For Mutual Advantage

VOLUME 166

NUMBER 5

NOVEMBER 1940

BY CLARENCE K. STREIT

THE English-speaking democracies, Winston Churchill has said, ‘will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage.’ That raises four questions which I have been asked to answer. I wish first to give quickly these questions and my answers, and then discuss them more concretely one by one.

First, how far have actual events moved us toward this mixing together? To the threshold.

Second, what realistic possibilities lie ahead for it in the coming months? Either it is going to continue evolving in a relatively slow, unconscious way as a chick inside the egg, or it is soon going to take definite, conscious form with relative abruptness, as when a chick breaks through the shell. The signs point to the latter.

Third, what are the issues involved? When are we going to begin to give this mixture form — in good time or too late? Where are we going to begin it — in the New World, with Canada alone, or overseas too, with the United Kingdom, Eire, the Union of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand? How are we going to organize it — on a government-to-government basis as the FrancoBritish alliance, the League of Nations, the early American Articles of Confederation, the British Commonwealth of Nations? Or on the man-to-man ‘Union Now’ basis of a Federal Union, as the U. S. A., the Provinces of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa? And what are we going to organize it for — to save British imperialism from Nazi imperialism? To replace it with American imperialism or Anglo-American imperialism? Or to end the era of nationalism and imperialism, and begin the era of the Free World State by the ‘Union Now’ policy of establishing a nucleus United States of Mankind, designed to grow gradually and peacefully into a universal government of, by, and for our whole species?

Fourth, what are the mutual and general advantages that would accrue from beginning this mixture on the lines of ‘Union Now’? All the material and spiritual satisfactions that come from victory — victory first of all over ourselves and victory finally for all our species — and what a victory! For achieving Union Now means achieving, in the nick of time and over terrifying odds, one of the great things men have always longed for and failed to do. It means opening equally for all an age that will really deserve to be called a New Age.

Copyright 1940, by The Atlantic Monthly Company, Boston, Mass. All rights reserved.

How Far Have We Come?

How far have actual events moved us Americans toward this mixing together with the democracies of the British Commonwealth ?

Events have already brought us and the British to the point where the only real hope of either lies in the other. For the first time in history there is not a single great armed power on earth to which either can turn for help except the other. Never before have Americans and British depended so deeply on each other for their freedom and their future as they do to-day. This situation is so new that its uniqueness has not yet even dawned on many people.

The Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations, the naval limitation treaties, the Kellogg Pact, the Locarno Treaty, the Dawes and the Young Plan, the World Court, the World Bank, collective security, continental alliances, appeasement, isolationism, neutralism — all the hopes that we Americans and British placed in these have been stripped away.

Fifteen months ago Americans and British still hoped that Moscow, Berlin, Rome, Paris, would keep them from having to depend on each other. Then we were stripped of the Russian hope. Next the Berlin hope was torn away. Then in quick succession went the hopes of keeping Italy out and France in the war. Meanwhile the high hopes the British set on the small European democracies and Balkan states have vanished, or they have dwindled as have the hopes that Americans had of avoiding dependence on the British by depending on the Latin Americans instead. And meanwhile the dangers to all us 200,000,000 men and women who speak English have been growing everywhere on earth like poisonous mushrooms.

Now these dangers have culminated in the first alliance in history aimed directly at the U. S. A. — an alliance of the three greatest aggressors on earth, the governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

In less than six months events swung us from a point where we were quarreling over mail censorship at Bermuda to one where this island had become, by friendly agreement, a common outpost of the censors and the censored. While we Americans talked generalities at Havana, we put teeth in President Roosevelt’s Kingston pledge by setting up at Ottawa a Defense Board with belligerent Canada, and called it a ‘Permanent Defense Board,’ without even that adjective’s rousing the wrath of the isolationists. This Board began at once what Europeans would consider the ‘staff talks’ of a military alliance — without any public mourning of the neutralism that had been forcing the British to tow across the Canadian line the war planes they bought from us.

Vast quantities of arms have found their way from the arsenals of the United States Army to the British firing line. The latest American war planes have been put at the disposal of the British. Events have even persuaded our government to reverse itself and find it legal to transfer fifty destroyers to belligerent Britain. And the idea of making this transfer has developed in a few weeks from a sale to an agreement whereby our ‘neutral’ country leased from belligerent Britain naval bases for 99 years, from Newfoundland to South America. If we take all that has happened in the past nine months as a measure of how much may happen in 99 years, we shall see that Anglo-American affairs are already mixed far more than those of any other Great Powers. The Axis has not gone in for 99-year agreements or ‘permanent’ boards. Even its alliance with Japan against us is for only ten years.

So much for the tangibles at this writing. Events have been no less active among the intangibles. They are perhaps even more important in this matter of the mixing together of Anglo-American affairs. Gone is the blind optimism that kept us apart last fall and winter and spring (remember when Mr. Hoover found that the Allies couldn’t lose and Messrs. Chamberlain and Churchill were crowing that Hitler had missed the bus in Norway?). Gone, too, is the blind pessimism that kept us apart in July (remember when Senator Pittman gave up the British for lost, and so many of our follow citizens were wringing their hands and answering every proposal for aid to Britain with a wail about our being too unprepared to do anything?). Events have replaced these extremes with a truer estimate of the situation, its dangers and possibilities.

Nothing has done so much to bring Americans and British together as the dogged determination with which the British have stood up alone against the German onslaughts, and showm not only their intention but their ability to hold the fort. British fortitude has done more than anything else could have done to turn the tide against the anti-British propaganda in America which has been as potent a factor in this war as British propaganda was in World War I. The magnificent fortitude of the British has served both to take this brake off the movement toward Anglo-American union and to put more power in its motor.

What Lies Ahead?

Among all the uncertain future factors in the situation there are three major certainties that favor the further and more rapid mixing together of American and British affairs. One is that winter is coming. Another is that the American elections will be over before winter comes. The third is the signing of the Triangular Alliance to prevent, by intimidation, the mixing together of British and American affairs.

At this writing no one knows who will be elected President, nor what the composition of Congress will be. But, whatever the result, it cannot be so hampering to the deliberate and rapid mixing of Anglo-American affairs as has been the preëlection period of 1940. Whatever the result in party terms, the result in terms of history wall be to clear the decks for quick, decisive action.

No one can foretell now how much winter will handicap German invasion of the British Isles and how much difficulty hunger will then bring the Axis on the Continent. It is equally guesswork how much these reverses will be offset by the fact that winter will favor the Axis in the South. It may well leave the Axis in control of the Mediterranean, and of Spain, Portugal, the western coast of Africa, and the Azores. This would be a very serious loss, but less important than conquest of the British Isles. Winter, by tending to divert Hitler temporarily from England and toward Lisbon, Dakar, and the Azores, works doubly to bring us and the British together. It gives us added stimulus to act, and time—a very limited time — in which to act.

We Americans are the ones who are holding back — but a surer spur to action could not have been applied to us than that used by the Axis when it allied with Japan to scare us away from the British. We are not the ones to bow to direct intimidation.

Given the slowness with which democracies move and their proneness to wishful thinking, it is realistic to expect the mixing of Anglo-American affairs to proceed gradually, at an accelerating speed. As I write, the next steps seem likely to be the opening to the American Navy of British bases in Pacific and Asiatic waters, and the development of American relations with Australia and New Zealand along the lines of the Canadian model. Other steps in the financial and economic fields are in the offing. Even so, the war will probably bring us by spring, in my judgment, to the point where this gradual evolutionary process will have reached its limits, and the time for organic change will be at hand.

But I must concede that, my judgment in this respect is influenced by my strong wish that we may have at least six months more before we have to face this basic issue decisively. The key to the immediate future lies in the British Isles. And before we trust too much in winter we need to remember that the last successful invasion of England began in mid-October (the Battle of Hastings was fought on October 14, 1066) and the Conqueror was crowned King of England by December.

Though we pray for the best, we should be ready for the worst. We should be prepared, therefore, to hear that the attempt to invade Britain has begun. The attempt may fail. If so, we must be prepared for another attempt to follow in better weather. The attempt may be only partly successful. The Germans may gain a foothold, for example, as the British did at Gallipoli, but be unable to drive their blow home quickly. And the attempt may rapidly succeed — or seem certain to succeed unless we come to the support of the British with our full power.

In any of these events we must be prepared to receive from the British at any time, once invasion is attempted, an appeal such as we received from the French in June. And we must face the fact that our answer to that appeal will have as decisive an influence on the course and results of the invasion as did President Roosevelt’s reply to Premier Reynaud. Had we been ready then to answer by throwing our full war power behind the French and British, there is reason to doubt that the French would have made a separate armistice. Had we been ready to answer then only a little less weakly than we did, our answer might well have sufficed to keep the French fighting and led them to accept by, say, 13 to 10 the Churchill offer of Federal Union which the French Cabinet rejected by only 13 to 10.

A weak American answer to the British appeal, at the critical moment that produces it, is bound to help the Nazi’s either to conquer the British Isles in short order or to gain and hold a bridgehead there. A strong answer can help frustrate the invasion.

There remains the grave danger that Japan and its Triangular Alliance will precipitate us into the war. It would seem reasonable for Japan to hold back, as Italy did with France, until Britain is in a desperate plight at home or in the Mediterranean. But the Japanese militarists are not noted for their reasonableness. And the Alliance may include a secret agreement to launch this year three simultaneous onslaughts — one against the British Isles, and the other two against the British positions in the Mediterranean and the Far East. The aim would be a knockout before we could act. In my soberest judgment, the Triangular Alliance has made it practically certain that we shall be in the war within six months, and all too possibly before 1941.

What Are the Issues Involved ?

We can be sure that we Americans shall have to face an appeal from the British before the British Isles are lost. Whether it comes in the fall, winter, spring, or summer, the issues involved are the same. These issues are when, where, and how shall we unite with them, and for what purpose.

The first two issues, when and where, go together. For if we wait too long we lose the possibility of uniting with the United Kingdom and Eire, and can unite only with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa. And if, in waiting too long, we lose not only the British Isles but most or nearly all the British fleet, then we may lose, for all practical purposes, the possibility of uniting with any of the British democracies except Canada.

Whether we unite with all six British democracies while their naval power is strong and intact, or whether — at the other extreme — we unite with only Canada, we shall be uniting with the war. We can now keep out of this war only if Britain, all alone, can not only overcome both Hitler and Mussolini, but all the while stand off Japan enough to keep us out of war from that side. That hope would now seem to be a wishful rather than a reasonable one.

It will be more prudent for us to face, in all its consequences, the fact that the British may not be able even to hold out another year against so many foes, and that they may at any time broadcast to us an even more heart-rending appeal than the French did. We must answer then either by entering the war beside them or by refusing. Our refusal at that critical moment may well prove to be the last straw. The Churchill government or British morale or everything may collapse—as things human can and do collapse when foes and friends alike prove too hard-hearted. Such a collapse would probably be accompanied by these three things together: —

One, a British revulsion of feeling against us, fed by all the suppressed bitterness that preceded it and by misery’s desire for company. Two, a threat by Adolf the Conqueror to wreak unspeakable vengeance on the helpless hostages in his power — particularly the wives and children of the common sailors of the British Navy — if the British Government refused to surrender to him the fleet he needs to control the world. Three, a feeling of deep gratitude by the British toward Canada and the other overseas dominions, and a desire in governing circles to escape to Canada with the fleet and continue the war from there.

Suppose the first two factors triumph before 1946, when our two-ocean navy will be ready. We must then quickly drop in Hitler’s lap South Africa with all its gold mines — and choose between buying all that gold from Germany and rendering worthless all the gold we have hoarded in Kentucky. We must also quickly drop to Japan not only the oil, tin, and rubber of the Dutch East Indies, but the Philippines, Alaska, and the white people of Australia and New Zealand. For we can protect them with our navy only by leaving our vital North Atlantic seaboard and the Canadian entry to the Great Lakes exposed to imminent invasion. The naval balance may well be turned so badly against us that we shall have to drop the southern part of Latin America, too, as being too close to Hitler’s African bases and too far from us to defend.

The only certainty in this hypothesis is that we shall be driven into some combination with Canada and the states washed by the Caribbean. But with what feelings will the Canadians join us then? What will they think of our refusal to aid England, as they mourn all the Canadians who by that time will have died in vain? When will they forget the tales that will come from Australia? It will not be a pretty picture when the white race there comes under the army that has made so sinister a reputation in China.

Shall we combine with Canada then only to sue for peace? If we do, what kind of peace shall we — the first democracy to withdraw its ambassador from Berlin — then obtain from a conqueror who controls Europe, Africa, and the British and French fleets and shipyards? Will Hitler’s low esteem of our military qualities (see Rauschning’s Voice of Destruction) be lessened by our attitude of helping the French and British ‘short, of war’? And what of Hitler’s partner, Japan? Yet, if we do not sue for peace when we combine with Canada, we must then continue Canada’s war with Hitler.

Suppose the third factor prevails and the Churchill government, instead of being overthrown as was the Reynaud cabinet, succeeds in escaping from the British Isles to continue the war from Canada with all the fleet that is left. That obviously brings the war to us, unless we repudiate our present pledge to Canada. But in these circumstances Canada and the British Government and fleet would have combined already. Such a combination could not agree to abandon to their fate all the millions left behind in the British Isles. We should, therefore, be bound all the more to continue the war till we drove the Germans from those Isles — and when we had done that we should simply have regained at great cost the position that is now ours for the taking. We should still face the present problem — how to drive the Germans from the Channel and overthrow Hitler. It is clear that by this third course we do not escape the need of fighting overseas. We merely meet that need at much higher cost.

Whether we begin fighting overseas or at home, whether we combine with all or only one of the British democracies, we must face the issue of how we are to organize the combination. Here we have only two choices, basically. We must combine either on some state-tostate basis or on some man-to-man basis.

In the former category we can choose some form of alliance, diplomatic understanding, league, confederation — some form of the system in which peoples deal with each other through their governments. This system allows each government an equal voice in determining common policy regardless of the number of citizens it represents. In it each government’s execution of such common agreement depends on its sovereign good will or upon the others’ coercing it by war, and each government retains its sovereign power to repudiate any common agreement, make a separate peace, or secede whenever it pleases.

In the man-to-man category we can choose either some form of Federal Union — that of the United States, or of Canada, Australia, the Union of South Africa, Switzerland — or some combination or variation of the different types. In such a system the peoples involved, where they deal with each other at all, do so through representatives especially elected for this purpose. The number of their representatives in their common government is roughly in proportion to each state’s population, adequate safeguards being provided to protect the people in the small states from domination by the larger ones. The state governments retain exclusive power in all affairs except those which the peoples have all expressly agreed to mix together under control of their union government, but they are excluded from any voice (as governments) in the union government. The agreements made by the union government are enforced against the citizens of the union as individuals. Each state government loses its sovereign right to repudiate such agreements, or to make a separate war or peace, or to secede.

The easiest way to understand the difference between these two basic systems is to imagine the relations between our forty-eight states or between the provinces of Canada as being governed not on the Federal Union basis, as they actually are, but on the basis now used to govern the relations between the United States and Canada. Or, conversely, imagine the relations between the United States and Canada as being governed on the same Federal Union basis as that in operation between New York and Massachusetts.

To choose the govern ment-to-government system is to choose the British rather than the American system. True, Canada, Australia, and the Union of South Africa have adopted for their internal affairs the basic Federal Union system of which the American Constitution was the first example. But the British Commonwealth of Nations is not itself a Federal Union; it is, instead, the most advanced type of league. The government-to-government system may be described as British also in that it gives the six British democracies each an equal vote with us, or six votes for the British Commonwealth to one for the United States, though the self-governing population of the whole British side of the English-speaking world is only 70,000,000, compared to 130,000,000 on the American side. This system also leans to the British side in allowing Britain, Canada, and the rest, to go to war regardless of us, though we are practically forced to come to their rescue if the war goes against them. Even then it leaves them the right to make a separate peace. Eire’s neutrality suggests only some of the possibilities and dangers. It should be noted that our relations with the British democracies are now on this government-to-government, or British, basis.

If we are to mix our affairs with the British on an American basis we must organize them as a Federal Union. This is American not only in the sense that it is an American invention; organized on a population basis, it gives the American instead of the British people the greater voice in governing joint affairs.

It is on this American Federal basis that our ‘Union Now’ policy would organize the English-speaking democracies. This policy is the more American since it would follow closely the lessons of American history in making the organization. It would have the seven English-speaking democracies follow the example of the Thirteen States in beginning with a common Declaration — this time of their Interdependence. In it they would proclaim the same free principles that the original Declaration did in announcing the aims for which the colonists fought.

The Union Now policy, moreover, would have the democracies set up first a provisional government — an Intercontinental Congress, this time — and give it the same powers the Continental Congress had (either de facto or through the Articles of Confederation), notably the sole power to make war and peace for all of them together. It would have this Congress organized, however, not on the Confederation basis that proved its inadequacy in early American history, but on the Federal basis, especially as regards apportioning representation according to population. It is suggested that in a Congress of 50 members 27 be elected by the United States, 11 by the United Kingdom, 3 each by Canada and Australia, 2 each by Eire, t he Union of South Africa, and New Zealand. Not these numbers, but the ratio, matters.

While this provisional Congress, established on a treaty basis, would be carrying on the war, the Union Now policy would have it pledged to convoke, as soon as possible, a Federal Convention. Its task would be to draft a permanent Constitution for The Union on the broad lines of the American model, as suggested in the book, Union Now.

The basis on which the English-speaking democracies organize themselves, when they do, is bound to be affected by the purpose for which they take this step. If our aim is primarily to maintain the freedom and sovereignty of the component states, then we shall adopt the ‘ British ‘ government-to-government system. This means that we Americans shall be fighting in a very real sense for the British Empire, since victory will maintain that empire as a quite separate sovereignty in which we have no voice.

If our aim is to maintain the freedom and sovereignty of the individual citizens rather than their states, we shall adopt the ‘American’ man-to-man system. But shall we adopt it simply in our own selfish interests? Shall we avoid British imperialism only to aim at American imperialism? (This may well be the result if we wait till we are reduced to the Western Hemisphere for a base.) Or shall we seek instead hegemony for the English-speaking world, and unite simply to replace Nazi imperialism, or Japanese, Russian, or Fascist imperialism, with English-speaking imperialism?

The policy of Union Now would have us avoid imperialism of every kind. It calls on the founders of The Union to establish it from the start as a nucleus United States of the World, to which outside and colonial peoples would be admitted as stales are admitted to the American Union. It would be deliberately designed to grow gradually and peacefully into a world government of, by, and for each individual of our species — into the Federal Union of Mankind.

The most difficult period for it is, of course, the one of getting started that we now face. The better to overcome these initial difficulties, it is proposed that in establishing the Provisional Union we make a specific pledge to admit to The Union as soon as they free themselves the eight Continental European democracies — France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The fact that the Union Now plan began by including all these, still has places reserved for them, and has not been changed in principle but merely reduced by the misfortunes of war to starting with a smaller and English-language nucleus, is, to my mind, one of its great assets. For this is conclusive proof and reassurance to all the outside world that Union Now does not aim at British, American, or English-speaking hegemony or imperialism, but at the mutual and general advantage of all mankind. And this is confirmed by the fact that our Union proposal now insists more than ever that we make a specific pledge also to admit to The Union even the peoples who are fighting the democracies, once they have satisfactorily restored their rights as men.

What Are the Mutual Advantages?

Only a few of the advantages of the Union Now method of mixing together the affairs of the American and British peoples can here be mentioned. One of the most immediate is that Union Now — and the sooner the better — provides the best guarantee of keeping Hitler out of all the remaining democracies. It provides the maximum power for halting Hitler at the Channel. If it is made too late to save the British Isles, Union Now gives the maximum guarantee that we and Canada and the rest of The Union will retain control of the united BritishAmerican navy and continue to rule the seas, safe from invasion while we arm. Once The Union is set up, no British government could surrender the fleet any more than the government of New York can surrender the armed forces of the U. S. A.

A second great, advantage is that Union Now not only solves the problem of halting Hitler, but at the same time solves the problem of overthrowing him. Other proposals do not even attempt to tackle this problem. They promise nothing more than balking Hitler momentarily, at the Channel, Bermuda, Canada, Boston. To do this they not only regiment us on the ramparts, they leave us regimented there. And for how long? Interminably.

Who has yet heard the advocates of isolationist defense, hemisphere defense, two-ocean navies, peacetime conscription of men and industry, aid-to-Britain-short-of-war, explain how and when they propose to free us from all this burden and danger? Even should all this repel one invasion, it leaves us still on guard against dictatorship attempting another invasion. That danger must remain so long as we fail to uproot dictatorship where it is. But how long can we allow ourselves to be regimented and taxed and centralized and deprived of this, that, and the other liberty at home without gradually giving way to dictatorship from within? Far from protecting us from the home-grown dictator, these other policies expose us to him more every year that they succeed in keeping out the foreign dictator.

Union Now gives us the best means we can hope to get to overthrow dictatorship on the Continent. Since we can hardly hope to overcome Hitler by landing an expeditionary force on the Continent, we must find some way of inducing revolt against him and Mussolini. How can we hope to do that if we and the British simply ally together, fight for British, American, or English-speaking hegemony against German and Italian hegemony? If we aim merely to smash Germany and Italy, shall we not make the Germans and Italians fight all the harder against us?

It is here that the Union Now policy of forming a nucleus United States of the World, providing for the eventual admission on an equal basis of all outsiders, and specifically pledging admission to certain key states, becomes a powerful lever for overthrowing dictatorship from within before it overthrows us from within. With all the force of dramatic surprise, Union Now — and, again, the sooner the better — makes for active revolt and passive sabotage among all the oppressed of Europe, by its living pledge of Federal Union’s better, richer, freer world for everyone. If Union Now will not raise in Europe itself the forces needed to overthrow dictatorship there, nothing short, of Union will.

A third and tremendous advantage of Union Now is that it removes the evils of world anarchy that produced dictatorship and war. Other policies either do not even dream of removing these evils or vaguely promise to do it by some method that has already failed. Their champions ask of us, as they asked of the British before, the heaviest sacrifices ever asked of either — peacetime conscription. They are headed toward asking us, as they have already asked the British, to go to war without requiring the government to have any plan for peace or world government, or make us or anyone any promises in these regards. They lead us toward victory by the hardest possible way, and if by the grace of God we do win, then they reward us with another Versailles, another League, another depression, arms race, dictator, catastrophe.

Union Now guards us and our friends and foes against repeating the mistakes of the last war. Instead of going to war again without getting or giving any commitments, we would, by Union Now, not go to war until we first got The Union established provisionally, and then we would fight only to defend it. We should know from the outset where we stood with the British and they would know where we stood with them. There would be that much less danger at the peace conference.

Moreover, the French and Germans and everyone else would know from the start where they stood, and they would have the best possible guarantee that we should not again refuse to enter — as we did with the League — the world organization we ourselves championed. For we Americans would have entered The Union before we entered the war, and should need only to extend it to the others at the end of the war, as we had bound ourselves to do at the start.

No blunder would seem more stupid than to go to war on an alliance basis with the British and fight to make a Union at the end, when we can get the British to agree to form The Union before we begin.

Union Now brings us first of all victory over ourselves. For Union Now to be established at all, we must conquer the pettiness, meanness, hatred, shortsighted selfishness, and injustice in ourselves, before we begin to conquer anything in our friends or foes. But once we conquer ourselves, victory over the others is certain.

By Union Now we begin at the height Lincoln showed that men could reach even in the midst of war. We begin ‘with malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.’

We, too, can achieve that spirit, that nobility of soul. With it we can achieve what men before us have always dreamed and failed to achieve. We can have the joy of founding that ‘Great Republic’ Lincoln sought ‘for Man’s vast future.’