The Irresponsibility of Labor
‘There is no employer or group of employers who can keep employees from organizing if they want to organize.’
MATTHEW WOLL
I
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, in his statement to the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor on February 11, clarified the attitude of his administration toward organized labor. He said: —
It must be obvious that the best possible result in rehabilitating our economic structure is to be found in the well-organized and highly developed organization of both employees and employers, with their relationship resting upon the foundation of conciliation and arbitration and the full and frank recognition of the unescapable community of interests to be found in industry itself.
The Federal Government has indicated through the National Industrial Recovery Act its desire that labor and management organize for the purposes of collective bargaining and the furtherance of industrial peace and prosperity, but the Federal Government cannot, of course, undertake to compel employees and employers to organize. It should be a voluntary organization.
Notwithstanding the inability under the American democratic system of the President or the Congress to ‘compel employees and employers to organize,’ the Blue Eagle campaign and the operations of the NRA have proved that government has — for a time, at any rate — the indubitable power to make its wishes difficult and unprofitable to reject.
Collective bargaining, whether voluntary or involuntary, must be recognized as a method of employee-employer relationship which enjoys government sanction and support, which labor, organized or unorganized, approves, and which capital can no longer oppose. No matter what else comes of the New Deal, collective bargaining, in some form, will be congealed into the American industrial system.
II
When a labor leader sits opposite a capitalist in a discussion over the terms of an agreement, the two sides are not evenly matched. Labor undoubtedly is in the stronger position.
The capitalist represents property which can be attached by a judicial decision. Against him and his corporation a judgment is likely to hold. He can be sued and, should he lose his suit, damages can be collected. Should a strike be of long duration, plant overhead reduces his profits or may wipe them out. In some commodities where competition is very active, outlets once lost may never be regained.
Labor is in altogether a different position. The union, which the labor leader represents, is not incorporated. Its officials cannot be sued for the damages which fall upon capital as a result of a strike. When an agreement is signed with a union, it can be broken by the union at will without recourse. Even when codes provide for a specific method of agreement enforcement, as in the automobile and the newspaper codes, labor contends that the agreement may be voided under certain conditions. For instance, in the case of the newspaper guild, the union did not like the particular government organ assigned to deal with the problem; in the case of the automobile code, the A. F. of L. resented the implications of an election of employee representatives which went against them. Labor can only be brought into the courts when a felony or a misdemeanor is committed by individuals; the union or the officers of the union as such are without legal responsibility.
William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, has stated the case against the incorporation of labor unions powerfully and succinctly: —
Trade-unions in no way resemble business enterprises. Trade-unions do not engage in business for profits, they do not assume business risks on which losses may occur. They must be compared to such voluntary organizations as benevolent and educational societies, rather than to business organizations. Trade-unions are associations of members who are seeking to promote the welfare of their members in ways other than in the making of profits from business transactions.
Trade-unions, therefore, like such benevolent and educational associations, do not need to incorporate. There is no occasion for them to seek this privilege from the state for the purpose of exempting their members from financial liability for the business losses of the association.
Trade-unions enter into contracts on behalf of their members, but these contracts must not be confused with ordinary contracts made between business organizations. Trade-union contracts are not contracts on which losses occur.
They are bargains for wages, for hours of labor, for general conditions of labor. They are employment contracts, which are of the highest interest to society as well as to the union members concerned. Suits to enforce these contracts by either side are virtually never taken.
When capital, as a practical proposition, enjoyed the right to use its strength against labor freely, the irresponsibility of labor was matched, to some extent, by the financial power of capital. Since the advent of the NRA, however, capital is limited in the exercise of its strength by particular provisions of statutes and the codes. On the other hand, no provision is made to force upon labor a similar responsibility. The balanced system which Mr. Roosevelt seeks is unbalanced by the uneven obligations and responsibilities of the parties to the arrangement.
If we analyze Mr. Green’s statement carefully, it would appear that he does not face this very definite fact that a strike, called in spite of an agreement or in spite of a code, violates a contract in such a manner that a business may be utterly ruined by the act of individuals who are not responsible for their actions under the law. Even agitation for a strike or the threat of the use of the strike weapon at a time when an industry is operating under a code, which has the effect of an agreement between capital and labor, may prove to be damaging to industry.
Take, for instance, the Kohler strike. The code provided for collective bargaining. A Kohler Workers’ Association was organized in September 1933, with a membership of 1800 employees (practically everybody at work in the plant), for the purpose of providing the agency to represent the workers. The American Federation of Labor also organized a union, No. 18545, for this purpose. No. 18545 demanded that it should be the sole representative of the workers, although its rolls represented a very small number of those employed in the plant. No. 18545 then called a strike, which was attended by violence and rioting and which to a very considerable extent reduced the ability of the Kohler Company to manufacture and sell its wares.
Ultimately the National Labor Relations Board held an election. The vote showed that 1063 voted for the Kohler Workers’ Association and 643 for Federal Union No. 18545.
In spite of the very definite decision of the Kohler workers to stand by the company union, in spite of the fact that the election was held by the government and conformed strictly to Section 7(a), pickets and agents of the federal union to this very day interfere with the Kohler plant and with individuals employed there and with the residents of Kohler Village, and no one can be made responsible for the conduct of the union.
Plad Mr. Kohler lost his case, he could have been taken into a court and he might have been punished. His opponents are free to continue to harass his business unmolested by the law.
In difficulties which the Chicago Motor Bus Company had with the unions, the Rosemont Garage, situated in a densely populated district, was bombed. In this garage 6000 gallons of gasoline were stored, and, had this tank been reached, there would have been a terrifying loss of life. Apart from this, fire was set to buses, and individuals loyal to the company were attacked and at least one of them was killed.
There is no protection against this sort of thing except as the criminal law can serve to punish offenders against the commonweal. But it is impossible to hold a union or its officials responsible for acts which may be initiated by the oratory of its advocates. To do that would be regarded as interfering with the voluntary action of workers in organizing for collective bargaining.
III
In the Houde Case, the National Association of Manufacturers filed a memorandum as a friend of the National Labor Board, in the course of which the question was raised: ‘Whom does the labor union represent? To whom is it responsible?’ Labor, when it treats with the employer, knows beyond peradventure the responsibility of the employer. He is a president or a vice president or a counsel. His relationship to the corporation is made clear by his official position in it. Labor knows that he represents the ownership of the stock of that company.
When a federal labor union asserts its authority in a situation, how is it to be determined — except as in the automobile case, when an election was held — that the union really represents the workers on the company’s payrolls? After all, under any interpretation of Section 7(a), the employer is not required to treat with the whole of labor in an industry, whether employed by him or his competitors. He is expected to meet only his own men, those who are on his payroll. When there is a conflict between a company union and a federal union, the employer knows whom the company union represents. He knows that its officers bear a specific responsibility to the whole or a part of the men on his payroll. But to whom is the federal union representative responsible? What is his exact and specific relationship to the names on the payroll ?
In the National Association of Manufacturers brief, this question is discussed from a strictly legal point of view: —
Every person has a right to know with whom he contracts. It is an elementary principle of contracts, firmly established, that a person has a right to know with whom he negotiates to contract and with whom he contracts. The parties to an agreement are as important as the terms of the agreement itself. . . .
These principles have been reaffirmed by the authorities charged with the administration of the NIRA. In release No. 1592 it was said: —
‘The provisions of the much discussed Section 7 (a) are merely the affirmation of a constitutional right of liberty of contract which has been in fact recently sustained by the Supreme Court when expressed in almost the same words in another federal law. . . . The NRA has steadfastly insisted upon preserving the constitutional guarantee of liberty.’
The statute does not authorize or permit anyone to represent an employee who has not been freely chosen by the employee to represent him.
It is a well-defined objective of the labor union to restore to ‘the individual as a member of a group the equality which has been lost through the transition from small-scale to largescale industry.’ If the group is to benefit by the social strength which it generates, it must assume full responsibility for its collective action. Furthermore, it must he prepared at all times to disclose the principals for whom the officers of a union act.
In the general strike in San Francisco in 1934, it was impossible to enforce collective responsibility and it was known that the representatives of labor did not represent the voluntary will of the workers. An existing agreement was broken without adequate and formal notice; the regulations of the unions were invalidated and conciliatory union officials were suspended from union activity. This particular strike is a startling example of the ease with which an unknown and irresponsible group of men, antagonistic even to the A. F. of L., can organize a pressure group, employ coercive methods, and force an entire city into the panic of a general strike before its back is broken by the general population of the city. All that these individuals had to do was to take control of a union and they were ipso facto placed in a position to commit breaches of the public peace which otherwise would have brought upon them the full force of the law.
The right to strike is a fully defended legal right of labor, and, conversely, interference with a strike is employer repression of the voluntary expression of the will of the workers. Neither capital nor the public has any legal right to protect itself from the consequences of confusing irresponsibilities which may arise from this right to strike under any circumstances.
IV
Capital has now been made responsible for the closest scrutiny as to its conduct. Income-tax returns, the provisions of the securities and banking acts, the disclosure of costs and operations under the codes, practically place the capitalist in a glass house. He cannot budge without someone scrutinizing his accounts. He is not to pay commissions which might be termed bribes lest the Nye Commission get after him. Even his expenditures for legal advice, public relations counsel, and advertising have to justify themselves, otherwise he may be accused of playing ducks and drakes with other people’s money.
Who, on the other hand, knows anything about the income and expenditure of organized labor ? How much comes in as initiation fees, dues, unemployment funds, political assessments, or anything else that occurs to the organizers? Who knows exactly how much is paid to labor officials as salaries and expense accounts?
Tom Maloy gets himself humped off in Chicago and it is discovered that he had been engaged in a labor racket which brought him tremendous wealth and a very notable funeral. A few months before he was killed, men entered his house and seized $50,000 hidden in a cupboard. Thomas E. Maloy was business manager of the Chicago Moving Picture Operators Union. He apparently used his labor union as a private business. His activities were as astonishing as the wealth that he accumulated. An agent of the New York Motion Picture Union is reported to have received gifts of $55,000 over a period of five years from his union in addition to a salary of $21,800 a year. In fact, motionpicture and construction unions are notorious for the racketeering that occurs in them.
There can be no advantage in piling up instances of malpractice in labor unions. Nor do I wish to give the impression that I believe that all labor leaders are corrupt and that all unions engage in racketeering. Such a conclusion would be as unfair and distorted as the assumption that all capitalist enterprises are engaged in the sadistic pastime of grinding the laborer beneath a spiked heel. The difference between capital and labor, good, bad, or indifferent, is that capital usually operates under a charter of incorporation, must restrain itself within limits set by the law, is subject to every type of control and supervision that legislatures can devise, while labor not only is uncontrolled and irresponsible, but is protected by specific acts of legislation even from judicial supervision.
And the fact remains that labor itself, including the membership of the unions, suffers from this irresponsibility, because there is no protection, under the law, for the rights of minority groups within the union as there is for minority stockholders in a corporation, nor can the majority of the membership protect itself against coercive activity by a willful and well-organized minority. The character of a union reflects not the will of the members but the attitude of its leadership, and once that, leadership is recognized by the A. F. of L. and is in possession of the funds of the union, it can employ whatever means it chooses to maintain itself in power. The regulations governing unions are not uniform, they are seldom published, and they are never registered with a governmental body. There is no way by which an unincorporated and unregistered body can be required to live up to its own regulations.
The worker who protests against injustices within the union is accused of being eit her a scab or a Communist. He may be suspended, and thus his livelihood is taken from him. He can seldom apply to the courts for protection, because the very unincorporated character of his association removes him from the protection of the law. His is a mere association of individuals, a mutual benefit society, as Mr. Green puts it, to which the laborer pays considerable sums in initiation fees, dues, and special assessments, over the expenditure of which he has only as much authority as his officers permit him to have. The law cannot protect his right to control the expenditure of these funds.
From this point of view the labor union is an anomaly in a democratic country in which the theory of government is that, in associations of any type, provision shall be made for rule by the majority with protection for the rights of minorities, the whole so organized as to be subject to review by the courts in the interests both of the individual member and of the community. A chartered corporation is so organized, and when abuses occur the attention of the government and the courts is automatically engaged. No labor union in the United States is organized on that basis.
V
As long as the relations between capital and labor were individualistic, the rules and regulations governing labor unions were, after all, the concern only of the members of a particular union. The outsider, including even the industrialist affected directly by the conduct of the particular labor leaders with whom he had to associate, cared little about the internal procedure of the union. The industrialist then had the right to choose for himself whether he would deal with the union and its officials.
It was labor itself that insisted upon collective bargaining as a procedure; and it is the American Federation of Labor which insists that it alone shall be the agency of collective bargaining. That opens wide the inquiry into the type of union that exists in this country; the responsibility of the union under the law; the responsibility of its representatives; the relationship of craft unions to the Federation; the cost of trade-unionism to the worker; the responsibility of the officers of the union for funds which are entrusted to them by the workers.
And then it is discovered that the entire trade-union structure in this country has been organized on the theory that there shall be no responsibility at any point. The A. F. of L. can dodge responsibility because in theory it is a sort of clearinghouse for autonomous international unions. The international unions are unincorporated bodies with rules and regulations which are not in any manner under governmental or juridical control or even scrutiny. The officers of the international craft unions have developed a system of ‘statesmanship’ which justifies secrecy in conduct to prevent capitalist espionage; but it is found that this involves the handling of huge funds without audit or control or even report of any nature, because the funds are used for strikes and for political expenses, which may mean anything at all.
Where an employee representation plan is used, — that is, where a company union exists, — the officers of the union are responsible in the sense that the men know them because they directly selected them and the employer knows them because they work in his plant. But in federal unions the workers may not at all know the 4 statesman ’ who is operating the union. How many elevator boys in New York know Mr. Bambrick who orders them to strike and who threatens to break an arbitration agreement to which the City of New York is a party? Who, in fact, is this man with whom the mayor of the metropolis has to deal? He came out of Chicago, but no one had ever heard of him in New York; yet he can make it impossible for employees to come to terms with their employers because they fear that they will be attacked physically.
Of course, American capitalism is in a manner to blame for some of the more accented phases of this problem. The American industrialists agreed to Section 7(a) of the NIRA, which could only mean a struggle between themselves as responsible legal beings and the A. F. of L. as an irresponsible being. When the American industrialists agreed to the codes, they should have stipulated that the agencies for collective bargaining, on both sides, should assume legal, juridical responsibility. That, like so much else associated with the NIRA and the codes, was left to time and luck. The necessity for clarifying definitions to fix specific responsibilities is only now obtruding itself upon American industry.
VI
Senator Wagner of New York has accepted the role as the legislative protagonist for organized labor. In that role he has been presenting legislation which has for its specific objective the establishment of the authority of organized labor in this country. The Wagner Bills of 1934 and 1935 have the same objectives: (1) to equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees; (2) to encourage the amicable settlement of disputes between employers and employees.
I have scrutinized the Wagner Bills closely and I find everywhere references to the responsibility of capital and nowhere references to the responsibility of labor.
For instance, Senator Wagner establishes in his bill a phrase, ‘the unfair labor practice,’ which becomes a punishable offense. Then it appears in his bills that only the employer can commit an unfair labor practice. In the 1934 bill, an element among the workers could apparently be guilty of an unfair trade practice — namely, those who remained loyal to their employers during a labor trouble. This classification is omitted in the 1935 bill.
Some of the provisions of both Wagner Bills contain startling factors which do not altogether appear on the surface. For instance, every employee representation plan of any industry is practically outlawed because it is possible always to maintain that representation by men employed in a company is a form of coercion. In the Weirton Case at Wilmington, Frank K. Nebeker, a government lawyer in charge, developed a psychoanalytical application to the labor problem. His general thesis seemed to be that no company union could be any good since those who are in such a group naturally favor their bosses because they work for them. In the course of the argument, this dialogue occurred : —
THE COURT. If that coöperative spirit in fact did animate this company and its employees, then their cooperating was all right?
MR. NEBEKER. I would not say so. If it animated the employees, then the company union was all right, but even though they had the most patriarchic ideas in mind at the time that they organized that company union, if it had the effect, however good it was, however useful it is in the industry, however much it would serve their interests, and even serve the employees, if it operated upon the minds of the employees, the minds and wills of the employees to get them to do something other than they wanted to do, then it is a violation of law.
If the spirit of the Wagner Bills were logically enforced, were carried out as Mr. Nebeker interpreted Section 7(a), then no man could represent workers except an outside labor union official.
Although an employer may not even suggest to his workers that they join an employee representation group, he may, according to the Wagner Bill, compel his workers to join a labor union. In spite of the extraordinary preference shown the labor unions, no responsibility is placed upon them. In fact, so guarded is Senator Wagner in preventing his act from being used to make labor unions responsible for their conduct that among the exceptions to the rule, the employers of labor to which the bill is not to apply, he lists ‘any labor organization or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.’
The Wagner Bill, from every point of view, would force the worker to join any labor organization which the National Labor Board would recognize as representing the workers. And, to make doubly sure, it provides for majority rule and gives the Labor Board the right to determine whether the appropriate unit is to be ‘the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or other unit.’ A board friendly to the A. F. of L. would have exceptional latitude.
In the Wagner Bill appears the clause: —
Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.
This provision eliminates any possibility that labor could be held to responsibility under the Act. For the law specifically provides that, if labor is dissatisfied with the administration of any of its provisions, labor may strike. But capital is precluded by provision after provision from protecting itself against the exactions of organized labor. Under the Wagner Act, capital’s responsibilities are increased, labor’s irresponsibility is legalized.
In the Guffey Bill to nationalize the bituminous coal industry, the spirit of the Wagner Bill appears undiluted. Part III deals with labor relations. The right of collective bargaining, as the law of the land under Section 7(a) of the NIRA, is reiterated, but specifically ‘no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union.’ The mere appearance of this prohibitive phrase in the Act would have the psychological effect of frightening workers into joining the United Mine Workers. If Mr. Guffey and Mr. Lewis had written the phrase thus, ‘All employees must belong to the United Mine Workers,’ it could have no stronger implication. In fact, further in the Act this phrase appears: the wage agreement, and so forth, ‘ between representatives of producers of the majority of its annual tonnage production and representatives of the majority of the mine workers therein belonging to a recognized national association of mine workers . . There is only one recognized national association of mine workers: Mr. Lewis’s organization. Employee representation organizations are never national, but represent the workers of only one company or one plant. By implication, they must cease to exist should this act become law.
The employer, under the Guffey Act, has nothing at all to do with the recognition of the agency of labor. The Labor Board alone determines who is the representative of labor. ‘The Labor Board may order a code member [the employer] to meet the representatives of its employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. Refusal may result in heavy penalties.’
Although the Guffey Bill, like the Wagner Bill, makes the responsibilities and obligations of capital unmistakably clear, not a single word appears to state the responsibilities of labor. Not a word appears to define the character and obligations of the ‘recognized national association of mine workers.’ They may do as they please. They may destroy the entire industry by a strike. No one can take them to task. There is no provision to hold them responsible.
VII
Great Britain once faced this same problem which the United States is now facing. The fundamental trade-union act was passed as far back as 1871, and has been developed by acts passed in 1876, 1906, 1913, and 1927. Under the 1876 Act, provision was made for combinations of workers to organize as corporate bodies and to receive certificates of registration. Trade-unions then took on all the characteristics, responsibilities, and obligations of a corporation. In the Taff Vale Case in 1901, the House of Lords, as a court, definitely determined that registered trade-unions could ‘no longer be considered as ordinary voluntary associations; they are quasi-corporations with many of the privileges and liabilities of full corporations.’
In the Taff Vale decision it was established that a union could be sued in its registered name for damages resulting from breach of contract. This decision led to widespread agitation among workers and liberals in England and resulted in the development of the Labor Party. As a result of this agitation, the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 was passed, extending legal immunity to trade-unions. The unions could not be sued for breach of contract (arising out of a labor dispute), but the liability of trustees of a union with regard to union funds remained. This Act also defined the legal and illegal character of picketing.
In May 1926, Great Britain was shocked by the general strike involving 2,730,000 men. Every means of production and distribution was paralyzed. The nation rose in its might to break the strike. Class differences were ignored. Parliament, in 1927, passed the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act. This act made the following provisions: —
1. General strikes are illegal and no man may be penalized for refusing to join one.
2. Intimidation is illegal and no worker should be compelled by threats to stop work.
3. No person against his will can be forced to contribute funds to a political party or trade-union.
4. Any person entering the civil service owes an undivided allegiance to the state.
The Act specifically stipulates what type of strike is illegal: namely, if it ‘has any object other than or in addition to the furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the strikers are engaged,’ and if it is a strike designed or calculated to coerce the government either directly or by inflicting hardship upon the community. It is illegal to apply any sums in furt herance or support of such an illegal strike. The same provision applies to lockouts.
No NRA or NLB or anything of the sort is erected to enforce the act. The ordinary courts of the country and the usual law-enforcement officers are charged with its enforcement.
The provisions of this act governing political contributions are unmistakably clear. No worker can be forced to contribute, and provision is made safeguarding him from coercion or even influence in this respect. The political funds of the union must be carried separately, and no other funds of the union may be used for political purposes.
All rules and regulations of the trade-unions must be amended to conform with this provision and must be approved by the Registrar of Friendly Societies. Under the law of 1871, registered trade-unions had to make an annual report to the Registrar. This is now applied to receipts, funds, effects, and expenditures and liabilities of the political fund of unregistered unions as well. An injunction ‘to restrain any application of the funds of a trade-union in contravention of the provisions of this act’ may be sued. The Attorney-General (in Scotland the Lord Advocate) is particularly given this power so that the usual courts of the country may declare whether a strike is legal or not.
The importance of the British Act of 1927 which now applies is as follows : —
1. Trade-unions are fully responsible under the law.
2. Their funds are public and must be publicly reported.
3. Racketeering is impossible.
4. The corrupt use of a strike fund is impossible.
5. The usual courts of the country determine whether a strike is legal or not, and no political agency or elective official is concerned in the matter.
6. Membership in a union cannot be made an obligation for employment.
7. The relations between capital and labor are determined by the individual employer and his own workers.
8. The trade-union is recognized as a legal body and as such is protected by law, but it also assumes full obligations and responsibilities under the law.
The trade-union movement in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is stronger than is the American Federation of Labor in the United States. In 1933, it could report nearly 4,500,000 members. It enters upon collective agreements, usually dealing with wages and hours. Disputes are comparatively rare, and are usually over wages, seldom over such a question as the recognition of a union. The machinery for settling disputes is very elastic and usually a voluntary settlement is achieved. The workers and employers generally come to terms without outside intervention.
The responsibilities imposed upon trade-unions by law are in no small measure the explanation for the very high quality of labor leadership in England. Labor racketeering, I repeat, is utterly unknown. MacDonald, Henderson, Snowden, the Webbs, are not equaled in their social or political significance by any labor leader in the United States.
VIII
How much responsibility can be imposed upon labor unions in the United States without impairing the right of the worker to collective bargaining? How far can the funds of the union be made public without destroying the usefulness of the trade-union, the company union, or any organization of workers? To what extent would incorporation or registration impair the usefulness of the union? At one time organized labor in this country favored incorporation, but after the TafT Yale decision in England the A. F. of L. adopted the permanent policy of avoiding incorporation for fear lest it be used to destroy the union by judicial action.
If the union can be sued for damages, the union can be obliterated. This fear has been the principal deterrent to incorporation. Yet it is obvious that the new setup under the NIRA, supported by such measures as the Wagner and Guffey Bills, requires fixed responsibilities on the part, of labor organizations. It docs not seem possible that such responsibilities can be evaded after collective bargaining has become the law of the land.
It would appear, in the interest of the community, the employer, and the worker himself: —
1. That all labor unions or associations should be required to obtain articles of incorporation from the states in which they are situated and take on the characteristics of a corporation, but that the right to strike for specific improvement in wages, hours, and so forth, should not be impaired.
2. That their rules, regulations, and bylaws should be printed and published and filed with some suitable agency of government.
3. That an annual report should be made of funds collected and expended, that this report should be filed with some suitable agency of government in printed form, and that these reports should be available for scrutiny.
4. That when trade-unions engage in interstate business they should he required to file all of the above with the Secretary of Labor and that failure to do so or to do so truthfully should be punished by law.
5. That the form of accounting should be as standardized as income-tax returns are, and that the source of income and the character of expenditure should be broken down to sufficient detail to avoid any possible ambiguity.
If the American Federation of Labor possessed even a modicum of statesmanship, it would favor laws specifying the responsibility of labor. For it should be obvious to labor leaders that if the American worker desired to join federal unions no power on earth could keep him out of them, particularly during the past two and a half years. No one who has studied the American labor movement can deny the fact that most workers stay out of federal unions because they resent high dues, high initiation fees, union politics, union racketeering, mediocre and often gangster leadership.
Surely Mr. Green should want to clean house in the circumstance of his present advantage. It serves the A. F. of L. badly to have Tom Maloys and many of his kind still running unions. They may be excellent organizers, but they involve the unions in a type of operation which is becoming increasingly unpalatable. For instance, Barnbrick’s threat to New York forced even a radical mayor, a friend of organized labor like La Guardia, to counterthreaten that he would use the police and the firemen to break the elevator operators’ strike. Workers tell of great unemployment funds which are not spent on the unemployed. The fact is that the workers do not know whether the money is spent honestly or not; they know nothing about it. It is all secret — and secrecy leads, in this unhappy world, to crookedness.
The employer charges irresponsibility; the worker avoids the A. F. of L. union because he has no voice in the expenditure of funds; the public is weary of the labor racket. The assumption of responsibility would actually strengthen the labor movement.