The League and the Italian-Greek Crisis

I

FORTUNE brought me to Geneva within a few hours of the arrival of the Greek appeal to the League of Nations against the Italian ultimatum. I was met by the news of the occupation of Corfu.

It is well to recall the events of the last days of August. The murder on Greek territory of the Italian members of the International Commission for the delimitation of the frontier between Albania and Greece was clearly a matter for which a definite responsibility attached to the Greek Government, and it was equally clear that Italy was entitled both to the most ample official apologies and to substantial reparations. But M. Mussolini’s ultimatum to Greece was as violent in form and in language as had been the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia which followed the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand. It assumed the complicity of the Greek Government in the murder of the Italian Mission without investigation and proposed that that Government should acknowledge its guilt in a manner as humiliating as could be devised.

The reply of the Greek Government, while expressing regret for the murders and agreeing to a public expression of that regret in a solemn and impressive manner, rejected the more extravagant of M. Mussolini’s proposals. Simultaneously the Greek Government appealed to the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva, which happened to be in session as a preliminary to the Fourth Assembly of the League. Before this appeal reached its destination M. Mussolini had acted. A naval and military expedition, of sufficient strength to make local opposition useless, had occupied Corfu, and the guns of the Italian fleet had fired a few rounds into the old castle of the island, which is of no military value whatever, causing the death of a number of refugees from the Near East who were lodged there under the auspices of the Commission of Relief of the League of Nations and of the American Near East Relief and of the British Save the Children Fund. The apparatus of war was set in motion in Italy, the Italian press was warned to publish no information as to naval and military movements, the Italian troops embarked for Corfu singing patriotic songs amid the cheers of an excited populace, and the preliminary steps were taken for calling out two classes of the Reserves. War fever was rapidly spread through Italy by the virulent and one-sided propaganda of the Italian newspapers, and I gather that in London, on the first of September, war was considered to be almost inevitable.

It was not so in Geneva. The excitement at Geneva was certainly intense. Everyone connected with the League recognized immediately that this was a test case, and that the future of the League depended upon the manner in which it dealt with an act of one of its members which was in direct violation of the Covenant. But the cooler heads understood at once that the mere fact that the Council of the League was in session, and that the Assembly was to meet on the third of September, made war between Italy and Greece highly improbable. It takes two to make a war, and it was seen to be unlikely that Greece, a weak and exhausted Power, would attempt to resist Italy in arms unless she were driven to despair. Before abandoning hope she would naturally place herself in the hands of the international body formed to prevent disputes between nations ending in war.

II

The first meeting of the Council of the League to consider the dispute between Italy and Greece took place in secret session on the afternoon of the first of September, with M. Politis, the head of the Greek delegation to the Fourth Assembly, present as representing the appellant. Thus within twentyfour hours of the full development of the crisis the representatives of the disputants were seated at the same table. This was the first achievement of the League in the matter and I doubt if it has been recognized at its full value. The influence of the League machinery in the attainment of a peaceful solution has been very generally overlooked, owing to the disappointment of those who were eager to see the League assert its authority swiftly and dramatically.

At the close of the Council’s meeting on September first it was announced that M. Salandra, the Italian member, was without instructions from his Government, that the Council had adjourned to enable a member of the Italian delegation to go to Rome to interview M. Mussolini, and that the Council had requested both the Italian and Greek Governments to refrain in the interval from any act which might further complicate the situation. It soon got about that M. Salandra had questioned the competence of the Council to deal with a matter which concerned the prestige and honor of Italy, and that when it was pointed out to him that the occupation of Corfu was an act which might involve the application to Italy of the sanctions of Article XVI of the Covenant, he had replied that no one had ever imagined that the sanctions of the League should be applied to a Great Power such as Italy.

The amazement with which these views were received in the Council and among the delegates outside it evidently showed M. Salandra that Italy would find little or no support in Geneva, and he no doubt so informed M. Mussolini, for the tone of the Italian Prime Minister immediately began to change. He announced that Italy had no intention of going to war with Greece, that the occupation of Corfu was a purely peaceful enterprise, and entirely of a temporary nature, and that its sole object was to obtain from Greece pledges for the prompt payment of the reparations demanded by Italy. This was curious language to apply to the forcible occupation of the territory of another Power, resulting in the death of a number of persons; but the direct result of the intervention of the League was that the danger of war had receded into the background, that M. Mussolini’s indignation was directed rather against the League than against Greece, and that the maintenance of the authority of the League became the issue of immediate importance.

With the arrival of all the delegations for the opening of the Fourth Assembly the views of the smaller nations became articulate. Their representatives held meetings among themselves. and in particular the Scandinavian group let it be known that if Greece’s right of appeal to the League were impugned they would have to consider their position in the League, which as an international organization would be valueless to them if it were to refuse to respect the rights of the smaller as against the greater Powers, while information arrived that the British Government had instructed Lord Robert Cecil to support actively the intervention of the League. In these circumstances and in this atmosphere the Council again met, nominally for the dispatch of its ordinary business.

At this meeting M. Saiandra presented an official Italian report on the occurrences at Corfu, a report which placed the responsibility for the bombardment and the consequent loss of life upon the Greek Commandant. When M. Politis began a reply on behalf of Greece M. Salandra at once objected that any discussion was out of order, as he was not yet in possession of instructions from his Government. To this Lord Robert Cecil replied that as the Italian representative had placed some new facts before the Council the Greek representative was clearly entitled to do the same, if he had any such facts to bring forward. M. Politis then handed in to the Council a statement in which the Greek Government expressed its willingness to comply with any decision which the Council might reach, and made suggestions as to the form which the inquiry into the murders should take, and the manner in which the apologies of the Italian Government should be publicly expressed. Further, the Greek Government offered to deposit in a Swiss bank 50,000,000 lire, the amount of reparations demanded by Italy, pending a decision of the League as to the exact amount which Greece should pay.

On the evening of the fourth of September the Italian delegate returned from Rome with the formal instructions of the Italian Government, which were read to the Council at its meeting on the following day. The Italian Government definitely and emphatically denied the competence of the League to intervene in an affair which concerned Italy’s honor and prestige. It asserted that Italy had clearly and precisely declared that she had no intention of going to war with Greece, and that the occupation of Corfu was undertaken solely with the object of obtaining from Greece adequate pledges for the payment of the reparations due to Italy for the dastardly murder of an Italian Mission, and that, as there was no threat of war, there was no case for the intervention of the League. Further, the note accused Greece of deliberately trying to evade the responsibility for the murders by bringing the matter before the League of Nations, and by endeavoring to arouse the sympathy of the representatives of the nations present at Geneva over the question of the occupation of Corfu, so that the murders for which the Greek Government was responsible, and which were the cause of Italy’s action, might be kept in the background.

To this M. Politis, who throughout these meetings spoke with great restraint and ability, replied that, so far from endeavoring to keep the question of the murders in the background, the Greek Government had already expressed publicly and to the Council its deep regret for what had occurred and had in advance agreed to accept any decision on the question of the murders which the Council might reach. He pointed out that the Greek Government accepted full responsibility for the fact that the murders had taken place in Greek territory, and was ready to make just reparation to Italy. He absolutely repudiated the suggestion that the Greek Government was in any way implicated in the murders and pointed out that there was as yet no proof that the murders had been committed by Greek subjects. Finally he reasserted Greece’s right to appeal to the League as one of its members against such an act of aggression as the forcible occupation of Corfu.

Lord Robert Cecil then asked that Articles X, XII, and XV of the Covenant should be read in French and English. These articles deal with guaranties against aggression, the danger of war, and the settlement of disputes between members of the League. The articles having been solemnly read, he reminded the Council that they formed part of the treaties of Versailles, Neuilly, and the Trianon, and that a repudiation of these treaties by one of the signatories would destroy the very base of the post-war settlement of Europe, and he concluded with a verbatim quotation from M. Poincaré’s latest note regarding the sanctity of treaties. The Council then broke up in an atmosphere of extreme tension.

The meeting of the Assembly had been wisely adjourned, in order that a situation sufficiently grave and complex might not be aggravated by interpellations from the floor of what is essentially the Parliament of the smaller nations.

III

Meantime, the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris had begun work. That body, composed of the Ambassadors to France of Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, with M. Jules Cambon as French representative and with a French Secretariat, is a relic of the Supreme Council. The Commission for the delimitation of the Albanian-Greek frontier, of which the murdered Italian Mission formed part, was appointed by it and worked under its authority. Its right to intervene in the matter of the murders was therefore incontestable. It had dispatched a note to the Greek Government demanding explanations and had received a reply in which that Government declared its willingness to accept the decision of the Conference just as it had placed itself in the hands of the Council of the League.

The Conference met in Paris on the fifth of September to consider the Greek reply and, recognizing the responsibility of the Greek Government for the murders committed in its territory, proceeded to consider the form which the inquiry into the murders should take. It at once telegraphed a report of its proceedings to the Secretary-General of the League. Touch between the two bodies was thus officially established.

The next day, the sixth of September, the decisive meeting of the Council of the League was held. The proceedings began with the leading of the communication from the Ambassadors’ Conference. It was agreed at once that a reply should be sent. Señor Quinones de Leon, the Spanish member of the Council, then brought forward a proposed reply which he had prepared in consultation with some of his colleagues. This reply fell into two parts. The first part acknowledged receipt of the Ambassadors’ communication and expressed agreement as to the responsibility of Greece. The second part contained a statement of the penalties which should be imposed upon Greece.

I will return to these penalties later. M. Salandra, while agreeing that the first or purely formal part of the suggested reply should be sent, absolutely refused to agree that the second part should go, on the grounds that this would implicitly establish the competence of the Council to deal with the Italian-Greek dispute, a competence which he again repudiated.

In the discussion which followed clear expression was given to the opinion which had been growing throughout the week. M. Hanotaux, speaking for France, Lord Robert Cecil for Great Britain, M. Hymans for Belgium, M. Branting for Sweden, and M. Guani for Uruguay, one after the other expressed the opinion of their Governments that the competence of the League was incontestable. The representative of Spain had already made his view clear in presenting his draft reply, and it was known that the representative of China would support the League. Viscount Ishii of Japan, in his capacity as President, had not expressed his views, but there was little doubt that he agreed with the majority of his colleagues. The only possible supporter of the Italian contention was Brazil, the representative of which country had not indicated the view of his Government.

It is worth while quoting M. Hymans verbatim, for he put clearly and concisely the point of view of the delegations of the smaller nations outside the Council: ‘I admire Italy,’ he said, ‘and believe in her high destiny. I have a profound respect and esteem for the eminent statesman who represents her here. Yet my conscience compels me to say that I cannot accept the theory of the incompetence of this Council which M. Salandra has put forward. In my opinion Articles XII and XV of the Covenant are clear and precise, and their application to the present case is certain. I see in those articles precious guaranties for the small nations, guaranties which appear to me to form the very basis of the Covenant. The interests of the small nations and the observation of the principles upon which the League of Nations is based demand a vigilant application of the rules which form the foundation of a new order of International affairs, of which we have formed the highest hopes.’

I have dwelt at some length upon this phase of the crisis in order to show how utterly misleading is the view put forward in a section of the British press that Lord Robert Cecil was upon the Council fighting a lone battle against Italy. In fact, the representative of Great Britain formed one of an overwhelming majority, and it is almost certain that Italy stood alone. Equally misleading is the contention similarly expressed that Lord Robert in this affair has acted as a dreamy idealist and in pursuit of his ideals has isolated his country. No politician could have handled a difficult situation more astutely, as the sequel will show, and rarely, if ever, in her history has Great Britain had so many friends as she has had in this business. Incidentally I can deny authoritatively the statement that Lord Robert at any time threatened Italy with the British fleet or that the British Government ever offered or suggested to the League to place the fleet at its disposal for the purpose of bringing pressure upon Italy.

The views of the majority of the Council on the question of competence having been clearly expressed, Lord Robert proposed that, in order to ensure coöperation with the Conference of Ambassadors, the verbatim report of the proceedings of the Council should be sent to Paris. After some demur from M. Salandra this was agreed to, M. Salandra abstaining from voting. I doubt if the Italian representative quite realized what the effect of this would be, or perhaps he did not think it possible that the verbatim report could be prepared in time to reach Paris for the meeting of the Ambassadors to be held on the following morning. The Secretariat, however, played up splendidly, and though the Council did not adjourn till 7 P.M., the corrected report was on its way to Paris two hours later and in the hands of the Ambassadors at 11 A.M., on the seventh of September. Thus the Ambassadors had before them the full text to which M. Salandra had objected, and at their meeting on that day decided to impose upon Greece terms which varied but slightly from those which had been before the Council of the League.

IV

It is now time to compare the terms imposed upon Greece by the Conference of Ambassadors, and accepted by both the Greek and Italian Governments, with the terms of M. Mussolini’s ultimatum, with the Greek reply thereto, and with the proposed terms considered at the Council of the League and forwarded by that Council to the Conference of Ambassadors. I will take these terms clause by clause.

Clause1. The Italian ultimatum required apologies from the highest Greek military authority to be presented through the Italian representative at Athens to the Italian Government. The Greek Government agreed to express its regrets in the prescribed form. The Council of the League suggested that apologies should be presented not to the Italian Government but to the representatives of the three Powers concerned in the delimitation of the Albanian-Greek frontier. The Conference of Ambassadors concurred.

Clause 2. The Italian ultimatum required that a funeral service should be celebrated at Athens in honor of the victims, in the presence of all the members of the Greek Government. This was accepted by the Greek Government, suggested by the Council of the League, and confirmed by the Conference of Ambassadors.

Clause 3. The Italian ultimatum required that the Greek fleet in the Piræus should salute the Italian flag in the presence of a division of the Italian fleet, and that the Greek warships should hoist the Italian colors at the main with a salute of twenty-one guns. The Greek Government proposed that a detachment of Greek troops should salute the Italian flag in front of the Italian Embassy. The Council of the League proposed that the Greek fleet should render a salute under conditions to be determined. The Conference of Ambassadors decided that the Greek fleet should salute the Italian, British, and French flags in the presence of the ships of the three Powers, which should proceed to the Piræus, and that the salute should be returned.

Clause 4. The Italian ultimatum required that military honors should be paid when the corpses of the victims were embarked at Prevesa. The Greek Government agreed. The Council made the same proposals and it was approved by the Conference of Ambassadors.

Clause 5. The Italian ultimatum required that the Greek Government should undertake an immediate inquiry into the circumstances of the murders, the inquiry to be supervised by an Italian officer. Greece agreed. The Council of the League proposed that the inquiry should be supervised by representatives of the three Powers concerned in the delimitation. The Conference of Ambassadors concurred, adding a Japanese President.

Clause 6. The Council of the League proposed that the trial and punishment of the criminals should be supervised by representatives of the League of Nations. The Conference of Ambassadors decided instead that this should be supervised by the above Commission of the three Powers, with a Japanese President.

Clause 7. The Italian ultimatum required the payment of 50,000,000 lire by the Greek Government within five days. The Greek Government protested that the above amount was excessive and declined to make payment until the circumstances of the murders had been investigated. The Council of the League proposed the lodgment of the sum of 50,000,000 lire in a Swiss bank as a guaranty of the immediate payment of the reparations as soon as these had been estimated. The Conference of Ambassadors concurred.

Clause 8. The Council of the League proposed that the amount of the indemnity to be paid by Greece should be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Conference of Ambassadors concurred.

From this it will be seen that there is no material difference between the proposals considered at the Council of the League and the terms imposed by the Conference of Ambassadors, and as the latter body had the Council’s proposals before it, it is reasonable to assume that it was greatly influenced by them. It will also be seen that the terms imposed upon Greece vary materially from M. Mussolini’s ultimatum. In the first place they refused to admit the right of the Italian Government to receive reparations before the investigations into the circumstances of the crime are completed; in the second place the Greek Government was not required to pay honor to the Italian flag but to the flags of the three Powers concerned in the delimitation, and those honors were to be paid in a manner which, while it made the responsibility of Greece clear, would not be unduly humiliating to the Greek Government.

V

These after all are details; the essence is that war has been prevented, and that the competence of the League of Nations has been acknowledged de facto, whatever M. Mussolini may say to the contrary. It has been acknowledged by the constant interchange of communications between the Conference of Ambassadors and the Council of the League, it has been acknowledged by the fact that the final terms of the settlement are almost identically those proposed by the Council, and it has been acknowledged by the fact that the amount of reparations to be paid by Greece is to be determined by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which is an important part of the machinery of the League. The function of the League is to preserve peace by the use of all possible means of conciliation; its sanctions are intended to be used only when all other means of preserving peace have failed. Article XIII of the Covenant recites that: ‘The members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration, and which cannot be settled satisfactorily by diplomacy, they will submit the whole matter to arbitration. . . . For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which such case is referred shall be the court agreed upon by the parties to the dispute.’

It might possibly have been better for the prestige of the League if the Conference of Ambassadors had not been in existence and if the whole matter had been in the hands of the League, but the Conference of Ambassadors was in existence and the murdered officers were members of a Commission appointed by it, while both the parties to the dispute agreed to refer it to the Conference of Ambassadors. In these circumstances the function of the League was clearly to forward a settlement by the Conference of Ambassadors in every way possible. For the League to have followed M. Mussolini’s example and for the sake of increasing its prestige with the small Powers to have applied its sanctions to Italy, which had a just ground of complaint against Greece, before it was known whether the Conference of Ambassadors could produce a settlement acceptable to the disputants, would have been morally indefensible and politically disastrous. Thus the League has so far in this matter acted in accordance with its principles. On the other hand, the Council could not refuse to hear the appeal made to it by the Greek Government, and I do not think that there can be any doubt in the mind of anyone who reads dispassionately the sequence of events which I have briefly narrated above, that, if the League had not been in existence and ready to receive the Greek appeal, Greece would have had no resource but to resist the Italian demands to the extent of her ability, just as Serbia resisted the Austrian demands in 1914.

Having attended all the meetings of the Council of the League held to consider this dispute, except the first secret session, I in common with the majority of those at Geneva have been much impressed by the simplicity and clearness of the Council’s methods and also by the value of publicity in such crises as this. The public character of the proceedings of the Council prevented the dissemination of false news and of mischievous propaganda. One can only compare with thankfulness the publicity and directness of the methods of the League for the preservation of peace with the secrecy and confusion which prevailed in 1914. The final settlement, by which Italy is to begin the evacuation of Corfu on the twenty-seventh of September, subject to the application of further penalties to Greece if the International Commission is not satisfied that the Greek Government is pushing its inquiries into the murders with all sincerity and energy, has been accepted even with a degree of enthusiasm by both Greece and Italy. Only those are dissatisfied who had hoped for some flamboyant assertion of the authority of the League. They have, I think, forgotten that the Council of the League is not a juridical body. In an international crisis it has to act quickly, so as to prevent war and to obtain time for the application, if necessary, of juridical process. The League has, in its Permanent Court of International Justice, the means of obtaining considered legal judgments in international disputes, and it may well be that that Court will have to decide certain questions arising out of the Italian-Greek dispute, such as the competence of the League, the degree of responsibility attaching to Governments for crimes committed in territory under their jurisdiction, and the question as to whether the occupation of Corfu was an act of aggression and therefore a breach of the Covenant. But it would not tend to make good international law if the Council of the League were to attempt to depart from the rôle of conciliation and adopt that of the judge, nor would it make for peace if, in the heat of an international crisis, the Council were to attempt to resort to the slow process of judicial investigation.

Until the Permanent Court of Justice has spoken, the incident cannot be considered as closed, but up to the present the Council of the League has in this matter fulfilled the function for which it was created.