The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Washington

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THE political sagacity of the President is one of his chief attributes, as everyone in wartime Washington would agree. But most people would qualify the compliment, for the President has his blind spots. And since the death of his man Friday, Louis McHenry Howe, he has made more than one political blunder. In some cases they may be the result of his zest for dangerous living.

At any rate, a story is told which bears out such a theory. A friend suggested the abolition, for the duration, of his press conferences. “I agree they are dangerous,” he replied, “but I do get a kick out of them.” The President clearly enjoys his twice-weekly tilts with the newspaper inquisitors. After most of them he looks almost as excited as if he had just finished a race. The price he pays is an occasional slip, though the astonishing thing is that there are so few slips.

Rubber bounces back

The rubber problem was considered settled after the Baruch Committee made its report. But the Administration soon had to beat a retreat from the program set out in it. The reason is simple. The erection and equipment of plants to make synthetic rubber would consume materials more urgently needed for making escort vessels and 100-octane gas. There could be no question as to which program must have preference. Hitler’s submarines are wreaking such havoc on our Atlantic shipping that, as a high official testily put it, we might soon find ourselves fighting in the Mississippi Valley. Perhaps the people think that in going back on the Baruch Committee the Administration has been unfair. That would be a wrong interpretation. Nothing is clearer than that the tempo of events in this war is so rapid that programs and minds must be kept in the highest state of plasticity. This fact the Baruch Committee itself acknowledged. A fundamental premise in its report was that the menace of the submarine was being steadily overcome. That premise has not been realized. Hence the Baruch recommendations had to be revised. At any rate Mr. Jeffers, in seeking to adhere to the program, was not fighting a battle for the private motorist, as some people seem to think. All the synthetic rubber that we can produce for a long time to come will go for military use and for heavy bus and truck transportation. It is unfortunate that the public is ignorant of these facts. Public responsibility, of course, belongs to the OWI.

Slow speed ahead

The Navy itself has begun to acknowledge the gravity of the submarine menace. It seems clear that we still lack unity of command in fighting the submarine. Surely, since the Atlantic is one operating theater, we and the British should hand over this crucial battle to a single head. At present we are divided. There is not even a unified command of our own Army and Navy in coastwise operations against the submarine.

The best way to establish unity is to make the services a unit. Over six months ago Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham said that a unified command in coping with the submarine was absolutely essential. Now there may be some action. It is said that President Roosevelt came back from Casablanca with this decision. The man who might get the appointment is Admiral Sir Percy Noble, now in Washington as successor to Sir Andrew Cunningham, who is doing a superb job off the North African coast, in charge of the Admiralty delegation. No two Britishers are more popular in Washington, and none knows anti-submarine warfare better than Noble.

It has taken the Navy a long time to give the war on the submarine its proper place. Till recently the Navy did not give priority for escort vessels even in its own building program. And the escort vessel requests were too various as to types. Now this has been changed. Not only is priority given to escort vessels; the types have been reduced to two or three. And the management of the building program has been turned over to that production wizard. Charles E. Wilson, of the General Electric Company.

Paging Mr. Wilson

Mr. Wilson is one of the few big men in wartime Washington. He is vice-chairman of the War Production Board, in charge of the aircraft program, with the additional responsibility of supervising the general production program. Thus he is at the civilian end of the production tug-of-war.

Some people may have thought that the military versus civilian struggle was over. To be sure, the fight was resolved by a compromise. But the armed services simply cannot keep their hands off the factories. They contend that since they place the contracts, they must supervise manufacture. Rubber Director Jeffers is the last civilian czar to blow up about these military “expediters.” But they don’t get in his hair anything like so much as they get in Mr. Wilson’s. One is always expecting to hear that Mr. Wilson has joined the steady procession back to civilian life of high WPB officials. It will be a major reverse if he does. To him, and to him alone, is due the big rise in the December output of aircraft. And nobody can touch him in ability to put through the escort vessel program.

Congressional critics of the military versus civilian squabble contend that the only solution is the statutory transfer of the procurement function to the War Production Board. It is doubtful. Interference by the armed services in the supervision of production is already a violation of the executive order setting up the War Production Board.

Mr. Nelson handed those powers to the fighting services, it was only when they had shown their inefficiency at a job which properly belongs to businessmen that Mr. Nelson sought to reclaim his powers. That brought the tug-of-war into the open. And, though harmony was hoped for in a compromise, the fireworks are still exploding in the business relations between Army and Navy and WPB. It is doubtful whether even a law would restrain the military expediters.

The State Department

Our political strategy abroad is turning the spotlight on Mr. Hull and the State Department. The cool reception accorded Mr. Hull’s apologies for his Vichy policy irks the Secretary of State. No man in our public life is more sensitive to criticism — perhaps because he has had so little of it. At any rate, he is now the target of those who believe that we have allowed the political situation in North Africa to stand out in blinding contrast to our professed policies. Not only are the liberals shocked, but the War Department and the OWI are critical.

In the State Department itself there is a sharp schism. Mr. Hull has taken the rap for the Minister at Algiers, Robert Murphy, who collaborated with the collaborationists. But he has not been consistent. At one time he passed the responsibility to the War Department, and then, after the Casablanca parley, sought refuge behind the Roosevelt-Churchill team. On one occasion Mr. Hull actually implied that the political situation in North Africa was none of the layman’s business. The spectacle has not been edifying.

Reputations in Washington

There are many mistaken notions about reputations in Washington. At least half a dozen men have been built up for their reputed toughness. Yet few of the administrators have this indispensable quality. Remember Mr. Nelson? Mr. Nelson is reputedly tough, but in reality he is a mild-mannered man who shrinks from asserting himself. Nothing makes him happier than the establishment of a new committee or the appointment of a new man who will be a buffer between him and the armed services.

Only Mr. Henderson accorded with his tough reputation. He was tough, — unnecessarily tough, according to his critics, — yet his successor at the OPA, Prentiss M. Brown, has advertised his own softness in a manner which may make the country wish Mr. Henderson were back.

The battle against inflation will never be won unless the men at the controls are unyielding against the terrific pressures from special interests. I am thinking particularly of the farm bloc and the bloc of organized labor, though a swarm of lobbyists are descending upon OPA to test Mr. Brown’s softness. The next “Battle of Washington” will be over inflation. At the controls are men like William H. Davis, head of the War Labor Board, Paul McNutt, head of the Manpower Commission, Claude Wickard, the food administrator. Not one of them has yet shown the requisite toughness.

Paul McNutt is as troubled about using the power in his jurisdiction as Mr. Nelson is. We sorely need some form of National Service Act. At least there must be freezing of labor in the factories, subject to appeal boards. As for the farms, a lot of damage has been done in letting so many essential workers enter the services or the war plants. The job now is to patch up the damage.

Arrest of the outflow of farm labor is accomplished only in part by the new directives to the local draft boards. They do not plug up the gap leading from farm to factory. They do nothing to repair existing damage. So far, only expedients have been suggested: raising a land army, encouraging immigration, using prisoners of war, setting up a point rationing system to curb civilian food consumption, giving a “Work or fight” order to men in certain nonessential occupations, providing incentive payments to the remaining farmers for higher output of essential meats and fats. Mr. Hoover proposes furloughs for uniformed farmers. Certainly the need calls for drastic measures. This year we cannot count on the excellent food crop of 1942. Yet our granary is now scheduled to meet United Nations as well as United States needs. The budget provides that one fourth of our production shall go for military and Lend-Lease needs, and the quota is bound to go higher, even when the war is over.

Paging Mr. Byrnes

But there is one man among all the administrators who feels the need for administrative strength. He is James Byrnes, a big man with a little staff. His job at the head of the Office of Economic Stabilization invests him with the responsibility for the conduct of all the offices engaged in keeping the economy on an even keel. The battle seems a losing one till one has seen Mr. Byrnes in action. He has a grasp of all the problems with which the lesser czars are struggling, definite ideas as to how to cope with them, a reserve power which he seeks to pump into the administrators, and an engaging sense of humor.

Still, the President cannot leave everything to Mr. Byrnes. It would be a source of strength to the “Assistant President,” the administrators, and the public in general if Mr. Roosevelt were to give more fireside chats. The need for more personal communication between President and people is profound. Only Mr. Roosevelt can clarify the war issues as they arise, keep our military ardor inflamed, and lead the unending battle for the paramount priority of the national interest.

THE MOOD OF THE CAPITAL

The mood of the Capital is that the President’s influence is not being exerted so much at home as it is abroad, and that it ought to be exerted at home too. The feeling is not restricted to the President’s relations with the people. Leadership thrives on organization as well as on inspiration. Yet the Capital is completely lacking in integration. A war cabinet sitting as an overall court of reference and decision would end many of the jurisdictional disputes that are now taking up so much of the Capital’s energy. In Mr. Jeffers’s words, there must be somebody at the top “who will say yes or no and mean it.”