An Unpopular View of the Shantung Question

I

ON one point in the much-debated peace treaty there seems to be general agreement among liberals in this country and Europe: German properties in Shantung should be returned to China. The territory controlled is indisputably Chinese in population and in geographic and historic connections. The leases and concessions involved were originally extorted by force, and when Japan wrested them from Germany, the world was distinctly given to understand that they would eventually be restored to the original grantor. To the conviction that this restitution should be made, all lovers of justice the world over have steadfastly adhered, and they have felt that any secret or public conventions to the contrary have, at the least, been dangerous, and have, at the most, perpetrated a serious wrong and threatened the future peace of the world.

As to the method by which restitution should be made, however, there has been, as all the world knows, a sharp divergence of opinion. The Chinese, the great majority of Americans, and a fair proportion of the thinking people on the Continent and in Great Britain have believed that the peace treaty should immediately turn over to China all former German possessions in that country, with, possibly, compensation to Japan for her expenditures and a guaranty that no portion of Shantung should ever again be alienated and that the province should be kept open to international trade. The other method, the one adopted by President Wilson and so much decried in this country, is to leave the properties in question in the possession of Japan and to trust her to restore them to China.

It is obvious that, whatever means are employed, certain definite objects should be sought. The first and chief of these is justice. Justice implies the ultimate restitution of all leased territories to China and the undoing of any impairment of the sovereignty and independence of that republic. It also implies due consideration of Japan’s expenditures of life and money, and ample securities to her for economic opportunities in Shantung equal to those of any other power and unprejudiced by special agreements. The wellknown facts of Japan’s limited resources and growing population, and her natural and legitimate belief that the neighboring continent furnishes her a field for commercial expansion, render the maintenance of the open door in China essential to the life of the island empire and to the peace of the world.

A second object, and one closely allied to the first, is the peace of the Far East. This depends in turn upon a number of objectives which any fair settlement must seek to attain. Perhaps the most obvious of all is the strengthening of China internally, so that as quickly as possible she may be able to manage her own affairs and rid herself of the tutelage of the powers, a tutelage which humiliates her, provokes her to militarism, and is conducive to international jealousy and strife. Another and equally necessary objective is the promotion of true friendliness between Japan and China — a sentiment which is now conspicuous by its absence, and which can exist only when there exist mutual trust and respect between the two peoples. Partly ignored by the West for the time, but ever present in the mind of the Japanese, is the necessity— equal in its urgency to the other two means of peace — that no other power or powers be allowed to encroach further on Chinese economic or political independence. Supervision of Peking must be increasingly international in its nature. A last prerequisite, and one usually misunderstood in this country, is a safe solution of the internal problems of Japan. Are the militaristic or the liberal elements of that people to control its future destinies? Is Japan to join heartily with the democracies of the world, and become a prosperous, therefore an earnest member of a league of free peoples, or is she to seek her salvation in the Prussian manner? The question is by no means so nearly closed as many in this country seem to think, and the world has it in its power to strengthen greatly, or to give a fatal blow to, the growing liberal sentiment in the island power.

These, then, are the objects which must be sought, whatever method is chosen of returning the former German holdings to China. For direct action by the Paris Conference, the first of these methods and the one favored by the majority in this country, both progressives and conservatives, cogent reasons can be advanced. The concessions in Shantung ensure to their holder the economic control of that province and seriously threaten the political integrity of the north of China. Since the Japanese are virtually masters of Manchuria and Mongolia, and since the former Russian counterweight is gone, to give to the islanders the dominant position in Shantung would be the equivalent of surrendering to them all China north of the Yangtze Valley. Japan’s promises, so far as published, are either indefinite or only semi-official, and contemplate at the best the retention of economic control. To cancel the concessions at once was then, it would seem, the only safe way of maintaining the independence of China. If this was not done, nothing but Japan’s fear of the consequences, or her forbearance, or a determination to be better than her word — a quality which is rare among nations — could save the great Asiatic republic from partition or virtual annexation. Few powers placed in a similar position have proved able long to resist temptation, and the record of Japan’s dealings with the Chinese offers but little encouragement to those who believe that she will be able to do so.

Such an act, which unquestionably would have called for no small degree of moral heroism, would seemingly, moreover, have helped to launch the League of Nations with a tradition for courageous fair dealing, and would have made inconsistent, and hence more difficult, imperialistic designs in China and other parts of the world. It would have condemned once for all the German procedure of 1898, and by implication it would have discredited the retention of other special privileges and spheres of influence in China and the exploitation of the disorganized peoples of the globe by their stronger neighbors. No other one act of the Paris Conference would probably have called forth more cordial approbation among the liberals of America and Europe, or have given more heart to Chinese patriots and dependent peoples the world over. Sooner or later Young China would unquestionably have followed up her advantage by other demands, and Koreans, Indians, Egyptians, and Persians might well have had courage given to their nationalistic programmes. An important setback would also have been given to secret arrangements similar to the inter-Allied agreements of 1917 concerning Shantung, and to the highhanded procedure which has too often marked Japan’s actions toward China since 1914. It would, for example, have vitiated in spirit the famous concessions of 1915, and might well have led to their further amendment.

This unconditional restoration of the Shantung properties to China, drastic though it would have proved, had in addition the approval of a large, perhaps the major, portion of America’s experts on the Far East. Sober-minded men who had given the best years of their lives to the study of China and Japan felt that this action was the only just one, and that the method which President Wilson chose would entail for the world a much larger aftermath of difficulties. Direct retrocession to China would unquestionably have cut the Gordian knot, and its simplicity could not but prove tempting. It may, indeed, still prove to have been the right course.

There are, however, some other considerations which Americans would do well to remember. We must recall, in the first place, that as a nation we possess a distinctly anti-Japanese bias, and that any solution which at first appears to us right is very apt to prove unfair to Japan. The reasons for this prejudice, and the question whether it is justified, need not here detain us; but it is undeniable that, as a people, we cannot view at this time the relations between China and Japan without distinct sympathy for the former and antipathy to the latter. This attitude is particularly characteristic of those Americans who have lived in China. Whether they are merchants, diplomats, or missionaries, they practically all unite in denouncing Japan and in proclaiming her programme in China a menace to the United States and a dark and iniquitous plot against a defenseless neighbor. That there is just foundation for much of their censure, no one who knows the situation can doubt; but we would do well to remember that most of them have never given more than passing attention to Japanese domestic affairs, and that they have looked so long on one side of the question that they have become partisans and advocates rather than fair-minded judges. They have the ear of our nation, however. Most of the few Americans who know Japan and attempt to present her position are either accused of being employed by Japan or have taken an equally biased pro-Japanese position, — a natural reaction from the extreme statements of their opponents, — and so are discounted by the public. Americans come to the Chino-Japanese question deeply prejudiced and should distrust any solution which at first thought seems to them just.

We need also to consider what would have been the effect upon Japan had the German holdings been taken from her outright and given to China. Her national pride, which is unusually sensitive, would have suffered a deep wound, for she would have been branded as untrustworthy, she would have been deprived of her most outstanding gain in the war, and in view of the refusal to grant her request for race-equality, whatever motive we may ascribe to that demand, and of the territorial gains made by her European allies, it is entirely improbable that public opinion would have allowed her to sign the peace treaty or to join in the League. Just what would then have happened to the internal political situation of the Empire is, of course, uncertain; but some who have intimate knowledge believe that the growing liberal movement would have experienced a serious reverse, and that the country would have been driven into the arms of the extreme militarists. It seems impossible that the present Cabinet could have survived the shock, and it is likely that, as in 1895, the country would have set diligently to work to perfect alliances, to strengthen the army and navy, and so to prepare for a future stern reckoning by arms like that which placed Japan in Manchuria in 1905. The people as a whole would naturally have felt that no dependence could be put on the generosity or good faith of the West, — for Europe had annexed territory while Japan had been denied even the temporary retention of it, — and they would have given ready heed to the powerful and blatant militarists.

The immediate and compulsory surrender of the Shantung holdings would, moreover, not have been just to Japan unless it had carried with it guaranties of reasonable commercial opportunities in China. Were China able, she would, if her present frame of mind were to continue, unquestionably discriminate against Japanese enterprise, and perhaps exclude her trade entirely. Against such a contingency Japan has a right to ask for safeguards, and machinery is not yet perfected to make these secure.

II

The other method of returning the Shantung concessions, and the one chosen by President Wilson, is to give them to Japan, to obtain from her assurances more or less definite that she will restore them to China, and then to trust to her good faith. This course, it must be frankly recognized, is extremely hazardous. The Japanese government has not an untarnished record for honest dealing, although it compares favorably in this respect with most Western powers. It is, moreover, easy to find excuses for delaying or modifying the fulfillment of a promise, especially when that is as indefinite as to time and details as is the one which the Japanese have so far made public. Then, too, such action seems to be the desertion of a friend who entered the war largely because of American example and influence. It has aroused opposition in the United States and has placed in jeopardy the already dubious outcome of the Senate’s discussion of the peace treaty. It has proved, too, to be a grievous disappointment to liberals who had pinned their faith on President Wilson, for it appears to be a surrender of some of his most cherished principles. On the surface, Italy does not seem to have been treated quite fairly, for, after having borne much of the brunt of the war, she is denied a single city,—Fiume,—and Japan, who sacrificed but little, is granted the control of an entire province.

There is, however, much more to be said for President Wilson’s action than is immediately evident. In the first place, it was obviously difficult to annul agreements made between Japan and the Allies under the stress of war and before we had entered the conflict. To have done so would probably not only have driven Japan from the incipient League, but would, if consistently followed, have denied to Great Britain and France their imperialistic hopes in various quarters of the globe, and so have led to the break-up of the Conference and the indefinite postponement of even an imperfect international organization. The risk might have been worth taking had this been the only consideration, for supposedly we would have preserved a clear conscience and could have trusted economic pressure and the liberals in these countries to bring the world to time.

But there are other and more forceful considerations. We need, in the first place, to remember that liberal opinion in Japan was vastly strengthened during the war, and that it has already modified and may eventually supplant the military tradition which has so long been dominant. For the past five years there have not been lacking influential Japanese who have condemned the government’s aggressive policies in China. Could this sentiment prevail, Japan would probably adopt toward China a far more counciliatory policy, and might even of her own free will restore the concessions in Shantung, and in such a way as to placate and gain the confidence of her huge neighbor and to cement a peace built upon good-will rather than force. This would be far preferable to a restitution forced by the powers, for it would save Japan the humiliation involved by the latter course, it would increase the possibility of the victory in Tokyo of liberal sentiment, and it would go far to cement a real friendship between the two great peoples of the Far East.

The hope that this consummation will be reached is not so chimerical as most Americans are inclined to believe. Japan is extremely sensitive to the opinion of the world. To this quality she owes much of the rapidity of her westernization in the nineteenth century. To it are also due in part her imperialistic ambitions, for these are merely the reproduction of what she found prevalent in Europe when she emerged from seclusion. Should the sentiment of the West condemn her actions in China, the hands of her liberals would unquestionably be strengthened. That, moreover, is exactly what is taking place. The American outcry against the Shantung settlement was inevitable, given our prejudices, and is having its effect, an effect which may well be accentuated as the months pass; and it may be that Japan’s Chinese policy will be altered more than we have dared hope.

To this same end is also tending the bitter opposition aroused in China by the peace treaty. The antagonism and the anti-Japanese boycott have been providing the liberals with peculiarly strong arguments against the measures of the militarists, for Japan’s commerce and industry are suffering, and the prosperity of these has been one of the chief objects of the aggressive groups. Should the boycott continue, Tokyo will almost certainly be forced to make concessions. While it is highly unfortunate that these could not have been granted earlier, and while they may be too late to restore good-will, it is better that they be made in this way rather than through the coercion of the Occident.

The anti-Japanese movement in China is, moreover, uniting that unhappy land as has no other event of recent years. The action of the Paris Conference was a severe disappointment, but it is possible that out of the humiliation there will be born a national consciousness and a patriotic impulse which would not have appeared for years had the Shantung properties been handed back by the powers without vigorous action by the Chinese themselves. In the last analysis, China’s salvation must come from within; and if this blow cannot rouse her, other and more serious ones are certain. She has too long trusted to international jealousies to save her, and some such shock seemed to be needed to make her stand on her own feet.

We need also to recall that Japan has made certain promises, even though these as yet are not entirely satisfactory. If the League, the organized conscience of mankind, is worth anything, it will hold her to them, and will insist, if necessary, upon better ones being made and kept. If it cannot do so, it would not have been able to prevent her from defying the Paris diplomats and retaining the Shantung properties; nor could it prevent her seizing more territory whenever it suits her convenience to do so. The League is certainly much more apt to hold her within bounds if she is inside rather than outside it. If Japan should fail to keep her word, and if the League should not succeed in obtaining justice peaceably, force could still be used by individual powers. The experiment of trusting to Japan and, if she proves false, of trying the machinery of the League, would seem to be preferable to telling her bluntly that she cannot be depended upon, and thereby wrecking the League before it is formed and making almost certain early hostilities in the Far East.

That the League will be able to hold Japan to her word, and to aid China effectively in her struggle to complete and competent self-government, is as yet uncertain, but it is certain that it is by some sort of international organization that this can best be done. It is also encouraging that the first steps have been taken toward the construction of an international consortium to finance China. It is through finance that the powers most adequately control the Republic; and if an efficient and inclusive international body can once gain an effective monopoly of all foreign loans, the importance of the spheres of influence and leased territories will be greatly lessened and the excuse for them obviated. All well-wishers of China must hope ardently for the success of such a Reorganized group. It may yet lead the way to the complete substitution of international supervision in China for conflicting and special concessions. Indeed, proposals have already been made for placing all foreign-owned railways, mines, and leased territories under international commissions.

If Japan is wise, she will return the Shantung properties at an early date, and without asking even for special financial reservations. Her best interests demand that she have the cordial friendship of the Chinese and the approval of the world. Any grudging or partial restoration will only add to the rancor of China and strengthen the suspicions of the United States and Europe. If she fails to convince China and the world of her good faith, there will be a cause of unrest which will threaten the peace of the world, and the League will have its strength tested to the utmost.

It is to be hoped that the Senate will permit the President’s plan to be tried. The policy of trusting Japan is certainly worth testing. It is also to be hoped that our State Department will continue to bring pressure to bear on Tokyo, either directly or through the League, to publish definite assurances of an early and complete restoration of the Shantung properties to China, and will not allow itself to be diverted until these promises are fulfilled. If we can do this firmly but tactfully, we shall prove ourselves to be true friends, not only of China, but of Japan.

However, while we do this we must guard ourselves against vilifying our neighbors of the trans-Pacific islands. We are too prone to substitute abuse for argument, and those of our newspapers and people who aid in the campaign of slander are doing far more harm than good. We ought, moreover, to see that Japan’s legitimate interests in China are fully protected. Some sort of international control must be established over that great but disorganized nation which will hasten the restoration of order, the realization of a good and stable government, the development of natural resources, and the maintenance of an open door. If this is not done, Japan will be continually impelled to step in. If it is done, Japan’s strategic geographical position will give her the commercial advantage which in the past she has too frequently sought to obtain by doubtful and devious methods. Upon some sort of effective and fair international supervision of China and the gradual abolition of spheres of influence and special privileges depends the peace of the Far East and of the world.