The Irish Education of Mr. Lloyd George

‘MEN say to me sometimes, “You have changed your coat.” Now I will tell you my answer.’

Mr. David Lloyd George was making a confession. Addressing a Unionist meeting at Maidstone, in Kent, May 7, 1921, he said: —

‘You remember Kitchener’s army. There was a call for men to serve their country in emergency and every man who came forward came in his own coat. You saw them marching and drilling, you saw them in every quality of cloth, every kind of cut, some fitting nicely, but all side by side, prepared to fight for the old land that belonged to them all. Afterwards, it is true, they put on the same uniform; but it was a uniform very few of them had worn before. Now that is my answer about a changed coat.’

Those who seek to understand Mr. Lloyd George will find in this story the key to his character, his mind, his politics, and policies. He is forever and eternally changing. Throughout the confidential negotiations which culminated in the formation of the Irish Free State he seldom wore the same ‘coat’ twice, but each time he changed his opinion or course of action, public opinion followed.

Peace between England and Ireland was the logical outcome of the Irish education of the Premier. This article deals with a part of his ‘schooling’ — with the events and the correspondence which influenced him in changing his views about the men who led the fight for the freedom of Ireland and the terms of an Irish settlement. It is a continuation of the narrative, ‘Ireland from a Scotland Yard Notebook,’ which began in the April number of the Atlantic.

I

One night, before the curfew proclaimed by the British military authorities forced the inhabitants of southern Ireland to be indoors before the last cock crowed, a group of Republicans, armed with buckets of white lead, brushes, a sense of humor, and a disregard for property, both public and private, left their homes and literally painted Dublin, Thurles, and Cork with the signs: —

‘Up De Valera!’

‘Buy Sinn Fein Bonds.’

In Dublin they evidently paused long enough before a billboard to read a British Government recruiting sign, appealing to the young men of Ireland to join the Royal Air Force, and ‘see the world.’ It was changed the next morning.

At this particular time members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, known as the R.I.C., who were doing special police duty for the ‘enemy,’ were being assassinated, secretly, silently, and mysteriously. One of these Sinn Fein sign-painters, effervescent with Irish wit, changed the poster by substituting ‘R.I.C.’ for the ‘R.A.F.’ and inserted the word ‘Next’ before ‘World,’ so that the citizens of Dublin read this announcement the following day: —

JOIN the R.I.C. and See the NEXT World.

During the riots in Londonderry, when the old Roman city was divided into hostile camps of belligerent. Protestants and Catholics, an associate of mine, who went there to report the developments for the Times, was arrested, first by one camp and later by another. Each time he was released, and he was finally given the freedom of the city. When asked how it happened, he replied that, being charged with espionage, he was closely questioned; but his fate was decided by his answer to one leading question, which both parties asked:—

‘Are you Catholic or Protestant?’

His reply was simple and effective: —

‘Neither — Journalist!’

So many unreal things happened in Ireland during the terrible days of murder, plunder, and arson which ushered in the present Government, that these stories are told for the purpose of picturing the half-tragic, half-comic circumstances surrounding the confidential peace negotiations which began anew in December, 1920.

But equally queer things happened in England. The queerest, beyond doubt, was the instability of Mr. Lloyd George. Although everyone knew that the secret of the correct understanding of the Prime Minister was the successful determination of his thoughts in contrast to his words, they were never easy to determine.

When I was reporting one of the meetings of the Allied Supreme Council last year, a member of the conference, who observed how the British Premier ‘switched’ from one policy to another at one session, related the incident as follows. The French and British premiers were arguing about reparations. Mr. George saw that he was not convincing his associates so he asked Arthur James Balfour, Esquire, to present the British point of view. The dignified elder statesman, with his thumbs pulling at the armholes of his vest, explained to the best of his ability what he thought his chief had in mind. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was studying the facial expressions of the Council. Convinced that Balfour was not making headway, Lloyd George interrupted by remarking that what Balfour had said was not the British position at all.

The President of the Privy Council sat down and listened to the Premier’s exposition of a change in policy. When he concluded Mr. Balfour rose, apologized, and said with a smile that the policy which he had expounded had been but was no longer the policy of his Government, and everyone understood. Mr. George had changed his ‘coat’!

The political coat which the Prime Minister wore on December 1, 1920, when he commissioned Archbishop Clune, of Perth, Australia, to negotiate a truce with Sinn Fein, which was known at the time only to a few members of the Cabinet, Scotland Yard, and certain Republicans, was not the same coat that he intended wearing throughout the negotiations. Being a politician, Mr. George told Archbishop Clune one thing and stated in Parliament something quite different. Accordingly, for the moment, he satisfied both!

Prior to the ‘peace move’ of Christmas 1920, after the several attempts at mediation by Sir Horace Plunkett, the British Labor Party, and a score of influential Unionist landowners, Ireland and England were at war. Both sides issued official military commu-niqués. Both suffered casualties. Each destroyed property and attempted to place the responsibility on the other. Both bombarded the public with their propaganda. At times it looked as if Ireland would kindle the fires which might consume the British Empire; and again, it would appear as if Ireland were about to succumb to a modified form of British rule.

II

In December, Mr. George inaugurated a dual policy toward the south. He authorized a leader of the Catholic Church to go to Dublin and negotiate a truce, and he attempted to divide Sinn Fein. Ten days after his first meeting with the Archbishop of Perth, he declared in Parliament that the Government had a twofold policy: it would talk peace with Father O’Flanagan and the ‘Moderates’ but not with those who were ‘responsible for murder.’

‘The Government are also very regretfully convinced that the party, or rather the section which controls the organization of murder and outrage in Ireland, is not yet ready for peace.’

Despite the advice of Scotland Yard and everyone acquainted with the Sinn Fein organization, Lloyd George was determined not to deal with Michael Collins, the real Republican leader and idol. Arthur Griffith, the acting-President, was already in prison under personal orders from Downing Street. Most of the members of the Dàil Eireann were either in Mount Joy in solitary confinement, or in a prison camp, surrounded by Tommies and barbed wire. Collins and his able chief of staff, Richard Mulcahy, would have been there too if the British authorities could have apprehended them. At the time Mr. George was insisting upon dividing Sinn Fein, the party was more united than it had been for months.

No one was more certain of this than Archbishop Clune. After conversations with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in London, he went to Ireland and interviewed Collins. Aside from myself, he was the only ‘outsider’ who saw Collins until the Peace Conference in London. He knew, as I did, that if he could come to terms with ‘Mick,’ the hero of the Irish rebellion, he could conclude a truce.

In these negotiations the Archbishop unquestionably had the sanction of the Vatican, although members of the Catholic Church were divided at the time on an Irish policy. While the Irish hierarchy was urging one policy upon Rome, the supporters of Cardinal Bourne, Archbishop of Westminster, were advocating another, and Mr. Balfour was making secret pilgrimages to St. Peter’s on behalf of the British Government. The following excerpts from a letter of Mr. Art O’Brien, who led the Sinn Fein forces in London, and who later became a member of the Irish peace commission, to Cardinal Bourne, is indicative of the tense feeling which existed in Catholic circles.

Cardinal Bourne’s political pronouncement, contained in the letter which, by his instructions, was read at all the Catholic churches in his diocese on Sunday last, has created the greatest indignation amongst Irish Catholics resident in England.

I can speak with confidence on the opinion of the vast majority of the Irish residents here, who, whether Catholic or Protestant, are solidly at the back of our people at home in their demand for the complete independence of their country, and for the settlement of the long-drawn-out struggle on the only lines that will lead to peace between the two countries, i.e., the recognition of the government, which has been established by the will and the exertions of the Irish people.

Cardinal Bourne may hope that his partisan-political lecture to members of his spiritual flock will help the activities of his Government at the Vatican, which for the past year have been very vigorous, and which, very recently, were hoped to produce fruit in a papal condemnation of the Republican movement in Ireland. If his Eminence has any hopes in this direction, it is as well that he, and the loading Englih Catholics who share Ids hopes, should understand that not even the most devoted Catholic in Ireland, or amongst the Irish people throughout the world, will accept political guidance or dictation from Rome. . . . His Eminence may equally rest assured that the only impression left by such letters upon the Irish laity, ns well as the Irish clergy, in his diocese, is one of disgust, at his narrow and unchristian attitude.

The only basis for Mr. Lloyd George’s contention that Sinn Fein was divided was a telegram from Father O’Flanagan, who became the acting-President of the Irish Republic when Griffith was jailed, and another from the Galway County Council, offering to negotiate peace. The Premier considered them Moderates, when, in fact, they did not represent any of the real leaders of southern Ireland.

When Father O’Flanagan’s telegram was sent, Mr. De Valera was in the United States; but he hurried across the Atlantic — how, when, and where the British Government never learned. Lloyd George was convinced that De Valera would side with Father O’Flanagan, so he gave orders to the British military authorities not to interfere with the president under any circumstances.

Before Dc Valera arrived. Archbishop Clune saw most of the Sinn Fein officials, both those in prison and those outside. These negotiations continued over a period of about five weeks; and in the end they failed, not because of any fault in the diplomacy of 1 lie Archbishop or in the attitude of Sinn Fein, but because Mr. George’s idea of a truce was a truce of surrender. He was not yet in favor of a ‘peace without victory.'

Late in January, the Dàil Eircann met secretly in Dublin. Mr, De Valera reported at length on the negotiations. What he said is best told in his own words, and I quote from a transcript of the secret minutes. He began by saying that the Archbishop had come ‘to Ireland ns an official intermediary 1o arrange a truce, and that he found Griffith and Collins to be “fair and reasonable men.” ’ Then he continued: —

The attitude of Mr. Lloyd George seemed to have changed somewhat during the week. He had before him the document which emanated from six of the thirty-two members of the-Galway County Council, — that document was passed upon the world as a resolution of the Council ‘quite unanimously,’as Mr. George handsomely appended,— and also Father CFlanagan’s telegram, both of which he believed, or pretended to believe, were indications of a general breakup of the morale of the Irish people and a cry for ‘pence at any price.’ In his speech on December 10, in the British House of Commons, lie flourished, as you remember, these signs, as he chose to regard them, of our demoralization, and outlined his plan for the victorious final assault. Our defenses in front were to be stormed and we were to be subtly and elaborately sapped from the rear.

However, His Grace was asked to return here, which he did. He hud further interviews with Mr. Griffith and with the others, whom he had already seen on December 12, 13, and 14. On the latter date the English Cabinet intimated its willingness for a truce for a month, on certain general terms which had been the subject of the discussions. These terms were reduced to a written formula and presented by His Grace to Dublin Castle on February 16. Here is the formula: —

‘The British Government undertakes that, during the truce, no raids, arrests, pursuits, burnings, shootings, lootings, demolitions, courts-martial, or other acts of violence will be carried out by its forces, and that there will be no enforcement of the terms of the martial law proclamations. We, on our side, undertake to use all possible means to ensure that, no acts whatsoever of violence will occur on our side during the period of the truce. The British Government on their part, and we on ours, will use our best efforts to bring about the conditions above mentioned with the object of creating an atmosphere favorable to the meeting together of the representatives of the Irish people, with the view to bringing about a permanent peace.’

This was a decided step in advance, which everyone at the time recognized. On December 17, Dublin Castle agreed to the formula, but added the condition that Sinn Fein surrender its arms! Mr. Lloyd George wished a truce of surrender!

Mr. De Valera continued his statement : —

The Archbishop returned and saw Mr. George once more on December 22. Before returning, he had got Dublin Castle to waive the condition of the surrender of arms. But Mr. George thought it could not be waived — an opinion which was enforced by Mr. Bonar Law.

As the Archbishop, who wished to be fair, could not dream of asking us to accept such a condition, the negotiations remained in abeyance until the 29th and 30th, when they were disposed of finally at a British Cabinet meeting. So the Archbishop was informed on December 31. On that date a totally new proposition was put forward, with which His Grace would have nothing to do. Thus [concluded Mr. De Valera] the whole thing ended, as I am sure many of you anticipated it would end, by the British Premier’s running away from the terms he had himself originally suggested.

Although the efforts of Archbishop Clune were not crowned with success, they were destined to tench Mr. Lloyd George a very serious series of lessons. But not for the moment. The British authorities were convinced that Sinn Fein was on the verge of disintegration. They boasted that they had ‘murder by the throat,’ and that the ‘terror was broken.’ The Prime Minister believed he had split Sinn Fein. The Tories whispered the advice that, once Britain offered peace to the Moderates, the Irish would fight among themselves. Even Scotland Yard was looking forward to the day when all the rebels would be imprisoned and powerless.

Day after day the military forces in Ireland hunted the Republican officers and scouts, captured their papers, closed their secret offices, and arrested them by scores. Mulcahy escaped one raid in his night clothes. Another time the military found his secret headquarters, and entered his room, to find the ink still wet on a letter he was writing his wife; but he was gone. Collins had similar close calls. To avoid capture one night he jumped into a well. Another time he was buried under the floor of a country cottage. Each time I saw him he bore a now scar; but on each occasion he refused to talk about himself. ’My life does n’t matter,’ he used to say.

The widespread destruction of property and the loss of life were, however, weakening the morale of both the Irish and British people. Throughout Ireland and England there were prayers for peace. The statesmen representing both belligerents were requested, not once but a hundred times, to cease fighting and ‘settle’; but the leaders were determined not to compromise, and when the public understood, especially the Irish public, their nerves were steeled for the fighting that was still to come.

Ireland was not a comfortable place to visit during these uncertain days. The streets of Dublin were policed by soldiers in fast motor-lorries, which raced hither and thither, dodging Sinn Fein bombs and ambushes. When the Irish began to throw bombs from tops of houses at passing motor-trucks, they were equipped with steel sides, and wire netting was arched over the tops.

These cars the Dubliners called ‘birdcages.’

‘Bird-cages’ were the armored fortifications which the Irish denounced and ridiculed, as the following incident so poignantly illustrates.

For years, — how many, no one knows, — an old woman had been selling cut flowers on the corner of Grafton Street and St. Stephen’s Green. One day a ‘bird-cage’ stopped directly in front of the flower-stand. The soldiers aimed their rifles through the portholes in the armored steel sides, and the spectators, anticipating an attack, grouped themselves about the old woman. Looking steadily at the lorry, and becoming more and more indignant, she exclaimed at last, shaking her fat fist at the soldiers: —

‘The Boers made you put on khaki, the Germans made you wear tin hats, but the Irish put you in cages!’

Is it necessary to add that she was the Joan of Arc of the crowd, and that even the Tommies laughed?

III

By February, 1921, it was evident in Downing Street that the Government had blundered by blocking Archbishop Clune’s efforts to negotiate a truce. The ‘politician’ began to look forward to the future. Reflection convinced him that there could be no negotiations so long as Mr. Bonar Law was in the Cabinet, and while Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster ‘boss,’ remained unyielding. But before Mr. George could move his pawns on the political chessboard, an Irishman by the name of Mr. Arthur Vincent appeared in London, as an alleged ‘envoy’ of Sinn Fein. The Prime Minister was anxious to know whether he spoke with authority. If he did, another effort would be made to ‘talk’ to the Irish leaders.

In the meantime, Sir Basil Thomson suggested that the first move in bringing about another series of informal conversations would have to be a conference between Sir James Craig and Mr. De Valera. The elimination of Sir Edward Carson by appointment to the House of Lords was Mr. Lloyd George’s method of making it easier for him to deal with Ulster. Carson would never meet De Valera. That was certain. The Prime Minister approved Sir Basil’s idea of a meeting between the leaders of the North and South of Ireland. If Vincent represented Sinn Fein, he was to be entrusted with the task of paving the way.

On the eve of another visit to Dublin, the Director of Intelligence asked if I would learn Mr. De Valera’s views. I was told that Mr. De Valera could be assured that the British officials would not arrest him; that Mr. Lloyd George would be glad to receive him in Downing Street if he wished to come over for a talk.

Upon arriving in Dublin, I called first upon an old neutral friend, whose name, for international diplomatic reasons, cannot be disclosed. He had draft - ed a platform of peace, which he wished to have placed before the Sinn Fein and British spokesmen.

As a result of these conversations, questions were prepared and submitted to Mr. De Valera. After he had given them careful consideration, he returned his answers. Encouraged and heartened by his attitude, I hastened to General Macready’s office and prepared a telegram for Sir Basil, which he had requested in order to place it before the Prime Minister who was scheduled to speak on Ireland on St. Patrick’s Day. The D, I. was anxious that his chief should not spoil the plans for negotiations by making statements which would interfere with the possibilities of a meeting between De A alera and Craig.

By five o’clock in the evening of March 17 the following message was delivered in London and placed before the Prime Minister: —

DUBLIN, March 17.
To SIR BASIL THOMSON,—
I submitted the questions you were interested in to Mr. De Valera on Saturday . . . and I received to-day the following note written by Mr. De Valera: —
‘Mr. Ackerman is at liberty to publish the following questions and answers, provided he undertakes to publish them in full exactly as they are.’
I saw a representative of Sinn Fein, who promised that he would forward the following questions to Mr. De Valera and if possible get his answers. I have just had them returned to me: —
‘Q. 1. Is Mr. Vincent acting officially or unofficially for Sinn Fein in his conversations with the British Government?
‘Answer. No, neither officially nor unofficially. Neither for Sinn Fein nor for the government of the Republic. We place no hope nor do we trust the ways of secret diplomacy. The question at issue is one between the peoples of Ireland and of Britain. Both peoples have elected their responsible representatives. Hide-and-seek methods are not necessary. The Irish people have indicated quite clearly what their claim is. Britain’s answer has been the partition act and a campaign of murder to make it acceptable. When Britain has made up its mind to revise its answer, it can express it in an equally definite way. When Mr. Lloyd George is seeking other ways, he is simply demonstrating that he is insincere.
‘Q. 2. Would you meet Sir James Craig to discuss and devise a scheme of fiscal autonomy, presumably on the lines of the Home Rule hill?’ (The last nine words were added to my question by Mr. De Valera.) ’Answer. I am ready to meet Sir James Craig, as 1 would meet any other Irishman, to discuss any question that affects the welfare of our country and to consider any scheme that would have for its object the prosperity, security, and happiness of any section of our people. I shall, however, never be a party to any conference, the purpose of which is to devise means for rendering more palatable the act of a foreign parliament partitioning our country and attempting to divide our people permanently into hostile sections.
‘Moreover, the primary question to be solved is not one between different sections of the Irish people, but one between the Irish nation and the British nation. When this primary question is solved our domestic difficulties will be easy of adjustment.
E. DE VALERA.’

Later, I had an hour’s conversation with Mr. De Valera’s aide. Mr. Lloyd George’s speech to-night is awaited with intense interest. If he indicates that the British Government is prepared to follow in general the proposals of Archbishop Clune, progress can he made. I have talked with three members of the Sinn Fein executive who have been interested in the following ideas: —

1. That Mr. Lloyd George discuss with Mr. De Valera an Irish settlement;

2.. That the British Government, without asking the surrender of arms, proffer a truce;

3. That fiscal autonomy be granted united Ireland;

4. That Mr. De Valera meet Ulster leaders;

5. That amnesty be granted.

CARL W. ACKERMAN.

The telegram, which was coded and dispatched from General Macready’s office, was paraphrased by Scotland Yard and placed before the Premier at about the same time he received the resignation of Mr. Bonar Law. The ill health of the solid, stolid Conservative chieftain was a great political loss to Mr. Lloyd George, but a victory for him so far as Ireland was concerned; and the Prime Minister, whatever his personal sentiments may be, is a farseeing statesman. The result of the resignation and the message from Dublin was that Ireland was forgotten in his speech, and the way was open for further preparations for a conference between Ulster and Sinn Fein. The next move was to interview Sir James Craig, who was spending in London his last few days as Financial Secretary to the Admiralty.

Colonel J. F. C. Carter, of Scotland Yard, paved the way for a meeting with Craig — a typical, tall, powerful, redfaced Ulsterman, colonel in the late war, and a teetotaler, although he inherited from his father one of the largest, whiskey distilleries in Ireland. Ulster, at this time, was feeling the disastrous consequences of t he Sinn Fein boycott of her banks and industries. Of all the weapons of the Republican forces nothing was more effective than the refusal of the South to do business with the North. It had the same effect upon Ulster that a boycott of New York by the business interests out side the met ropolis would have upon our largest financial and business centre.

I told Sir James the results of my talks with Collins, and the communications with De Valera. Craig agreed at once to a meeting with the Sinn Fein executive, naming his conditions, which I was sure would meet with Mr. De Valera’s approval. After informing Mr. Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s chief secretary and Sir Basil Thomson, I left that night for Dublin. In the meantime, the new Viceroy, Viscount FitzAlan, and Sir Hamar Greenwood, the Chief Secretary, were informed, and within a few days the leaders of the North and South were in conference.

This meeting was hailed by the British press as the first ‘ hopeful sign’ of the possibilities of peace in Ireland. Even the Conservative, anti-Sinn-Fein Morning Pont admitted that ihe interview ‘must conduce to the improvement of a very bad business.'

IV

Before arranging the preliminaries for the Craig-De Valera meeting, I had been in Rome, where I listened to an inspiring discussion of the relation of the Vatican to the Irish rebellion by Archbishop Cerretti, Assistant Secretary of State at the Vatican, one of the most powerful young men in the Church. Although a Protestant by faith, my attitude was that of my colleague who was arrested in Londonderry. I told him of the interviews I had had with Collins, Macready, Sir Basil Thomson, Griffith, and Greenwood.

Of all the Irish ministers, it seemed to me that Collins had a better understanding of Lloyd George than any of the others. He played Mr. George’s game of bluff. Each time the Prime Minister denounced him as a ‘gunman,’Collins retorted by asserting that Sinn Fein would never compromise, although I knew all the while, from Collins’s private remarks and attitude, that if he could obtain for Ireland control of finance, army, and courts, the name of the government would not be a handicap to peace.

Griffith and Collins were not wedded to the name ‘republic.’ The republic to them was a campaign cry, as it was at the time for Mr. De Valera, because it crystallized in one word the aspirations of the Irish people. What Ireland wanted was independence, in fact not in name, and her leaders knew that if they could get Mr. George to recognize the demand of Ireland for individuality, freedom politically, and equal rights in international affairs, as well as control of domestic affairs, the name would not matter.

Returning from Italy to Ireland I had another interview with Collins, who returned the manuscript with the accompanying note:—

DEAR MR. ACKERMAN, —
First let me say that I am sorry I have delayed you so long with this story — things are not always easily worked, and in the present circumstances delays areinevitable Enclosed herewith is the story as I would like it to appear. You will observe that I have made some few slight alterations in the form, and have made a few slight corrections. I would draw your attention to the following: —
Otherwise, I think, everything is clear, except that I would like to draw your attention to one serious error into which you have fallen.
I do not know any Sinn Feiners who think Macready kind and human and meaning to be fair. We believe he is here to do a dirty job for a dirty enemy, and he and his satellites are acting up to their terms of reference with apparent satisfaction. Please incorporate this as my view in any case.
Enclosed also are my answers to the questions you submitted. I would wish to give a little more time to them, but alas, it is not practicable.
If you come to Ireland again, take care you do not have this letter on you when you run into one of the English ambushes. It would ruin you in their eyes, and I fear all your American citizenship would not prevail against their first fury.
With good wishes,
Yours sincerely,
MICEAL O. COLEAIN.

(Signed in Irish)

Mr. Collins added the last paragraph because, during our talk, I had said that two prominent residents of London had warned me not to go to Ireland because of the danger I might be encountering by interviewing him and then the British authorities. I told him I had no fear of the British or Sinn Fein, but that I wanted his personal assurance that there would be no retaliation from his organization because of my contact with his ‘enemies.’

Of course, he gave it, as General Macready did, and I did not experience the slightest danger from either belligerent.

After General Macready had read Collins’s letter and interview he sent this message: —

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS IRELAND

pABKGATE, DUBLIN
(Personal) 12th April, 1921.
MY DEAR MR. ACKERMAN, —
So many thanks for your note of Monday and the enclosure, which is most interesting. I am sorry our friend Michael has such an opinion of me; and as regards the ‘satisfaction’ in carrying out one’s duties, I am afraid that the only satisfaction I can look forward to is that of never seeing his country or any of his compatriots again for the rest of my life!
Yours sincerely,
G. F. N. MACREADY.

Collins’s answers to my questions, which were communicated to the Prime Minister and the Chief Secretary, were placed before a special Cabinet meeting. This statement by the leader of the Sinn Fein army and Minister of Finance, which was sent to me in London, after De Valera and Collins had approved it, was considered by Scotland Yard as marking the turning-point in Irish-British affairs. For the first time in over a year of confidential conversations, a real leader of the Republic had answered, in writing, questions upon which the British Government could formulate a peace policy.

The paper which was introduced at the Cabinet meeting read; —

LONDON, April 11, 1912.<br/&gt; Mr. Michael Collins, Sinn Fein Minister of Finance, has sent the following replies to written questions submitted to him on March 31, 1921: —
Question 1. The British contend that they cannot and will not grant Ireland a republic outside the British Commonwealth of Nations. You say the terms are a republic only. How are these differences to be adjusted?
Reply from Mr. Collins: —
‘England’s contention is based upon might, not right. If they abandon might and take their stand on right, there will, I think, be little difficulty in a friendly solution. It is not conceivable that a free Ireland can encroach upon any of the national rights of a free England. All nations are justly entitled to safeguard their rights, and if, on either side, a genuine right is threatened. it will, I am sure, be found easy of adjustment, and any safeguards on one side or the other can undoubtedly be readily arranged.’
Question 2. If a safe-conduct were granted, would you and Mr. De Valera meet Sir James Craig?
Answer by Air. Collins: —
’I have had an opportunity of consulting the President on this question. He and I are perfectly willing to meet any representative Irishman and discuss with him ways and means of advancing the interests of our nation. For such meeting we need no safe-conduct from any outsider in our own country.’
Question 3. The British military authorities declare that the use of force by the Sinn Fein has failed. You say the policy of England of terror has failed. If it is acknowledged that the British have failed, and the campaign is stopped, will the Sinn Fein cease its campaign ?
Answer by Mr. Collins: —
‘The Sinn Fein campaign is one entirely of self-defense. Our position is that we are protecting ourselves against the attacks of an enemy. If the English campaign of aggression stops, there will be no longer any need to defend ourselves. In other words, when the English withdraw their armies of occupation, we shall be free.’
Because it had been stated frequently that complete fiscal autonomy might be offered Ireland, I asked Collins whether there would be a basis for settlement if fiscal autonomy, separate Irish courts and police were granted Ireland, or, in other words, complete control of Irish affairs.
He answered: —
‘Complete control of Irish affairs involves complete disappearance of English interference. Complete control of Irish affairs will settle the question. We have no desire to control or interfere in any way in the affairs of any other people. On our side, that is all we ask for ourselves. It is a simple and reasonable stand.’
Question 4. Will you agree to a truce?
Reply: —
‘The best answer I can give you is to refer you to the meetings of Archbishop Clune with various parties on both sides last December. At that time a formula was practically agreed upon: but the English leaders, thinking they saw in the too hasty frankness of some of our people a weakening in our resistance, with characteristic English craftiness altered their position to one of insisting upon complete surrender. The root of the question is English aggression. The cessation of that aggression will constitute a truce in itself.’
CAUL W. ACKERMAN.

The significance of these statements to-day lies in the fact that, when the peace treaty between Ireland and England was finally officially negotiated, the Sinn Fein delegation’s platform was based upon Collins’s proposition that ‘it is not conceivable that a free Ireland can encroach upon any of the national rights of a free England,’ and his further declaration that ‘complete control of Irish affairs will settle the question,’ as well as upon Griffith’s statement to me in the summer of 1920, that peace would never be made unless the Irish and British plenipotentiaries sat around the same table as equals.

V

But Mr. Lloyd George, in April and May, was not convinced that the time had come to make peace. At the same time that he had the Collins statement before him, he had an interview with General Macready, which I was anxious to publish. Sir Hamar Greenwood had objected to publication. The account of what t ranspired is best told in the words of the Chief Officer in Command of the British Forces in Ireland.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS IRELAND

PABKGATE, DUBLIN 9th April, 1941.
(Private and Confidential)
DEAR MR. ACKERMAN: - This is a very private letter, for your information only, in reply to yours of the 8th. I can quite understand from your point of view your disappointment in not being able to make use of the talk we had, but I am also sure you clearly understand my position in the matter. When I consulted the Chief Secretary [Sir Hamar Greenwood], one of the arguments which passed between us was that very possibly the Prime Minister might think it advisable to give you an interview. I am sure there is no person who would endeavor to do what was right in the matter better than Philip Kerr; and when this coal-strike trouble is over, and should you be seeing Mr. Kerr again, I have no objection to your showing him, or for the matter of that, the Prime Minister, the account you drew up of our talk, on the clear understanding that you inform them that, after consulting the Chief Secretary, I had told you that I was unable to authorize publication.
I have an idea that the Chief Secretary is keeping the interview for the purpose of showing it and your article on Michael Collins to the Prime Minister when he goes over.
I have written this in confidence to you, so that you may know exactly how the situation stands.
Yours very truly,
G. F. N. MACREADY.

For several days the Cabinet debated the possibilities of a conference with Sinn Fein. Two policies were considered— one, that the British publicly proffer a truce and invite the Irish Cabinet to a meeting, and the second, that the military campaign be intensified. The Premier, backed by the Unionists, still believed that Sinn Fein could be divided, and he refused to contemplate any conference which would admit Griffith and Collins.

On April 18, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George announced the Cabinet’s decision in a letter to the Lord Bishop of Chelmsford, who, in an appeal signed by nine Anglican bishops and eleven leaders of the chief Nonconformist churches, had condemned the military measures in Ireland. In this paper he declared that, so long as t he leaders of Sinn Fein held out for an Irish republic, ‘and receive the support of their countrymen, a settlement is, in my judgement , impossible.’ The Premier referred to t he conversations I had had with Collins, but insisted upon disregarding Collins’s answers to the questionnaire.

The first attack in the renewed warfare upon the Republic was contained in the interview which General Macready had given me. Although it was held up, first, by Sir Hamar Greenwood and secondly, by the Prime Minister himself, it was at last released by Lloyd George, with the statement that what Macready said expressed the opinions of the Government. As this was the first and only interview which the general gave, it caused a stir in Dublin and London. Every leading British weekly reviewed it, the official daily of Sinn Fein answered it, and for several weeks it remained the keynote of the British policy. The view of the Spectator is quoted as typical of the public reception in England.

General Macready, in a remarkable interview with the correspondent of the Philadelphia Public Ledger, — reproduced in Tuesday’s Morning Post, — described clearly the foul methods of the Sinn Fein rebels. What they do is this: surrounded by a group of men, women, and children, they fire at Crown forces or throw bombs. If they use revolvers, they pass them to the women who work with them. When we search the men, we find they are unarmed, and it is very difficult, very difficult, indeed, to search women; and although we know that they are as active as the men, we have done nothing to them.’ General Macready went on to express his astonishment at the calmness of the troops and police, who are menaced daily in the streets of Dublin by these treacherous enemiesGeneral Macready said that, despite their base tactics, Sinn Feiners, when taken, always had a fair trial; whereas they themselves gave short shrift to their victims. He told the correspondent that ‘there is no such thing as a Blaek-and-Tan to-day.’ The British recruits reinforcing the Royal Irish Constabulary had been amalgamated with that body. General Macready stated also that there was no starvation in Ireland, although people in districts where the rebels had damaged the roads and railways necessarily ran short of their usual supplies.

We are very glad to read General Macready’s plain and graphic account of the real situation in Ireland. We may call attention also to the vivid narrative in this month’s Blackwood by the wife of one of the officers who were attacked by assassins in Dublin on November 21 last. We cannot help wondering why the Government do not make such facts widely known. The Sinn Fein propaganda, lavishly subsidized from abroad, is very active in spreading falsehoods; whereas the Irish office issues very little news. It ought not to be left to an enterprising American journalist to extract a statement of the case from General Macready.

Cardinal Logue, speaking in a Tyrone church last week, said that he ‘knew for a fact that if the people of Ireland abandoned crime, they could obtain everything that was necessary for the country. An Irish Republic,’ he added, ‘they would never obtain so long as England had a man to fight with. If they got a full measure of selfgovernment, with control of the taxation, that would give them all they asked for.’ Cardinal Logue, the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, spoke wisely and, we are sure, sincerely. But his Church has, we fear, allowed the Sinn Fein murdergangs to acquire too firm a hold. Mr. De Valera on Tuesday issued a manifesto to the Irish electors, informing them that a vote for Sinn Fein will be a vote for ‘nothing less than the legitimacy of a republic for Ireland against England.’ Mr. De Valera thus repudiated Cardinal Logue’s well-meant advice.

This was May seventh. In the meantime, the Earl of Derby, the most powerful Unionist in England, had been to Ireland. When I talked with him about the attitude of the Catholic leaders, he remarked that a banner, carried in a New York Irish parade, told the ‘whole story.’ I give it in answer to the Americans who believe that the ‘Irish question ’ is a religious one; ‘ We take our religion, but not our politics, from Rome.’

Later the Irish Bulletin printed the following ‘ on good authority’: —

In the course of a visit recently paid by Lord Derby to Cardinal Logue, a conversation took place in which the following passage occurred:

Lord Derby: ‘No doubt your Eminence is extremely gratified at the appointment of a Catholic Lord Lieutenant?’ [Viscount FitzAlan]

Cardinal Logue (after a little reflection): ‘As much gratified. Lord Derby, as I would be at the appointment of a Catholic hangman.’

Thus the foundation for the Irish education of Mr. Lloyd George was laid. In this paper I have quoted extensively from certain documents to prepare for the interviews in May and June of last year which led to the peace conference. Throughout those critical months, I made repeated journeys between Dublin and London, carrying messages and ideas back and forth between Downing Street and the Irish headquarters. I interviewed Griffith in jail; Collins ‘on the run’; Fitzgerald in solitary confinement; dined with Macready; carried Sir Hamar Greenwood’s message to Collins, that the British would grant an amnesty during the peace conference; and arranged the interview between the Prime Minister and former Governor Glynn, of New York, which marked the climax of the Irish negotiations. The details and the difficulties of these dramatic events will be narrated in the Atlantic next month.