Italian Tyranny: An Anti-Fascist View

I

THREE years ago I came to Italy to follow the fortunes of Fascism, which was then at the zenith of its popularity and power. The land was athrill with hope and faith in the movement. That faith amounted almost to a definite vision of the new dispensation of peace and prosperity that Fascism was to usher in. Everybody was singing or humming or whistling Giovinezza. Even the wheels of the Pullman seemed to take up the triumphant strains and chant them down the ringing grooves of the long way from Modane to Turin, to Genoa, to Pisa, and to Rome. Through some mysterious operation of mass psychology I too felt myself seized by the same emotion as I crossed the Alps and passed into the land of sunshine. When I arrived in the Eternal City I found all my old friends full of faith and confidence in the destinies of the new regime. Fascism was the sun of the political future. True to her historical traditions, Italy had once again come to the assistance of Europe in its hour of agony and disaster. She had discovered a new political formula which would solve the riddle that had puzzled the brains of European statesmen ever since the camp fires had been quenched in 1918.

Delusion. There is not a sadder or more sordid chapter in the modern history of Europe. No government in recent times has had such a golden opportunity as did that of Signor Mussolini. In November 1922, he had at his back the whole of Italy and the active sympathy of neighboring nations. Representatives from all the great constitutional parties — Liberals and Populists and Democrats — joined his Cabinet. The press of these parties gave loyal and generous support. Famous statesmen of the old regime, such as Giolitti and Salandra and Orlando, lent the aid of their political ability and experience. The Vatican sent an order to the bishops all over the country to help the new government. Even the Socialists did not stand in the way, for leaders like Turati and Treves and D’Aragona expressly adopted the policy of giving Fascism a fair chance to carry out its programme of reconstruction and restoration.

What is the state of affairs to-day? Not a single non-Fascist statesman or political leader is now associated with Mussolini’s régime. The Liberals and Populists and Democrats have all left the Cabinet. Giolitti and Orlando and Salandra have definitely gone over to the Opposition; and the nonparty ministers, General Diaz and General Di Giorgio and Admiral Thaon Di Revel, have also deserted. All the important newspapers of the country have follow’cd suit; not a single journal of repute supports Fascism now, except its own subsidized and controlled party organs. Besides fulfilling the office of Premier, Mussolini is now also Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War, Minister of Marine, Minister of Aviation, and so on. And he is all these at one and the same time, not because he is anxious to hold all power in his own hands, but primarily and principally because no man of outstanding ability and public repute can be induced to accept a portfolio in the Fascist Cabinet. When not only respectable passengers, but also the legally certified officers, abandon their posts and take to boats, leaving a self-appointed captain alone on the bridge, something must be radically wrong with the methods whereby the ship of state is being navigated. That is the most obvious and striking phase of the Italian political situation at the present moment.

How has it come about? What are its immediate causes? What precisely are the mistakes in navigation which have driven the legitimate officers from the ship? To these questions I can now give a fuller and fairer answer than I could have given while I lived in Italy; for I have recently recrossed the Alps, in the company of several Italian political refugees.

II

It is difficult to understand the policy of wrong-headedness that Mussolini has persistently followed since the early months of 1923. The problem is one of psychopathy rather than of politics. Therefore I shall not risk a discussion of it here. The historical facts are as follows. For the first few months after taking over legislative power Mussolini showed himself agreeable to the idea of allowing the people of Italy to be governed in a legal and constitutional manner. But before the spring of 1923 was far advanced the Dictator returned to his old ideas of violence and accepted the cooperation of some of the baser satellites with whom he had been associated in Milan. The precise period at which these henchmen began to function as official instruments of government is not easy to fix. But we shall not be far wrong if we associate it with the organized attack against the ex-Fascist deputy Misuri, on May 29, 1923. Misuri had just made a speech in the Chamber, criticizing the ways of the Fascist Government, and at the break-up of the sitting Mussolini openly threatened to have him punished. The assault followed almost immediately. Misuri has declared in the press (Il Popolo, December 21, 1924) that Mussolini gave orders for the assault, and nobody has ever contradicted this statement.

The Misuri incident may at first sight seem a rather stale topic of discussion, but I have recalled it here for a special purpose. I wish to alter the angle of vision from which it has hitherto been looked at in the foreign press, and, as a consequence, to alter the angle of vision from which all such crimes have been looked at. The Misuri incident is a definite landmark that probably marks the first official operation of the Cheka in its official functioning as a normal organ of government. We can never hope to understand the present state of affairs in Italy if we continue to attribute such incidents as the attacks on Misuri, Amendola, Forni, and so forth, to the general spirit of violence that has been characteristic of Fascism as a popular movement since its foundation. These incidents, and darker crimes of which we shall speak later, have no connection with Fascism as a popular movement. There is overwhelming evidence to show that they are the official acts of the official Cheka. Therefore they must not be confounded with the more or less sporadic outbursts of violence that appear from time to time throughout the country, mainly due to local animosities or to the clash of local personal interests.

An understanding of what the Cheka means, how it was founded, and how it functions, is a necessary preliminary to any honest study of the Fascist régime. The story of how the Cheka was definitely established and organized is told in an affidavit drawn up by Signor Finzi, Undersecretary at the Ministry of the Interior. He penned his document immediately after the Matteotti murder, when he had reason to fear that he was about to be made a scapegoat; he laid the document before three gentlemen who were in close touch with the leaders of the Opposition. The whole story is authoritatively told in the indictment drawn up against General De Bono and laid before the Senate by Dr. Donati, editor of the Populist organ, Il Popolo. Last June the Grand Jury of the Senate gave its decision and failed to find a true bill against De Bono. As the matter is no longer sub judice we may cite Donati’s indictment as a piece of historical evidence throwing a welcome light on some dark patches of current Italian history.

In his solemn accusation Dr. Donati writes of the Cheka as follows: —

‘The criminal association — or the Cheka, as it is more commonly called — bound together under a pact of mutual common action in crime the highest leaders of Fascism (Rossi, Marinelli, and so forth), the professional assassins (Dumini, Volpi, and so forth), and the nonofficial coadjutors (Corriere Italiano, Filippelli, and so forth). It had its headquarters in a government building, the Viminal, where Senator De Bono also has his dual headquarters, as Director-General of Police and Chief of the Militia.

‘The Cheka, which had already existed in embryonic form, was endowed

with a regular constitution of its own at a meeting held in the private residence of the Premier, in the Via Rasella. Among those present was General De Bono, who had already been appointed Director-General of Police and First Commander-General of the Militia. There is explicit mention of this meeting in the affidavit drawn up by Finzi, which was submitted to three gentlemen who can give evidence as to its contents. These are Signor Schiff Giorgini, Commendatore Guglielmo Emanuel, head of the Roman office of the Corriere della Sera, and the journalist Carlo Silvestri. This is also borne out by the evidence which these gentlemen have already given before the Crown Prosecutor and confirmed by Finzi himself in a recent conversation which he had with Silvestri. Therefore the Cheka represented a constitutional organ of the Fascist Party and the Fascist Government.

‘As we shall see, the Cheka was entrusted with a twofold task: (1) to spy attentively on all movements of political parties and persons opposed to Fascism, also on lukewarm friends and open dissenters; (2) to suppress the more dangerous adversaries by violence “in style,”¹ under an astute system of protection which ensured the impunity of the assassins and their paymasters.

‘The executive of the Cheka is identical with the General Command of the Militia. The General Command recruited the hired assassins, furnished the material and financial means, arranged the plans, gathered information, provided — through the office of the Premier’s press agency (Cesare Rossi) —for the “working up” of public opinion, and made arrangements with the police authorities to guarantee the impunity of the direct culprits.

‘The Cheka was considered as an instrument “necessary for the government of the country,”according to the literal expression used by Finzi in his affidavit. To this Cheka organization we are to attribute the well-known acts of violence committed against the deputies Mazzolani, Misuri, Buffoni, Amendola, Forni, Ciriani, Bergamini, Nitti, and the journalist Giannini; also the murder of Father Giovanni at Argenta, the murder of the laborer Antonio Piccini, Socialist candidate in Reggio Emilia, and the murder of James Matteotti.’

III

The statements made above have been corroborated by the Rossi and Filippelli memoranda, by the sworn confessions published by numbers of ex-Fascists, by General Balbo’s letter dealing with the Minzoni murder, which was produced in court last year, and by several witnesses who have already given evidence before the Crown Prosecutor in connection with the forthcoming Matteotti trial. Moreover, though the Grand Jury of the Senate decided that Dr. Donati had not supplied sufficient evidence to warrant a true bill being found against De Bono as an actual accomplice in the Matteotti murder, they did not deny Donati’s main thesis. They even admitted the existence of the Cheka, speaking of it in the text of the judgment which they gave as ‘the committee which had been organized against the enemies of Fascism.’

I have somewhat labored this affair of the Cheka simply because it furnishes the master key to the whole situation in Italy to-day. By the establishment of the Cheka all pretense of constitutional government was thrown to the winds. When the whole question of the Cheka and its crime came before Parliament on the third of last January, following the publication of the Rossi memorandum, Mussolini said: ‘I declare before the whole Italian people that I accept the moral, political, and historical responsibility for all that has been done.’ This open and formal acknowledgment caused the secession of all non-Fascist members from the Cabinet, and also the passing over to the Opposition of Salandra, Giolitti, and Orlando. The Fascist Minister of Justice also resigned. The explicit motive for this wholesale desertion on the part of responsible statesmen was that they could not continue to be associated with a government that had openly approved a criminal organization as a normal organ of public rule.

Before I come to trace the widespread and intricate ramifications of the Cheka and to explain its operations, I must open a rather lengthy parenthesis in order to disclose certain historical facts which must be borne in mind if we are to understand how such a regime comes to be tolerated by a monarchy which has sworn to uphold the Italian Constitution. If statesmen like Giolitti and Orlando and Salandra could not be associated with Mussolini, because of his nonconstitutional methods and his open acknowledgment of crime as an instrument of government, why did not the King immediately call for his resignation? All constitutionalists hold that it was the King’s sworn duty to do so. Not only does Victor Emmanuel not bow to this opinion, but he has recently made it plain on more than one occasion that Mussolini enjoys the favor and confidence of his Sovereign. What is the explanation?

I repeat the current explanation that is given in the inner political circles of Italy. I can vouch for the truth of the historical facts as stated; but I do not wish to risk an opinion as to whether these facts adequately explain the present attitude of King Victor Emmanuel III.

We must go back to the episode of the ‘March on Rome.’ The Fascist propagandists usually dress up that event in military trappings that outrival those of Napoleon’s Grand Army on the road to Moscow. Mussolini has recently got into the habit of perorating about the three thousand dead that they left by the wayside. Contemporary historical research, however, has definitely established the fact that one boy succumbed to the fatigue of the march — that is the full casualty list of the great Fascist anabasis. The propagandists also talk of the three hundred thousand armed Black Shirts then ready for the fray; but they admit that only fifty thousand actually came to Rome. The plain truth is that about eight thousand Black Shirts took an actual part in the march to Rome; they were badly armed and they had no properly organized commissariat. Monterotondo was their rallying-point in the neighborhood of Rome. General Badoglio, who was head of the Army Intelligence Department, assured the Government that he would scatter the whole lot in a few hours with one regiment of soldiers. On October 27 the King advised the Government to declare martial law, and the decree was decided upon that evening at a meeting of the Cabinet. On the following morning it was posted throughout the country, and the local Fascists began to melt away like grease spots under the iron. Panic set in at Monterotondo. What if the plan should miscarry?

For there was a plan, whereby the Black Shirts had been guaranteed a peaceful entry into the Eternal City. At a meeting held in Florence some time previously, attended by Fascist emissaries, a few of the army chiefs, and some members of the NationalistImperialist Party, it was agreed that the march on Rome should be attempted. D’Annunzio was offered the leadership, but he refused. General Peppino Garibaldi was then asked to head the Fascist ranks, but he also declined the honor. No further offers were made and the Fascists were left without any leader of recognized valor or prestige. At the meeting in Florence it was agreed that if the Government should use the army to drive back the Black Shirts, and if a serious encounter should occur between the contending parties, the Duke of Aosta would intervene. Both the army and the Fascists would obey him; for he is extremely popular in military circles. His intervention would necessarily involve the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel III and the appointment of the Duke of Aosta as Regent. It is only fair to say that this arrangement was a very general one and was dependent on many eventualities. A mass meeting of Fascists was held at Naples on October 24. The Duke of Aosta betook himself to Spoleto, within motor drive of Rome. When the Fascists were gathered in the San Carlo Theatre at Naples they received the following telegram from Rome: ‘ Venite. La pappa è pronta, le mense so no imbandite. Non avrete che a sedcrvi a tavola.’ (Come. The viands are cooked. The meal is served. You have only to take your places at the table.) The meeting broke up and the march to Rome began. But Mussolini traveled to Milan and there watched how the fortunes of battle would go.

When Premier Facta went to t he King, on the morning of October 28, for the royal signature to the martiallaw decree, Victor Emmanuel III refused to sign. What had happened on the night of October 27-28 to alter the mind of the King? A group of National-Imperialists visited him at his family residence on the outskirts of Rome in the early hours of the morning of October 28. They told him that the Duke of Aosta was at Spoleto with eighty thousand armed Fascists, and that he intended to seize the Crown. They also declared that the army would not obey the orders of the King. The story had only a small foundation in fact, for the Duke had no armed followers at Spoleto. But the King evidently believed what he had been told, and took a drastic course. He refused to sign the martial-law decree. Then he opened negotiations with Mussolini through the Milan Prefect, and eventually offered Mussolini the premiership. The latter saw his opportunity and seized it. The King had made Mussolini, and Mussolini had saved the King. It is now said that this initial pact is the principal reason why the King still maintains Mussolini in power. To my thinking, that is only a part of the explanation. We shall see later that there are other forces at play which are less contingent and more fundamental.

IV

Let us return to the Cheka. The spy system is the most extensive branch of the organization. At the beginning of the present year emissaries were appointed to watch over all the state and provincial and municipal bureaucracies throughout the country. Their business is to report on the state of mind of the employees. If an unfortunate civil servant, for instance, should express views unfavorable to Fascism, he is at once reported to headquarters. Sometimes an order will be sent forthwith, transferring him to some distant part of the country. If he happens to be a family man he is ruined; for it would be impossible for him to think of transferring house and home on the miserable salary which a civil servant receives. Obviously the Government now finds that this system of persecution is not sufficiently drastic. Therefore it has introduced a new law, which declares that all public functionaries may be dismissed on a notice of twentyfour hours if their conduct is such as to create the suspicion that they are not enthusiastic supporters of the regime. This law extends to magistrates and judges.

A system of espionage is set up also in the offices of large concerns which are not under government control, especially banks and joint-stock companies, and large corporations. Negotiations passing between the banks and trading concerns are reported to headquarters. If the trading concern in question happens to be outside the ring of Fascist interests the bank is at once asked not to extend financial facilities. And the bank cannot, now very well refuse; because, according to the new decrees passed since Signor Volpi became Finance Minister, the banks are practically under the thumb of the Ministry of Finance. They are now bound by law to make a daily report of their transactions to the Finance Ministry.

Another interesting department of surveillance is that which is installed in the post office. When a name is sent to the Cheka as that of a nonsympathizer, orders are sometimes given to stop the mail addressed to the individual in question, whether he is a foreigner or an Italian subject. This is especially so if he has anything to do with journalism or politics. Here I can speak from personal experience; for my own mail has been seized, and checks sent to me in payment for work published abroad were sequestrated. In that matter I have made assurance doubly sure. Since I left Italy I have sent several letters to myself, all directed to the usual address; but they have not been delivered. In each case they contained references to imaginary articles published abroad.

In the administration of justice the Cheka plays a very important part. The police have to take their orders from it. They are sent to search private residences and arrest peaceful citizens who have committed no offense against the law. To take some cases in point: Last June, Count Cesare Sforza was arrested and thrown into prison at Massa because he had a requiem Mass said in his private chapel on the anniversary of Dr. Matteotti’s death. He still remains in prison, sharing his cell with common criminals, and no charge has been preferred against him. Professor Salvemini was arrested last summer and thrown into prison in Florence because some antiFascist literature was found in his home. There is no writ of habeas corpus in Italy. You may be thrown into jail without any charge having been made; you may remain there for several months and then be released without even the compliment of an apology. There is no legal redress and no legal defense. That is one of the reasons why so many non-Fascist Italians have to play the coward’s part to-day.

In the courts one sees the same system in operation. When a Fascist is brought to trial there is apt to be a gang of armed militia in the court. They intimidate the witnesses and the attorneys. In such circumstances there is small possibility of securing an impartial judgment from judge or jury. It would be useless to labor this point. One cannot take up an Italian paper day after day without finding reports of such instances as I have mentioned; and almost every week there are protests from the law associations against this wholesale suppression of justice.

Taking a general glance at the whole position as I have stated it, the reader will probably be inclined to ask how it is that such a regime is tolerated by a civilized people in the midst of all those European nations that have poured out their treasure and their blood and their tears to save their liberties from the threat of an oppression which certainly could not have turned out more unbearable than that of Fascism. The answer to the question is many-sided. Here I can only touch on a few of its more obvious phases.

In the first place let us take the negative side of the explanation. Italy is now in a position of political independence such as she has not hitherto enjoyed. Austria has been destroyed. If Austria were in her old position on the Alps, and if the Hapsburg Empire ware still in existence, Fascism would be impossible in Italy. There is no danger from France. Though there are upward of a million Italians in that country, many of whom are political refugees from Fascist oppression, they are only vaguely talking about raising forces to cross the Alps and free their native land from the grip of the internal tyrant, as French troops once before helped to free her from the yoke of the stranger. A well-known member of the Garibaldi family is once again in France, and a formidable association called the ‘Garibaldi Legion flourishes on the free soil of the French Republic. But times have changed. Europe is tired of war. Foreign nations are willing to stand any amount of truculence from Mussolini because they dread the risk of raising anything like serious international questions at the moment.

When we come to Italy’s economic dependency the case is far more serious. Italy has practically no raw materials for her industries, for she has no coal or iron supplies. She cannot grow sufficient foodstuffs to support her people. Therefore she must import heavily from abroad. Her yearly deficit in the balance between imports and exports is now about 300,000,000 dollars. This means that Italy has to get a generous share of credit abroad, and she cannot count steadily on that favor unless she enjoys the confidence and good will of the nations with which she trades. Moreover, as her labor is one of her principal exports, it is absolutely essential for her that her citizens should be welcome abroad.

Therefore the Fascists are striving with might and main to maintain confidence and good will abroad, especially among banking and large commercial interests. For this reason they have organized a system of propaganda to convince outsiders that the economic and financial position of the country has steadily bettered under the Fascist regime. To bring this fact home to outsiders they have given to the public a state budget which has little or no relation to the real financial condition. It is simply a piece of propaganda. I should not make such a statement without being in a position to bring forward proof. Take De Stefani’s budget for 1923-24. For that year I find that under one heading alone there was an expenditure of fourteen billions of lire (700,000,000 dollars) not a cent of which is debited in the state budget. The expenditure was officially announced in the Official Gazette (June 27, 1924, page 16). It figures in the Treasury accounts, but it is carefully kept out of the budget that has been published. That sum alone would practically consume the whole income from taxation for the same year. Therefore De Stefani’s first budget had really a much heavier deficit than those of his predecessors, even if we confine the deficit to the above expenditure and say nothing of other Treasury debts incurred. To keep all such questions dark, the press is muzzled and foreign journalists are watched and persecuted lest they begin to pry into the question of Italy’s finances. By such means and by the expenditure of huge sums for propaganda abroad, the Fascists think that they will be able to stave off the day when their real economic and financial position may become known to foreign bankers and foreign industrialists.

V

So much for the negative side of the reply. On the positive side the question may be put thus: What are the stable and abiding forces behind Fascism? There must be some group of strong and well-established interests whose policy and profit Fascism serves. What are they? The answer is simple. They are the monarchy and the plutocracy.

Let us take the monarchy first. I have already suggested some reasons why the King is personally favorable to Mussolini. But when I speak here of the monarchy I do not mean the King alone, but rather the whole dynastic clan with its feudatories and beneficiaries. These must not be confounded with the aristocracy; for, though they form part of it, the aristocracy embraces a much wider and more indeterminate class. We may therefore speak of them as the court party.

There is nothing to show that this party has any brotherly feeling for the Fascists or that they are in sympathy with Fascist vulgarity and violence. But they are operating under cover of the Fascist terror to transform the laws and constitution of Italy so that these latter will no longer bear the democratic imprint of the Risorgimento; to sweep away the whole democratic substructure and build on its site a system somewhat on the plan of the old Prussian regime. The court party would have a place corresponding to that of the Prussian Junkers. It would form a privileged ruling caste entrenched behind the bulwark of the Crown.

This court party is represented in the Mussolini Cabinet by the national imperialists Federzoni and Rocco, Minister of Justice. It is from this source that most of the recent laws have arisen, which enslave the press, condemn the formation of societies such as the Freemasons, and place the bureaucracy and judiciary absolutely at the mercy of the Government. The idea is to create a huge state and municipal bureaucracy which will be the faithful watchdog of the monarchy and its privileged caste — on every office stool in every state department, on every teaching-chair in school or college or university, and in every town hall throughout all the 9200 municipalities into which the people of Italy are civically grouped. In other words, the court party would hold central control over all the subordinate forces that formulate and direct public opinion. In bringing about this condition of affairs the Cheka is doing the unpleasant work for the time being. But once that unpleasant work is accomplished, the Cheka will be cast off, just as a victorious general discards the army spies once the vanquished foe has rendered up the sword.

The plutocracy works hand in hand with the court party to sustain the Fascist sway during this transitory period. To understand what the plutocracy means we must realize that capitalism in Italy has a character and constitution peculiar to that country. There is no wealthy class. The people do not invest their money directly in large commercial and industrial undertakings — they take it to the savings departments of the banks. The banks, in their turn, finance and control industrial and commercial concerns. That is the general rule, which naturally has its exceptions. Therefore in Italy you have a parasitic plutocracy of a peculiar type. It is not large enough to form a class, but is a very strong clique or caste. It finances the Fascist Party and the Fascist press. In return it receives privileges which consolidate its own position. For instance, the fiscal policy of Fascism has considerably lightened the burden of taxation for the wealthy classes and transferred it to the proletariat. Foodstuffs are now taxed to the last potato and the last head of cabbage to be gathered in field or garden; but the death duties have been abolished, and also the tax on the profits made by large corporations. Another return that the large banking groups receive for their support is in the shape of state concessions and monopolies and public contracts. The latter are now no longer open to public tender, but they are always conceded privately by the Government. This period, however, is only transitory. When the banking groups have the State fully in their hands, and their vested interests are bound up with the prosperity of the State, they will look for more able and more economic managers than the Fascists. When that hour comes the doom of Fascism will have sounded; for at the present moment Fascism is utterly dependent on the funds that are forthcoming from the plutocracy. Therefore Fascism must eventually pass.

What will be the result for the people of Italy? On the whole I think that the Fascist movement will have brought at least one blessing in its train. It will have taught a bitter lesson to the Italian populace. That populace has not hitherto taken the public interests of its country with the same seriousness that one finds elsew here. The Italians of the rank and file have been split up into more than a score of political sects, and have hitherto had no real political party. When they wake up from the nightmare of Fascism they will find that their common rights have been legislatively filched from them in the meantime. Arrayed against them will be the organized vested interests of the plutocracy and the privileged caste solidly phalanxed around the monarchy. That privileged caste will have its supporters placed in every position of control throughout the country — press, schools, army, police, judiciary, municipalities, state bureaucracy, and so forth. It will present a united front, and can be fought only by a united front.

The pinch of poverty and the stress of life and the unequal burden of taxation will force the populace to take a serious interest in public affairs. Then you will have the disappearance of all the sects — the Liberals of the Right and the Liberals of the Left, the Giolittian Liberals and the Nittian Democrats, the Populists and the Republicans and the Communists and the Maximalists and the Reformist Socialists and the numerous other political denominations that have hitherto formed the bewildering mosaic of Italian political life. Already there are signs of all these dissenters uniting into one great national bloc, as we saw recently at the Sicilian local elections. That bloc will probably be antimonarchical and will have the court party opposed to it. Thus there will be two great parties on much the same lines as the Liberals and Tories in England during the most classic period of British parliamentary life. It will not be a bad thing for Italy and may possibly lead directly to an era of peace and prosperity for the Italian nation. That, at least, is my own hope and belief.