Peace and the Navy
I
THE world stands aghast at the tragedy of China. One of the largest, most populous, and potentially richest of countries, inhabited by a race of exceptional vigor, character, and intelligence, has been rendered prostrate in a few short months by a well-armed overseas nation of relatively slender resources of materials and men. The ancient Celestial Kingdom henceforth will afford the classic example of the folly of unpreparedness — of the grave fallacy that lies in the doctrine of peaceful security through military weakness.
True enough, unduly swollen armaments also carry a menace of war. We saw something of that in 1914, and history records many other instances. Nevertheless a country possessing great military-naval strength can almost always choose peace if it so prefers — an honorable peace. Certainly this is very true of a nation as well isolated as the United States. For us adequate armaments — especially naval — offer a positive way to peace with security, for the country and its external interests.
This is undoubtedly the cardinal principle underlying the President’s recent message to Congress urging substantially greater preparedness. ‘Specifically and solely,’ he says, ‘because of the piling up of additional land and sea armaments in other countries, in such manner as to involve a threat to world peace and security,’ additional fighting forces are needed for this country. Military-naval adequacy is a matter of relativity, and, to quote the President further, ‘our national defense is, in the light of the increasing armaments of other nations, inadequate for purposes of national security and requires increase for that reason.’ For us it is the most certain way to ward off insecurity and war in a world seething with a spirit of great unrest and aggression.
The failure to limit armaments by international agreement is the greatest world tragedy since the holocaust of the World War. Reasonably balanced armaments, such that the strength of each nation would act as a deterrent against outside aggression, are an ideal worth working for. The stability of peace would be vastly improved and the heavy economic burden of armaments relieved. If satisfactory proportions of armaments among the powers could be established, the general level could be reduced.
The great promise given by naval limitation treaties of 1922-1930, supplemented by the Kellogg Pact, has unfortunately not been fulfilled. In that highly constructive movement the United States led the way and made much more than her share of sacrifices in the common good. In barest outline the degree of American concessions to the cause of naval limitation is represented by our allowances under the treaties compared with the size of our navy as it existed beforehand — relative to other countries in both instances. Contrasted with the British, we voluntarily wrote down our navy, 396,871 tons more than they did. With respect to Japan, our corresponding loss was 450,000 tons. The latter figure, believe it or not, is the equivalent of more than half the navy of Japan at the present time.
But even these figures fail to represent the full extent of our sacrifices. Our scrapping programme by treaty included eleven great capital ships on the stocks upon which upwards of $300,000,000 had already been spent and whose completion would have made us by far the strongest naval power. Besides all this, we gave up rights to naval bases in the Orient which, translated into terms of naval power, reduced our potential strength in that region by at least 50 per cent of our fleet, whatever its size might be. In other words, after cutting our navy 450,000 tons, relative to Japan on the status quo basis of 1921, we agreed to restrict our power in Oriental waters by a further 50 per cent of the remainder. Such is the handicap resulting from having no naval base near a theatre of operations.
It was a noble gesture made in the hope of promoting world peace generally. But it also had specifically in view the permanent settlement of the chronically vexatious situation respecting China. During the World War, Japan had seized a large section of that unhappy country, and her ‘Twenty-one Demands’ giving control over the Chinese Government were in force by virtue of a large army of occupation. The Naval Limitation Treaty was one of a group of treaties and agreements under which Japan consented to evacuate China and joined with us and seven other nations in categorically guaranteeing the political and territorial integrity of China in the future.
In effect, therefore, the price of our unmatched naval sacrifices which would make it impossible for us to attack Japan, or even to interfere with her future will in the Orient, was her promise to restore China to the Chinese and to refrain from future aggression against that weak giant of a neighbor. Costly as it was, our diplomacy had succeeded, but it is worth noting here that diplomacy then had the potential backing of overwhelming sea power, which it lacked a few years later when it failed utterly. Unquestionably force is a necessary handmaiden to successful diplomacy in this troubled world.
The late Senator Lodge, a member of the American Delegation to the Conference, characterized the whole arrangement as an ‘experiment’ in international relations. Certainly nothing like it had ever been tried before. Those loudest in its favor were subsequently the leaders against building up our navy to treaty levels, partly on the ground that we should not trust ourselves with so much power. They seemed to prefer to trust Japan with superstrength in the Orient. The ‘experiment’ proved to be not only a failure, but a costly failure as well. If we now had the splendid battleships that were scrapped then, we should not need to spend hundreds of millions on new battleships to-day.
During the eight years from 1922 to 1930 an odd naval race was in progress. America went backward because of old ships that became obsolete and England virtually stood still, while Japan went forward by leaps and bounds in the smaller types of ships upon which the treaty had placed no limitation — the so-called naval ‘auxiliaries’ comprising principally cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Italy and France also built up rapidly in these types. There was a decided halt abroad only in the construction of battleships, which all had agreed to limit. In the beginning our navy had had a great deficiency in cruisers, and we declined to make it up for the sake of setting a good example. England started with a surplus of cruisers and was content to build only replacements for the older ones. Japan began with a deficiency similar to ours in auxiliary tonnage and immediately undertook a great building project in these types of ships. In effect, the money she was able to save through the treaty by stopping battleship construction was diverted to new smaller vessels in large numbers.
In this way Japan’s total naval strength relative to other countries was greatly increased. She had taken full advantage of the loophole in the 1922 Treaty which was not plugged up until the London Naval Treaty of 1930. Then in 1931 Japan embarked on her conquest of Manchuria despite strong diplomatic protests from America and other countries, who declared the invasion to be in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty which Japan had signed in 1922. But Japan was now in a position to ignore diplomatic protests that lacked the potential backing of force. Vastly improved relative naval strength and great geographic isolation, made doubly secure by an absence of strong foreign naval bases in the Orient, were combined with political tension in Europe and an America gone pacifistic to guarantee Japan freedom from outside interference.
In regard to alleged treaty violations, Japan took refuge in the contention that Manchuria was not a part of China, but even this alibi was thrown to the winds when a few months ago she embarked on the general conquest of China that is now in progress. Once again Nippon’s advance has been timed so that the storm of diplomatic protest from the western world can be safely disregarded. Her naval position is still favorable, America remains on guard against any action that might lead to war, and the acute political situation in Europe effectively ties all other great navies to those waters. What a striking contrast to 1922, when diplomatic pressure, well fortified by great potential naval strength, sufficed to induce a peaceable evacuation of China by firmly entrenched Japanese armies.
The futility of diplomacy when divorced from adequate force, the danger of being drawn into war from weakness, and the peaceful security that is inherent in military-naval strength, are principles that have many illustrations in American history. From this point of view the following episodes, besides the foregoing, are well worthy of critical examination: the quasi-naval War with France (1798-1801), our wars with the Mediterranean Barbary Powers, the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, the occupation of Mexico by the French during our Civil War and their subsequent evacuation, the crisis with Japan during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, and our entry into the World War.
In the latter case, President Wilson at first strove valiantly to safeguard our interests through diplomacy alone, then became convinced that a backing of great naval power was necessary if we were to avoid being drawn into the conflict, rushed through Congress the huge naval building programme of 1916, and finally failed in his peaceful object because too long a time was required to build ships. An earlier start by a year or more might well have rendered them effective in supporting diplomacy. No doubt this severe lesson was taken to heart by the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and now influences him as President during the current crisis. His great building programme started now will well serve our diplomacy towards safeguarding America’s interests and keeping her out of war in the forbidding outlook in both Asia and Europe.
II
The new programme lags behind similar action by other nations. It calls for a navy about 20 per cent larger than that allocated to the United States under the naval limitation agreements of 1922 and 1930. In consequence of Japan’s refusal to continue these treaties they expired in 1936, but nevertheless we have since voluntarily accepted that quota as our upper limit — to which, in fact, we have never built up at any time after 1922. Until recently Britain has also kept under the same treaty maximum, although maintaining a larger navy than ours.
On the other hand, Japan quickly built up to the extreme limit of her quota under the treaties, and after their termination it has been assumed that her new construction has considerably exceeded that level. It is impossible to speak with certainty on this point because, after refusing to renew the limitation treaties, Japan also declined to join Great Britain and ourselves in an agreement for mutual exchange of information on new construction. She preferred to maintain secrecy, and this fact, combined with her recent invasion of China and an unwillingness to bind herself to keep within the old treaty limits, points strongly to a substantial increase in Japan’s navy since 1936. This presumption is well supported by various other indications and reports.
Because of this Japanese attitude as well as the rearmament of Germany and substantial increases in Italian preparedness, a year ago England announced a prodigious new defense programme to cost nearly seven billion dollars, a large part of which was to be used for the construction of new ships, in part to replace units becoming obsolete. It contemplates ten new battleships (to make a total of twenty-five), additional aircraft carriers sufficient for five hundred planes, and new cruisers and destroyers to reach a total of seventy and two hundred, respectively. French policy is to maintain a navy equal to those of Germany and Italy combined.
Thus, among all the great naval powers, we are the last to adopt the policy of expanding our fleet above the standards of total tonnage set under the expired treaties.
It should be emphasized, however, that naval power is a matter of relativity, and that the new American programme does not aim to raise our navy above the old 5-5-3 proportions fixed by international agreement in 1922. Because other nations have recently projected increases in the total size of their navies, it is necessary for us to do likewise if the traditional proportions of strength relative to them are to be preserved. Obviously the aggressive implications that have been assumed respecting our programme in certain quarters are quite unwarranted. We are merely catching up with others who have already set the pace.
In fact, moderation has governed us even in the new programme, under which we should fail to come up to the 5-5-3 proportions. In battleships, for instance, we have fifteen built, two building, and five additional projected, including those in the programme — a total of twenty-two. The corresponding unofficial figures for the British are fifteen built and a total of twenty-five, including those building and projected. Similarly Japan’s total by unofficial reports is fourteen, of which ten are already completed. The comparable French total is eleven, the Italian eight, and the German eight.
In all cases a substantial part of the new construction is earmarked to replace old units that are already, or soon will become, obsolete through age. For example, our grand total of twenty-two as set forth above really represents a permanently serviceable force of only eighteen, because by the time the new ships can be completed older ones will be beyond the age of effectiveness. A necessary further explanation is that for some of the ships projected there is no immediate appropriation of funds. They therefore merely represent a declaration of future intention to build.
The numbers of battleships dealt with in the preceding paragraph are necessarily subject to change in the event of a material alteration in the individual size. (The generally accepted maximum at present is 35,000 tons.) If larger units become the standard, then a smaller number would be built. This question is unfortunately shrouded in doubt because of Japan’s refusal to join Britain, America, and others in an agreement for mutual exchange of information as to plans for future naval construction. Although Japan may deny to-day the existence of plans for 43,000-ton battleships (as is reported by the press while this is being written), nevertheless tomorrow she may actually initiate such plans secretly. Other powers would virtually be forced to adopt the larger size as soon as they became aware of the Japanese raise in the ‘ante.’
The matter of individual size of battleships is of outstanding importance because a few ‘monster’ ships could so far outclass current types as to defeat a whole fleet of them. Their larger guns could sink old-fashioned antagonists before the latter could get within effective range. Besides this, the ‘monster’ could be given greatly superior speed, much better armored protection against damage from gunfire and aerial bombs, as well as vastly improved underwater protection against mines and bombs, and great steaming radius. The design of every ship is a compromise between the demands for gun power, protection, speed, and fuel capacity. Each one of these factors involves weight, which requires a certain tonnage or displacement to be floated. There must therefore be a compromise among the essential factors when the size of the ship is restricted. Admiral Fiske once proposed a ‘compromiseless’ ship — meaning one in which could be placed all the gun power, speed, protection, and cruising radius that were wanted. This meant that the total size of the ship would have to be unrestricted, and that she would be virtually irresistible, unsinkable, inescapable, ‘uncatchable,’ and unhampered by refueling requirements.
As measured by the standards of that era, something on the order of such a ‘dream ship’ came into being early in the present century with the advent of the dreadnought. This was then a new type of battleship so much larger and more powerful than her predecessors as to outclass them, and thus to render them obsolete. It was a revolutionary development, and at great expense the principal navies were hastily modernized accordingly. The nightmare of a repetition of this overhangs the naval world now because of Japan’s secrecy and refusal to coöperate in the exchange of information, or in an agreement at least limiting the individual size of battleships.
It is pertinent here to consider the utility of the battleship type, especially in view of the widespread opposition from air-power extremists. This matter has received the most thorough experimentation and technical examination in all navies, and complete confirmation has been given abroad to the contentions of American naval officers that were made during the acute controversy that raged in this country some years ago. As to relative costs, the British Admiralty recently announced that one battleship could be built for the approximate cost of forty-three twin-engined bombers. Compare this with the extravagant equivalent of one thousand planes so persistently claimed here.
The British authorities also point out that battleships have an indispensable function in the control of the high seas that aircraft cannot perform, that all other types of naval vessels are more vulnerable than battleships to air attack, that anti-air defense from ships has vastly improved in recent years, and finally that, although scarcely unsinkable, battleships can take a lot of punishment from the air without sustaining fatal damage. In truth, battleships can be sunk more readily by heavy gunfire from other battleships or forts than by bombing attack from the air. There is no doubt whatever that battleships are justly termed the ‘backbone’ of sea power, though it is also an indisputable fact that naval aviation is an immensely important and powerful arm of the fleet.
In the new programme the increases for naval aviation are well in excess of the general average of a 20 per cent addition to the fleet as a whole. The navy is now exceedingly air-minded and bows to no other service on land or sea in its faith in the utility of air power, or in the excellence of its aviators and equipment. The limit of planes is raised from 2050 to 3000; aircraft carriers (ships) from six to eight; and seaplane tenders (ships) from three to fourteen. Seven of these new tenders are small, but each will be able to ‘mother’ a squadron of twelve large seaplanes or ‘flying boats.’ The difference between ‘carriers’ and ‘tenders’ is that the former normally carry the planes on their decks, except in flight, whereas the latter merely serve as a base from which repairs and supplies can be received by large flying boats that rest habitually on the water when not in the air. In supporting the new naval programme before the Congressional Committee, Admiral Leahy said, ‘It is my considered opinion at the present time that the most urgent improvement in the nation’s air defense is an increase in the number of naval patrol planes and their tenders.’ Such aircraft are useful not only in gaining early information of hostile approach but also in subsequent combat operations with their bombs.
Besides provision for strengthening battleships and naval aviation forces, the President’s programme would similarly add to other combat types represented principally by cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, in such proportions as to elevate our quota of total fighting power on the sea by about 20 per cent. In addition it is proposed to build fortytwo more non-combat vessels which must supply and otherwise serve the fleet proper. In this category are such types as repair ships, mine layers and mine sweepers, hospital ships, store ships, and tenders to destroyers, submarines, and seaplanes.
It is well to recall the fact that all of these ships are not to be built at once, that the programme merely fixes an upper limit to which we can build in an orderly and hence more economical way over a period of years, that much of the new construction is for the replacement of ships becoming obsolete through age, and that we are the last among the great naval powers to increase our navy above the limits previously fixed by the now expired treaties.
III
‘How is the navy to be used?’ is a question in which public interest has been actively reawakened by the President’s recommendations for more ships. In certain quarters the fanciful suggestion has been voiced that our navy may have some sort of understanding with the British navy for joint action in Asia or elsewhere. This is scarcely worthy of answer to anyone possessing even rudimentary knowledge of our form and method of government. Such a thing might be possible in Japan, where army and navy are almost independent entities, virtually free from civilian control and responsible only to an Emperor who is mainly a titular and religious head largely divorced from active political participation in the government.
This is one of the most baffling aspects of the present situation in China. It is the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy that are acting, rather than the political branches of the Japanese Government or Japan itself in a broad sense. The Foreign Office may make apologies for what has been done and give assurances of what will be done by the combat forces, but its words carry no final authority because, regardless of contrary technicalities and theories, the whole government is in fact dominated by the military-naval groups.
In democratic America such a relationship between civil and military functions and officials is quite inconceivable. State policies are determined exclusively by civilian political officials — in the White House, in Congress, and in the State Department. The navy acts only in accord with such policies and under the direction of its constitutional Commander in Chief, the President. The support of national policies, however they may be defined by civil authority, is the first duty of the navy — a duty which it has ever loyally performed.
In this respect the navy’s task is sometimes difficult because of policies that are loosely defined or frequently changed. These handicaps are unavoidable, however, in a world of international competition and where vital circumstances are constantly undergoing alteration. The game of international politics is like any other game, in that one moves for defense, for improvement of position, or to outmanœuvre an opponent. The frequent changes of policy, with regard to the Caribbean and Europe, that were forced upon President Wilson by unstable conditions well illustrate the necessary impermanence of policy. Too rigid a declaration of policy in advance may easily lead to its defeat or virtual nullification by another nation seeking to escape its consequences. For example, Japan rendered our recent Neutrality Act ineffective by refraining from declaring war on China. In international affairs the President needs the benefit allowed by the Constitution of a great deal of unhampered discretion if he is to employ the navy in the best way to safeguard the national interests in unexpected contingencies.
There are many earnest advocates who would restrict our navy to a purely defensive rôle, near our coasts, including the Panama Canal and possibly Hawaii. As Admiral Leahy said in his recent testimony before a Congressional committee, ‘In defending our territory in war we cannot assume an attitude of passive defense and simply beat off an attack at one place and later another. In such a case we would see our coasts blockaded, our outlying possessions seized, our commerce, both coastwise and foreign, driven off the seas, and we would undergo the costly experience of finding the war lasting’ until the enemy ‘had attained every objective and everything he wanted.’
This nation should be the last to overlook the fatal economic consequences of a sea blockade. Fallacious arguments are frequently advanced about the country being so nearly self-supporting as to be able to endure a blockade without much suffering. The same reasoning could have been applied before the Civil War to the Confederate States, which under the Union blockade endured economic collapse and dire hardship including starvation in many large cities. The mere withdrawal of foreign shipping from the American trade during the Boer War and during the early part of the World War precipitated acute industrial depression within our borders. The shuttles of ships on the oceans, no less than transport ashore, weave the fabric of our economic well-being.
Under modern conditions a blockade sufficiently effective to upset the intricate mechanism of industrialism can be conducted from a long distance offshore. During the World War the British blockaders of Germany operated as far as a thousand miles from Heligoland. A tight blockade of the United States would be more difficult, but nevertheless important classes of our foreign commerce could be stopped front much greater distances if our navy were held to our side of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. For example, in normal times the value of our trade with the general region of the Orient, including Australia and India, aggregates two billion dollars annually. Much of this represents automobile exports and rubber imports. Our vast automobile industry is thus subject to near ruin by hostile naval operations seven thousand miles from our shores. The situation respecting our commerce with South America is similar.
When, or under what general circumstances, our essential commerce in these and other regions might require the protection of our navy cannot be foreseen — perhaps not at all, if a potentially unfriendly power should feel that adequate protection would be forthcoming. If, however, such a country knew that the American navy was tethered to America and denied its normal major function of safeguarding the economic life of the nation, as it is related to the high seas, then the probability of shutting down Detroit factories and closing salesrooms all over the land, through hostile naval operations in the Orient and South America, would be greatly increased. So also would be the likelihood of a general blockade of our coasts conducted from near mid-ocean.
Another cogent reason for an unchained navy in these days of airplanes is the menace of bombing. We are fortunately situated so that this hazard is virtually restricted to planes that are based on ships. And they must come to within a thousand miles of the coast before war loads of bombs can be flown over a land objective. The best defense against this form of attack is to meet the hostile ships at sea with our fleet before they can approach the coast close enough for their bombers to take off. Some will argue that our fleet will itself be too vulnerable to air attack. The reply is that the hostile ships will also be vulnerable to the planes and guns of our fleet, which should be sufficiently strong to win the contest and thus protect our cities. And the farther at sea this is done, the less will be the danger at home.
At the moment special interest as to the possible employment of our fleet has reference to the Orient. It may be said with certainty that what danger there may now be of war with Japan would be very much less if we had in existence the fleet which the President recommends, together with an adequate naval base in the Philippines, making it possible for the fleet to go out there at any time and remain indefinitely. Provocation against us would then vanish. History proves conclusively that the Japanese deeply respect superior force. When they have had it, they have been aggressive. Their present invasion of China was launched when the chance of interference by stronger powers in Europe and America was nil. The invasion during the World War was under similar circumstances. In 1922 it was the influence of these powers at a time when they were able to send overwhelming naval forces to the Orient that persuaded Japan peacefully to evacuate and give up an already established control over China. In the Far East, more than anywhere else in the world, can the influence of force be used as an effective ally of diplomacy and peace.
Just what occasion the future may bring forth to call for our fleet going out to the Orient is impossible of prediction. We have to look forward to a long period of Japanese occupation and control of China, characterized, perhaps, by repeated minor incidents that will provoke us, and by a growing encroachment upon our general rights and interests in the Celestial Kingdom. What is of much greater importance, however, is the increasing detriment to our economic prosperity that will surely come from a highly industrialized Orient fed by the limitless Chinese resources of raw materials — all under the centralized control of Japan.
Unquestionably the fundamental aspect of Japan’s adventure on the continent is economic. She seeks relief from overpopulation and hopes for untold wealth through industrialism and world trade. For this she finds many precedents in the western world, which cannot justly criticize, however much it may deplore and struggle against, the economic upheaval that it faces in consequence. Already American unemployment lists and relief rolls have been greatly lengthened by the flood of Japanese goods on our counters — sold at prices far below any possibility of competition. The flood has only begun, assuming that Japanese conquest of China will be consolidated. Tariffs and quotas cannot give sufficient protection against this, because of inevitable competition in our foreign markets.
But in this respect America stands in considerably less jeopardy than does England, as well as all the industrialized countries of Europe. They face the ruination of their whole economic structure, while with our better balance of agriculture we can carry on with less general distress. This point is worthy of special emphasis because of the suggestions and implications prevailing for many years that it is the United States which must stop Japan and that war between these two countries is inevitable. This hypothesis is unsound as regards not only the basic economic danger inherent in the prospective unbeatable industrial setup in the Orient, but also the impairment of interests within the boundaries of China. British interests there aggregate about eight times, and French interests four times, those of the United States. Russia’s concern with affairs in China is also more vital than ours.
The general attitude of the American people and their government against plunging into a war with Japan is therefore perfectly well warranted. If Japan must be stopped, it is primarily a matter for European countries. Nearly all of them stand in greater economic danger than we do, and there would be no equity in our undertaking an Oriental crusade as a champion of European interests.
On the other hand, our ‘stake’ in the situation is very substantial, aside from a sympathy with the world’s general welfare. Should we join with European nations in settling this affair in Asia if they should undertake to do so? It would seem that sooner or later they will be compelled to take some action, as a matter of economic self-preservation. What our attitude would or should then be respecting joint action will necessarily depend upon many circumstances that cannot be foreseen. But in any case we shall prefer to avoid war, and our ability to aid in a settlement without war will be greatly enhanced by a powerful fleet, and doubly so if it has an adequate base in the Philippine Islands for its logistic needs. In anticipation of this situation that seems certain to arise, we should now provide both the fleet and the base, remembering that such a base would in no wise impair the independence of the Philippines.
A naval demonstration in overwhelming force — such as, for example, the combined fleets of England, France, and the United States — could unquestionably settle the Asiatic problem on terms satisfactory to the western world, and without war. Japan’s position in China is vulnerable in the extreme to a threat of superior sea power. Her army must be supplied by sea from the mother country, and if the overseas communications were cut for any considerable length of time Chinese and Russian troops would certainly destroy Japan’s forces of occupation.
A diplomatic demand for the evacuation of China, backed by greatly preponderant fleets, would therefore leave Japan no choice but to comply. To fight the foreign fleets would mean only the certain destruction of Japan’s fleet as well as her cherished army. Inherently the present situation in the Orient presents a classic opportunity for the influence of superior naval forces as an ally of diplomacy and peace. But obviously the European superiority of naval forces must be very pronounced. Otherwise war would be certain, and a satisfactory settlement exceedingly uncertain. Without a settlement by some such pacific means as suggested, the danger of widespread war arising out of the ferment in China will surely be chronic for many years.