A Naval View of the Conference: Fleet and Base Limitations

I

THE stated purpose of the Washington Conference was to arrive at such ‘a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East’ as to permit of a general limitation of armaments by common agreement. It was a call upon the nations concerned ‘to do that finer, nobler thing which no nation can do alone’ — to make such sacrifices and to come to such rearrangements as would reduce the likelihood of war in the Far East and thus enable the principal Powers to limit their armaments wit hout und ue danger to themselves or to those dependent on them for security.

In effect, the Conference was like an intense drama, the circumstances of which put its participants under such pressure as to make recognizable their real attitudes toward the questions in issue and, incidentally, to bring to light the particular aims characteristic of each. But, with the best of intentions and in spite of unprecedented official publicity, inadvertently it was made particularly difficult for Americans, inexperienced in evaluating the amenities of diplomacy, to appreciate this drama, to see behind it the historical background of the problems with which it dealt, and to recognize the actual purposes of many of its participants. In some measure this was due to lack of matured understanding of the questions in issue on the part of some of the media of public information. But perhaps the most beclouding factor was the national propensity to consider everything indiscriminately with unbounded optimism — so-called. Optimism does not consist , however, in being willfully blind to all the obstacles of life, in living in a world peopled by the fatuous fancies born of kindly credulity. Real optimism consists in marching undauntedly forward to a higher goal with as full an understanding as possible of every obstacle.

From such impediments to comprehensive public appreciation of the situation, it followed that the effects of many important obstacles to the main purposes of the Conference have not been generally realized. Yet it is not to be supposed, in this day and generation, that even the most ardent advocates of unreserved ratification of every agreement drawn up by the Conference would advocate their ratification without public appreciation. It would seem to be, therefore, not only a duty to the public but the duty of the public to face frankly the undesirable as well as the desirable elements with which the Conference dealt, back of the screen of diplomatic amenities. And, happily for t hose who believe not merely in a limitation of armaments but in ultimate disarmament, we shall see that the Confercnce has made possible a situation approaching much more closely to those ideals than the most ardent advocates of them seem to have realized.

II

The general objective of the United States — which was the objective of the Conference as a whole — was (1) to improve policies and consequent conditions in the Far East so as (2) to reduce a specific expectancy of war in the Pacific, and (3) thus permit of a general limitation of armaments.

With this general objective Great Britain was in hearty sympathy — under the very natural proviso that nothing offensive to her close ally, Japan, should transpire in such a way as to endanger the great British interests in the Far East or the security of British India and Australasia. And it was well understood that Great Britain came to the Conference with the particular hope that the aversion of the United States to the Anglo-Japanese alliance might result in expanding that alliance to an Anglo-American-Japanese alliance. For to bring the United States into alliance with herself has been a more or less persistent item of Great Britain’s foreign policy, at least since George Canning proposed it in 1823. With respect to this policy — of increasing moment as the United States grew in power—the ‘Four Party Treaty’ between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France is an interesting development.

The particular objectives of France at the Conference were twofold. Her paramount concern was that, nothing should be done at Washington that would limit the military power of France on the Continent of Europe vis-à-vis Germany; and M. Briand’s remarks on this subject summarily deleted the entire subject of the limitation of land armaments from any further consideration by the Conference. An evident corollary to this desire for military security on the part of France was her desire to strengthen her naval power in the Mediterranean for the purpose, stated by her representatives, of being able, in the event of war in Europe, to draw with assurance on the great manpower of her vast African possessions. This entrained her possible use of a potential naval command of that vital British line of communications with the Far East, which passes through the Mediterranean as a makeweight in Continental affairs—useful especially in the event that Great Britain should have trouble in the Near, Middle, or Far East.

But to grasp the full meaning of this phase of French policy, one would have to go back beyond the construction of the Suez Canal by de Lesseps, beyond Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt, and even to the famous memorandum wherein Leibnitz recommended Louis XIV to assail the Netherlands by war in Egypt, — in order to reach their Far Eastern trade, — while keeping peace in Europe. Though this cannot be done here, it should be noted that the European-Continental situation and the consolidation of her vast domains in Africa are much more important, to France than are Annarn and her Polynesian possessions and that, consequently, it is to be expected that, her outlook on Far Eastern matters in future will be as it was at the Washington Conference — quite subordinated to French interests in Europe, Africa, and the Near East. In fact, France is and will continue to be in the posit ion of one so intensely concerned with vital matters near home that remote affairs can receive but secondary attention, with the result of scant understanding. This is evidenced by the French Government’s having conceived the mistaken idea that the real purpose of the United States in calling the Washington Conference was to adjust differences with Great Britain, and that, in this fancied juxtaposition of the two English-speaking Powers, France would find her greatest advantage in playing the role of peacemaker.

Of Italy it need only be said that her Far Eastern concerns are less even than those of France; and that her Mediterranean interests, though less extensive, are more vital to her because of her position. But that is not to say that they were parallel with those of France. On the contrary, it appears that Italy found her advantage in sympathy with Great Britain and, by securing the right to a fleet equal in size to that of France, quietly secured a potential naval advantage over the latter because the Italian peninsula does not divide Italy’s two coasts to the extent that the Iberian peninsula divides the t wo coasls of France.

The fact that, of late, Japan has been spending very nearly one half of her national revenues on her navy, while the United States has been spending less than a tenth of the Federal revenue on the American navy, led Japan to welcome with enthusiasm the call of the United States to a conference for the limitation of naval armament per se. But the fact that the proposed limitation of naval armament was predicated on arriving at ‘a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East’ led the militarist press of Japan to characterize the invitation to Japan to attend the Conference as ‘the greatest calamity that has ever overtaken the Japanese Empire.’ To reduce naval competition might save Japan from ruin or from the internal necessity of going to war prematurely in order to justify naval expenditures and prevent internal revolt; but policies in the Far East were matters of which, in the view of some Japanese, the least said the better. Yet it was realized that, if Japan declined to attend the Conference, she might be diplomatically isolated and could not hope to save herself from the internal dangers of her excessive naval expenditures.

Finding herself forced by internal as much as by external conditions to attend the Washington Conference, it became the duty of the Japanese Government to make such an estimate of the situation and to devise such a plan of procedure as would give the best promise of protecting and, if possible, advancing Japanese policy while relieving Japan of her unparalleled burden of naval expenditure. The fact that relief from such expenditures would be very beneficial to Japan and that the United States had called the Conference as a means to the end that armaments be limited — and consequently would go far to succeed in that end — made it evident that the interest of Japan would be best served by first getting from the United States and other Powers a commitment as to the limitation of armaments; and this while holding back conclusions on vital matters of Far Eastern policy. Then over-insistence by the United States or other Powers on a practical revision of Japan’s policy in Asia might be stopped by a threat to ruin the ends of the Conference as to naval limitations by alleging inability to accede to some item thereof. But such a procedure would have been merely defensive of Japan’s politiconaval status as it existed at the opening of the Conference.

It was natural for Japan to suppose that, having called the Conference, the United States would be prepared to pay a high price to make it a success and might, therefore, be induced to a commitment that would constitute a positive improvement of Japan’s politiconaval situation. The problem was to determine on an objective of great naval advantage to Japan, such an objective as would render unnecessary further expansion of Japan’s navy while protecting her political policy, and such an objective as might be attained by astute diplomacy at the Conference.

From the course pursued by the Japanese from the moment of their arrival at Washington it was evident that they came with such a plan, prepared by the coöperation of statesmen who understood naval strategy with naval strategists who understood statecraft. It was a plan that should have been apparent before the Conference opened to anyone really conversant, with the strategy of the Pacific; for it was a plan that was obvious from the outset to all but those who did not understand both statecraft and naval strategy. Yet the Japanese put it through — as will appear hereunder — with results far transcending such a detail as whether the ratio of capital fleets was to be 10-10-6 or 10-10-7, all the talk over this detail being merely a cloud of dust thrown in the air to conceal the real objective. And, as will appear, they thereby gained an unprecedented naval victory, pregnant with political possibilities for which it would be difficult to find a parallel in history.

To the foregoing very brief outline of the particular objectives of some of the Powers at the Washington Conference, it should be added that some of the Chinese seemed to have entertained hopes of territorial rest itution — in addition to Shantung — and hopes of political and economic independence which the issue has proved to have been exaggerated. They seem to have recalled the American idealism that inaugurated the Open Door Doctrine, not only to assure the openness of all China to the trade of all the world without discrimination, but also to assure the territorial integrity and political entity of China; and they seem to have expected that this same idealism would insist on the taking of material steps to correct incursions that had been made during the last twenty years against this doctrine. Furthermore, the Chinese expected that American idealism as to China would receive material support from the fact that, when the Open Door Doctrine was inaugurated, in 1900, the exports of the United States to Asia had amounted to only about $65,000,000, which was only about 1.4 per cent of the total of American exports for that year; whereas these exports had increased to over $770,000,000 for 1920 and constituted nearly 10 per cent of the total exports of this country for the last-named year. But, in entertaining such hopes, the Chinese overlooked the fact that the Open Door Doctrine has been merely a talking matter to most Americans, whereas the control of the Open Door is a fighting matter to Japan. And they also overlooked the fact — well understood by the Japanese and other strategists — that the United States would be very seriously handicapped in supporting the Open Door Doctrine, or any other policy in the Far East, against material opposition, because of the naval strategy of the situation.

III

It was not to be expected that public interest woidd concern itself first with such particular objectives as have been suggested, even though they were important factors underlying the primary problem of putting in effect in the Far East such policies as would ensure fair practices by all and to all in that field; and this to the end that the likelihood of further aggressions there — or of a war of defense against further aggression — would be so reduced that it would be safe for the Powers, and for those dependent on them for security, to limit armaments.

On the contrary, public interest centred on the tangible objective of limiting armaments. And this natural centring of public interest on this objective was particularly emphasized because the Conference, though dealing with conditions in the Far East, occurred soon after the great, war in Europe and, consequently, at the height of such a popular reaction against armaments as usually follows the close of every great war — especially if it has been one of the wars fought to end war.

From this it followed that the greatest popular interest was accorded to the proposal to destroy over half of the aggregate tonnage of American, British, and Japanese capital ships, built or building, to stop forthwith all building of such ships, and to set up the ratio of 10-10-6 as that to be maintained for ten years between the capital fleets of these Powers. But the Japanese insisted on retaining their brand-new’ Mutsu which is the greatest battleship in the world and which was built largely by popular subscription; and in order to do this they contended for a ratio of 10-10-7. This was adjusted by allowing Japan to retain the 33,800-ton Mutsu while earmarking her 20,800-ton Settsu for the scrap heap. But this increase in Japanese tonnage compelled the United States to undertake to complete the 32,000-ton Colorado and West Virginia as substitutes for the 20,000ton Delaware and North Dakota; and this in turn caused Great Britain to desire to undertake the building of two entirely new ships of not over 35,000 tons each, whereupon the Thunderer, King George V, Ajax, and Centurion, aggregating 91,500 tons, would go to the scrap heap. This readjustment caused by the Japanese retention of the Mutsu retained virtually the ratio of 10-10-6 or 5-5-3; but it prevented the putting in practice of the plan to stop forthwith all building of capital ships.

The following tables show the number and tonnage of capital ships to be scrapped and to be retained by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan as though the above detailed replacement had been carried out; —

CAPITAL. SHIPS TO BE SCRAPPED (as after impending replacements)

68 ships aggregating 1,645,810 tons

CAPITAL SHIPS TO BE RETAINED (as after impending replacements)

From the above tables it appears that, allowing for the two 35,000-ton British ships to be built from the keel up, nearly three fifths of the tonnage of capital ships now built or building in the American, British, and Japanese navies are to be destroyed. Such a sweeping destruction of capital tonnage might be considered as a great reduction of the power of the capital fleets. But further examination will show that this would be an incorrect conclusion.

Of the total of 1,645,810 tons to be destroyed, over half is constituted by ships almost all of which are so old, so slow, or are so comparatively weakly armed, that they can no longer be considered fit to fight in an up-to-date battle-fleet. In this connection it is appropriate to recall that, before 1910, — and as a measure of naval efficiency in expectation of war by Germany, — Admiral Lord Fisher got rid of 160 British naval vessels ‘that could neither fight nor run away.’ To this it may be added, on personal knowledge of the present writer, that, for several years past, some American naval authorities have been advocating disposing of 15 out of the 17 American battleships to be scrapped; and this not as a measure of reducing the power of the American fleet, but as a way of increasing the efficiency of the American navy by relieving it of practically useless deadwood. As somewhat, the same holds true for almost all the British and Japanese ships afloat and to be scrapped, it is difficult to sec in this doing away with 51 obsolete or obsolescent battleships any reduction in fleet power. On the contrary it may be esteemed as a very material contribution to naval efficiency. But it should be added that doing-away with these 17 American battleships will not relieve, to any material extent, the present shortage of personnel in the American navy; for, all in all, on 15 of them there are many fewer than 1000 men at the present time.

On the other hand, the plan to scrap over 700,000 tons of capital ships now building and not to undertake the construction of about half as much more that was in immediate contemplation is a positive gain. But it should be realized clearly that it is a limitation as to further expansion and not a reduction of present power. And the corollary to this is that the proposed fleet, limitations, per se, do not furnish any warrant for reducing expenditures for naval operations. They give promise only of avoiding very large future increases for construction and operation; and this only after the heavy costs of carrying out the scrapping programme shall have been met.

Right here it should be realized that, if the present personnel of the American navy were to be assigned only to the ships built and to be retained under the limitation plan, and to their auxiliaries, the fleet could not be 80 per cent manned. This and other economies now make for the fact that the actual ratio between the American, British, and Japanese fleets is not 5-5-3, but between 4-5-3 and 3-5-3. The truth of this will be appreciated by those who know the relative training in these three navies, and who realize that ships do not fight each other but that it takes trained men to fight ships.

Besides putting the above-discussed limitation on the future expansion of capital fleets, the naval agreement provided that the United States and Great Britain might build airplane carriers, each to the extent of a total of 135,000 tons, Japan being limited to 81,000 tons in accordance with the 5-5-3 ratio — this in addition to such experimental airplane carriers as are now in each of these navies. As these vessels are likely to cost about $800 per ton, their construction in the near future will amount to something over $280,000,000 in all, or to about $110,000,000 for four or five American airplane carriers.

It will be recalled that the original proposals for naval limitations contemplated limiting the aggregate allowable tonnages for cruisers and for submarines as well as for capital ships and airplane carriers — which latter are coming to be considered as a special type of capital ship. But apart from specifying that no vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons, other than a capital ship or airplane carrier, shall be acquired or built by the Powers concerned, and that no vessel of war other than a capital ship shall carry a gun of over 8-inch calibre, the limitations agreement is silent as to regular cruisers, destroyers, and submarines — and this in spite of the conflict of opinions and interests that centred around submarines during the Conference. So France attained her strenuously voiced desire to be permitted to build as large a submarine flotilla as Great Britain.

It may be said, in short, that the naval limitations agreement does not limit the extent to which future competition may be carried in building submarines, destroyers, cruisers, or any other type of combatant naval vessel in any number, except capital ships and airplane carriers. It virtually does not reduce the present effective force of capital fleets in themselves, but merely provides against their further expansion; and it makes specific provision for expansions of the present airplane-carrier forces. As the present effective force of capital fleets in themselves is not virtually reduced, as the expansion only of capital ships and of airplane carriers is limited, and as the expansion in volume of cruiser, destroyer, submarine, and any other naval forces is unlimited, it is difficult to see why some have acclaimed this agreement as a tremendous reduction of naval forces. It is merely a limitation upon the future expansion of capital forces. And this mere limitation of capital forces — counting airplane carriers as such — was obtained by the United States in consideration, as we shall see, of a further naval agreement which may be expected to have a much greater effect on the future than any question of fleet ratios or limitations.

Because of the circumstances just outlined, the conclusion seems inevitable that we must dismiss any thought of reducing American naval expenditures below the present level of about $450,000,000 — if the 5-5-3 ratio is to be realized. On the contrary, there will have to be some increase if crews are to be provided for all vital ships, including the new West Virginia and Colorado, so as to raise the limited fleet to its expected place in the 5-5-3 ratio. Nevertheless there will be saved still further increases because of construction on thirteen new capital ships now to be scrapped and to provide for the operation of these ships had they been completed. Beginning a year or so hence, this saving of increase in expenses may average something under $150,000,000 a year for some years, or less than 4 per cent of the present gross annual expenditures of the Federal Government of the United States.

Considerable as such a saving would be, it would be surprising if any were to weigh a possible saving two years hence of less than 4 per cent of the Federal expenses against the question of whether or not the naval limitations of all kinds, as agreed on, conduce to peace or court war. Nor is a possible future saving of less than 4 per cent of our Federal expenditures to be considered in the same category as is a question greater than that of peace or war — namely, whether the arrangements arrived at conduce to the spread of righteousness or tend to condone unrighteousness. For, above all, ’it is righteousness and not peace which should bind the conscience of a nation as it should bind the conscience of an individual.’

Such considerations lead us to the conclusion that the most important thing for us to attempt to estimate is whether or not the naval limitations agreed on will tend to spread righteousness in the Far Fast; and, subsidiary to that, whether or not they will tend to maintain peace in the Pacific. But, in order to make such an estimate, we shall have to consider the functions of naval force in the Pacific as modified by the Washington Conference, political condilions in the Far East, and the very promising results to be expected from some of the non-naval agreements reached at Washington.

IV

It may conduce to a clearer appreciation of the more important naval consequences of the Washington Conference, as they affect the functions of naval force in the Pacific, if first we consider some of the functions and limitations of modern navies. Then we can apply general principles to the specific situation in the Pacific.

The first mission of all armed force, from the policeman to the navy, is to maintain law and order in consonance with the policies of peace; and this by being of such potency that a breach of the peace would not promise desirable results to anyone, whether an individual or a nation, whose ethics alone are inadequate to keep him from peacebreaking. That is what Mahan meant, in part, in saying, ‘The function of force is to give moral ideas time to take root.’ If armed force is unsuccessful in the maintenance of peace, then individual or international war supervenes, and it becomes the duty of the armed forces to stop the war by doing — if necessary — such violence to the peace-breaker that his will or power to continue his warfare will be broken.

The basic mission of a navy is to defend its country and those for whose defense its country is responsible. The defense of British overseas domains by the British navy and the defense of the Philippines by the American navy are instances wherein a Powder, by assuming suzerainty, has incurred the concomitant and unavoidable moral responsibility for the defense of its dependents. Collateral to this primary mission of defense, there rests upon a navy the duty of supporting the external policies of its country. The Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Doctrine are instances of such policies.

In the main, the function of a navy in war is to secure freedom of movement by sea for the other armed forces and for the commerce of its nation, while reducing the capacity of the enemy to continue to fight by excluding him from use of the sea as a channel for his combatant and commercial movements. This securing ‘the command of sea communications’ is accomplished by the use of two different but interdependent naval forces, one of which depends on ‘concentration’ for its efficacy while the other acts by ‘dispersion.’

As the naval objective is to close the sea to enemy movements while keeping it open to friendly movements, it is evident that an extensive amount of ‘dispersed’ patrol work will have to be done. The enemy’s raiders will have to be hunted down, his troop transports will have to be captured and his merchantmen driven from the sea; and the seas will have to be patrolled in order to assure safety to all kinds of friendly movement thereon. These dispersed naval operations are carried out by cruisers of all types and are known as cruiser warfare. And incidentally it may be noted that, strategically speaking, the German submarine campaign was a type of cruiser warfare, its peculiarities being due to the tactical qualities of submarines.

But if the enemy is at liberty to send to sea a number of cruisers, or more powerful vessels, ‘concentrated’ in a squadron, these superior forces of his will be able to overcome, unit by unit, the ‘dispersed’ lighter cruisers engaged in blocking his transportations and in protecting the movements of their own navigation — whereupon ‘the command of sea communications’ will pass to the enemy. Such squadrons must be countered by stronger squadrons; and in these juxtaposed squadrons of ‘concentrated’ force we find the genesis of battle-fleets, the essential and paramount constituent of which are capital ships, with their tremendous ‘concentration ’ of striking power. This brings us to the phase of naval operations opposite to ‘dispersed’ cruiser warfare, namely, ‘concentrated’ battle-fleet warfare.

The first mission of a battle-fleet is to prevent the enemy from putting to sea in such force that he can secure the command of sea communications — as just described. But it he should put to sea in concentrated force, then the mission of the battle-fleet will be to destroy or drive back to port the enemy battle force. The watch maintained by the British Grand Fleet, over the German High Sea Fleet during the late war and its driving of the High Sea Fleet back to port in consequence of the Battle of Jutland furnish good example of this. And here it should be realized that, had the British not confined the heavy naval forces of the Germans, the latter would have erupted and, with the aid of lighter German forces, would have destroyed all convoy and antisubmarine operations in Western European waters — whereupon, with the passage of the command of sea communications there to the Germans, the Allied cause could not have survived.

In short, it may be said that the first mission of a battle-fleet is to destroy or confine the battle forces of the enemy so as to enable its own nation’s cruiser forces to obtain and maintain dispersed command of all military and commercial movements by sea in the contested area.

When a nation has obtained command of sea communications by its battle-fleet helping its cruiser forces thereto, and when it thus has deprived the enemy of all essential movement by sea, it may be considered as exerting in full the pressure of sea power proper against the enemy in order to bring ruin to his ability to continue the war. But it may be desirable to accelerate the somewhat slow processes of economic and social disintegration by a military invasion of the enemy’s country — or by invading and capturing some of his possessions as a makeweight for peace. In such an event, the battle-fleet may be called on to perform its ultimate mission of enabling the landing of an army of invasion, at an appropriate spot, under the protection of the guns of the battle-fleet; and, collaterally, it might be called on to support the invading army in coastal operations. But all of this only after adequate command of sea communications in the critical area has been secured.

This whole series of interdependent operations rests on the ability of the battle-fleet to take such a position as to control the maritime situation in the contested or critical area, such a position being preferably some strategically commanding and adequate advanceoperat ing base with which a reasonably safe line of communications and support can be maintained from the home base. Before the days of steam, a battle-fleet of sailing vessels could remain at sea for six months without taking on supplies of any kind. It could voyage to any part of the sea and, at the end of its voyage, be thoroughly fit for battle. Its freedom from the need of bulky supplies and elaborate maintenance-repairs enabled it to operate for very long periods at sea and remote from any base. But modern battle-fleets, though vastly more dependable and powerful, have great limitations that are not generally realized. The most pronounced of these is a comparatively short, radius of effective operation because of limited fuel supplies; and this effective radius is particularly short where high speed, consuming a disproportionately large amount of fuel, may have to be maintained because of danger from submarines and where, consequently, it would be very dangerous to slow up in order to take on fuel from an accompanying tanker.

Evidently a battle-fleet must have fuel enough to steam to its war station at whatever speed, within its capacity, may be best — and zigzagging, if necessary, because of submarines; it must be able to steam about its war station at such speed as to guard it from submarines; its ships must always have on board ample supplies of fuel to go through a protracted battle and long chase at the highest possible speed; and their reserves should be adequate to get them back to their base. But the fact is that there is not a battleship to be kept in the American fleet that can steam 10,000 miles at cruising speed with a clean bottom without refueling; and most of them can go little over 6000 miles under such ideal conditions. Not one of them could travel eight days at battle speed with a clean bottom; and on the average their fuel tanks would have to be replenished before they had traveled six days. With foul bottoms — which greatly retard vessels — they could not average to steam for five days at battle speed, and some of them would be exhausted before they had traveled 2000 miles in all.

From the data from which the above statements were deduced the conclusion seems unavoidable that the limit of the effective return radius or range of the American battle-fleet would be about 2000 miles from its base, if it had to pass — as it would — through submarine-infested areas.

This suggests the simile that a battlefleet is like a tremendous gun that can be moved from base to base and that will be all-overpowering within the radius of its range, from whatever position it is based on. But — like a gun — beyond the limit of its range from its base it will be powerless. In turn, this gun and base combination, or battlefleet, and naval-base combination, suggests that naval bases are the foci from which battle-fleet power can be exerted — to the extent of the power of the fleet and over return radii of different lengths, as may be determined by ship characteristics and by local circumstances. So, instead of having a uniformly colored map of the oceans over which the sailing ships of old might cruise at will, a naval map of the world would now show certain naval bases with special areas of high battle-fleet power emanating from them. Within such areas enemy cruisers could not carry out sustained operations. But outside those areas the battle-fleet power would not extend and be a protection to its own cruisers. This leads us to the conclusion that naval power is not merely a matter of fleet ratios, of which we have heard so much of late, but that it is also a matter of geography; that the locations of operating naval bases determine the areas in which battle-fleets have power — and that beyond those areas their powder does not extend.

With this very meagre outline in mind as to some of the major principles of naval operations, we may proceed to examine the naval situation in the Pacific as it has been arranged at the Washington Conference.

V

As naval warfare, like chess, is primarily a question of location and then a matter of the timely movement of forces of different strengths, we must first picture to ourselves the very simple geography of the principal strategic points in the Pacific. Hawaii is 2100 miles west-southwest of San Francisco. With adequate base facilities — which do not yet exist — in both places, the American battle-fleet could be supplied from San Francisco if it were based on Hawaii. And from there it could protect the western coast of the United States from enemy operations other than of a touch-and-run cruiser nature — except for the fact that Japan is building large submarines of such great cruising radius that they will be able to cross the Pacific, operate off our western coast for a month and then return to Japan without refueling.

Guam is 3330 miles slightly south of west from Hawaii; and Manila is 1523 miles west beyond Guam. As we have seen that a battle-fleet has an effective return radius of only about 2000 miles, it is clear that neither Guam nor the Philippines could be defended by a fleet based on Hawaii. But if a fleet could be sure of finding fuel and other base facilities at Guam, it could easily advance from Hawaii to Guam, for the distance is less than 4000 miles; though from Hawaii a fleet could not reach the Philippines without refueling somewhere, as they are nearly 5000 miles distant; and a fleet of superior power, based in the region of Guam, could defend the Philippines, as they are only 1500 miles from Guam, although both the Philippines and Guam are less than 1400 miles to the southward of the great naval bases in Japan proper. It will be seen from this that Guam occupies a pivotal position in the strategic geography of the Western Pacific, giving to the possessor of an adequate and secure base region, with Guam as a nucleus, what are known as ‘interior lines.’ For not only would a fleet based in the region of Guam command the northern and eastern approaches to the Philippines, but it would command the lines of communication between Japan and the Marshall, Caroline, and Pelew archipelagoes, which lie to the southward along the line of communications between Hawaii and the Philippines, and in close proximity to this line.

Bearing this geographic disposition in mind — and assuming that the United States had a virtually impregnable fuel-supply base at Guam — let us suppose that a war were to occur between the United States and Japan over any one of a dozen causes; and let us apply to it some of the principles of warfare that have been outlined above for this purpose. The object of each nation would be to force the other to stop fighting in order to then impose its own will in the matter in dispute. With the American battle-fleet able to base on Hawaii and to refuel at Guam, it would be most hazardous for Japanese forces, other than submarines, to venture to the eastern side of the Pacific. But it is not to be expected that Japanese submarines would not operate against commerce at focal points from Seattle to Panama. It would be vain to expect, however, that such operations could be even a seriously contributing cause toward forcing the United States to give up fighting. And as the stronger American battle-fleet, based as far west as Guam, would protect the Philippines, it would seem that in no way would Japan be able to do anything to the United States to force the latter to stop fighting.

On the other hand, it is claimed that Japan could be conclusively invaded if a fleet greater than hers were based on Guam, which is less than 1400 miles from her shores. It is impossible to see how this could be done, because Japan’s vital points are either around the Inland Sea, the approaches to which are impregnably defended, or have impregnable defenses of their own. But a preponderant American fleet, based as far west as Guam, would make possible the most intensive kind of cruiser warfare against Japanese commerce at its foci — at least after certain other advance bases had been established. And a continuance of this cruiser warfare would soon come to cost Japan more than it would to yield in the matter over which the war was being fought. So, because of having an impregnable base nucleus at Guam, the United States and those dependent directly on her for protection, namely, the Philippines, would be secure and Japan, without conclusive invasion, could be forced to stop fighting. It may be added that the above statements have been made with an appreciation of the local limitations of Guam itself, and also of its relations to other not remote archipelagoes.

But if, in the situation just described, we make but one change and suppose that Guam is not impregnable, then the American battle-fleet could not be based further west than Hawaii. In that event, it could not defend or recapture either Guam or the Philippines, to say nothing of conducting operations against Japan; and tips for the very simple reason that the battle-fleet range is only about 2000 miles from its base, while both Guam anti Japan are over 3300 miles from Hawaii, and the Philippines are nearly 5000 miles distant.

The situation that, would arise under these circumstances has been tersely described in his Sea Power in the Pacific by the distinguished British naval authority, Mr. Hector C. Bywater, in the following terms: ‘The conclusion is that within a fortnight after the beginning of hostilities, the United States would find herself bereft of her insular possessions in the Western Pacific, and consequently without a single base for naval operations in those waters.’ If this occurred, the United Slates could not bring pressure to bear on Japan to make her stop fighting until after a base in the Far Eastern waters had been reconquered, an operation, it may be said, that would take about three years of purely naval warfare. Only thereafter could the cruiser operations begin under the protection of the finally advanced American battlefleet to force Japan to stop fighting. In other words, failure on the part of the United States to have a secure nucleus base at Guam would result in adding about three years to the duration of a war with Japan.

Here the very natural thought will spring to many minds that, in the event of trouble between the United States and Japan in the Far East, the British naval forces would support the Americans, and their bases would be at the disposal of the American fleet. Such coöperation, though rendered in the heartiest way, would be of surprisingly little material assistance because of the geography of the situation.

First, the British naval base at Weihai-wei is to be abandoned and that at Hongkong, beyond the Philippines, is in a condition somewhat analogous to the American facilities in the Philippines; and the British base at Singapore is over 6000 miles from Hawaii. Furthermore, the line of communications between Hawaii and Singapore would pass through a region that would be infested with Japanese submarines. So Singapore would be inaccessible to the American fleet, except by very long circuits.

Next, Japanese waters are about 3000 miles distant from Singapore and, consequently, a fleet based at that base could not reach Japan any more than could a fleet based at Hawaii.

And last, but not least, the line of communications between England and Singapore is 8000 miles long and might require very heavy guarding at certain points, which two factors, taken together, would result in inability on the part of Great Britain to maintain at Singapore anything like as powerful a force as the United States could maintain at Hawaii. So, while there would be the most natural reasons to expect British-American naval coöperation, it should be realized that the British could not contribute as much effective force in the Pacific as the Americans — who should look on the task, therefore, as primarily theirs.

From what has been said the conclusion seems inevitable that the single question that has the most influence on the naval situation in the Western Pacific is, whether or not the United States has secure tenure of Guam. If at Guam there are merely adequate naval stores and such defenses that it cannot be taken by a battle-fleet, then, in the event of war, the American battle-fleet could proceed there and, after refueling, cut the lines of communication the Japanese had extended to the Philippines — if the Japanese had been venturesome enough to attempt to take the latter with Guam securely in American hands. During the early stages of the war, Guam and other appropriately placed islands in the Western Pacific could be provided with adequate base facilities and then the war would proceed to a reasonably quick end.

But if Guam is not strongly enough defended to stand off a battle-fleet, then Japan can take also the Philippines and hold all the Far Eastern possessions of the United States, secure in the knowledge that it will take the latter about three years to regain from Hawaii a base in the Far East by a certain series of operations, during which the American people might get tired of an uneventful war in which there would not be over 300,000 men in the army and 400,000 in the navy, with only comparatively few of the latter seeing any fighting. The fact is, that if the popular agitation for a reduction in naval expenditures had not led the House to decline to pass the Naval Bill as passed last spring by the Senate, Guam now would be in defensible shape. But, as a result of that agitation, Guam can be taken by a battle-fleet. This brings us to the pivotal point of the whole series of negotiations that occurred during the Washington Conference.

VI

As already may have been inferred, the pivotal point of both the naval and the political conclusions of the Conference was the question of fortifications and naval bases in the Far East — and most particularly the status of the fortifications and such beginnings of naval bases as the United States has in her insular possessions in the Far East. Article XIX of the Naval Treaty provides that these latter fortifications and so-called naval bases shall remain in statu quo as at the time of the signing of the Treaty. That is to say that they shall remain in such a status that the Japanese battle-fleet could take Guam and most of the Philippines within about a fortnight of the outbreak of hostilities, and that thereupon, the American battle-fleet being without a Far Eastern base, would be powerless beyond its range of about 2000 miles west of Hawaii — this irrespective of its size relative to that of the Japanese battle-fleet, and for reasons similar to those that make the biggest gun conceivable literally powerless at a distance about twice as great as it can shoot its projectile. Whatever factors led to this pivotal conclusion may be viewed in two entirely different lights.

It was said early in this article that it was clearly evident to strategists that the Japanese came to the Conference with a definite plan designed (1) to safeguard their present politico-naval status in the Far East, and (2) to use the responsibility of the United States for the popular success of the Conference so as to exact concessions that would improve the politico-naval status of Japan in the Far East. A thorough knowledge of the strategy of the naval situation, which has been merely outlined above, made it extremely easy for strategists to forecast what would be the main element or objective in such a Japanese plan. One had only to determine on that factor in the strategic situation which would be of the greatest advantage to Japan, and yet be attainable by negotiations carried out under all the circumstances qualifying the Washington Conference. So there was no surprise among those who understood the strategic factors involved when, in the very first week of the Conference, rumors developed to the effect that, the Japanese, as well as objecting most positively to the proposed scrapping of their peerless new battleship, the Mutsu, were raising questions as to the fortifications and so-called naval bases in the Far Eastern possessions of the United States — and this as a factor of the proposed limitation of naval fleets, and although it had not been mentioned in the original proposals made by Secretary Hughes as to the limitation of fleets.

Here it should be recalled that at first the Japanese insisted that, instead of the originally proposed American-British-Japanese fleet ratio of 10-10-6, this ratio be adjusted in their favor to 10-10-7, whereby it would be permissible for them to preserve the Mutsu. And they even went so far as to state categorically that for many years the Japanese public had been educated to believe that the safety of Japan depended on her having a fleet in the exact ratio they desired, namely, 10-10-7; and that, in consequence of this longestablished belief on the part of the Japanese public, it would be highly dangerous to the Japanese Government to agree to any fleet ratio other than 10-10-7.

But those who had strategic understanding of the situation kept their eyes on the questions being raised as to fortifications and naval bases. And again it was no surprise to them when, at the end of the first month of the Conference, it became known that Japan had yielded her desire for a fleet ratio of 10-10-7 and had accepted the ratio of 10-10-6, in spite of what had been said about public opinion in Japan; and that furthermore, it had also been agreed to maintain the status quo, namely, inadequacy of American insular fortifications and naval bases in the Far East. For those who had technical understanding of the situation had held all along that all the talk about a 10-10-7 fleet ratio had been made with a realization that the success of the Conference in the public mind, outside of Japan and France, would depend on establishing the enthusiastically acclaimed 10-10-6 ratio, and that, therefore, holding out against this last-named ratio might furnish sufficient leverage for Japan to obtain from the United States the vital concession as to the establishment of the status quo for insular fortifications and naval bases — and this especially as only naval authorities and some statesmen would realize the full bearing of this concession to Japan.

Finally it should be recalled, as supporting this technically held point of view about the fortifications and naval bases, that, on January 10, Japan held up the whole naval treaty because of it; and it was not until the end of that month that consent as to the final form of the clause dealing with them could be obtained from Tokyo and from the Japanese delegates to the Conference.

On the other hand, there are grounds, very broadly held, for dismissing the line of argument that has just been made as merely a product of the complexes of the technical mind. The more broadly entertained line of thought, as to the reasons why it was agreed not to permit the development of further fortifications and naval facilities by the United States in the Far East, rests on the conception that, in spite of some particularistic motives, the virtually all-absorbing object of all the Powers at Washington was to bring about such conditions in the Pacific that war between the United States and Japan would be impossible and that, consequently, armaments could be reduced. Statements have been made in official circles to the effect that the capital fleets of the United States and Japan have been so reduced that neither nation is left with sufficient naval power to strike at the other — a conclusion which, as we shall see, is one-sided.

In addition to this there is the conviction held by many to the effect that the American Government was so intensely determined to give a convincing demonstration of the belief attributed to it — to the effect that peaceful concord should take the place of armed potency in the Pacific — that it acquiesced readily to the Japanese suggestion that there be no further development of American insular defenses in the Far East; and that it did this with a full understanding of the strategic consequences of this concession to Japanese desires.

But perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the theorem that there was no ulterior motive or suspicion in the steps taken to reach the agreement that these defenses should remain in statu quo is to be found in the fact that the British supported the Japanese suggestions to this effect vis-à-vis the United States. For it should be inconceivable that, in this, the British sided with Japan rather than with the United States, unless the entire matter was dealt with in such a harmonious manner and with such reliance on such diplomatic rearrangements as the Four Party Treaty as to preclude the idea that Japan was seeking to deprive the United States of any power in the Far East, and thus to leave all matters there really in Japanese and British hands.

Be all this as it may, the outstanding fact that cannot be too clearly recognized is that the agreement to maintain the status quo as to the now inadequate defenses of the Far Eastern dependencies of the United States is pregnant with naval and political results much more far-reaching than are the limitation of fleet ratios — and this because the range of power of a battle-fleet is only about 2000 miles from its base in submarine-infested waters. It is as though the United States had a great gun — its fleet — which it could mount on a concrete base at Hawaii; and as though it had the location for a similar base at Guam. Because the gun mounted at Hawaii will reach only 2000 miles, it is impotent either to protect Guam or to attack Japan, both of which are over 3300 miles from Hawaii. And the only way to give the gun potency in the Far East would be to advance it to a base from which its projectile could reach the critical areas. But the first such American-base location is Guam which could be reached by the Japanese fleet, as it is less than 1400 miles from Japan, and which is so lightly armed that it could be taken instantly by the Japanese fleet.

From this the inevitable conclusion is that the establishment of the status quo as to Far Eastern American defenses has in fact, made the United States impotent in the Far East, in the event of war — provided Japan keeps submarines enough to oblige the American battle-fleet to steam at high speed and, consequently, to burn its fuel so rapidly that it cannot travel far. And the corollary to this impotence of the United States in the Far East is that, as the Japanese fleet can have the Far Eastern waters to itself, it is really allpowerful there.

Here it should be recalled that, as we have seen early in this article, the whole effort toward the limitation of naval armament has not resulted in any considerable reduction of effective fleet power per se; nor has it resulted in any limitation whatsoever of the volume of cruiser fleets or destroyer fleets or submarine fleets or fleets of any other kinds of auxiliaries; but it has resulted merely in limiting the further increase only of fleets of capital ships proper and airplane carriers — this without even a prospect of reducing naval expenses, except by not attempting to maintain in practice the 5-5-3 ratio set up in theory with so much acclaim. And in order to bring about this single limitation of moment the Administration of the United States has agreed to a strategic limitation of naval power whereby, in the event of war, the American navy would be without any real power in the Far East, while the Japanese navy would be all-powerful there.

The conclusion seems unavoidable, therefore, that the naval effect of this whole arrangement is not the establishment of a 5-3 ratio of naval power between the United States and Japan with respect to the Far East. On the contrary, it means virtually complete disarmament by the United States in the Far East while Japan — though stat istically less heavily armed at home than the United States is at home — is left overwhelmingly armed in the Far East. And about the same thing might be said with respect to Great Britain’s power to express naval force in the Far East vis-à-vis Japan. Consequently, in the Far Eastern situation, a region of international interest has been delimited in which Japan is omnipotent as far as arms go, and in which the other interests relatively are powerless. So in the Far East we have a region in which virtually the equivalent of disarmament of all Powers, except Japan, is proposed — a region in which, therefore, the only reliance will be in the validity of such diplomatic agreements as those in which the advocates of complete disarmament repose so much confidence. Consequently, this region may be looked upon in the immediate future as a localized experiment in disarmament wherein, in spite of Japan’s armaments, the world is trying the experiment of relying merely on agreements.

VII

It is not within the particular purview of this article to indicate the political consequences that are possible from such a naval sit uation as we have been examining. But we set ourselves the task of attempting ‘to estimate whether or not the naval limitations agreed on will tend to spread righteousness in the Far East; and, subsidiary to that, whether or not they will tend to maintain peace in the Pacific.’

The euphemisms of diplomatic and official expression to the contrary notwithstanding, the underlying problem that confronted the Conference was caused by what the Japanese aptly designated as the ‘accomplished fact’ that, in only the last sixteen years, Japan has extended her control over about 1,500,000 square miles of Eastern Continental Asia in which dwell over 50,000,000 non-Japanese — exclusive of Shantung. And it was further realized that the Philippines were very likely to come within the sphere of her expansion because it was known that, even before these islands passed from Spain to the United States, it was the Japanese who were back of the native uprising against Spain, it was the Japanese who caused the American Intelligence Service the most concern during Aguinaldo’s uprising, and it has been the Japanese who have been fostering the independence movements in the Philippines ever since. This should cause no surprise; for the plan of procedure has been patently like that followed by Japan in first making Korea independent of China, in 1894, then forcing a Japanese protectorate on Korea, and finally absorbing Korea as an integral part of Japan in 1910. Nor was the situation limited to the Philippines; for it has further possibilities that are thoroughly well realized in detail in official Dutch and British circles. Hence the British naval base expansion at Singapore.

We have seen that, in effect, the naval t reaty puts up a bar that excludes the United States from naval power in the Far East; and we have seen that, with an adequate American fleet at Hawaii, Japan cannot make an attack in force on the United States. This has led many hastily to the conclusion that neither the United States nor Japan can attack each other, while each can defend its own. As none of Japan’s important interests, out posts, or moral obligations lie in American waters, and as the American fleet will be powerless to enter Asiatic waters, Japan is safe from American aggression. But the Philippines lie under the very shadow of Japan, and the United States is responsible for them and for their safety, at least until such time as they can maintain their independence. Furthermore, to Continental Asia, lying immediately back of Japan, the United States is under all the moral obligations implied by the Open Door Doctrine. In our dependents and in our moral obligations Japan can assault us vitally. So any statement that the naval agreement debars aggression in the Pacific would seem to be one-sided.

In the light of all the circumstances just stated, or implied, it would seem difficult to support the contention that the naval agreement, considered by itself, tends to spread righteousness in the Far East — unless Japan chooses, without forceful compulsion, to bring to a definite end the general policy she has been pursuing in recent years. And if she does not so choose, it is difficult to see how peace will be maintained in the Pacific — unless the Powers pharisaically abandon all responsibility for the maintenance of righteousness in the Far East. But it may well be that the entirely new freedom accorded Japan in the Far East will result in an entirely new policy on her part, especially under the stimulus of the purely diplomatic agreements drawn up by the Washington Conference.

The underlying task before the Washington Conference really was to find a diplomatic prospect of solving the problem occasioned by the expansive course Japan has been following during the last sixteen years — and to find this in view of the depleted condition of the European Powers and in view of the popularity of the movement for disarmament in the United States. Of first importance in this respect is the Four Power Treaty which supersedes the Anglo-Japanese alliance and which binds the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan to each respect the insular possessions of the others in the Pacific. Alongside of this is the treaty regarding China, wherein Japan joins the other Powers that participated in the Conference in categorical promises to respect the Open Door Doctrine, this latter being elaborated in such great detail that an evasion of it would seem difficult — otherwise than by a patent breach.

In the light of these treaties it would seem that the great accomplishment of the Washington Conference has been to reach something of ‘a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East ’ — in principle. The value of the entire accomplishment will depend on the spirit with which each and all concerned put these principles into practice. Only as, in the course of years, it becomes manifest that principle is or is not being put into practice, will it be possible to decide whether America and Britain have been wise in virtually withdrawing their great naval police power from the Far East and in giving to Japan an unchecked opportunity to choose her course.

But as year by year the real results of the Washington Conference become manifest, we should view them not in a contemporary light only — for our duty runs not to our contemporaries only. Actually we who now control the United States are the beneficiary legatees of all the accumulated product of all of the struggles and of all of the sacrifices of all of our forbears. Back through the first century of our national life, back through our colonial era, back through the rise of England and of the countries that have contributed to our minority population, goes the chain of those painfully accumulated legacies that in us have culminated, making us heirs to all that is implied by American citizenship. If we but pause for a moment to realize that upon us rests the responsibility of administering the accumulated product of the scores of generations that have labored successively to build up our civilization, we cannot fail to recognize our connection with the past and our debt to it; and we cannot but weigh with a new reverence our present decisions as to what we will do with this civilization we call our own.

Just as what we are and have to-day is the fruit of the decisions and of the struggles of Washington and his contemporaries, of the mediaeval English and early Teutons, of the French and Italians back to ancient Rome and Greece and Judæa, so the results of what we do to-day will go on down the river of the centuries. Yet there are two great differences. First, we can look back with some degree of finiteness and appraise the past, at least since the dawn of definit e history. But who could set up a standard whereby to measure the effect of our present doings upon the immeasurable future? Again, the past, from which has come our inheritance was comparatively small and restricted in its influence on the whole world of its day. In Elizabethan England there were but about five million people; and their influence outside their island was slight. To-day there are over one hundred million Anglo-Saxons whose collective influence throughout the whole world is greater than that of any other single race. So, though our debt to a long past is great, our duty to a future, greater in every sense, transcends it beyond any measurable ratio.

In the light of such considerations we should see ourselves, not as a generation unique in history, apart from the past and lords of the present. Rather are we but the very transient trustees of the heritage of all for which the past has lived, charged with the duty of administering it for a few years that are of comparatively little moment in themselves; but above all, surcharged with the responsibility of administering today our trust for the future of our successors and of the world in such manner that they will not look back on us as false trustees, who took our present ease instead of performing our perhaps more painful duty as a sound link in the chain of generations — a link in nowise extraordinary in itself, but one on which rested unusual responsibilities for the foreordaining of the world-conditions of life in the immediate and more remote future.

Geography has ordained that the United States, with young Canada on her right and younger Australasia on her left, should constitute the front rank of the whole civilization of Europe facing the new er civilization of awakening Asia. Americans should realize not only the prominence, but more particularly the responsibility, of their position. And Europeans, in spite of their present travails, should realize that the future of white civilization as a whole may require that America take not her eyes off the Pacific, however much she may desire to look helpfully across the Atlantic. And furthermore, Americans should realize the many, many times repeated lesson of history to the effect that, when the people of a civilization become so individualistic and so easeloving that they care not if their remote dependents are subjugated by a more virile race, that selfish shirking of responsibility, and consequent recession of empire, invariably foretell the downfall of the civilization as a whole — unless an Aurelian and a Diocletian save it from disintegration and destruction as they saved Rome.

Great as may seem the promise today from the agreements arrived at by the Washington Conference, the actual accomplishment of its underlying purposes will be in the hands of those responsible for the maintenance of our civilization as a whole, and by force if need be, until such time as moral ideals shall have taken root and borne adequate fruit throughout the world.