Latin America

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THE event of the summer in inter-American affairs has been an Argentine invasion of Washington. The invader was General Carlos von der Becke, who approached Washington in early June with two basic objectives: to obtain American arms for the Argentine Army and Navy, through the influence of high military authorities; and to by-pass, and if possible humiliate, Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, in charge of inter-American affairs, who has stoutly opposed selling arms to a government friendly to the Nazis during the war.

Almost within hours of von der Becke’s arrival, the Perón Foreign Office released the news that Argentina was exchanging diplomatic recognition with Soviet Russia. The Buenos Aires news cables were full of reports that the deal with Moscow included agreements that the Soviets would furnish Argentina modern military equipment if the United States would not.

General von der Becke knew what everyone else knows in Washington: that a coterie of generals and admirals for months has been pressing the State Department to forgive the Perón government its World War II peccadilloes, and to sell it arms again as a means of building up an all-Hemisphere military front for a future struggle with Russia. Now, with the idea flamboyantly circulated that Soviet Russia herself might be on the point of infiltrating Argentina, — so Argentine logic ran, — the admirals and generals would redouble their pressure.

After a dinner given him in Miami by Lieutenant General George H. Brett of the Air Forces, General von der Becke moved on to Washington. He came to town just as hearings were to begin on a Hemisphere defense measure, indorsed by President Truman, which called for the sale of American arms to Latin American republics. If some direct commitment could be inserted to make Argentina one of the bill’s beneficiaries, von der Becke would rate as a successful lobbyist.

Persona non grata — retired

There was one minor difficulty. Some time in advance it had quietly been made clear to the Buenos Aires government that a full-dress visit from an Argentine Chief of Staff would not be welcome. The General, consequently, went through the formalities of “retiring” from the Army.

The arrangement had its advantages. The private visitor could omit a courtesy call on the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of inter-American affairs, as a visiting top general could not. The General was encouraged to believe that Mr. Braden was “on the way out,” that our State Department’s Argentine policy was due for a speedy overhauling, and that Congress could be made to “see sense” on legislation for an over-all distribution of arms in Hemisphere defense.

But in order to get these assurances confirmed, von der Becke had to see the United States Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. And General Eisenhower politely but firmly told his visitor that nothing had changed and the matter of selling arms to Argentina was still strictly in the hands of the State Department.

There was only one thing left to do. The “invader” must make a frontal attack on the State Department itself. Then came the final check. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson consented to receive the distinguished visitor, but only in the presence of Assistant Secretary Braden.

Sitting comfortably on the side lines, Mr. Braden heard Acting Secretary Acheson inform General von der Becke that the Perón government could have no American arms until it carried out its pledges to the other American republics, under the Act of Chapultepec, to suppress Axis economic activities in Argentina and to turn over certain notorious Axis agents wanted by the United Nations. It was exactly what Assistant Secretary Braden had been telling the Argentine government ever since he took office last October.

General von der Becke retired in good order, but the repercussions were considerable. The military pressure groups were given due notice that the State Department still proposed to be “boss” in a negotiation vital to Hemisphere security. Mr. Braden’s office, for the first time in his term of service, specifically denied that he would resign his post within a month.

Washington was undecided as to whether the Assistant Secretary had won a major battle or merely a skirmish in the war to force the Argentine government to live up to its inter-American obligations. But there was no question that Perónism’s strongest enemy in Washington was stronger for the time being than he has been for several months.

The Russo-Argentine flirtation

Except to World War III’s military evangelists, the dangers of the Argentine-Russian rapprochement, too, looked less alarming in the clearer air after the defeat of von der Becke. The situation could be put this way: diplomatic recognition between the two governments was no more than an obvious convenience. The visit of a Russian trade commission and a series of trade agreements merely reflected the legitimate need of both countries for larger economic outlets.

Beyond this a controlling political factor stood out in plain view. No two powers in the world have a greater interest than Soviet Russia and Argentina in obtaining drastic concessions from the United States for their economic objectives and their highly divergent political viewpoints. The stage, in other words, was set for a joint needling process. The gossip concerning a Russian program of supplying Argentina with arms was the implement.

Certainly, no overwhelming reason developed in the ballyhoo for “appeasing” Argentina or Russia because of their newly discovered community of interests. It remained to be seen whether Russia seriously intended to, or could, furnish formidable modern equipment to a South American power; whether military missions and a military alliance aimed at the United States would follow the armaments.

It remained to be seen, also, whether such an alliance would be accepted by the rest of Latin America and by the strong anti-Communist elements in President Perón’s following, even if Moscow should ever propose it. The thesis that a showdown between the United States and Russia might begin over the question of who furnished arms to Perón looked a little foolish in fact, after General von der Becke’s fiasco.

Diplomacy of suspicion

Assistant Secretary Braden’s temporary and tactical victory, however, did not clear up growing confusions on the inter-American front connected with Russian influences, real and fancied. While in the von der Becke affair the generals and admirals lost the decision on points regarding the immediate rearmament of Argentina, they did not in any sense lose their insistent convictions that a Perónist Argentina sooner or later can and must join the line-up against Russia.

A change in administrations in Washington or in the delicate State Department balances by which Mr. Braden holds on to his job might give them the top hand in the next decision. In this case, the Perón government would be welcomed back into the interAmerican power bloc as a full participating member, fascist or not — on the principle advanced in a Washington wisecrack that: “the only thing the military still hold against Hitler is that he was prematurely pro-fascist.”

There is no question that Russian needling of the United States position in Latin America is strengthening the hand of the military, regardless of temporary checks. Moscow’s cordiality toward Buenos Aires, for instance, undoubtedly has had the effect, if not the design, of stiffening the Perón regime’s resistance to carrying out Argentina’s Chapultepec obligations.

And up and down the Hemisphere, wherever the Communists have press or radio freedom of expression in any of the republics, the propaganda is going full blast that the United States has returned to “dollar diplomacy” — that even its requests for food from Latin America to relieve the world famine are rooted in a desire to starve the neighbor peoples so that they cannot resist “imperialism.” What the Russians hear of the military efforts in the United States to unite the American republics in a bloc against them naturally fires them with new energies for these stratagems.

Latin America’s dollar balance

The financial resources of the Western Hemisphere for beginning an over-all economic renovation have never before even faintly approached what they are today. In the Latin republics more than three billion “blocked” dollars are left over from war sales and profits, awaiting expenditure or investment — not to mention the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars piled up in the local currencies.

LATIN AMERICA (continued)

Even in the numerous republics that require 51 per cent or more domestic ownership of new business enterprises, sufficient Latin American capital is available, probably for the first time in history, to provide majority investment in as much new industry as national economies can absorb.

Furthermore, neither United States nor Latin American capital needs to go into new industrial ventures blindfold. For twenty-five years the United States Commerce Department’s Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce has been making exhaustive studies of the economic activities and needs of the Latin American republics. Since 1940, the war-born Inter-American Development Commission has been surveying the possibilities of practical economic progress in every republic. United States business experts participated in the investigations of the Commission, and made special reference to industrial opportunities.

We know, for instance, with considerable statistical proof, how much a few processing plants for wood, leather, and vegetable oil would benefit Paraguay’s backward economy. We can draw a concrete picture of what metalworking industries may be fostered by the development of Brazilian “big steel,” and can foresee advantages which domestic steel rails and girders may confer on railroads and construction.

Mexico has a current rating as a good place to set up an electrical appliance industry. And in Mexico City one plant is being started which will raise some 5000 Mexicans into the skilled and semi-skilled wage brackets.

Trained men

Again, for broadening the base of Hemisphere economy, the joint trained manpower resources of the republics were never greater. In spite of the chronic shortage of technicians, no economic group is growing faster in Latin America than that of the young men who are being equipped by university training for technical expertness in industry.

Through the “trade scholarships” instituted by the Office of Inter-American Affairs during the war years, hundreds of young Latin Americans have been given technical education through the opportunity to work side by side with skilled workmen in United States factories.

We shall need to approach the industrialization of South America with plenty of rational skepticism. Not every country can develop all the “little Pittsburghs” and “little General Electrics” its national pride dreams of — or exploit all the mineral resources and agricultural frontiers it is convinced are present in its hinterland. But we can do without one final skepticism: the assumption that by investing in the future of 130,000,000 people so closely linked to us geographically, we are “boondoggling away” our economic substance or any portion of our national security.