in America.
The full story of those seventeen vessels added to the American registry under a misapprehension, is instructive and heart-breaking. Three of them are to-day sailing under the Belgian flag, to insure cheaper running, while the ownership remains the same. Three are engaged in the South American coastal trade. Three are laid up in San Francisco, two now belong to the United States government and are employed in connection with the work of the Panama Canal, five are engaged in the transpacific trade, and one was recently lost. Hence we find that after a lapse of a decade only eight of these seventeen vessels remain to the American merchant marine.
IV
Turning to the story of Britain, we find that her merchant marine represents over fifty per cent of the world’s shipping. In spite of its being watched over by a department which is burdened by the supervision of mines, factories, and railroads, it has maintained a steady growth throughout the many vicissitudes of the shipping industry. Some may jump to the conclusion that in bringing Britain and its merchant marine into the argument I am forging a weapon that can be turned against myself. This is not so! As an island nation dependent upon other countries for its foodstuffs and raw materials, Britain must keep a watchful eye on her ships and legislate with a view to keeping her course clear of antiquated laws. The President of the British Board of Trade may be without knowledge of the sea, but no matter what the man’s credentials may be, it is comforting to know that he is swept along with the flood and must starve with the rest of us if the merchant marine of Britain cannot perform its national function. So, irrespective of party politics, Britain’s economic position forces her into her paramount position in the maritime world. In certain unessential details, a British Minister of Marine, instead of a President of the Board of Trade, would prove valuable; but, in essentials, the issue does not lie in his hands, for we Britishers must starve if we cease to interest ourselves in shipping problems. When a nation lives by the sea, the protective instinct which forces its ships into all the nooks and corners of the world is an inheritance which brooks no interference from politicians who have personal axes to grind.
Now, my contention is this: that so vast are America’s maritime interests from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboards, via, and including, the Panama Canal, that they call for special legislation and an administrative department governed by a Minister of Marine vested with liberal powers to alter laws which are out of sympathy with modern needs, and to institute new laws that will aim at putting a stop to the prodigal waste of America’s maritime wealth.
As before pointed out, the proceedings of the last Congress were all in favor of ships engaged in the already protected coastal trade. No real concessions were made to deep-water tonage. The new laws aim at increased safety at sea, but they do not point the way to increased American tonnage. Still they are a sufficient index to prove that if their framers devoted their time to investigating the true causes responsible for the decline of the American merchant marine and were free of the baneful influence of trusts, the American tonnage problem would soon be solved.
Let me call the roll of some of the handicaps, imposed by law on American shipowners, which need no highpower microscope to show their unsympathetic nature: —
A ship may not be purchased from foreigners and placed on the American register.
Owners of an American merchant ship must be American citizens, or a legal corporation organized and chartered under the laws of the United States or of any state thereof, the president and managing directors of which shall be citizens of the United States.
Masters, officers, and pilots of American ships must be American citizens.
American ships, of the tramp class, are required to carry seven hands more than British ships of equal tonnage, and this number increases pro rata with tonnage.
The hydrostatic tests which American steamships must periodically undergo ruin boilers and add enormously to the already heavy running expenses.
All foreign vessels of a certain class — and in certain countries vessels of every class — receive bounties and mileage money, while American ships of every class have to shift for themselves.
The foregoing are but a few of the many evils which hamper American efforts in the maritime industry.
Commissioner Chamberlain devotes a considerable portion of a recent report to a masterly exposition of the methods employed by maritime nations which promote foreign commerce and shipping by means of subsidies. He considers this kind of expenditure as practiced by the majority of maritime nations, and arrives at the conclusion that the United States might do far worse than adopt certain of the salient features of these methods in order to give life and encouragement to her languishing merchant navy. ‘American capital,’declares Commissioner Chamberlain, ‘ is not predisposed toward the sea at present, much less is labor so predisposed.' And he goes on to say: ‘Repeal [of obsolete laws] may be advocated as an academic proposition; it may be advocated because the law is at least a dead letter, and it may be advocated in order to clear the way for subsidies when the inadequacy of the present laws has been shown by actual experience.’
A Minister of Marine unhampered by general legislative work could devote his time solely to shipping problems. As a free lance in the American shipping world he, as well as his subordinates, could within a very short time fully grasp the situation and decide what is worth retaining and what should be dumped overboard.
Germany, like the America of the last half century, is an ardent supporter of the protective principle, yet she has an eye to business, and though she may deplore the necessity of having certain of her ships built in British yards, she can yet see that by admitting these foreign-built ships to the German registry she increases her prestige and over-sea commerce. Foreign-built tonnage has t he same earning capacity as tonnage built in domestic yards. Every day Germany is adding lustre to her flag and breeding sailors, while every day American sailors and shipwrights are becoming scarcer. Norway affords us a splendid example of a poorly equipped country creating a merchant marine through purchasing and building ships.
Soon after the American Civil War, the centre of effort in shipbuilding shifted from America to Europe. The shipbuilding industry travels to positions of equilibrium where the cost can be reduced to a minimum without depreciation in the output and quality of the work. Experience and evolution govern the class of work and the size of new tonnage. So we shall find that when the day dawns for America once again to establish herself in the shipping world, her shipyards, plant, and business methods will be hopelessly out of date owing to the tremendous increase of the tonnage of individual vessels and the methods now employed to run modern leviathans.
In a recent speech the German Emperor said: ‘Germany’s future is on the sea.’ As an intelligent man, he sees that the sea can return a rich harvest. Where is the man in America who dares say that America’s future is on the sea? Let America produce such a man and place him at the head of a department that will work fearlessly for the shipping cause. There is tremendous leeway to make up, although American shipping is not yet on a lee shore.
v
It may, I believe, be taken for granted that the internal industries of America are fundamentally in a sound condition and can be trusted to look after themselves for a time, while a little more time, thought, and money are expended on ships and sailors. The duties falling within the jurisdiction of a Minister of Marine should include wardenship over all the seaports, harbors, rivers, and canals of the United States; maintenance of the lighthouse, life-saving, and revenue services; power to enforce by-laws regulating river, canal, and ocean passenger services; inspection of hulls and machinery; prevention of shipping trusts and freight monopolies and preferential tariffs; examination of masters, officers, and pilots; control of the hydrographic department; furthering of nautical science; protection of fisheries and the maintenance of a limited lien on the revenue derived from ocean commerce; supervision of training schools and ships for boy seamen; power to direct the attention of Congress to old shipping laws which penalize any particular trade or class of vessel, and to suggest the substitution of new laws for old when, thereby, they will encourage shipbuilding in all its branches; power to hold courts of inquiry into wrecks and strandings, and the right to recommend the building of nautical colleges in order to encourage American boys to study American nautical history and take an interest in modern nautical affairs with the idea of, later, following the sea as a calling. In fact, the powers vested in such a minister ought to be not a whit less than those granted to the head of the army and navy. No Jack-of-all-trades can watch over the welfare of a merchant marine such as America is justified in possessing.
Many contend that the prodigality of America is but a sign of her youth. The excuse is a pitiful one. What of Germany’s youth? What of Japan’s youth? What would Captain Ferry think of Japan to-day? And (what is more to the point) what could he help thinking of America to-day? Refusing to face one’s obligations is an extravagance of which only America could be found guilty. When the majority of American citizens appreciate the seriousness of the calamity clearly, as do a few public-spirited men, they will never again have to submit to a humiliating indictment from the Commissioner of Navigation. It deserves quoting, word for word: ‘During the year we had hat seven steamships regularly crossing the Atlantic to Europe, and recently two of these have been transferred to a foreign flag. Crossing the Pacific regularly we have but six steamships, and we have no steamships under the American flag on routes to South America below the Isthmus and the Caribbean Sea, to Australia, or to Africa. ’ Further, ’For several years past we have virtually ceased to build ships for the foreign trade, and the industry owes its existence almost wholly to the laws restricting domestic transportation by water to vessels built in the United States.’