'Kultur' in American Politics

I

‘GERMANY serves the whole world as an example in cultural and intellectual matters. They may storm, shout and get into a passion; they cannot dispute the superiority due the Germans in all provinces of science and industry.’

The above quotation, from the New York Staats-Zeitung of July 7, is a clear statement of the German-American attitude towards ‘Kultur.’ All the peculiarly German forces in this country agree whole-heartedly in the opinion there expressed. From the German point of view, the United States is wofully deficient in cultural matters, and two great institutions among those maintained by German-Americans have decided that the time has long been ripe for a change — the National German-American Alliance, together with its state branches and its affiliated societies, aided and abetted by the German-language press.

The Alliance, while denying a political activity ‘in the usual sense of the word,’ openly admits that it has a ‘cultural mission’ to perform, boasts that it has ‘always shown itself the best friend of Germanism and proved itself a support and herald of true Americanism.’ This mission, as defined by the New York State Alliance on July 2, consists essentially in the following points: ‘The promotion of the study of the German language and literature in our public schools; the encouragement of worthy immigrants to become citizens; the creation of liberal immigration laws; the abolition of those laws which unnecessarily limit our personal liberty; increased active participation of German-speaking citizens and organizations in public life, politically and otherwise, to the end that our civil-service legislation be improved and extended, that public corruption be grappled with and true patriotism cultivated by putting the welfare of the state over our personal interests; and, finally, the cultivation of everything in the German character and in German civilization which must be regarded as a desirable element in our national process of assimilation.’

The resolutions containing the principles just mentioned assert that the prevailing thought‘in this whole work is our serious desire for America’s good.’ The German-language press believes unanimously that ‘no real American can doubt the purely American motives behind such a declaration.’ The Alliance urges that ‘the individual, whatever his party, be led by them in his political activity.’

The Alliance further admits that it has been trying to consolidate the German vote. In correspondence from the press bureau which it maintains in Philadelphia, it says, —

‘ In unity is power, and the power of American citizens of German descent and their political significance is centred in the preservation of their unity, which is the goal of the German-American Alliance. Every attempt to break it up and destroy it amounts to treason to the cultural mission of the German race in the United States of America.’

Referring to this same consolidation of the German vote, the St. Paul Volkszeitung says that the President’s foreign policy has accomplished ‘the consolidation so often and so vainly attempted in the past.’

Such consolidation of the German vote, taken together with the admitted aims of the Alliance, can aim at but one thing: permanent legislation in favor of ‘Kultur’ and a pro-German policy in our international dealings.

The Chicago Abendpost admits this in its issue of June 8: —

‘For many years back the GermanAmericans have been flattering themselves with the hope that the founding of the National German-American Alliance might become the point of departure for a healthy political activity. That was at least one reason for founding the National Alliance for a great number of Germans who took a greater interest than usual in the public affairs of the country. It is better to say right out, Yes, we favor a policy which will be advantageous to Germany; we are fighting everything which has for its goal Germany’s detriment or which might result in hostility between Germany and the United States.’

Thus, ‘Kultur’ is to be impressed on the country and a pro-German attitude demanded ‘in the best interests of the American people’ and ‘by every means at the command’ of the National Alliance and its constituent organizations.

The propaganda is directed against our predominating Anglo-Saxon culture; its mission, according to the Baltimore Deutsche Correspondent, is that ‘of preventing the now incipient Anglicizing of the American people, of seeing that the race of men issuing from the melting-pot be no Anglo-Saxon, but a purely American race having its own history, its own politics, its own culture, its own philosophy of life, its own way of thinking and feeling.’

Up to now, this propaganda has made little headway. Unity of action was not to be had, and only unity of action could avail. Germans must unite as Germans to accomplish such a task as their leaders have set for them. They must also break loose from party ties. ‘We urge everybody,’ says Max Hottelet, an influential German of Milwaukee, speaking of the presidential contest, ‘ in this great electoral campaign to forget former party lies and to come out for our principles.’ Urging Democrats to leave their party, Eduard Goldbeck, in a letter printed editorially in the Milwaukee Germania-Herold, says, ‘As party members, German Democrats will regret this result, but they will comfort themselves with knowing that they have done their duty to America and TO GERMANY.’

Thus, the point of the Alliance’s contention that it is not in ‘party politics’ loses its force. Of course it is not in ‘party politics.’ It is in politics to get what it can for ‘Kultur’ and for Germany, and it cares not a straw from which party its favors come.

Up to the outbreak of the European war, efforts toward uniting the German vote were unavailing. Party adherence and lack of unity persisted. Only when an extraordinary impulse arose did they join hands. This happened in 1890, in Wisconsin, during the agitation of the Bennett law, which made a certain minimum of English instruction compulsory in all schools of the state. As Emil Court, secretary of a local political organization in Milwaukee, said a few weeks ago at its first meeting, —;

‘In the past we were once before brought together like this in Wisconsin —at the time when the Bennett law threatened us. It was then that the Lutherans and Catholics and all societies in Wisconsin of whatever description, all citizens in whose veins German blood flowed, stood together as a unit and killed the Bennett law. What we accomplished then, we can accomplish again.’

Similar enthusiasm has long been felt for the preservation and introduction of German instruction in the public schools, the spread of which is sought ‘in the interests of the entire American nation.’ A circular published in papers using the German language and emanating from New York even goes so far as to urge all Germans to speak German exclusively in the streetcars, stores, theatres, and all public buildings, to the end that German be forced upon the nation, at least as an auxiliary language. Americans would then soon learn German, the writers of the circular believe, in order to get German-American business.

In local elections, Germans were chosen as Germans, irrespective of party, as far back as 1908, at the behest of the German press and of the Alliance. The attitude of the Milwaukee GermaniaHerold on this matter is typical: —

‘In the interests of America, therefore, we shall have always to choose on principle among equally worthy candidates the candidate of German descent, and, indeed, on principle as long as the danger of America’s Britannization is not definitely broken and caused to disappear.’

Now a new impulse has come t o unite them — the European war. Their sympathy for Germany has aroused them, united them, and made them willing to forget party ties. This sympathy actuated Edmund von Mach, when, characterizing the war as a war against the principles of ‘Kultur,’ he called upon German-Americans to unite here in the interests of ‘Kultur.’

‘Then we too shall be invincible and able to contribute our part to the ultimate victory,’ he said. ‘When the fanfare of peace then blows at last, we shall have no cause to feel ashamed, and we shall be able to raise our heads proudly on high and rejoice, “Thank God, we, too, have been able to have a share in the patient suffering and to aid."'

What can this mean but a political activity toward the Germanization of America?

Connected with this sympathy for Germanism is an implacable hatred of everything Anglo-Saxon. Anglo-Saxonism is English and un-American. Germanism should be, must be, universal.

What is the danger of it all? Simply that in their hot enthusiasm, the Germans may win a partial success, especially in state and municipal elections. As the New York Staats-Zeitung aptly says, ‘ Every nation has something sacred, and that is its soul, its individual and independent entity, its peculiar ego. If it gives over this sacred thing to another, it has lost itself.’ We shall be lost, if we betray our present, natural culture, even though we substitute ‘ Kultur.’ We have the Staats-Zeitung’s word for it. That is our danger — that we be robbed of our national soul.

There is, however, some amelioration in sight. Even among German newspapers, there is a healthy opposition to this propaganda, but the Alliance and its press are meeting it with intimidation. Referring to the state of mind of Germans the Chicago Abendpost said a few months ago, ‘they are very much afraid of being considered un-German’; but, it added, ‘we should be the last to grant Italians and Russians in Germany the right to act in elections to the Reichstag as Italians and Russians.’ As another example, mention may be made of a group of influential Philadelphia Turners, which, while censuring the National Turnerbund for failing to recognize the Kaiserhof Conference in Chicago, ‘raises its voice in protest and warning.’ It orders that ‘the damage already done be nullified,’and asserts that the Turnerbund ‘will not only have to give up its stand but also seek and find a closer feeling with the National Alliance.’

Such is the procedure against delinquents who refuse to obey their orders. Yet, the Alliance ‘is not seeking to force its members to vote for any individual candidate.’¹

The ultimate ‘cultural’ objects of Pan-Germanism are far from realization, but these distant goals have been laid aside for the moment. They are useful in the attempt to capture minor offices of government, but for the Presidency they will not serve. The attitude of German-Americanism has come about through the mission of revenge alone. It is not based on‘Kultur,’ unless undying hatred be an element of ‘Kultur.’ German leaders in the national contest do not get their inspiration from the future. They are little troubled about the actions of the new president. They look backward at the ‘blunders’ of the present administration. They behold our President’s ‘ Anglo-Saxonism’ and Roosevelt’s ‘defection’ from the ranks of the Germans, and they thirst for revenge on these two men. Roosevelt they hate as a traitor to the German cause; the President they hate as one who has never known ‘Kultur,’ who has always been an ‘Anglomaniac’ and an agitator for this country’s return to the English colonial system. ‘Any Republican, except men of the Roosevelt-Lodge-Root clique, can certainly win against Wilson,’ the Cleveland Waechter und Anzeiger declares. ‘How thoroughly President Wilson has incurred their displeasure is shown by the remarkable circumstance that there is not one of the Democratic German-language papers, so far as we know, upon whose support he can depend,’ says the Germania-Herold. The President’s ‘undiluted Anglo-Saxonism ’ must be made innocuous. The encouragement of‘Kultur’ must wait.

II

The German press and the Alliance unite in claiming that they desire nothing more than ‘strictest neutrality’ in their presidential candidate. Neither President Wilson nor Mr. Roosevelt, in their opinion, has the slightest appreciation of the nature of such neutrality.

‘The public is stuffed with lies and falsely told that German-Americans are wretched villains, miserable blackguards and faithless traitors,’ says the Excelsior, a German Catholic weekly, ‘because they will not subscribe to the pseudo-patriotism “for revenue only” imported from London and patented in Washington, and the pseudo-neutrality similarly imported and patented. The German-Americans, so the fabrication goes, demanded of Wilson a policy which would be advantageous to the Central Powers and prejudicial to the Allies. No, you members of the international association of lies, the GermanAmericans demand a policy which shall treat the belligerent parties equally and demand and compel respect for our rights from one side with the same emphasis it does from the other.’

That this neutrality, in the opinion of Germans, is non-existent may be seen from the following excerpt from the Waechter und Anzeiger’s typical Fourth of July editorial: —

‘And from fear of imagined and fabricated German dangers for our dear Monroe Doctrine, America has again become a British vassal state on this Fourth of July, 1916. It is governed as pleases London, its trade is dependent on British permission on land and sea, it may pass no laws which England does not want, its citizens must no longer turn to their representatives in Congress with their desires, and Congress must no longer trouble itself with important affairs of the land. The British Ambassador in Washington, the British financial and munitions agent in New York, the metropolitan press in British possession, British spies in all branches of public life, and British prevarication which gives fine names to hateful things: that is the picture before which we stand. And two exPresidents approve this condition — out of fear of a danger which is fabricated for them.’

The Alliance and the German press actually do want nothing but ‘neutrality,’ as they understand the term, but their understanding is based entirely on their German feelings and not on such considerations as beseem American citizens. Neutrality should uphold our ‘rights,’ they say, and serve all violators thereof with an ‘equal measure’ of punishment. To this end, they consider essential the declaration of an embargo, a warning to Americans to keep off Allied merchant vessels, a reprimand to England because of her violation of Greece and her seizure of our mails, a protest against England’s violation of our commerce. To be neutral, the United States must protest to England on her blockade and agree with Germany’s principles of her submarine warfare.

The attitude of Germans toward an embargo on arms is characteristic of their general attitude. They believe an embargo should be declared in the interests of humanity and as a means of shortening the war. As far back as December, 1914, the Gcrman-American Chamber of Commerce issued an appeal to Germans throughout the country, in which it demanded that all Germans exert their influence on Congress in favor of an embargo.

‘The bill before Congress forbidding the export of all war materials must pass,’ it commanded. ‘And as soon as possible. To this end all American citizens of German descent must be mobilized immediately. Congress must feel the “furor Teutonicus” in all its strength. We must successfully and brilliantly measure our strength with the Anglo-American element. We must prove that German-Americanism in the United States is a power which must be reckoned with. Every German must write to his Congressman and request him categorically to vote for this bill.’

Germans deny that sympathy for Germany dictates this demand. They claim to be actuated only by the interests of America. ‘ It is said,’ says the Cincinnati Volksblatt, ‘that Germans sought with this demand to help their kin in the old country. Apart from the fact that this is untrue, only a war exporter and a pro-Britisher could see in it an opposition to American interests, for it is easily proved that arms exports are the cause of great damage to our own country.’

Yet the demand does favor Germany. All demands made by the GermanAmericans do. This can hardly be regarded as accidental. On the submarine question, Germans stand united for a proclamation of warning to American citizens to keep off merchant vessels of the Allies. They believe that the President’s attitude on the submarine question is ill-characterized by the expression ‘humanity.’ They point out that the speediest slaughter is often the most humane, and urge that the President put no obstacles in the way of such ‘humanity,’ as practiced by Germany. While not favoring any action on our part against the violation of Belgium by Germany, they urge action against England because of her ‘violation’ of Greece. These demands, also, are favorable to Germany. Must that again be considered accidental? The whole fabric of German demands is woven with anti-British threads on a warp of pro-Germanism. Our attitude toward England is characterized as shamefully weak; England’s mail seizures, her violations of our commerce, her generally ‘outrageous’ conduct call forth the most violent of denunciations of a President who has shown himself a ‘traitor to America’s best interests’ by not erring in his neutrality on the German side.

Such is the German conception of neutrality. Such is the foundation on which they establish their criticisms of President Wilson and Mr. Roosevelt. Such is the platform on which they will criticize our next president, if the war still continues.

III

The greatest fear in the hearts of Germans directly preceding the Republican Convention was that they might have to choose between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Roosevelt. It was to avoid that necessity, if possible, that the GermanAmerican Conference was called at the Kaiserhof in Chicago directly before the Convention. ‘The German-American Conference,’ says the letter of censure to the National Turnerbund,

‘ offered us our only great opportunity to make clear to the parties our stand as American citizens and to spread before them our grievances and demands and the unadulterated truth before the nominations and before election — and to do this emphatically through men whom we had sent as delegates and irresistibly through the support of a united German-Americanism such as is to be found in the ideals incorporated in the National Alliance.’

Since Germans felt that Mr. Wilson would most certainly be renominated, the Kaiserhof Conference attempted to work only on Republican delegates. After Mr. Hughes’s nomination, delegates to the conference openly boasted that they had been instrumental in Roosevelt’s defeat and Hughes’s consequent selection. It will be so if Hughes defeats Wilson.

The causes back of German dissatisfaction with Roosevelt are patent. His ‘hyphen’ speeches troubled them. German papers represented him to their readers as a ‘traitor’ to the German cause. The Germania-Herold said of him in April last year, ‘Among all the bitter disappointments which we have had to experience since the outbreak of the war, it was perhaps the bitterest of all that we should see this man with whom, of all others, we felt so much united, on whose moral support we had confidently relied in these hard times, acting in concert with the Germanophobes.’

Why German-Americans should have expected Mr. Roosevelt to defend them is not very clear, but everything which he said disillusioned them — especially his attitude on Belgium’s violation — and they developed for him a most violent hatred. Dr. Münsterberg, coming to Roosevelt’s aid, was ridiculed as an unknown theorist from whom nothing sane might be expected, and as a representative of ‘Puritan’ Harvard under orders from President Lowell!

Who can say that the results of the Kaiserhof meeting, as they see those results, have not encouraged Germans to an even bolder confidence in their power? Now, in addition to this complacent belief in their intellectual superiority, they are developing a bullying spirit of conceit in their political strength. They promise Mr. Hughes ‘as many as 3,000,000 votes.’ Time alone will make good or break that promise — time and Mr. Hughes.²

Against the domestic policies of the President, Germans have no criticism to make. ‘If the European war had not broken out during Woodrow Wilson’s administration,’ says the Deutsche Correspondent, ‘it could only be said of President Wilson, “Ho served his country well.” ’

It cannot but seem strange to most intelligent men that Germans agree fairly well in commending all of Mr. Wilson’s domestic policies and in condemning all his foreign policies.³ Yet such is the case. ‘In word and in deed, Woodrow Wilson has always shown a patience towards the cause of the Allies hardly compatible with the dignity of the country, while towards the Central Powers he shows himself the inexorable Shylock demanding his pound of flesh, even though he must have known that he was thereby crippling one party and giving advantage to the other. The one-sidedness of his actions right now again gives cause for serious accusations which he cannot get rid of in an off-hand manner.’ Thus the St. Louis Westliche Post. Because of this onesidedness, ‘nothing which Democratic leaders can say or do will make GermanAmericans friends of Mr. Wilson again.’

‘ The great mass of German-Americans,’ says Amerika, a German Catholic organ, ‘are through with him and only circumstances now quite unforeseen could bring about a reconciliation. They cannot be talked down.’

The ‘hyphen’ plank in the Democratic platform and the President’s speeches which preceded it arouse their wrath. ‘If the German-American, yes, the entire non-British element of the population,’ says the Waechter und Anzeiger, ‘can forgive and forget what Wilson has done to it, or even pretends to forgive under the circumstances, then it deserves to be treated as it has been treated.’ They want nothing to do with the candidate who ‘tries to get the vote of the Know-Nothing element’ by ‘such dirty tactics.’

No word is considered too strong by German papers to bring home to their readers the ‘traitorous’ actions of the ‘vice-regent of England’ ruling ‘with high hand ’ in ‘the branch offices of the British government’ in Washington. Wilson is pictured as a traitor to the interests of his country, a ‘lackey in Britain’s livery’ who knows that he is doing wrong, but persists in ‘kissing the hand of his Britannic Majesty’ as the latter ‘kicks him like a dog.’ Our ‘so-called government’ is ridiculed, to the end that hate, relentless and burning, may be instilled in the hearts of their readers.⁴

It is stated without qualification that the President wanted a war with Germany and did his best to bring one about. It was Germany that frustrated his plans, ‘humane’ Germany who could not see America suffer as she has suffered. Mr. Wilson and his adherents, together with the pro-Allies, are typically characterized by the Excelsior: —

‘They are only Anglo-Saxons working on Cecil Rhodes’s testament, to the end that the proud, independent United States may again be brought under the yoke of Old England. And at their head — intentionally or not — stands Woodrow Wilson, who still calls himself President of the United States, but who really is nothing more than a British colonial director. By their fruits shall ye know them!’ The Excelsior adds, ‘If ever in the history of the Presidents of the United States an impeachment process was in place, it is in place now.’

The later phase of the President’s Mexican policy is characterized as the boldest plan ever conceived by a presidential candidate. The President realized that defeat would be his portion, ‘if nothing unusual happened.’ ‘But Wilson has power in his hands,’ says the Philadelphia Tageblatt. ‘He can bring about situations which will compel the people to leave him in office. Serious foreign developments alone could move the people “not to swap horses while crossing a stream.” That is the long and short of the Mexican affair.’

The President is criticized for his attitude on the Lusitania tragedy. German papers agree in fixing the blame for the loss of American lives on England, who ‘merely used American citizens as a safe-conduct for her ammunition’ in the hope that serious difficulties with Germany might develop if these should be killed. Says the Waechter und Anzeiger, ‘To speak of a crime on the part of Germany in the Lusitania case is the most foolish cant conceivable. Our munitions exports, America’s wallowing in blood-money, America’s self-deception — these are crimes also on the conscience of our own people.’

The President’s action in the Sussex case continues to be discussed at intervals. The Fatherland, criticizing our government for believing its own evidence rather than Germany’s original denial of blame, holds that ‘to question the statement of the German government in this matter is to impeach one’s own good faith.’ Later, when that government formally admitted her guilt, The Fatherland remarked: ‘The German Government has admitted that, according to first evidence presented, the Sussex was sunk by a German submarine. The Fatherland is by no means convinced that the evidence is authentic.'

By the German-American press, every hypothesis put forward by Germany is believed rather than the statements of the President, who is altogether too monarchical for the gentle exponents of Kaiserism in our land. ‘Mr. Wilson should have been Czar,’ says the Waechter und Anzeiger.

Such is the criticism, such the language that is being used to turn the German vote from Mr. Wilson. That the language has an American sound can hardly be maintained. Whether or not the criticism is justified is not the subject of this article.

IV

Evidence already presented shows that the German-Americans are demanding ‘neutrality’ of their candidate, and that they are convinced that President Wilson does not have their brand. They are just as little convinced that his antagonist will be amenable to their wishes, but they do not hate Mr. Hughes. The Excelsior expresses approximately the correct idea:—

‘Everybody knows that Hughes has in no way expressed his views on his position and that he has not even been asked to express them. GermanAmericans merely weigh his personality against Wilson’s and will vote for Hughes, not because they hope for a pro-German stand from him, but because they believe that he is able to differentiate between right and wrong, while Wilson has shown that he cannot do this. People will, of course, not demand of German-Americans that they vote for Wilson. Wherefore, only Hughes is left.’ If it should turn out that Mr. Hughes is ‘neutral’ in the ‘Hexamerican ’⁵ sense, so much the better. If not, they will have their revenge, and ‘Scarcely any one will deny that the war will be over before Hughes has any opportunity to define his American policies, so that for Germans it makes no difference what Hughes or Wilson will do.'

In spite of their natural coolness toward a man about whose intentions they know almost nothing, the German press and the Alliance express themselves in most cordial terms concerning Mr. Hughes. The New York Ilerold particularly extols in him qualities which will make him an ideal candidate for German voters. This paper was especially gratified by his nomination, since it had suggested his candidacy as far back as December, 1915. It feels a sort of proprietary interest in him by right of discovery.

All the German papers, excepting a few of small circulation and influence, agree that Mr. Hughes can be no worse than Mr. Wilson, although they have had some doubts since Mr. Roosevelt espoused the Republican cause. They propose ‘ to take a chance ’ on the double probability of a speedy end of the war and Mr. Hughes’s superior ‘neutrality.’ That is all the significance which can be attached to the general trend of Germans to the Republican camp—that and their all-consuming hate for the present occupant of the White House. But even hate is a fickle thing. Who knows what may yet develop?

Throughout all German-America the campaign goes merrily on, with slander for Wilson’s share and flattery for Hughes’s. Individuals or organizations which show a tendency to go over to the Democratic camp are loudly denounced as traitors to the cause, as renegades and turncoats; but the increasing number of such defections is noticeable to the close observer. As their grip on the German vote weakens, the Alliance and its faithful press grow bolder in their attacks on the man, who, whatever his shortcomings, is still our President.

Enjoying a fair degree of privacy because they are printed in a foreign language, German papers do not hesitate to use bad names, coarse slang and vile expressions in discussing the head of our ‘so-called government.’ Publicity is needed, but few newspapers appreciate the need or dare supply it. Boycotts have been suggested, but to the average newspaper a boycott means death.

The delegates to the Kaiserhof,⁶ emboldened by their success in Chicago, hope for further conquests. The press, depending on its ‘dear friends’ and ‘faithful bed-fellows,’ the Irish-Americans, still feels sure of its 3,000,000 votes and of ultimate victory.

Does ultimate victory mean the practical support of all German contention against England? England’s plans for a commercial boycott of Germany as construed throughout Gcrman-America are directed largely at the trade of the United States. In order that these plans be frustrated, ‘diplomacy would dictate that the United States unite intimately with Germany; but Wilson is merely a Germanophobe, and cannot sec the light. Even the Chicago Abendpost, a reactionary paper, feels that it is ‘imperative under these circumstances for America to unite intimately with the Central Powers — industrially and politically.’

Where will it all end, if Germans, continuing a united force in American life, proceed in politics, federal and local? What would be the ultimate goal in their political efforts? I answer with a quotation from the Waechter und Anzeiger : —

’The result of parliamentary government, which is more or less synonymous with party government, as is shown by the results of any election, is the eternal shifting of inexperienced men, poorly informed men and those trained for other professions. What brings about this shifting of inexperienced men, we see right here in America in our presidents, who are also products of party government. It may, of course, be much better than an autocracy where the autocrat cannot see for the lack of a parliament which can speak out and let him see — better, that is, than the stability of erring blindness. But it is infinitely worse than a government system in which the officials are experts, whose office is their profession, who are publicly instructed by a representation of the people.’