After an a-Bomb Falls

by JOHN W. M. BUNKER

1

YOU can’t effectively double your fists or lash out with your feet at the A-bomb; and it doesn’t give you time enough to run away. For every weapon there has been a counterweapon or a defense; but these countermeasures lag behind the attack, and this latest weapon is of too recent origin. Until there is assurance of adequate military protection against atomic attack the civilian must supplement the military with civil defense.

In atomic attack the unseen and undetectable threat is likely to evoke in the uninformed the instinctive biological response of headlong flight. American men and women have shown in other situations that they can rise above this animal-like response to run. What strikes terror to the savage, civilized men meet with reasoned evasive or defensive action instead of with flight. If fear is accompanied by understanding, if we know what to expect, then in spite of fear we by and large act creditably and usefully when the test comes.

Because we have learned what fire docs when out of control, we hold fire drills in our schools. Fire drills are devised not to prevent fire, but to reduce the casualties which it is capable of causing if panic replaces discipline. The house owner, realizing from the experience of others that a fire in his dwelling can result in great financial loss, takes out insurance for at least partial reduction of this potential loss. The soldier going into combat is supplied with a steel helmet to reduce the extent and probability of injury. None of these measures is designed to prevent fulfillment of threat; they are calculated to reduce the damage. This is the philosophy of civil defense.

Insurance is ordinarily based upon a record of past experience. In respect to civil defense against atomic attack, the experience table is brief. We in the United Slates of America have never been bombed in our own land, and while the veterans of recent wars are more experienced in this regard, not even they have been exposed to the atomic bomb. For experience we must substitute reasoned conclusions and predictions based on such records as are available to us. Moreover, we need assurance that the records are reliable.

In the first five years the tale of the A-bomb and its effects was told in different ways not mutually consistent. Few among us knew what to believe. There was a temptation to shrug off the whole matter as reportorial confusion or exaggeration. In 1946, a year after the bombing of Japan, despite efforts to enlighten the public about the potentialities of this weapon, a poll revealed that apparently 2 per cent of the American people had never even heard of the bomb. Among the other 98 per cent, complacency, because we were the only nation to possess the secret, favored relegation of the whole matter to oblivion. These states of mind have not been completely dispelled in 1951.

In October, 1950, The Effects of Atomic Weapons, published by the Government Printing Office, made available for the first time the authoritative detailed account of the bomb effects in three experimental tests and in the two explosions in Japan. On this factual account, supplemented by such official releases as may be forthcoming on later experimental tests, our Civil Defense must be based. He who reads that story must be a strange being if he does not then feel apprehensive, but for him who reads and understands, informed fear should replace unreasoning terror. This may conceivably contribute to the saving of life, his own or that of another.

Theoretically, civil defense planning in the United States could make it unprofitable for an enemy to attack us with bombs, atomic or otherwise. Such extreme measures as extensive dispersal of bousing and of industrial buildings are said to be able to create an unprofitable target, but the economic cost of that sort of thing seems at the present time to constitute a premium too high to pay. Civil Defense as it is presently conceived is designed to reduce the losses and not to prevent their cause.

Lacking experience, faced with a threat that is in some respects new, knowing that this threat lies in the use of weapons which are possessed by a power of whose friendship we have grave doubts, what can we do?

The first thing which seems sensible for everyone to do is find out the facts about the effects of atomic weapons. A brief, completely reliable account is available in a small booklet issued by the Federal Civilian Defense Agency in 1951, entitled “Survival Under Atomic Attack.” The story is also pietorially presented in a short moving picture released under the same auspices and carrying the same title. Various state civil defense agencies have issued similar booklets — as, for instance, that published and distributed by the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency to the number of more than two million, captioned “Protection from the Atomic Bomb.” These are carefully edited, concise résumés of the principal elementary facts. These facts should be studied and discussed by every citizen until they become firmly fixed in his understanding.

In 1945, and for some time thereafter, there were those who believed that we could be scared by tall tales of A-bomb horrors into taking some sort of action, unspecified, that would abolish this threat. Their avowed purpose was to play up the horrors to the limit, to paint word pictures of the worst that in imagination could happen to an uninformed and therefore unprepared civilian population. We have not been entirely freed from such tactics even today, although we know better. It just does not work, this scaring people into behaving. It merely accentuates terror and encourages a fatalistic attitudo of “What’s the use?” and it is human nature to think of death or injury by violence as something to deplore, which is hard on others but which is not likely to happen to “me.”

Others have taken the stand that we should not scare our fellow citizens, lest they do nothing in the way of prudent preparation, so let’s play it down and emphasize the assurance that after all a bomb is a bomb, that it rarely does so much damage as is hoped for by those who use it, and ordinary precautions are good enough, and anyway, this country never was bombed and probably never will be.

A middle group, which constitutes the majority of our people, takes neither extreme false position. This group believes that everyone is entitled to the candid truth without exaggeration and without undervaluation. For most persons, the unvarnished truth is on the whole somewhat assuring because it is a fact that atomic warfare is a type of attack about which something definitely can be done; it is a threat against which shelter and protection are possible. In spite of the terrible forces which may be let loose, there is — or there can be — a place to hide. And then, too, the energy liberated is dissipated so rapidly that in most cases we don’t, have to hide very long.

What we would have to take in case of atomic bombing is largely what other communities have taken in the form of saturation bombing in the last war — namely, wreckage and fire, and temporary disruption of transport, housing, communication, and supplies. In atomic bombing this destruction will be delivered in few er packages of greater power in a shorter time. The new hazard which has been added — nuclear radiation — is temporary, decays rapidly, and can be guarded against by those prepared and warned.

2

THERE are three essential characteristics of atomic bombing. First, the blast effect as from every explosion, which lasts in this case for only a second at any one point but packs a terrific punch at close range. It causes serious structural damage for two or three miles. If new bombs are more powerful than those used in Japan — and it would be rather naïve to suppose that technical advances have not been developed since Nagasaki — the range of destruction will be greater. But it is an inescapable fact that if the energy released by a new bomb is twice as great as that of the old ones, the destructive effect is increased by only about one quarter. The degree of destruction at one-half mile in 1945 would be felt at five-eighths of a mile from a bomb twice as powerful. And even a bomb one thousand times ns powerful, to take an extreme hypothetical example, would increase destruction by only the cube root of one thousand, which is ten.

The most extensive destruction from the old bombs was attained when they were exploded at about 2000 feet, above the target. More powerful bombs would cause equivalent destruction immediately below from a still greater height.

A second immediate effect of the A-bomb, also common to other types of explosions, is a flash of heat. This travels in straight lines with the speed of light and wears off with distance. It is readily stopped by almost anything solid. It lasts significantly from the atomic bomb for three seconds only. It is hottest in the first second. The type of bomb we know can cause skin burns within a radius of two and one-half miles. Flash burns are as bad as any other burns — such as from fire or excessive suu tan on the beach. Too much has been made of the observation that in Japan wooden structures facing the bomb were scorched by this heat flash, and the assumption is readily made that such heat, can set fires. We should not forget that at distances within which tinder can be ignited in this fashion, a blast of wind at several hundred miles an hour comes along after the flash and should put out any such incipient fires, or most of them, anyway. This is not science, it is just common sense.

In writing of this aspect of heat-flash ignition of inflammables, Horatio Bond, export of the National Fire Underwriters Association, has this to say: “There is some chance of fire primarily from heat flash within a two-mile radius. Ignition of thin paper, light cotton cloth, excelsior, shavings and similar materials is possible, but it should be kept in mind that the mere burning of such objects will not cause a continuing fire unless they happen to be located so that the1 fire can spread to other objects in the vicinity. The arrangement of combustibles in the buildings of the target city is more important than the heat flash itself. Removal of cotton drapes from windows, the clearing of rubbish (or covering rubbish piles) would be more important measures to reduce the number of possible primary fires.

“Outside the areas of complete destruction of wood buildings by blast, the heat flash could not be expected to ignite the outside walls of wood buildings in many cases. Also, fabrics hanging in folds would be more susceptible to ignition than flat fabrics. Their shape is more important than their color. White cotton in folds would probably ignite more readily than black cotton cloth flat, although there is an observed tendency for dark fabrics to ignite more readily than light-colored ones.”

The fact that white looks white because it reflects light, and black is black because it absorbs light, explains why at a critical distance (too close to the source to matter significantly on account of other greater risks) black cloth charred — or transmitted heat — whereas white reflected it. This matter of the color of clothing is too trivial in the over-all picture to merit serious attention in civil defense against atomic attack. Objects or persons near enough to catch fire from the heat flash are likely to be damaged from flying wreckage. At greater distances, almost anything will adequately protect the skin against flash burns. And, at the worst, the danger is for only three seconds following the burst.

3

THE third danger from the atomic bomb is nuclear radiation. Invisible, like X rays, it has great penetration without causing any sensation in the person receiving it. Like X rays, a small amount does no harm, more will make one ill, and too much can cause death. The great danger from this source is the first ten seconds. Shelter is offered behind substantial concrete even near the point of ground zero. Earth also is a good absorber of nuclear radiation. In the basement behind the foundation wall, near the floor to gain as much as possible of Mother Earth’s, protection, is the best place for the first minute. After that one must watch out lest he be trapped in wreckage or by growing fires above, or by gas leaking from broken pipes aboveground, or by water from a similar source. The cellar is the place for the householder to stay for a minute after an atomic bomb burst within a few miles; after that he had better be prepared to move. The cellar is obviously one “place to hide.”

From the bombs over Japan, no lingering nuclear radiation remained after ninety seconds: and half of this dosage was delivered in the first second; 80 per cent of it was gone in ten seconds. Those who were a mile or more away, if uninjured by flying wreckage as the blast swept past, or by the conflagrations, were able to engage in rescue work.

Had the bombs by accident or intent been exploded within a few hundred feet of the earth or adjacent waters, there would have been a cloud of dust or spray containing radioactive particles, subject to distribution by wind and weather, which could conceivably settle on whoever or whatever was out of doors for some minutes after the burst. Such particles would contribute lingering radioactive contamination. Even after the atmosphere is cleared of radioactive particles, those that have fallen to the ground can be picked up by pedestrians and by traveling vehicles, but fortunately the radioactivity of fission products decays rapidly after any atomic explosion.

The atomic, weapons exploded at Eniwetok in May, 1951, were on steel towers, and were, therefore, low-level bursts. In a press conference on June 13, Brigadier General James Cooney, in reporting on these tests, stated: “In a low air burst just above the ground’s surface, the significant residual radiation would be confined to an area 300 to 400 yards in radius. No rescue work would be required in this area, because it would be devastated. Rescuers outside of this area would not be subjected to injurious ionizing radiation in reaching survivors.”This statement is not supplemented by any data on weather conditions, but one may assume that persons approaching ground zero in these tests did not do so from down wind.

General Cooney further stated: “Radiation safety surveys made after the tests in the immediate area of Eniwetok Atoll and neighboring inhabited atolls failed to reveal any contamination of a serious nature. Food and drinking water outside the destroyed area continued to be fit for human consumption.”

The trouble with such statements as those quoted above is that they appear to cover more contingencies than they actually do, as is the case of all generalizations based on only a few observations. Explosions of any sort are unpredictable in all their ramifications, even as the lightning stroke is unpredictable in all its effects. Concerning atomic attack, the more we learn the better we can plan, but at best we can hope for only a little knowledge. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing if its extent be overestimated: a little is better than none.

It is important not to overlook the caution uttered by the Chief of the Weapons Test Division of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission in his statement on June 13: “Both military and civil defense leaders, noting that there has been improvement in weapons design, must necessarily plan on the basis of weapons several times more powerful than the Hiroshima-Nagasaki, or nominal weapon.”

The unit of radiation is the roentgen: a whole body exposure to 50 roentgens will bring about nausea and some blood changes in most persons. This radiation sickness from such a dose is of a type from which complete recovery can be expected, for most persons, according to the data presented in The Effects of Atomic Weapons.

If as a result of low-level bomb burst, there is a region in which the radiation intensity at one hour after the explosion is read by meters at 10 roentgens per hour, that does not mean that firefighters and rescue workers may work for only 5 hours before getting the sickness dose of 150. As a matter of fact, it would take 150 hours of continuous exposure to get this dose. Even then, we have no data to show how much less effective 50r may be over 150 hours than 50r in a few minutes, which is the basis of data given us.

However, it is only fair to point out that successive doses of radiation add up, not directly, but to some degree. The body cells have a power of recovery from radiation damage which has not been measured for man, but it is certainly substantial.

In Hiroshima after the air burst of the bomb, there developed a fire storm in the center of things. I have recently read a gruesome account of what this would mean to a city of the United States. But the fact is it might not develop. To feed fuel to a fire storm there must be a definite degree of concentration of roof area of buildings to total ground area. To have a fire storm there must be scores or hundreds of fires at once that can coalesce. But even a vulnerable area could be saved from this wholesale destruction if fire guard squads are available to cope with the fires at the start.

The principal hazards from atomic bombing are therefore not unknown: destructive blast as from any explosion, but in this case more powerful; a flash of heat that can be dodged if we are prepared and know where to go and have time to go there — and do so; nuclear radiation for a short time and a limited distance, against which substantial protection must be sought for a matter of seconds.

The lingering radiation associated with clouds of dust or mist from a bomb burst, near the earth’s surface is the principal hazard of atomic bombing which requires new measures of protection. The thing to do in such a case is stay indoors until assured on good authority that it is safe to venture out; or if driven out, to seek shelter again as soon as possible, shedding outer clothing and shoes when entering another shelter, and following up with a prompt wash if possible. Decontamination is a long word which means removal of dirt from surfaces where the dirt has become radioactive or consists in part of radioactive fragments caused by an A-bomb explosion. Whether decontamination is cleansing of the skin and hair or the outside of food containers, it is a matter that can be accomplished to an astonishingly effective degree with soap and water and scrubbing.

Uncovered food that may have received falling dust or fog or rain shortly after a burst had best not be eaten until and unless it is declared safe by radiation monitoring services, which are needed for every community to some degree. Anything covered in cans or bottles or paper packages cannot have been harmed. It is safe to use if the outside of the container is first washed clean.

What happened to the unprepared inhabitants of the two bombed Japanese cities should never happen here. It could, however, if like the ostrich we bury our heads and take no effective measures. Men are not readily touched by disaster to others at a distance in time or space. I read frequently of homes that are burned out with perhaps loss of life. It is too bad, but what did the Sox do today in baseball? I don’t really feel that my own house will ever catch fire, or if it should, that the fire department will not take care of it promptly. Nevertheless for nearly a half-century I have paid fire insurance premiums and I do not regret that I have never had occasion to cash in on this insurance.

The insurance of Civil Defense I will buy because I am convinced that the loss to settle without it is far too great to contemplate. I do not expect to be bombed or to be hurt by a bomb. But I am convinced that it could happen. I now am sure that if I am in a target area I shall in all probability need help if I am to survive. That help must come from someone else who is in the less damaged fringes of the area. It is only fair then that if I should be in the fringes of such an area, I be ready to go to the aid of the other fellow nearer in, for no amount of preparation will guarantee that no one will be hurt.

Many are sure to be hurt if this thing happens, and it can happen. Some of those hurt can be saved from resulting fire or other cause of loss of file if prompt action is available. Others will be without housing or food for a time. They may be my friends or strangers, or I may be one of them.

Preparation for mutual assistance and on an extensive scale is the premium we are asked to pay for this mutual insurance. It is a very small price for a very great gain if there ever comes a day of reckoning.