'A Paper of the Highest Importance' Mr. Lloyd George's Plan to Win the War in 1915

WHEN the battles of the Yser and of Ypres came to an end in November 1914, the barrier of trenches on the Western Front, from the coast of Belgium to Switzerland, was complete. The Germans, having failed in their attempt to break through to Calais, had withdrawn a large number of their troops from France and Belgium and had sent them off to Russia. What in these circumstances was to be the policy of the Allies in 1915? The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, wished to make an attack on the Belgian coast in order to capture Zeebrugge and prevent the Germans from using that port as a base for submarines. General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, disagreed with this plan. He thought that the lines of the Allies on the Western Front were not safe, and he therefore wanted reënforcements to be sent to France before the Allies made any attack. In a letter to Sir John French, dated January 19, 1915, he said: —

The French General Staff considers a German offensive possible — even probable — in the near future. The Germans are certainly making new formations; the 38th Corps has been identified in Bavaria.

Our front must therefore be made absolutely secure. If broken, for example, about Roige and Montdidier,¹ the consequences for the Allies would be of the most serious description. In addition we must place ourselves in the position of being able to assume the offensive. . . .

Operations toward Ostend-Zeebrugge, though important, are, for the moment, secondary, and in my opinion should follow rather than precede the principal action — that is, the collection of reserves.

The largest potential reserves of the Allies at the beginning of 1915 consisted of the new armies that Lord Kitchener was creating in England. What was to be done with these new armies?

The British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, summoned a War Council to consider this question. The Council met on January 7 and 8, and Lord Kitchener told Sir John French in a letter that the principal questions discussed were: (1) the proposed advance to Zeebrugge; (2) the organization of the new armies; (3) the possibility of employing British forces in a different theatre from that in which they were then used.

The result of these deliberations was embodied by the Council in a memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief: —

The possibility of employing British forces in a different theatre from that in which they are now used.

The Council considered carefully your remarks on this subject in reply to Lord Kitchener’s letter; and came to the conclusion that, certainly for the present, the main theatre of operations for British forces should be alongside the French Army, and that this should continue as long as France was liable to successful invasion and required armed support. It was also realized that, should the offensive operations subsequently drive the Germans out of France and back to Germany, British troops should assist in such operations. It was thought that, after another failure by Germany to force the lines of defense held by the French Army and yours, the military situation in France and Flanders might conceivably develop into one of stalemate, in which it would be impossible for German forces to break through into France, while at the same time the German defenses would be impassable for offensive movements of the Allies without great loss of life and the expenditure of more ammunition than could be provided. In these circumstances, it was considered desirable to find some other theatre, where such obstructions to advance would be less pronounced, and from where operations against the enemy might lead to more decisive results.

For these reasons the War Council decided that certain of the possible projects for pressing the war in other theatres should be carefully studied during the next few weeks, so that, as soon as the new forces are fit for action, places may be ready to meet any eventuality that may be then deemed expedient, either from a political point of view or to enable our forces to act with the best advantage in concert with the troops of other nations, throwing in their lot with the Allies.

From the memorandum it is evident that, while the British Cabinet as a whole was not prepared to override General Joffre’s request for reënforcements for the Western Front, there was a general feeling that the position in France and Belgium was one of stalemate and that it would be best to find some easier way of attack than through German trenches.

The British system of government by Cabinet is based on the principle of collective responsibility — that is to say, each member is individually responsible for the decision of the Cabinet as a whole. It follows that each member of the Cabinet has the right to place before his fellow members his views upon any question which comes before them. Thus it happened that when the Cabinet was discussing the policy for 1915 a whole crop of plans was presented to it, some of them coming from members who had no connection with any of the military departments. In The World Crisis, 1915, Mr. Churchill says: —

At the end of the year 1914, various attempts were made to survey the general situation and make plans for the spring. On January 1, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, circulated a paper of the highest importance, drawing attention to the unfounded optimism which prevailed about the war situation, to the increasing feature of Russia as a prime factor, and to the need for action in the Balkan Peninsula to rally Greece and Bulgaria to the cause of the Allies.

Of this crop of plans Lord Fisher, the naval head of the British Admiralty, wrote to Mr. Winston Churchill, shortly before the meeting of the War Council of January 7: —

DEAR WINSTON, —
I’ve been informed by Hankey that War Council assembles next Thursday, and I suppose it will be like a game of ninepins! Everyone will have a plan, and one ninepin in falling will knock over its neighbor! I consider the attack in Turkey holds the field — but only if it is immediate. However, it won’t be. Our Aulic Council will adjourn till the following Thursday fortnight! (N. B. When did we meet last? And what came of it???)

In the game of ninepins, Mr. Winston Churchill’s pin was that the main attack in the east should be on Turkey through the Dardanelles; Mr. Lloyd George’s that the main attack should be on Austria through Serbia, while a subsidiary attack should be made on Turkey. As is well known, Mr. Churchill won the game, and the expedition went to Gallipoli. His plan he has described in great detail in his book, The World Crisis, 1915. Mr. Lloyd George’s plan has never been published, though it has been the subject of frequent reference by writers on the war. This ‘paper of the highest importance’ the Atlantic Monthly is now able to present to its readers. We have added to it a few explanatory notes. Otherwise it is as Mr. Lloyd George presented it to the British Cabinet in January 1915.

I

Now that the new armies are in course of training and will, with the Territorials, be ready by the end of March to the extent of at least half a million men, I suggest that it is time the Government should take counsel with the military experts as to the use which shall be made of this magnificent force. It is a force of a totally different character from any which has hitherto left these shores. It has been drawn almost exclusively from the better class of artisan, the upper and lower middle classes. In intelligence, education, and character it is vastly superior to any army ever raised in this country, and as it has been drawn not from the ranks of those who have generally cut themselves off from home ties, and about whose fate there is not the same anxiety at home, the people of this country will take an intimate personal interest in its fate of a kind which they have never displayed before in our military expeditions. So that if this superb army is thrown away upon futile enterprises such as we have witnessed during the last few weeks² the country will be uncontrollably indignant at the lack of intelligence and prevision shown in our plans. I may add that operations such as we have witnessed during the past few months will inevitably destroy the morale of the best troops. Good soldiers will face any dangers and endure any hardships which promise ultimate progress, but this intermittent flinging themselves against impregnable positions breaks the stoutest heart in the end.

There are therefore three or four considerations I wish to urge on the military situation.

1. Stalemate on the Western Front

I cannot pretend to have any military knowledge, but the little I saw and gathered in France as to the military position, coupled with such reading on the subject as I have been able to indulge in, convinces me that any attempt to force the carefully prepared German lines in the west would end in failure and in appalling loss of life, and I then expressed this view to my colleagues. General Foch told me that there would be no more retreats on the French side, and I could well appreciate his confidence after I had driven past trench behind trench from Paris all the way to the Aisne. The French Generals are confident that, even if the whole of the German army now occupied in Poland were thrown on the Western Front, the French and British troops would still be able to hold their own.³ The same observation, of course, must apply to the German military position. We were told the other day that the Germans had during the last few months prepared a series of trenches of the same kind on their side right up to the Rhine. After three or four months of the most tenacious fighting, involving very heavy losses, the French have not at any one point on the line gained a couple of miles. Would the throwing of an additional half-million of men on this front make any real difference? To force the line you would require at least three to one; our reënforcemcnts would not guarantee two to one, or anything approaching such a preponderance. Is it not therefore better that we should recognize the impossibility of this particular task and try to think out some way by which the distinct numerical superiority which the Allies will have attained a few months hence can be rendered effective?

2. Extension and consequent attenuation of enemy’s front

Another consideration which ought to weigh with us is the importance of attenuating the enemy’s line by forcing him largely to extend it. The Germans now defend a front of six hundred miles. No wastage in sight will reduce their forces to such numbers as would make any part of their line untenable. The French returns of wounded prove that 79 per cent of the wounded return to the line: 54 per cent of the French wounded have already returned; 25 per cent are convalescent and will soon be back. It is a fundamental mistake always committed by the press to exaggerate the enemy’s losses: the slight and curable character of most wounds is always overlooked. But if the length of the German line is doubled, even at the present rate of attrition it might become at an early date so thin as to be easily penetrable.

3. Forcing the enemy to fight on unfavorable ground

The enemy is now lighting in country which is admirably adapted to his present entrenching tactics. He would be at a disadvantage if he were forced to fight in the open.⁴

4. Necessity of winning a definite victory somewhere

There is another consideration, which is political as well as military, but which nevertheless cannot be overlooked in an exhausting war like this, where we have to secure continuous exertion and sacrifice on the part of our own people, where we have also to think of hesitating neutrals with large armies who are still in doubt as to their action. There is a real danger that the people of Great Britain and of France will sooner or later get tired of long casualty lists explained by monotonous and rather banal telegrams from Headquarters about heavy cannonades, ‘making a little progress’ at certain points, ‘recovering trenches,’ the loss of which has never been reported, and so forth, with the net result that we have not advanced a yard after weeks of heavy fighting. Britishers have ceased to be taken in by reports which exaggerate slight, successes and suppress reverses; neutral states have never been deceived by these reports. The public will soon realize that the Germans are now in effective occupation of a larger proportion of Allied territory than they were in possession of at the date of the battle of the Aisne. This is true of Belgium, of France, and of Poland. These occupied territories contain some of the richest coal fields and industrial centres of Europe, and the most sanguinary attacks have not succeeded in moving the Germans (on an average) a single yard out of these territories. A clear, definite victory which has visibly materialized in guns and prisoners captured, in unmistakable retreats of the enemy’s armies, and in large sections of enemy territory occupied, will alone satisfy the public that tangible results are being achieved by the great sacrifices they are making, and decide neutrals that it is at last safe for them to throw in their lot with us.

II

Inasmuch as these objects cannot be accomplished by attacks on the Western Front, some alternative ought to be sought. I venture to make one or two suggestions. I have heard of a proposal that there should be an attack in the direction of Denmark upon the north coast of Germany. This proposal is associated with the name of Lord Fisher. For the moment I cannot venture to express any opinion upon it, as I should like to know more about the military and naval possibilities of such an enterprise. It strikes me as being very hazardous and by no means certain to fulfill the purpose which its originators had in view. SchleswigHolstein, with its narrow neck, could be easily defended by a comparatively small German army strongly entrenched against a hostile force seeking to advance into Prussian territory, and there is no room for flanking operations. But at the present moment I would rather not criticize this plan. My purpose is rather to put forward another alternative and I think more promising scheme for consideration by the Prime Minister and his advisers. It would involve two independent operations which would have the common purpose of bringing Germany down by the process of knocking the props under her, and the further purpose of so compelling her to attenuate her line of defense as to make it more easily penetrable. I will explain these two operations in a little more detail.

The first operation. — I suggest that our new forces should be employed in an attack upon Austria in conjunction with the Serbians, the Rumanians, and the Greeks. The assistance of the two latter countries would be assured if they knew that a great English force would be there to support them. Rumania could put 300,000 men in the field, while retaining a sufficient force to keep the Bulgarians in check. As this move might decide the Bulgarians to remain honestly neutral, the Rumanians could spare another 200,000. The Serbians and Montenegrins could put another 300,000 in the field. The Greeks have an army of 200,000 available.

How many men could we spare? By the beginning of April we shall have in this country 700,000 men who will have undergone a six months training. Of these 400,000 will be Territorials, 200,000 of whom will have been in camp continuously for eight months. We shall have in France a force of 300,000 men, provided we do not waste it on barbed wire. The French can easily defend their lines against the troops which Germany can spare from defending Silesia after the Austrian armies have been withdrawn to defend their southern frontier. We should require 200,000 experienced regular troops to stiffen the new armies. We should thus have a force of 1,000,000 men available. Four hundred thousand men might be left here as a reserve to throw into France in case of need it the French were hard pressed before the southern diversion against Austria developed. Some of them might be sent to Boulogne so as to be at hand in case of emergency. Subsequently the force could be sent to reënforce the new expeditionary force from time to time. This would leave 600,000 available for the Austrian expedition. Gradually this force could be increased as the new armies were equipped.

This would mean an army of between 1,400,000 and 1,600,000 men to attack Austria on her most valuable frontier. Here the population is almost entirely friendly, consisting as it does of Slavonic races who hate both the Germans and the Magyars. We could send our troops up either through Salonika or, I believe, by landing them on the Dalmatian coast. We could seize islands there which might make an admirable base for supplies, not far removed from the railway through Bosnia into Austria. This operation would force the Austrians to detach a considerable army from the defense of Cracow, and thus leave Silesia undefended. The Austrians could not withdraw the whole of their army to face this new attack, because in that case the Russians could pour through the Carpathians and capture either Vienna or Budapest. The front which would be developed would be much too lengthy for the Austrians to entrench and hold. The Germans would be compelled either to send large forces to support their Austrian allies or to abandon them. In the first case the Germans would have to hold an enormous length of extended front — in the aggregate 1200 miles — and the Allies would for the first time enjoy the full advantage of the superior numbers which by that time they could put into the field. The Germans would also render themselves liable to a dangerous attack in the rear from the immense forces which by that date Russia will have placed in the field. On the other hand, if the Germans decline to quit their own frontier and leave the Austrians to their fate, that empire would be rapidly disposed of as a military entity, and about 2,500,000 men (including Russians) engaged in the task of attacking it would be free to assail the Germans.

Two incidental advantages of this course. — (1) Something which could be called a victory would be thus within our reach, and the public would be satisfied to support with all their resources the conduct of the war for a much longer period without grumbling or stint. (2) Italy would not only be encouraged by this formidable demonstration ; she would be forced in her own interest to come in, because the operations would be conducted largely along the coast which she is looking forward to annexing to her kingdom, as the population is predominantly Italian. She must view with very great jealousy any occupation of this territory by Serbian troops, and Italian public opinion would certainly not countenance any proposal on the part of the Italian Ministry to come to the aid of Austria, if we made it clear that the whole of this littoral would become Italian territory if Italy helped to conquer it.

The second operation involves an attack on Turkey. There are four conditions which an attack on Turkey ought in my judgment to fulfill: —

1. That it should not involve the absorption of such a large force as to weaken our offensive in the main field of operations.

2. That we should operate at a distance which would not be far from the sea, so as not to waste too many of our troops in maintaining long lines of communication, and so as also to have the support of the fleet in any eventualities.

3. That it should have the effect of forcing Turkey to fight at a long distance from her base of supplies and in country which would be disadvantageous to her.

4. That it should give us the chance of winning a dramatic victory which would encourage our people at home while it would be a corresponding discouragement to our enemies.

Perhaps I ought to add a fifth: it would be a great advantage from this point of view if it were in territory which appeals to the imagination of the people as a whole.

III

What operation would meet these conditions? It is supposed that the Turks are gathering together a great army for the invasion of Egypt. The sections show that they have collected something like 80,000 troops in Syria and that they are slowly moving them along toward the Egyptian frontier. I would let them entangle themselves in this venture, and while they were engaged in attacking our forces on the Suez Canal I would suggest that a force of 100,000 should be landed in Syria to cut them off. They could not maintain themselves in that country very long once their railway communications were cut. They would therefore be forced either to fight or to surrender. The distance from Constantinople to Syria would not permit them to bring up reënforcements in time to produce any impression upon the situation. A force of 80,000 Turks would be wiped out and the whole of Syria would fall into our hands. The pressure upon Russia in the Caucasus would be relieved; the Turkish army in Europe could not effectively attack our lines of communication, as they would be bound to take steps to redeem the situation in Syria and if possible recover the country.

Unless we are prepared for some project of this character I frankly despair of our achieving any success in this war. I can see nothing but an eternal stalemate on any other lines. The process of economic exhaustion alone will not bring us a triumphant peace as long as Germany is in possession of these rich Allied territories. No country has ever given in under such pressure, apart from defeat in the field. Burke was always indulging in prophecies of victory as a result of France’s exhaustion. The war with France went on for twenty years after he indulged in his futile predictions. Germany and Austria between them have 3,000,000 young men quite as well trained as the men of Kitchener’s armies, ready to take the place of the men now in the trenches when these fall. At that rate the process of exhaustion will take at least ten years. In soil, in minerals, in scientific equipment, Germany is a country of enormous resources. In the number of men who have a scientific training it is infinitely the richest country in the world. That must not be left out of account when we talk about the process of exhaustion. No doubt they will suffer a great deal from lack of copper. We must not depend too much on this. German industries dependent on copper will suffer, but one way or another copper will be found for ammunition. Copper in small quantities will get in through neutral countries. Neutrals cannot resist the prices offered by Germany for their copper supplies. Moreover, they have inexhaustible supplies of coal and iron, and as long as they have the Hungarian plains they can frugally feed themselves. There is an enthusiasm and a spirit, according to every testimony, which cannot be worn down by a two or three years’ siege of German armies entrenched in enemy territory. The German spirit will not be broken by the bombardment of Dixmude or Roulers.⁵

Supply and ammunition difficulties, severe economic pressure, financial embarrassments, industrial depression, even privation and distress — nations will face them cheerfully as long as their armies in the field are in unbeaten possession of their enemies’ land. But once defeat which is unmistakable comes their way, moderate economic troubles make a deep impression on their judgment. Such defeats are not to be compassed along our present lines of attack and we ought to seek others. We ought not to allow things to drift. We ought to look well ahead and discuss every possible project for bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

If a decision were come to in favor of some such plan of campaign as I have outlined, it will take weeks to make the necessary preparations for it. I cannot recollect that in our discussions at the C. I. D.⁶ such an operation was ever contemplated. The ground has therefore not been surveyed. It would take some time to collect the necessary intelligence as to the country so as to decide where to land the army and what shall be the line of attack. Transport would have to be carefully and secretly gathered. Large forces might have to be accumulated in the Mediterranean, ostensibly for Egypt. It might be desirable to send an advance force through Salonika to assist Serbia. Military arrangements would have to be made with Rumania, Serbia, Greece, and perhaps Italy. All this must take time. Expeditions decided upon and organized with insufficient care and preparation generally end disastrously. And as similar considerations will probably apply to any alternative campaign, I urge the importance of our taking counsel and pressing to a decision without delay.