The Sudan Challenges the South

THE Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, or Black Country, is a distinct menace to the American cotton market. It is an immense area. It is practically as long as the distance from the Canadian border to New Orleans. It begins at the twenty-second parallel (North) and runs to the fifth parallel (North). Without irrigation no crops can be grown in paying quantities north of the thirteenth degree. But England has ordained that hundreds of thousands of acres of this rainless zone shall be converted into a cotton paradise. The carrying out of this programme calls for intimate coöperation between practical politics, engineering skill, and business acumen. Great Britain has statesmen, engineers, and men of affairs. The work that this ideal combination has now well under way is such a challenge to the South that it is of compelling interest to the readers of this magazine.

I

When Sir Herbert Kitchener, at the head of British and Egyptian forces, reached Khartum in 1898, he found a country laid waste by war and disease. Agriculture had been destroyed. Commerce was practically nil. Confusion reigned supreme.

On January 19, 1899, an agreement was entered into between England and Egypt which provided that the conquered territory should be reconstructed and administered by an AngloEgyptian condominium. This means that the British and Egyptian flags were to be used together throughout the Black Country. They still fly there side by side.

Egypt is the daughter of the Nile. Without the waters of that stream it would be a desert. Lord Cromer, therefore, insisted that the conquest of the Sudan was essential to the very existence of the state ruled by him. He feared that if the Black Country remained ‘no man’s land’ European nations might seize it and divert the Nile to other parts. The Anglo-Egyptian condominium, accordingly, emphasized the fact that the Nile was Egypt’s river.

So jealously did the great proconsul adhere to this principle that when, during his reign, the Sudan desired to use a small quantity of Nile water for experimental purposes Lord Cromer insisted upon the authorization of Cairo being first obtained. This permission was granted for a specific acreage. It was accorded as a favor, not as a right. It was renewed from time to time. When the British Protectorate was abolished, in February 1922, the Sudan had various permits, most of them issued after Lord Cromer’s departure, which allowed it to draw enough water wherewith to irrigate 300,000 acres. But the lid was never removed.

It thus came to pass that when, on February 28, 1922, England abolished the British Protectorate over Egypt the Sudan was naught but a viaduct which conveyed water to Egypt. But the unilateral declaration which proclaimed Egypt’s independence created what the eminent English historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, calls ‘a diplomatic fiction.’ This language is probably used by the editor of the Survey of International Affairs because Egypt was declared to be independent ‘with reservations.’ One of these ‘reservations’ applies to the Sudan.

It was officially announced by Britain that ‘until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Egypt’ the status quo should remain intact. This, of course, meant that until London and Cairo got together the Sudan continued to be nothing but a canal dedicated to carrying Nile water to Egypt.

But on November 18, 1924, stupid Egyptian extremists killed Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar or Commander in Chief of the Egyptian army. In the British ultimatum to Egypt of November 22, 1924, there appeared the following clause: —

‘His Majesty’s Government, therefore, require that the Egyptian Government shall: ... (6) Notify the competent department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated in the Gezira from 300,000 feddans [acres] to an unlimited figure as need may require.’

‘This demand,’ writes Toynbee, ‘was subjected to prompt and vigorous criticism in Great Britain on the triple ground that it was irrelevant to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, that it was an unwarranted repudiation of a pledge, and that it was likely to alienate the mass of the Egyptian peasantry and to confirm the conviction in Egypt that there could be no adequate guaranty for Egyptian rights to Nile water without exclusive Egyptian control over the Sudan.’ England, therefore, took steps to attenuate the sweeping terms of this ultimatum.

Correspondence passed between the British High Commissioner in Cairo and the Egyptian Prime Minister. In January 1925 the English Resident wrote: —

‘His Majesty’s Government are disposed to direct the Sudan Government not to give effect to the previous instructions as regards the unlimited development of the Sudan Gezira, on the understanding that an expert committee, to be composed of a neutral Chairman, a Dutchman, Mr. J. J. Canter Cremers, an Englishman, and an Egyptian, shall meet not later than February 15 for the purpose of examining and proposing a basis on which irrigation can be carried out with full consideration for the interests of Egypt and without detriment to her natural and historical rights.’

The Commission met. Its work was on the eve of completion when the Dutch chairman died. It is said that the Englishman and the Egyptian submitted in March 1926 what is called a ‘unanimous report.’ But the Egyptian ministry then in office was moribund. It allowed the recommendations to slumber. Its successors — and there have been several cabinets since then — do not appear to have disturbed this repose. But Sudan irrigation has not been affected by these soporific tendencies. It seems to have progressed, or rather to be in process of progressing, considerably beyond the 300,000 acres dead line.

II

And there is a reason why British statesmanship thus favors the Sudan. It is because Manchester calls for Empire-grown cotton. The Sudan can answer this demand. Egypt cannot. In these last eight words lies the kernel of the entire problem. With it is inseparably connected that of the limited amount of available Nile water.

This relative drought is emphasized by the fact that not one drop of liquid from the Nile reaches the Mediterranean during May, June, and the early part of July. Dams are erected across the mouths of the Nile to prevent the sea from flowing upstream. Every molecule of the precious fluid is used for irrigation purposes. It happens, not infrequently, that the total summer supply does not suffice for the existing needs of Egyptian, to say nothing of Sudanese, agriculture. But there is never a year when Egypt can afford to waste the slightest quantity of its life-giving elixir.

Egypt now has 7,200,000 acres under cultivation. Its total of arable lands aggregates 9,100,000 acres. Should this latter extent be put under the plough, saturation point will have been reached.

Egypt has a population of over 14,000,000. This figure is increasing by leaps and bounds. These mouths require food. To feed them, sugar, corn, wheat, onions, and household vegetables are grown, which cuts down the available cotton territory to an eventual total of not more than one third of 9,100,000 acres. This means that Manchester cannot look to Egypt as the means of quenching that appetite which craves for Empire cotton, and implies that the cotton-growing interests of the British Commonwealth of Nations view with displeasure an Egyptian Nile-water monopoly which restricts the expansion of the Sudan.

III

It was in 1913 that the first decisive step was taken to harness the Nile for the benefit of the Sudan. In that year Lord Kitchener, then British Diplomatic Agent in Egypt, the Sudan Government, and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate took up a project for irrigating the Gezira District of the Sudan with gravitation water to be obtained by constructing a barrage across the Blue Nile near Sennar.

The Great War delayed this project. It was not until 1925 that the work was completed. The dam cost more than $55,000,000. As many as 25,000 laborers a day were often employed on the job. The barrage is nearly two miles long. Connected with it there are 9286 miles of canals in the first 300,000 acres brought under irrigation. The amount of water stored behind the dam is slightly under 800,000,000 tons. Some of it is below the level of the land. Some is wasted through evaporation. It is stated, however, that something over 400,000,000 tons is available.

This gigantic undertaking serves what is known as the Gezira, or Mesopotamia, which lies between the Blue and White Niles and which forms a big triangle with its base on the railway from Sennar to Kosti and its apex at Khartum. The whole area contains approximately 5,000,000 acres. It is estimated that 3,000,000 acres can be brought under the plough. At the end of 1927 more than 300,000 acres were under irrigation. It is affirmed by trustworthy English authority that by 1930 this area will be increased to nearly 500,000 acres. This foreshadows a time when the entire 3,000,000 arable acres will be under cultivation.

IV

British brains have devised a plan whereby maximum efficiency is certain to be derived from these Gezira lands. What is known as the Gezira Plantations Syndicate is a trust headed by Friedrich, Beit and Company of London. The active member of this group is also English. His name is Einstein. It is said that the stock in this company is rather closely held.

This well-managed corporation went about matters most methodically. Before it delved into its pocket, the Sudan authorities took possession of all of the Gezira under an ordinance dated October 20, 1921. This proclamation gave the Government the right to rent, the lands from the owners of the soil at an annual rental of fifty cents per acre.

Those thus expropriated were given the first claim to take up holdings, as nearly as possible equivalent to their own properties. Yearly cultivating tenancies were granted them, with a right of renewal if they complied with specified conditions.

On the other hand, the Syndicate, under the supervision of the Government, manages the letting of the lands and the cultivation by the tenants. The Einstein group gives the latter whatever technical assistance they may require. It grants them loans when and as their needs may necessitate. It sees to it that two thirds of each holding are planted with fodder and grain crops for the tenant’s own consumption. This is tax-free. The remaining third is devoted to cotton. The Syndicate markets the fleecy staple. The gross profits are divided as follows: the tenant gets 40 per cent, the Syndicate 25 per cent, and the Government 35 per cent, respectively. The Sudan gets this large share of the receipts because it built the dam.

The original franchise granted to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate will expire in 1939. In 1926 the concession was extended from 1939 to 1950. The latest available official Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan states that the following principal changes are involved in the new grant: —

1. The area of the concession is substantially increased.

2. On completion of the full additional area, the Government’s share will be changed from 35 per cent of the proceeds to 40 per cent, and the Syndicate’s reduced from 25 per cent to 20 per cent.

The Report adds that it is expected that ‘the full area’ will be in cultivation in 1930. But nothing is specifically said as to what is meant by ‘full area’ or to what extent ‘the area has been substantially increased’ by the 1926 agreement.

All of this tends to show that there is a working alliance between British diplomacy, the Sudan Government, and Cisjordanian brains of German origin and English nationality. Its objective is to get plenty of cotton out of the Nile Valley. It is doubtful whether a parallel can be found anywhere else in the world for this happy partnership between statesmanship, administrative efficiency, and high-grade promoting skill. It does credit to England. It strikes at the American Cotton Belt.

V

As a result of the foresight, resourcefulness, and perseverance of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, Lancashire mills are now receiving 100,000 bales a year of the highest grade long-staple cotton. The Sudan produces what is known as Sakellarides cotton, which is the equal of American Sea Island. This latter variety is practically extinct. But, with a potential expanse of 3,000,000 acres upon which to count, the day may not be far distant when those 100,000 bales of Sakellarides will jump up to over a million. Britain needs cotton. Downing Street, the Einstein organization, Sudan sweat, and Nile water have combined to see that Manchester is adequately supplied.

It is difficult to overestimate the agricultural significance of this coöperation between statesmanship, capital, brawn, and irrigation. It means that scientific farming upon a large scale will become a reality. It guarantees adequate financial support to the farming interests. It assures intelligent salesmanship.

It is true that the Sudan Plantations Syndicate — which is more than Wall Street, for it is Downing Street. — seems to control but 3,000,000 arable acres. This gives it but 1,100,000 more acres than the potential expansion of Egypt. It might, therefore, be argued that, after all, this departure from the Nile-for-Egypt polity of Lord Cromer represents nothing more than an extra annual supply of 366,666 bales of cotton.

There are at least two answers to this objection. The first is that the redemption of these 1,900,000 Egyptian feddans might have been delayed indefinitely: the improvement was in the womb of time, where it might have remained until the end of time. The second is that, now that Egypt’s Nilewater monopoly has been broken, it is not impossible that other Sudan Plantations Syndicates may arise with other Geziras. The British Empire needs cotton. The Nile is beneficent. The Sudan is both big and thirsty.

At the present moment the Sudan is producing 1.12 bales of 430 pounds per acre. It was thought that the Syndicate or its tenants would not be able to get the necessary labor to meet the expansion opened up by irrigation. But it is set forth in the official report before cited that ‘labor has presented no difficulty, and the general well-being of the natives in the thickly populated Gezira area is manifest.’ And Fort Sudan is there to get the crop to the Red Sea and the oceans of the world.

The South should therefore reconcile itself to certain salient facts. They may be summarized as follows: —

1. Manchester desires to supply its looms with Empire-grown cotton.

2. British diplomacy is endeavoring to further this ambition, and has but recently supported a certain financial group known as the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, which is coöperating with Manchester.

3. The present drift of events in the Valley of the Nile appears to foreshadow that the Sudan Plantations Syndicate will get whatever Nile water its requirements may necessitate.

4. This diversion to the Sudan of the waters of the Nile has already opened up more than 300,000 acres, containing at least 100,000 devoted to cotton culture.

5. An incomparably efficient scheme has been elaborated by the Syndicate which assures the systematic, economical, and widespread development of what is known as the Gezira District of the Sudan.

6. The arable zone controlled by these financial interests totals 3,000,000 acres.

7. If the past and present may be accepted as a gauge for the future, it may be assumed that Nile water will, at no distant date, irrigate this immense area.

8. This means that the cotton market of the 1930’s will, in all probability, be called upon to absorb annually 1,100,000 more bales of long-staple cotton.

9. The fact that the Nile has apparently ceased to be a monopoly of Egypt seems to point to the query as to whether the more distant future may not see even more Sudan cotton menacing the agricultural welfare of the Southern states of the United States.