The French Point of View

I

THE present state of the great mass of French opinion could not be better explained than it has been by M. Poincaré on various occasions recently, and notably in his speech to the Senate, on the 29th of June; a speech listened to approvingly, and the conclusions of which were sanctioned by a resolution voted unanimously by the Upper House.

The questions of the Interallied debts and of German reparations can scarcely be separated from each other, for France. Theoretically, it is true, they are distinct and of a different kind: the first result from engagements more or less freely contracted between allies, or associates, in the course of a war conducted in common; the second, from conditions imposed upon a conquered enemy. An objection might be raised as regards the debts of France to England (about 14,000,500,000 francs in gold). These should perhaps be considered as a single account, comprising the common sacrifice entered upon freely by both countries. They came into the struggle at the same date, and one of them expended in human matériel much more than the other. Would it not, therefore, be just to consider as a whole the losses in human lives, in matériel, and in cash, suffered by the two nations, and to emphasize the fact that the mighty effort put forth by the British Empire could not have been made except for the occupation of the frontier by the French army; while at the same time the French army found its needs of every kind satisfied through British financial and naval support? If the balance sheet of the war is thus made up, it may rightly be asked which of the two Allies owes more to the other.

II

As to the United States, to whom the French owe about 16,000,250,000 francs in gold, the situation is different. In this case a power enters into war freely, at her own time. The sums which she advanced to her associates have, as a matter of fact, served to pay for the supplies, in matériel and equipment, bought from her. American industry largely profited and these sums, in consequence, did not go out of the United States. However, the reasoning does not apply, in this case, as closely as with England. To be sure, France has made to other states (Russia, Belgium, Italy) certain advances, less in importance, — about 6,000,000,000 francs in gold, — but still, not negligible. Nevertheless, she has up to now made no claim for repayment. Finally, loans and advances in time of war were agreed to at a time when the unsteadiness of exchange was scarcely noticeable. It seems as if it would be just to maintain for the loans this real value, as it was when they were subscribed, and not to apply to them the actual current rate, which has been completely warped by an economic situation, the direct consequences of the war let loose by the central empires. Although there are these reservations, France has no intention of repudiating her debts, if payment is demanded. M. Poincaré has affirmed that anew; and in addition there is the assurance that no French government will fail in its engagements. Only the means must be given to fulfill them.

First of all, it is necessary to emphasize certain figures which establish the weight of France’s financial burden. The amount necessary for the restoration of the devastated regions is estimated at 130,000,000,000 francs. We must add to this, service pensions for the wounded, the widows, and the orphans of war; all charges which ought to fall upon Germany, but which, following successive reductions, have fallen back — for more than half the amount — upon the victorious country. France has already advanced in this way 90,000,000,000 francs.

One factor which is not negligible is the lessened amount of the tax collections. It is physically impossible for our ten devastated departments, the richest ones in the country, to discharge their whole obligation. Besides, the twenty billions, or thereabouts, of French capital invested in Russia and not productive of interest for several years, causes a diminution of private fortunes which is not without reflection upon the tax yield. Despite this, the financial effort which has been made for two years is considerable. The old taxes and the new have reached a maximum that it no longer seems possible to surpass. Loans have succeeded one another and the care of this internal debt absorbs a large part of the national budget. Why is this? Chiefly because France has the desire and the imperious need to reconstruct the devastated regions; she exhausts herself in this work, the burden of which, as I have mentioned above, ought to fall back upon Germany. Now the interest of 90,000,000,000 francs, thus advanced by France represents almost exactly the 4,000,000,000 deficit foreseen in the 1923 budget.

So long as reparations in money and kind are not made good by Germany, the financial restoration of France remains impossible. And the objection should not be made that the military expenses are exaggerated. These have increased in proportion to those of 1913, 90 per cent only, although those of the United States have increased 174 per cent, those of England 181 per cent, those of Spain 275 per cent, those of Japan 290 per cent, those of Italy 390 per cent. Although the military expenses of France are 1,823,000,000 francs in gold, those of Japan are 1,900,000,000; those of Great Britain 4,300,000,000; those of the United States 6,100,000,000. One is found, therefore, facing this paradoxical situation; extreme exigencies on the part of the allies and associates and the impossibility of making the conquered pay. In order to facilitate settlement, at Genoa they went as far as to demand of France that she abandon one part of her claim against Russia.

The two questions, therefore, are closely connected, and only a general liquidation will allow an escape from chaos. In the praiseworthy intention of giving to Europe a certain economic stability, the Allies are forced to come to the aid of the country which is most impoverished, Russia, and to lighten the the burden imposed upon Germany. The order adopted causes astonishment, and it is asked, why begin with Russia — that is to say, with the least civilized country in Europe, who, by her own faults and her own crimes, had brought upon herself a frightful situation; who repudiated the principles recognized till now as most sacred; and who finally showed herself incapable of drawing upon her immense resources. We agree that the Russian nation inspires pity, that it ought to be recognized by charity; but we cannot go further, and can only approve the position taken by the government at Washington toward Moscow. Serious and sincere discussion is impossible with the representatives of the Soviets; the first sessions of the Hague Conference confirm on this point the experience of Genoa, just as it was foreseen and predicted in the French press.

After Russia comes Germany, where the factories are intact, but where the government follows with success a financial policy based upon the progressive debasement of its currency. Here is a country which England represents as a future client, although she will be for her the most redoubtable of competitors — a country, finally, whose political equilibrium is every instant at stake.

III

Would it not be more just at this time, and more in conformity with good sense, to begin with the most civilized nations, and with those that the devastations of war have affected most profoundly? The work of European restoration is a long job. It ought to make a vigorous start and then advance steadily. Logic demands that the work be distributed in the region of Western Europe which was in former times the most prosperous and most fertile in intelligent initiative, and which has been systematically ravaged and depopulated: the North and the East of France. Not only would this rehabilitation make reparation for one of the most unjustifiable attacks that has ever been made against the right of nations (a voluntary and calculated destruction of industrial organizations, ironworks, farms, and mines), but also it would permit production to get on its feet again. Finally, applied at the most seriously injured point, it would have its effect in the country most opposed to ideas of disorder and anarchy. General equilibrium can be gained only when France — where revolutionary propaganda is marking time — is again strengthened and stabilized.

Since it is considered indispensable to restore to Germany her economic powers, in order that she may meet her obligations to the Allies, how can a similar treatment be refused to France, who also is obliged to acquit herself of a heavy debt?

If then the desire is sincere that Europe regain little by little her healthy life, it is indispensable that France be permitted to recover her breath as soon as possible. For this she requires that the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles do not remain a dead letter, and that Interallied solidarity continue to function in peace as it did in war. This solidarity, far from being secured by the successive conferences, has on the contrary been brought in question by them. Behind official programmes, there is, above all, the eager search for oil concessions. Further, the practical utility of those conferences is very questionable, with the United States not participating. Her position seems to us perfectly justified, but we cannot imitate it, for France must be at all places where European affairs are discussed.

We must seek a close liaison with our allies and war associates, and we must above all bring them to the knowledge that debts and reparations are indissolubly bound together.