Europe

ON THE WORLD TODAY

WILL a general Peace Conference of the United Nations merely harden existing differences in Europe among the Big Four? Or will it tend to reduce these barriers? An immediate Conference appeals to the imagination of impatient Americans, who are irked by the slow progress of peacemaking.

Voices of caution are heard, meantime, and not from quarters notable for sympathy with the diplomacy of Moscow. The Times of London warns that any Peace Conference which gathers prior to achievement of joint agreements with Russia on major issues will be confronted with a problem of jurisdiction well-nigh insoluble. How, for instance, can a lasting peace be made for the Russian-occupied Balkans, or for a Germany four-ways divided, unless Russia shares in eventual compromises?

At the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars, a task similar in nature — the pacification of the whole of Europe — confronted the peacemakers. There, also, the chief spokesmen for the leading powers submitted their decisions to the Conference itself, which was extremely large. These decisions were not subject to change by majority vote or any other device. Those who agreed signed; those who did not agree could refuse to sign.

One of the first discoveries made by the peacemakers at Versailles, after World War I, was that no progress could be made in a general meeting of all interested states. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 held but six plenary sessions — to ratify the decisions already made in private by Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and later Orlando. The principal powers found it impossible to hammer out agreements any other way.

In the Potsdam Agreement — which has been neglected in many respects by Mr. Byrnes — the outline of arrangements for peacemaking follows these precedents fairly well, even to the point of emphasizing that the general Peace Conference shall not have power to alter agreements submitted to it. The Conference can only discuss them and offer suggestions, which the Big Four may or may not accept.

It is possible that useful compromises might be suggested in a general Peace Conference on some matters which have hitherto divided the Big Four. No mistake could be more unfortunate, however, than to imagine that a Peace Conference will find itself competent to adjust basic disputes among the major Allies by a show of hands. The primary responsibility for major decisions continues to rest with the Council of Foreign Ministers. Attempts to blur that fact can only lead to a divided world.

Gardens to the rescue

Summer harvests are easing the pressure of famine in some parts of Europe and mitigating the pangs of hunger in others. This is especially true in Western Europe. The Dutch have transformed their countryside into a vast vegetable garden. They suffer still, however, from an acute shortage of fats and oils. No remedy for this shortage will be in sight for months. Though the rebuilding of the cattle herds goes on steadily, there is a preponderance of young stock, which must be preserved until war losses are recouped.

Belgium, likewise well on the road to agricultural recovery, is afflicted with the same shortages as the Netherlands. France is making rapid progress in the recapture of war-ruined fields for agriculture.

In Greece and Southern Europe, famine is far from defeated. The people of northern Greece, harried continuously by the developing civil war, eke out their lives with stewed weeds and roots. A poorto-fair harvest in parts of the Ukraine may bode ill for millions in Eastern Europe, though the tremendous program for food raising which is being fostered all over the Soviet Union this summer promises to offset in part the results of deficient rainfall.

Austria finds little respite from hunger except through the efforts of UNRRA. What will happen to her when that organization closes its books this autumn is painful to contemplate. The prospects are grim.

Hunger still stalks Poland, and is one of the contributing factors in the ominous increase of armed strife in that country. The Czechs, on the other hand, have made substantial progress in augmenting their food supply. While the Russian-occupied portion of Germany is not suffering from food shortages, the situation in the neighboring British zone is growing steadily worse.

General McNarney’s headquarters, while announcing that the problem of food has been solved for the time being in the American zone, issues welljustified warnings that there may be a recurrence of difficulties this coming winter. In few countries on the Continent are means available for accumulating substantial reserves.

The lifeline of Central Europe

The economic recovery of the nations of Southern Europe, as well as their progress toward political peace, depends to a great extent upon speedy agreement among the Big Four on the issue of the Danube. With the exception of Trieste, no tougher problem confronts the peacemakers.

Selfish control of the navigable waterways of this 1740-mile-long trade artery has been one of the most persistent causes of war in Europe during more than two centuries. From 1718 onwards, attempts have been made to establish international agreements to settle the question of the Danube. Under the Treaty of Versailles and a convention signed June 23, 1921, the principle of free navigation was agreed upon for all countries from Ulm to the Black Sea.

At that time, however, the post-war picture of politics and power in the Balkan region was very different from what it is today. The defeat of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire broke the power of those two great nations in the Danube valley. It left Britain, France, Russia, and, in a few years, Italy as interested parties. Investments from these countries and from the United States were soon plentifully distributed all the way from Austria to Rumania.

After 1921, the maritime Danube, from Brăila to the Black Sea, was governed by a European commission. The remainder of the river, from Brăila up to Ulm, was under the direction of an international commission. The question now before the Allies is: Shall the peace settlement re-establish something like these old controls, on an international basis, with the United States as a party to them, or shall Russia’s demand for a different system be adopted?

Russia’s program accepts the principle of free navigation of the greatest of Europe’s rivers. Mr. Molotov has acknowledged that principle. But whereas the Americans, British, and French insist that the application of the principle be vested in an international commission on which Britain, France, and the United States shall hold places, the Russians declare that the Danube traffic control must be restricted to nations along the river.

No navigation control commission can function until normal relations are re-established between the Danubian states and the victorious Allies. No traffic is allowed to pass from the American zone into the Russian-controlled reaches of the river, but some 1500 river craft are operating busily from the westernmost limits of the Russian zone all the way down to the Black Sea.

Politics on the Danube

Matters have not been helped by the action of the Department of State, in following up the American Army’s raid on Danube shipping in May with the announcement that our seizure of 372 river craft would be used to force Russian acceptance of Washington’s ideas about regulating Danube traffic. Most of the boats taken in that military raid (which was made for the purpose of seizing arms and military fugitives) belong to Austria and Germany.

To imagine that seizure of these boats would prevent the Russians and the states lower down the river from continuing river traffic is absurd. The Czechoslovakian Danube Navigation Company, for instance, operates 119 barges and tankers on the river, together with 10 cargo boats and 12 tugs. Of these 141 ships, with a tonnage of approximately 85,000 tons, some 37, with a tonnage of 21,000 tons, have been impounded by the action of the American Army. The remainder are in operation.

This same company, now active under a joint system with the Russians, maintains facilities for handling 800,000 tons of freight at Komárno alone. At Bratislava its factories and docking facilities have a capacity of a million tons a year. Rumanian and Bulgarian fleets are plying the river under similar arrangements with Russia.

The answer to the Danubian question will be found eventually through compromise. There is a sound argument behind the Russian approach to this problem. There is plenty of historical precedent behind the position taken by the United States and Great Britain. The issue should not be confused with idiotic maneuverings for prestige. The real problem is one of free navigation under fair rules, for the welfare of the nations lining the banks of this important river.

Every one of the nations between Ulm and the delta depends upon the Danube for its economic health. Most of the exports and imports of these countries travel by this water route. The undeveloped or meagerly developed water-power resources of the river constitute one of the greatest potential sources of wealth in the whole region. It is estimated that development would mean 300,000 horsepower for Hungary, 2,200,000 for Bulgaria, and 6,000,000 for Rumania.

For this region of Europe, which is notoriously afflicted with poverty despite vast potential wealth, the fullest and freest development of Danubian resources and navigation is imperative. It is to be hoped that the peacemakers will keep this goal clearly in mind.

It is of far greater importance to Europe than the question of who shall sit on a commission to assume charge of the river’s traffic problem. If the functions, duties, and authority of such a commission are properly defined in advance, the issue of personnel can certainly be managed without difficulty.

Russia’s web of peace

While progress in economic recovery is slow and uneven, the game of making alliances proceeds at dizzying speed everywhere in Europe. France, in recent weeks, has reknit her old pre-war ties with the Polish government in a mutual assistance and friendship pact aimed at their ancient mutual foe, Germany. Russia, with whom General de Gaulle established a mutual alliance for France soon after his return to Paris last year, has further fortified her ties with Poland through financial and military agreements. Yugoslavia has strengthened her relations with the Czechs and Poles.

The Russians, thus far, appear to hold the lead in the game of alliance making. Their pacts of mutual aid now form a system which includes Finland, Poland, France, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. This arrangement, it is worth noting, closely resembles the picture of Eastern European alliances prior to the fateful days of Munich.

Whether the succession governments of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary will eventually find their way firmly into this mutual defense structure is a question which must await the peace settlement for the Danubian states. There is no doubt that tentative pacts closely approaching the old alliance system have been concluded between Moscow and Bucharest, Sofia, and Budapest. These transitional agreements, however, lack at present the strength of the Russian-Polish, Russian-Czech, and RussianFrench accords.

Britain mends her fences

Britain is not far behind Russia in speeding up the hunt for alliances. So far, because of the dispute about the Ruhr and the Rhineland, the resumption of her alliance with France has been delayed; but the London government today is far more sympathetic to the suggestion for a mutual compromise on that point than it was last winter.

Meantime, Mr. Bevin is assiduously working out new alliance designs in the Middle East. In Egypt, Britain’s aim is to transform an uneasy and outmoded protectorate arrangement, no longer acceptable to the Egyptian government, into a somewhat different form of protectorate, which has the semblance of a pact between equals.

The treaty negotiations pivot on Britain’s determination to withdraw her armed forces from the Nile country while retaining full power to use Egypt in any future Imperial emergency. Accordingly, London demands that whenever an emergency arises, Egypt shall accept return of British forces and turn over all resources of the nation to Britain, and meantime keep up all essential military installations with British technicians.

Egypt’s rejoinder is partial agreement and partial defiance. She insists on the right to remain neutral in any war, unless she is herself actually threatened. She rejects the British proposal concerning emergencies. Cairo feels that this would subject Egypt to British occupation on any of a number of flimsy pretexts. She also insists upon retaining full control over her own resources. King Farouk’s government has not forgotten that the British Army brought up tanks and troops to the royal palace in 1942 to compel the monarch to name a premier of London’s choosing.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, the British are making better progress. The King of Trans-Jordan has tied his domains into the British defense system as partial payment for his crown, and promises to extend his rule, if possible, farther north.

Russia’s quiet dicker with Afghanistan last month, adjusting an old border dispute, has alerted British diplomacy. The connection between this maneuver at India’s northern gateway and the success in Realpolitik scored by Moscow in Iran is tenuous. But it indicates that Russian prestige in the Middle East is not diminishing.