Latin America

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THIS autumn it is necessary to look on the Western Hemisphere front from a new point of view. Brazil’s entrance into the war late in August changes sharply the relationship of the American continents to global conflict. In Chile and the Argentine, there are still huge stretches of technically neutral coasts, but all effective color of isolation has been lost. The land-mass of South America is now officially open to attack at its most important strategic point — the eastward-jutting “bulge” of Brazil, 1600 miles from Vichy-controlled Africa — and is available, presumably, to the United Nations as a base for offensive operations against the enemy.

This is as significant for the United States as for any of Brazil’s South American neighbors almost as significant as it is for Brazil itself. A southern Axis front against the Panama Canal and our whole system of supply from South America could be opened up by an enemy gaining a foothold on “the bulge.”On the other hand, by utilizing “the bulge’s” strategic advantages fully and efficiently, the United Nations can work much faster and more effectively, not only at smashing the Hitler submarine offensive in American waters but at the highly more difficult task of bottling up the Axis in Europe.

For all these reasons, the importance of Brazil’s declaration cannot be measured simply by adding a new flag to the United Nations collection of standards and counting up Brazil’s resources in active and reserve troops, warships, and fighting planes. Everything connected with the “bulge front" has been converted by her action into a major military objective with significance both for ourselves and for the enemy.

From now on, we shall be able to measure the strength and weaknesses of the Western Hemisphere front mainly by keeping our eyes on far horizons — the Azores, the Cape Verde and Canary Islands, and Dakar. The struggle for Egypt and the Suez becomes even more important to the American nations now than it was formerly, because Axis victory in North Africa would make it far simpler and less risky for Hitler to release forces for an offensive westward across the South Atlantic.

Brazil on our side

Nevertheless, the advantages of Brazil’s declaration of war to the strength of the United Nations greatly outweigh such liabilities as there may be in the picture.

The Number 1 advantage is, of course, that United Nations military forces, with suitable fighting equipment, now can make much fuller use of “ the bulge" than was possible while Brazil maintained a technically neutral position, however friendly. Not only can its already considerable defenses be strengthened, but, with rising air superiority on the United Nations side, the region should be useful as a base for bombing and other military operations which would prevent Axis activities in West Africa from getting seriously under way. What agreements are being made with Brazil to bring about such use of her territory are naturally military secrets, but there are plenty of indications in Washington that the cooperation will be practical and wholehearted.

In other words, the United Nations, if they utilize their opportunities, from now on should have the jump on the Axis in anything that it may be planning in the way of an attack toward the American mainland.

Other advantages include Brazil’s strengthened position for dealing with her large fifth-column elements, her powerful military position for taking care of any pro-Axis activities in French Guiana, and the strategic assistance which the use of her immense coastline should provide for operations against the Axis submarines. Now that Uruguay, for all practical purposes, has joined Brazil in action against the U-boats, the coastline from which the sea marauders can be attacked reaches all the way from Greenland, by way of the West Indian and Guiana bases, to the mouth of the La Plata estuary.

All in all, through Brazil’s declaration, the United Nations have gained immense powers of both defense and initiative at the sacrifice of practically nothing; for the risk of an Axis thrust against South America at “the bulge" has not been increased in any realistic sense by Brazil’s belligerency. Hitler would have struck, if his chance had come, regardless of declarations, if only for the reason that his need of cutting the United Nations supply lines from South America is imperative. Brazil’s formal entry into the war now makes it possible not merely for the United Nations to mass adequate forces against such a stroke, but for them to forestall and permanently to prevent it.

Will the example be contagious?

From the point of view of its effects on the relations of other South American governments to the war, Brazil’s action is important. But it is easy to exaggerate its potentialities. No doubt, among the governments which have already broken relations with the Axis, the course taken by Brazil will form a precedent for war declarations in the event of further submarine outrages. It evidently has had happy effects on Chile’s increasing rapprochement with the United Nations, and if Chile should break her Axis diplomatic relations within the next few weeks, Brazil’s stand should be considered a factor in her decision.

These two nations are old associates in South American balance-of-power combinations, especially against the Argentine. Hence, if Chile has felt uncomfortable in being classed as a confederate of Argentina in policies beneficial to the Axis, Brazil’s new status should make her all the more anxious to break loose from the embarrassing fellowship.

But too much should not be made of these delicate emotional impulses. Chile’s neutrality is based on a realistic fear of a Japanese break-through from the Southern Pacific toward her shores. Final decision regarding her Axis relations, then, is much more likely to wait upon the removal of serious invasion threats from Australia and New Zealand than to be precipitated by the action of a friendly government whose military problems are mainly in the Atlantic. The fact, indeed, that Brazil’s war declaration did not include Japan strongly suggests that there may be a quiet understanding between Rio de Janeiro and Santiago not to make unnecessary trouble for each other in dangerous waters.

In view of these factors, too much should not be expected, either, of the scheduled visit of Chile’s President Juan Antonio Ríos to the United States in October. Closer economic and political collaboration no doubt will be sought in Ríos’s conferences with Washington officials, and possibilities explored for strengthening Chile’s defensive armaments. But developments along these lines cannot materially change the situation in the Antipodes, and in any case it would be bad politics — South American style — for Ríos to urge basic reversal of his country’s diplomatic policies after being entertained in Washington.

The effect on Argentina

Actually, Brazil’s war entry affects Argentina much more directly. It openly and disastrously weakens her in the South American balance-of-power competition and is, in this sense, another indication that, with every new bid in the global warfare, the stakes in the Buenos Aires gamble on a victory for the Axis, or on a negotiated peace, are rising.

For example, Brazil’s military strength is now, with United Nations aid, due to be increased more rapidly than ever. So is her military and economic influence in the border states of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. Uruguay’s officially proclaimed adherence to Brazil’s cause should even make it possible, if emergencies demanded it, for the United Nations to blockade the mouth of the River Plata and shut off Buenos Aires from world commerce for an indefinite period.

Yet the practical effects for the time being may easily be to deter the Castillo administration still further from actions favorable to the United Nations, and even to strengthen it in its isolation. For among Argentine government circles, feelings of rivalry and jealousy for Brazil are so strong that even a new affront from the Axis would hardly provoke action until all color of suspicion had been removed that the Brazilian example or pressure from Rio de Janeiro had anything to do with it.

The coming of war to the huge neighboring coastline of Brazil considerably increases the chance of submarine sinkings and other incidents which will force Argentina into a different attitude, regardless of the Government’s love of isolation and aloofness. At the same time, the anti-Government forces desiring a diplomatic break, or even a state of war, with the Axis have been immensely strengthened in Argentina.

How strong the pressure is becoming from these sources was indicated by the offer of ex-President Augustin P. Justo, immediately after Brazil’s declaration, to enlist in the Brazilian Army. This act was more than a purely political gesture from a former Conservative leader who is an avowed presidential candidate of the war party in the 1943 elections.

The Justo action is a symbol of the feeling of thousands of practical Conservatives in Argentina, and of course of nearly all Radicals, that the republic by her isolation, is throwing away both her leadership in Latin America and, in the event of an Axis defeat, her military security itself.