The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Washington

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THE loss of Sumner Welles as Under Secretary of State cannot easily be assayed. The Leftist press is mourning his departure as the loss of the only liberal in the State Department. Primarily Mr. Welles’s influence lay in what he did rather than in what he said. Diplomats and men of business have said he was a man you could do business with. He was a coherent force. He begot the Good Neighbor policy and, what was more important, he executed it.

The big issues

Mr. Welles fell foul of the Secretary of State on three principal issues. They were: —

1.The Rio Conference of January, 1942. Mr. Welles was the head of the American delegation, and he was called upon to draft a compromise anti-Axis formula which would satisfy both Brazil and Argentina. Brazil would not have signed without Argentina. After Mr. Welles had framed a satisfactory formula. Secretary Hull phoned him from the State Department demanding that it be withdrawn. Mr. Welles appealed to the President, and in a threecornered conversation Mr. Roosevelt upheld Mr. Welles. Mr. Hull felt the humiliation.

2.The St. Pierre-Miquelon incident. When the Free French Admiral Musilier captured these islands during the Christmas holidays of 1941, Secretary Hull, afraid that the act would offend the egregious Admiral Robert of Martinique, made Admiral Musilier release the prize, and condemned the act by the “so-called Free French ships.” Mr. Welles again expressed himself at variance with his chief, and the objection rankled.

3.Mr. Welles’s organization of post-war study groups within the State Department while Mr. Hull was recuperating in Florida. The groups had chairmen of the caliber of Myron Taylor, Isaiah Bowman, and Norman Davis, with Mr. Hull as overall Chairman and Mr. Welles as Vice Chairman. Every week the chairmen used to report to the White House with Mr. Welles. The practice continued after Mr. Hull got back. About three months ago Mr. Hull shelved Mr. Welles from the delegation to the White House and took his place. This disturbed Mr. Welles, who had worked hard and long on post-war reconstruction with the study groups.

The State Department will not be the same. Mr. Hull is streamlining his department in a way which is leaving the old-timers a little breathless. After Vice President Wallace was relieved of his duties in economic foreign policy, the President ordered that ail agencies having to do with economic relations abroad should be directed as to policy by the State Department.

To fulfill the new mandate, Mr. Hull immediately set up the Office for Economic Coordination (OFEC), and a steady recruitment of personnel has been going on, which has brought a new activity to the traditional and conservative State Department. At any rate, OFEC will be represented abroad by area directors, equivalent almost to regional ambassadors, who will control the policy of all the agencies doing business abroad.

Mr. Hull’s energy in this new direction is already alarming the war agencies. Judging from Mr. Hull’s departmental orders, he appears to want to control operations as well as policy, though the original directive limited him to policy-making.

What is our foreign policy?

There is not the same activity in the formulation of our political strategy. Here is our great weakness. It should now be apparent that the ad hoc nature of our political strategy is not giving the United States the political leadership of the United Nations. Our political status is woefully behind our military status. Example: we recognized the French Committee at Algiers only after nine governments had shown the way, and then not as a government - in contrast to what Russia did.

There is no clear line of foreign policy. There cannot be a clear line because military expediency is binding on political officers. Reflect on the schism over the House of Savoy, The OWI, after the fall of Mussolini, disparaged both the King and Badoglio; General Eisenhower commended both to the Italian people. It was military expediency. But, when nothing happened, General Eisenhower took the OWI line and called both “Men of Rome.” But the OWI, which had been rapped over the knuckles for its anti-Fascist line remained in the doghouse. Neither the President nor Secretary Hull offers any objection to the subordination of political policy. The President himself laid down the rule that if the devil himself will help us across a bridge, then we should accept the aid of the devil.

OWI under fire

The OWI is having renewed difficulty in getting news out of the Army and Navy. Evidence is the resignation of Nicholas Roosevelt. Mr. Roosevelt was OWI’s liaison officer with the armed services. He was appointed to effect a working arrangement with the Army and Navy. After nine months he has given up the job as hopeless. He was kept outside the inner sanctum and thrown the news which the Army and Navy decided to publish.

The services contend that they cannot trust OWL To be sure, the organization contains men who are not so responsible as they might be, but no irresponsibility could be charged against Nicholas Roosevelt, an editor of note and a former Minister to Hungary. He could have been trusted. His aid, moreover, would have been invaluable. But the Army and Navy don’t want advice on their public relations. They are set in their policy — a policy of little news, and even that lacking in realism. For instance, they don’t like to show death and destruction. The wounded are routed so as to avoid the main cities, lest they hurt American susceptibilities. Actions in the newsreels are made to look like maneuvers.

In these circumstances the wonder is that the Army and Navy complain that the war is not taken seriously enough. Or that OWI is criticized. The agency is criticizable for not insisting that the armed services live up to the President’s directive in setting up OWI. Mr. Davis got a sweeping mandate “to issue such directives concerning war information as he may deem necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order, and such directive shall be binding upon the several Federal departments and agencies.” Mr. Davis hasn’t made anything binding upon the Army and Navy. He isn’t made that way. He is, as the Nicholas Roosevelt resignation signified, a petitioner. It looks as if OWI were slated for the next blowup.

A new kind of gunpowder

The place of Air Powder in the military organization is getting ready for a showdown when Congress reassembles. There has been much dissatisfaction with Navy propaganda against Air Power. The admirals sit on news but are free with their views. These have been placed in the national magazines as a counterweight to the campaign to give Air Power equality with Army and Navy in the military organization. Clearly Air Power cannot be restrained. It is pulverizing Germany and as a “second front” it may prove to be the arm upon which Britain and America rely. Yet Air Power still lacks the command status which Army and Navy have.

At present the armed services are represented in the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Admiral Leahy (the President’s chairman), Admiral King, General Marshall, and General Arnold. Arnold is the head of the Army Air Corps. The setup gives the appearance of acknowledging Air Power on an equal basis with Army and Navy. But the appearance is illusory. For one thing, General Arnold has nothing to do with naval air power; for another, he is subordinate to General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff. What the airmen feel is their due is that they shall be entitled to develop their own plans in executing the air strategy laid down by the Joint Chiefs.

The bombing of Germany is the prime example. When plans were made for this enterprise, it was provided that there should be more bombers in Britain than there are today. Airmen contend that it has been impossible to live up to the plan because the Eighth Air Force has been constantly tapped for other purposes. General Eaker is constantly protesting to Washington. If the plan were left alone, as it would be if the air force had planning equality, then we might be further advanced toward the conquest of Germany. Raids like the one on Ploesti are ordered by the Joint Chiefs. The airmen are told what to do. If they counter the orders by giving expert judgment on their requirements, they are ignored, and told to go ahead with what can be spared.

A separate air command?

But equality in command for Air Power, or a unified or separate air force, requires more elucidation than is usually given to it. A separate air force would include only the long-range bombers. There would be no interference with the auxiliary air arms of either Army or Navy. Navy, for instance, would retain carrier planes and coastal reconnaissance, and Army its cooperation arm called the Tactical Air Command.

(continued)

Only the bombers, or the strategical air arm, would be severed from Army and Navy. It might not be necessary even to take the bombers away from Navy. For we are beginning to drip the bombers for the reduction of Germany and Japan. As they are built, they would be controlled separately, along with the bombers belonging now to the Army Air Force. A separate air force, moreover, would be entitled to develop plans for their construction as welt as for their use.

Confidence on the rise

Withal there is a momentum in the war effort which is irresistible. The air of serene confidence which Mr. Churchill breathed over the newspaper correspondents on his visit to the White House has had a tonic effect. Perhaps he would not take any bets on a collapse of Germany this year, but you can see that he has an awareness that nothing is impossible, especially as a result of the air onslaught. The British know their Germany to be too intelligent to fight on when the realization that victory is impossible has become widespread. The war is likely at any time to produce such great events that I feel that Mr. Churchill came to Washington to be on hand in case something happened calling for swift and significant decision. Italy came through on schedule. What is next?

He occupied the waiting period by doing his part to crystallize the political thinking of Americans on political strategy and post-war world organization. Most Americans, to judge from the Gallup Poll, demand an assumption of American responsibility for world order, even if that responsibility entails an alliance with the British. In this respect the Deweys of the G.O.P. are indistinguishable from the Willkies. if the Rooseveltians are not more concrete, the Republicans may steal their clothes while Roosevelt is swimming.

THE MOOD OF THE CAPITAL

The mood of the Capital is uneasiness over the continued lack of political strategy as exemplified in North Africa and Italy. The uneasiness is due to the signs that this condition is intensifying the difficulties with Russia. The Russians want to stress the prime service they are rendering in defeating Germany. They must know the damage to the will and means to resist which the Allies are inflicting on Germany. I won’t say the situation vis-a-vis Russia is creating defeatism. The situation calls for a supreme effort by our diplomacy to develop a common policy. This war, even more than the last, is too important to be left to the generals or to military expediency.