The Intimate Papers of Colonel House
Arranged as a Narrative by . Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1926. Large 8vo. xxi+471+508 pp. 2 vols. Illustrated. $10.00.
THIS latest addition to the ever-growing group of the memoirs of eminent men whose names will go down to history in connection with the World War is an interesting and important one. It tells a tale of success and achievement, of secret counsel and fruitful suggestion, of clear vision and skillful manipulation. We get the story at first hand from Colonel House’s own diary, his memoranda, and his letters, the whole connected and elucidated under his guidance by Professor Seymour’s narrative and laudatory comment. To be sure, we do not find much that is startlingly new. Mr. House is no longer the man of mystery that he was to the public ten years ago. The ‘Colonel malgré lui,’ as Clemenceau wittily called him, has not always been able to keep out of the limelight. His words and his acts have been known and discussed; thousands of people have met him personally; his friends are many, his critics not a few; the extraordinary relation between him and President Wilson has become a part of American history. One need not, therefore, expect revelations in his Intimate Papers. They do, however, contain much that is of value, and they form a notable addition to the literature of contemporary events of world-wide consequence.
The two volumes which have so far appeared end with the entrance of the United States into the World War. They therefore cover only a portion of the story of the intimacy between the President and his unofficial counselor, men of very different mould, whatever might be the agreement in their views. It is not to be wondered at that their ways should have parted later. Throughout the pages the central figure stands forth, or rather glides to and fro, as the man who pulls the strings, the invariably wise and unselfish guide, philosopher, and friend — perhaps too much so for complete verisimilitude. But the question which obstinately besets the reader is, was the relation a wise thing in itself? It was not so novel as the author seems to think. After all, Professor Seymour as a historian is well aware that the confidential adviser of the sovereign and his high official have on countless occasions not been one and the same person. Unofficial agents who have passed over the heads of accredited (and thus discredited) envoys are not peculiar to open diplomacy. The eighteenth century was full of characters of that kind, and Louis XV, hardly a model to follow, amused himself by having a diplomatic service of his own unknown to his foreign minister, and not infrequently acting in opposition to his regular representatives.
To be sure Colonel House may have been able to convey the views of the President to Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg and to get their exact impressions in return more exactly than could Messrs. Page and Gerard; he could doubtless look at foreign questions from more sides and in a fashion more sympathetic to the solitary soul at the White House than could Secretary Lansing; there might be reasons why he alone and no member of the Cabinet should be aware up to the last moment on the second of April whether or not Congress was to be asked to declare that a state of war existed with Germany; but such facts inevitably undermined and rendered painful the position of the President’s official agents and advisers. Even the best influence has its dangers if it remains occult and uncontrolled by the responsibility of having to bear the burden of results. Rulers have usually done well in not letting their own families have much share in their decisions. Somewhat the same sort of thing applies to their friends, unless the friends take part in the actual work of government.
No such doubt, however, finds place in Professor Seymour’s volumes. They breathe the satisfaction of a record of quiet personal triumphs from the days when Colonel House was a youthful Texas politician to the one when, as the sole confidant beforehand, he witnessed and timed the speech in which President Wilson asked Congress to proclaim our entry into the World War. Still there are some who will refuse to be convinced. While admitting the skill of Colonel House as a politician, his good sense, his tact, his art of making friends, they may dispute both the correctness of his views and the extent of his accomplishment. For instance, was his fruitless mission to England and Germany in 1914 based on a correct understanding of the situation? Most foreigners would still smile at the idea that if he could have got Sir Edward Grey to meet the Kaiser at Kiel, with the Colonel himself as a mediator, all would have been well. They would point out that the World War was not due solely to Anglo-German rivalry. Again, was it mere obstinacy and shortsightedness on the part of the Allies which made them in 1916 lose interest in the proposed American mediation when President Wilson inserted the word ‘probably’ after the assurance that the United States would enter the war if Germany should refuse to accept the terms agreed upon in the memorandum? Professor Seymour’s argument that ‘probably’ did not mean anything except that the Senate must be consulted is far from convincing. Did it not mean rather to the Allies that the Government of the United States reserved to itself the liberty to do as it pleased when the time came? There are indeed many questions, large and small, that are raised in the mind by the perusal of these Intimate Papers, and the answers to them will be affected by the sympathies of the reader. But the papers themselves are none the less interesting on that account.
ARCHIBALD CARY GGOLIDGE