Strategy With a One-Ocean Navy
I
THERE are three possible outcomes of the war: a German victory, a deadlock followed by a negotiated peace, or a German reverse eventuating in a British victory. A German victory would require an immediate and protracted national effort by Americans; if they can cope with this situation they can confront any other with equanimity.
It is important, therefore, to envisage as accurately as possible the situation that would result from the assumed early victory of Hitler, remembering that it is a hypothetical assumption which will probably not occur and certainly will not happen exactly as suggested. Calm reflection upon the possibilities of the worst possible situation will prepare Americans to react promptly to the condition that actually develops, and throw light on the future relations of Great Britain and the United States.
In the negotiations that resulted in the exchange of destroyers for bases, President Roosevelt was assured by Prime Minister Churchill that the British Government would under no circumstances surrender or scuttle the British fleet. It is probable, however, that if the United Kingdom yields, another government may succeed to power. Not only Churchill and his cabinet but all Britain knows that Pétain’s unconditional surrender did not reduce the severity of the German terms to France. No sensible person in the United Kingdom would expect any mercy from a triumphant Hitler. If conditions in the United Kingdom gradually became unbearable, Churchill’s cabinet could make suitable dispositions of the army, navy, and air force that would prevent these forces from being trapped by the Germans. Such action by the present British Government would be required by their pledge to us and even more by their obligations to the great overseas dominions, who would be exposed to the fury of Hitler if the imperial forces surrendered.
The armed forces could reënforce every part of the British Empire; in the true military sense their departure would constitute a mammoth redeployment of the fighting men of the Empire. When the collapse of France was imminent, Churchill urged a similar course of action upon the French cabinet as the supreme duty of France to itself and its colonial empire.
The abandonment, probably temporary, of the British Isles would not be too high a price to pay for the survival of the remainder of the Empire. Even if London, Liverpool, and the populous industrial cities of the Midlands are reduced to brick dust, they could be rapidly rebuilt if the Empire finally wins.
Should sentiment cause the British military to hesitate to abandon their civilian population, a glance across the Channel will show that the disarmed French soldiers, sailors, and aviators are utterly unable to improve the conditions of French civilians. By surrendering, the British military can remain helpless eyewitnesses of the suffering of their countrymen, but they will only add to the national mortification and increase the number of Hitler’s hostages. By evacuating the British Isles, they can certainly increase the protection of the overseas Empire; and by continuing the struggle abroad they can obtain better terms for the United Kingdom, and probably, for fortune usually favors the brave, eventually overcome Germany. Pride in their past and hope for their future equally demand that British forces continue the war even if the United Kingdom is forced to surrender.
The most immediate danger to the United Kingdom is from the German air raids. To date the British air force has successfully resisted the German air force and carried the air war deep into German territory. It is a fair assumption that most of the aircraft factories, airdromes, and airfields in the United Kingdom will have been destroyed and all reasonable hope of maintaining the air force abandoned before yielding will be considered. If such a fateful decision should be reached, all remaining bombing planes and all medium-range fighting planes could reach British or friendly territory by refueling at intermediate bases.
There are over two million soldiers under arms in the British Isles, half of them superbly trained veterans capable of campaigning anywhere in the world. Every British commonwealth, practically every crown colony, and India are represented in this truly imperial army. The British merchant marine can furnish transports. It is not likely that an army, navy, and air force which evacuated over 85 per cent of a trapped army from Dunkirk will be unable to withdraw from their own islands. And they could withdraw in good order, with all equipment, formations intact, ready to resume the fight with Hitler in any part of the world.
The navy is at present distributed between the British Isles, Gibraltar, and Alexandria. If worst came to worst, it could cover the withdrawal of the army from the United Kingdom. When this major task had been accomplished, the Home Fleet could fall back upon Gibraltar, the Azores, Newfoundland, Bermuda, or Canada. Light cruisers, destroyers, mosquito vessels, and submarines could operate from Iceland and the Azores against German commerce and communications with the British Isles. If Gibraltar becomes untenable, the ships based there can retire to the Azores or Cape Verde Islands, maintain their communications with Canada and South Africa, and continue to blockade the Mediterranean. If Egypt is forced to capitulate, the British squadron based on Alexandria can retire to Aden, Karachi, Bombay, Colombo, Australia; or, if desirable, the whole British fleet could concentrate at Capetown and proceed to the Far East.
To oppose the British navy, the Axis powers will have immediately available only the remnants of the German fleet, which will be needed to maintain Germany’s communications with her forces in the British Isles, and the Italian navy. Mussolini’s ambitions centre around the Mediterranean basin; he would be willing to see Gibraltar returned to Spain provided he could establish his forces in Egypt, control the Suez Canal, and obtain a share of the Mosul oil; he would resent, even if he acquiesced in, Russian control of Constantinople. To protect his share of the spoils from his allies and to maintain the communications of his African armies, Mussolini will retain the bulk of his fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and Red seas.
The collapse of the British Isles would release the German army and much of the air force for operations in eastern and southeastern Europe, even in Asia Minor and Africa. The German success would create a tension in the relations between Italy, Russia, and Germany as they attempted a temporary settlement of the Balkans and Asia Minor.
If, then, both British squadrons were forced to evacuate the Mediterranean, either squadron, measured by the results of Italo-British naval engagements, would be more than a match for any Italian squadron that Mussolini could spare from the eastern Mediterranean. During this same time Hitler would require all the remnants of his surface fleet to protect the cross-channel and North Sea communications of his army of occupation in the United Kingdom. Hitler can quickly repair and complete ships captured in the United Kingdom, but they would not be sufficient, even with Pétain’s navy, to overcome the British control of the Atlantic.
The probabilities are that, even if the United Kingdom surrendered, enough of the British navy would be left to control the eastern Atlantic and the northern half of the Indian Ocean. If suitable precautions were taken, ample soldiers could be sent from England to reënforce their own bases or seize others. Certainly a goodly number of the Royal Air Force would escape; and on that gallant corps a new and greater air force can be built. If Hitler captures the British Isles, he would only disperse, not destroy, the British armed forces.
If this estimate of the situation resulting from the hypothetical German capture of the British Isles is substantially correct, our present Atlantic squadron will be enough to cope with any Axis forces that could evade the British fleet in the Atlantic. Even in the event of complete disaster leading to the surrender of the British fleet, our fleet would still have time to reach the Caribbean Sea before Hitler could organize an overseas expedition capable of crossing the Atlantic. And our homogeneous fleet would have a decisive advantage in a naval battle over a hastily assembled coalition armada.
II
Japan’s partnership in the Axis must now be considered. At the very moment when conversations were in progress between the State Department, the British Ambassador, and the Minister from Australia concerning the future status of the Far East, Germany, Italy, and Japan announced their resolve to coöperate in establishing the new order in Europe, Africa, and Asia; they emphasized that this alliance was launched against the United States, Great Britain, and China by excepting Russia from its provisions.
The conferences in Rome and Berlin that preceded the agreement were initiated by Hitler after he had postponed his much advertised invasion of England; the results were announced in a theatrical manner in Berlin. It is probable that Hitler wished to turn the eyes of his followers to a more distant view. It is conceivable that Hitler and Mussolini really believed that the Japanese threat would frighten Americans and cause them to stop all aid to Britain.
The announcement only revealed what was already known in every well-informed chancellery. Japan began the operations of the aggressor nations with her invasion of Manchuria in 1931; since the European war of 1939 she has followed the devious course of non-belligerency invented by Mussolini. Like her partners, Japan is actuated solely by her own interests; if she is drawn into this war she will confine her operations to the Far East, and any help she gives the Axis will be incidental. Neither Germany nor Italy can assist Japan while the British fleet is in being, although they might temporarily benefit from any diversion of American aid to Britain. But Great Britain will also profit by American intervention in the Far East; on balance she might be the gainer.
The permanent beneficiaries of Japan’s unmasking are Americans, many of whom hitherto trusted Japan’s assurances of friendship for the United States. They can no longer be deceived. Americans east of the Mississippi are more familiar with the strategy of the Atlantic than the Pacific; Americans west of the Rockies are keenly aware of the problem of Eastern Asia. The adherence of Japan to the Axis should show all Americans that the naval strategies of the Atlantic and the Pacific are inseparable parts of the same problem; and it should remind them that, if the British fleet surrenders, the United States will face a naval threat in two oceans, with one fleet.
To meet this danger Americans do not today possess a two-ocean navy, but they do have the most powerful one-ocean navy in the world, including battleships, aircraft carriers, heavy and light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mine layers and sweepers, with necessary supply ships. The squadrons into which the several types are formed have cruised in company for years; they have been drilled until they respond simultaneously or in succession to a single visual or sound signal of the Commander-in-Chief. The fleet is always accompanied by its own completely integrated naval aviation and can maintain aloft its own fighting, observation, and bombing planes; its seagoing submarines can keep their stations in fair weather or foul; its cruisers and destroyers can scout or screen, attack or defend, as the situation demands. Its main batteries of 16, 14, and 8 inch guns would be its major offensive weapon, supplemented by torpedoes. It has been trained tactically for a major naval battle on the surface, under the surface, and in the air.
Our central position facing both Atlantic and Pacific will permit our navy to take the initiative in either ocean. If the situation in the Far East should be more acute, the fleet could suddenly appear in Manila, where its presence would prevent any further aggressions on the part of the Japanese until they had fought our numerically superior fleet in the Manila-Singapore area.
Under cover of our fleet, the garrison and fortifications in Manila and Guam could be strengthened. China and the Netherlands East Indies would be aided, the Soviet would be relieved of some of its fears of Japan, and the British position in the Far East improved. When these measures had been accomplished, the fleet could return to Hawaii, or, if the situation in the Atlantic demanded, it could continue to the Caribbean.
While our fleet was in the Far East, the security of the South Atlantic from Axis aggression would depend upon the ability of the British navy to maintain control of the Atlantic Ocean. If the British fleet lost control of the Atlantic, our army could protect the United States and Canada from invasion until the return of the fleet to the Atlantic, and army aviation could hamper an Axis attack on South America.
If it were considered wiser to secure our position in the Atlantic first, the fleet could proceed immediately to the eastern Caribbean, where it would be in the best strategic position to intercept any Axis forces attempting to attack North or South America. Under its temporary protection, vital positions in the Atlantic could be rapidly strengthened to forestall any Axis invasion. The fleet could then return to the strategic centre of gravity of both oceans, the Hawaiian Islands.
While the United States fleet was in the Atlantic, the Japanese would have a free hand in the western Pacific and could overrun the Philippines. If the absence of our fleet was prolonged, the Japanese might be tempted to occupy the Netherlands East Indies and perhaps attack Singapore. When our fleet returned to the Hawaiian Islands, it would be in an excellent position to operate against the overseas communications of Japanese armies in Manchuria, North China, Eastern China, Indo-China, the Philippines, and perhaps the Dutch East Indies. Stated differently, the Commander-inChief of the Imperial Japanese navy, with a fleet numerically inferior to ours, would have in addition to the fundamental task of keeping open the trade routes of the Japanese islands the further responsibility of maintaining the supply lines of the huge armies of occupation. The Japanese navy is efficient, its officers and men are brave and well trained, but it could not accomplish this insuperable task.
III
Even taking full advantage of our superior central position and the Panama Canal, the fleet will have to be smartly and correctly handled to protect our interests in the Atlantic and Pacific; and Congress was wise to make appropriation for a two-ocean navy. But time will be required to construct this new navy, and in the meanwhile we must concentrate our national energies on making doubly sure that we can meet any immediate emergency. We must also have a long look ahead to see where our steps are taking us. We have undertaken the defense of Canada and Latin America; we are considering with Great Britain and Australia the problems of the Pacific. At first glance these undertakings seem to break with our former policies; actually they result from a logical application of the Monroe Doctrine and opendoor policies to the present world situation.
A two-ocean navy when actually completed would reinsure the Western Hemisphere against invasion, protect trade routes in both oceans for essential raw materials, and defend American interests in all parts of the world. The cost of its construction and maintenance will be enormous and continuous, for fleet obsolescence is almost as costly as a naval battle. Even so, a two-ocean navy will be more economical than a standing army of two million men; also it is sounder strategy to keep the enemy at a distance with a two-ocean navy than to permit a landing on our shore.
The surest protection against enemy aviation is the occupation of bases from which attacks could be launched. Alaska, Hawaii, and other possessions in the Pacific protect our west coast; our recently acquired bases in the Atlantic greatly strengthen our position there, and the mutual defense pacts being negotiated with South America will protect our southern frontier. Absolute security must be reserved for another world, but when our present defense program and treaties are complete the United States will be the best-protected country in the world.
The cost of a two-ocean navy will be truly colossal; the diversion of so much productivity and man power to naval use will inevitably and continuously reduce the American standard of living no matter how wisely and economically the fleets are built and maintained. Americans should recall that as long as the British navy was willing and able to secure the Atlantic the United States was under no such naval necessity. Numerous excellent reasons can be advanced to support Great Britain, but none more compelling than the financial burden the United States would bear if the British Empire should be destroyed and Hitler permitted to develop the shipbuilding facilities of western Europe. The problem we confront today may not be a temporary one. Time is not necessarily on our side; and unless we are sound in our judgments, and energetic in action, time will serve Hitler.
The situation in the Atlantic is critical, but not acute; if the United Kingdom can successfully resist, — and General Strong, of the United States Army, has staked his professional reputation that it can withstand Hitler, — the naval situation in the Atlantic may never become acute. At present we have an opportunity to strengthen our bases in Guam and the Philippines. If at the same time the United States can extend enough assistance to Great Britain, Germany may be defeated before our two-ocean navy is completed. Hitler’s downfall would remove the reason for a two-ocean navy, and relieve this and succeeding generations of Americans from the burden of supporting such an armada.