A New Look at Formosa

by GEORGE E. TAYLOR

1

THE Republican Administration has compelled a new look at Formosa. In January, 1950, President Truman stated that no help would be forthcoming from us in the event of a Communist invasion of the island. Six months later that policy was reversed; in order to safeguard our lines of communication when the Korean war began, the Seventh Fleet was given the task of preventing Communist invasion, and the Nationalist Government was forbidden to attack the mainland. Since then the State Department has said that Formosa is included within the American defense system in the Far East and that we will not tolerate any further expansion of the Communist orbit in Asia. During the last two years we have set up military and economic missions in Formosa and have dug ourselves into its political life.

Formosa is not as easy to evaluate as Greece, Turkey, or even Spain. Too many emotions are involved. Few foreign heads of government have risen so high and fallen so low in public esteem as has Chiang Kai-shek, and attitudes towards him tend to go to extremes. Some hold him alone responsible for everything that has happened to China, while others hold one or two Americans solely responsible. Neither view explains the long and complex process by which the present Communist regime on the mainland came to power, and neither helps us to evaluate the role of Formosa from the standpoint of the national interest.

The very concept of the national interest raises the question of perspective. It is quite possible to see the Formosa problem as a by-product of the war in Korea and assume no further responsibility for the future once that conflict is over. Some have advocated a United Nations trusteeship. Others have assumed that some sort of adjustment can be made with regard to Formosa if there is to be a general over-all settlement with Communist China in the Far East. There is the widely held view that the Communist regime is here to stay and that Chiang’s government, merely by existing, is a constant irritant and a threat to peace.

The Communist conquest of China can also be seen as the latest phase of a long struggle with the Soviet Union over the destinies of the Chinese people, a struggle which began with the revolution of 1917 and will go on for an indefinite period. This would imply that we should not give up recovering control of the mainland for anti-Communist forces any more than the Soviet Union gave up all hope for the Chinese Communists when Chiang broke the Russian alliance in 1927. It might have been wiser for us to have seen the struggle in this light, but actually we never did.

One of the consequences is that we have to make up our minds not only about Communist China, which is not too difficult, but also about the millions of Chinese outside the reach of Peking. How shall we evaluate the political structure, the economic and social policies, of the Nationalist Government? Is this a government with which we can work? Such questions lead us on to the even more important matter of the relationship between the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the rest of the Free Chinese— the 12 million Chinese who are living neither under Communist rule nor under the Nationalist Government on Formosa. Most of them are concentrated in Southeastern Asia, including a large block of over 2 million in Hong Kong. There are many thousands scattered around the rest of the world, particularly in the United States and Japan. Is Chiang the accepted leader of these Free Chinese? Can the Kuomintang provide the ideological leadership to unite all Chinese and so spearhead the political attack on Communist China? What contribution can Chiang Kaishek make on the military as well as on the ideological side? And where do the Free Chinese fit into the free world?

The political direction in which the leaders of the Nationalist Government are moving does not depend on Chiang Kai-shek alone, important as he may be as a symbol of all that is good and bad in modern China. These days we have to remind ourselves that he led the Nationalist revolution to military and political domination of the country, built up some of the key institutions of the modern state, stood firm through eight years of war, and tried to hold his party, his government, and his country together during the civil war.

On the other hand, the Generalissimo’s monopoly of power and sense of indispensability are stronger than at any time in the past. He still emphasizes the “leader principle” and thinks of loyally as much in personal as in national terms. Although he technically owes his position to the Constitution and comes up for re-election this year, his personal power is sufficient to guarantee his continuance in office if he so desires. It may be strong enough to ensure the succession to his son, Chiang Chingkuo, usually referred to on Formosa as the Crown Prince, a man who already has enormous power by virtue of his control over political education and the commissars in the army. Chiang Ching-kuo got his picture of the world, from the age of fifteen to thirty, in the Soviet Union.

Among the Chinese on Formosa there is probably more acceptance of Chiang today than there has been for a long time, partly because those who felt that loyally to their country was not the same as loyalty to Chiang are in Hong Kong, Japan, or America. Those who remain feel that Chiang is a symbol holding them together. Those who stood fast during the darkest days of Formosa are knit together with strong emotional bonds; they form a compact group which tends to look with occasional bitterness on those who were not with them. They come from all walks of life — military, political, business, education, law, the arts, and the lowliest of trades. Both in the extent of his self-criticism and in his sharing of the blame, the Generalissimo is apparently very much one of the group. He deserves much of the blame, but most Chinese on Formosa prefer not to make him the scapegoat for everything; they themselves accept their own part of the responsibility.

2

THE character of the Nationalist Government has changed considerably in the process of building a base in Formosa. For one thing, there are many empty chairs around the council tables. Some of the men who joined the Communists are sorely missed; others were liabilities whose loss causes no grief. Those who came over as fifth columnists created a serious problem which is now apparently in hand but which accounts for a good deal of the jittery reaction to criticism and highhanded ar-

rests and imprisonment. Men have come to the fore in various departments of government who were associated, on the mainland, with good government and reform. But for the hundreds of trained government officials for whom there are no jobs, and for high army officers who have no soldiers to train, there are government rice and housing and, for some, honorary positions or further training in special schools.

The situation of the Nationalist Government in Formosa can be better understood if we imagine the bulk of our Federal government, with about half a million troops and a million civilians, setting up shop in Hawaii. One of the biggest problems is that of the relationship between the local population and the mainlanders, including government, army, and civilian refugees. Strain and conflict are inevitable. There is no doubt that the Formosans, who first welcomed their release from Japanese domination and then ran head on into carpet bagging administration and the bloody conflict of February, 1947, for which they held the former governor, Chen Yi, responsible, are full of bitterness. The Nationalist Government has recognized this situation and has taken steps to improve matters. Chen Yi was executed not in punishment for the things that happened under his rule, but for suspected dealings with the Chinese Communists. The Formosans, who preferred the former interpretation, turned the execution into a tremendous occasion for celebration.

General Chen Cheng is largely responsible for a great improvement in the behavior of Nationalist troops, and Governor Wu for bringing into the provincial administration a majority of Formosans. Furthermore, the very fact that Formosa is now a part, in fact the only part, of Nationalist China means that Formosans may freely enter high schools and universities, privileges formerly very rare indeed. Women also enjoy a status denied to them by the Japanese. Some Formosans are being recruited into the army, although it is difficult to find out the exact number.

The Nationalist Government conducted the first popular elections in Formosa, but it took steps to make certain that the direction of affairs should not get out of the hands of the Kuomintang. There seems to be no question that in northern Formosa the elections were manipulated. It elections had not been held, the Kuomintang would have been accused of being undemocratic; whereas if the elections disturbed the Kuomintang’s control over its military base, the antagonism between mainlanders and Formosans would have flared up immediately. The Kuomintang will obviously try to keep control. The problem will be solved in the long run, if only because the relations between mainlanders and Formosans will not always be those between two well-defined and cohesive groups. The reform measures, such as redistribution of land, will break up the cohesiveness of the Formosans much more than that of the mainlanders. New lines of cleavage will emerge.

The Nationalist Government is clearly showing a new spirit in its approach to government. There is very general agreement that only by doing a good job on Formosa can a beginning be made on the long road back. This attitude takes the form of an eager effort to correct “mistakes” made on the continent. It is felt that neglect of the people was among the major reasons for losing the mainland and that the most convincing way to demonstrate a change of heart is to push through a reform of the land. Definite steps have been taken towards land reform, a policy which has behind it the driving force of General Chen Cheng, the premier. Chinese Communist success in exploiting the condition of the peasantry undoubtedly explains General Chen’s zeal for land reform and the almost unanimous approval of 1I10 Legislative Yuan for his program. The facts that the members and families of the Nationalist Government own little industry and less land on Formosa, and that their futures depend directly upon the welfare and producing capacity of the island, certainly make acceptance of the task that much the easier.

The philosophy behind land reform on Formosa is that it will increase production, lessen social tension, and lay the basis for further industrialization. The first step, reduction of land rental to a maximum rate of 37.5 per cent of the main crop, was accompanied by a sharp drop in the price of land. Premier Chen Cheng claims that the lawcourts have rigorously enforced the regulations and that over 9000 cases of litigation have been successfully settled. Contracts are now for six years, enforceable at law, instead of being at the will of the landlord. The second step was to sell public lands, meaning those lands expropriated from former Japanese monopoly companies. The final step is the limitation of landholdings. The money paid in compensation to landlords is to be diverted into industry.

New laws and new taxes on land increment are designed to make it difficult to speculate in urban land. The general field for speculation is narrow because of government monopolies in several important products such as sugar and tobacco, while imports and exports will obviously remain under government direction for a long time to come. It is no simple matter, however, to compensate landlords in such a way as to avoid inflation, prevent speculation, and assist in industrialization. Nor has this final stage of the land reform program been thoroughly clarified.

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THE general economic recovery of Formosa, as well as the land reform, would have been impossible without American assistance. The funds appropriated by the United States government for Formosa, even now not much more than $300 million a year, cover the cost of imports such as cotton, soya beans, fertilizers, and petroleum. Proceeds from the sale of these things, called counterpart funds, are used for other aspects of the program. In addition to the Mutual Security Administration program, there is the Chinese and American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, an agency whose legal status derives from the China Aid Act of 1948. A Chinese chairman presides over two American and two Chinese commissioners. The work of the commission is directed mainly towards applying modern science to Formosan agriculture; it includes such varied activities as the improvement of seeds, vaccination against hog cholera, instruction in the use of fertilizer, and assistance in carrying out land reform. Even more important than the achievements of the Commission is the pattern of international coöperation that the J.C.R.R. has successfully developed, a useful example for the rest of Asia.

In contrast with earlier days, there are now an approximation to a balanced budget, an open statement of military expenditures, a determined effort to keep down inflation, a much greater opportunity for the many high-class Chinese technicians and public men whose abilities have not always been fully exploited. There seems every reason to believe that personal corruption in the bureaucracy, which lives on a very low salary scale, has been reduced to insignificant proportions. As the result of past experiences, public opinion is highly unfavorable to bureaucratic techniques of self-enrichment. There is much more knowledge today than there was formerly of what the rule of law involves, especially in regard to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The military have agreed, with some reluctance, to making arrests with the knowledge and coöperation of civil authorities. The trend is in the right direction.

The basic political problem on Formosa is whether the civil and military bureaucracy shall be a democratically controlled or, as it is now, a ruling bureaucracy. It is quite clear, however, that there is no prospect of any alternative group, such as businessmen, coming to the top. What matters, for the political future of the Kuomintang and the mainland, is whether the bureaucracy can he made subject to the will of the people.

The general temper of a government is hard to measure, but when we remember that it is only four years since the chaotic days of defeat and flight to Formosa, the spiritual recovery is amazing. There are a large number of men formerly blocked and thwarted on the mainland who are now being given an opportunity to do constructive work. There is a tremendous vitality among the many local and functional organizations on the people’s level which are doing the job of reconstruction and defense. Whatever the motives of the government may be, there is evidence that the Chinese on Formosa feel the government has a strong interest in their welfare and a willingness to coöperate with them rather than to order and command.

On the level of central government there is a change in the temper and influence of the Legislative Yuan, a body which bears few resemblances to our Congress but which is theoretically representative of the Chinese people. Formerly it drafted laws under instructions. Today it calls ministers to account, goes over the budget, investigates special problems, and initiates legislation. The unaccustomed opportunity to criticize and query ministers of state has gone to the heads of some legislators, but in general the record is one of responsibility and hard work. The tenure of the legislators is extended at the pleasure of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo; nevertheless, they are at present permitted to bring a very salutary influence to bear upon the administration and they represent one development which is in the direction of establishing a form of constitutional control over the bureaucracy.

What of the Kuomintang itself? The Central Reform Committee, set up to revise party doctrine, is thought by some to be the real ruler of Formosa. It certainly works closely with the Generalissimo, who is head of the party. One of its first tasks was to review the events of the past ten years and find out what went wrong. Not only committees of the Kuomintang but also special training schools for officials are going intensively into both the past and the future. Blueprints for a reoccupied mainland are already in being. There is no lack of activity, self-criticism, and training. What is the spirit and philosophy behind all this? Has there been a real change?

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IT IS freely admitted that the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen — Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood — were never fully applied on the mainland. In the new party literature the principle of livelihood now takes first place; the principles of nationalism and democracy are considered as the means by which livelihood — that is, economic justice and social harmony — can be achieved. The society that China must have, according to the new literature, will be a Democratic-Socialist society, something like the welfare state of the Labor Party in England. The peasant will have his land, the worker his just wage, the capitalist his limited profit; the state will control all major industrial enterprises and undertake all large-scale public works for agriculture. The bureaucracy will be controlled by the people through their elected representatives. The present constitution, if it is vigorously applied, will guarantee personal freedom for all.

Such, in general outline, is the picture as it is drawn up on paper. It differs from the past in the emphasis on what Dr. Sun called livelihood and the acute realization that if social and economic justice are neglected, both nationalism and democracy, the other two of Sun’s principles, are lost. Many members of the Kuomintang see the problem as one of paying more attention to the welfare of the people and of avoiding corruption. The argument seems to run: we lost because of bad government; therefore, we must become a good government; finally we must persuade people we are a good government by our behavior on Formosa.

All this is to the good, but it is still more the philosophy of a ruling rather than of a controlled bureaucracy. If it were given another chance on the mainland tomorrow, the Kuomintang might well provide good government, but the trouble is that it cannot get back without enlisting the support of other Chinese, both outside and inside Communist China. To do this calls for a political appeal much stronger than the promise of good government. The appeal must capture the imagination and enlist the willing coöperation of many different people, over whom Formosa at present has no political control. It must also be believed.

Chiang Kai-shek has made a bid for political support by announcing that he is willing to let bygones be bygones. He was thinking of all those Chinese who parted from him politically. Whether or not his offer will be reciprocated remains to be seen.

The Kuomintang took a big step toward regaining the political initiative in its declaration on land policy. The peasant on the mainland has been told, by all the devices of psychological warfare, that he may keep his land, however unjust the process by which he got it. Landlords, where they still exist, will be compensated. By accepting the Communist redistribution of land, the Kuomintang recognizes the peasant’s hunger for property, while the compensation to landowners acknowledges the rights of private property and the obligation to redress injustice. This policy also makes possible a powerful psychological campaign to bolster the peasant’s pride in ownership and to stiffen his will against the time when the Communists move on to the next step, that of taking the land away from him to form collective farms.

At the present time it would be difficult to say whether the recovery of Nationalist prestige owes more to the actions of the Kuomintang or to the policies of the Communists. Relations between Formosa and the other Free Chinese are improving. Even though a suspicious attitude towards many Chinese in Hong Kong still persists, room is now being found on Formosa for those who wish to come, and several hundred families have already moved there. Machinery has been set up to assist refugee intellectuals in Hong Kong in other ways. A good many men who have escaped from Communist China are now on Formosa in useful positions. But one big factor in the change is the damage that Peking has done to Communist prestige with Chinese abroad by its efforts to extort money by blackmail, its attack on the business classes and intellectuals on the mainland, and its alliance with Moscow. The drift to the mainland has definitely dropped in volume and there is much more traffic the other way, but Formosa still has far to go before it becomes a beacon for all who would flee from Communism in the East.

Why is this so? The Kuomintang still shows an uneasy concern over the possible rise of a Third Force, a political center of gravity outside of Formosa. In Hong Kong there have always been Chinese who opposed the Kuomintang even before World War II. They are not likely to change. Many have joined them who lived in Kuomintang China until i949 and now, in the political sanctuary of Hong Kong, enjoy the luxury of thumbing their noses at both the Communists and Chiang Kaishek. But Hong Kong is no place to organize political parties, a fact made only too clear by the flight to Japan of Ku Meng-yu, Chang Fa-kwei, and Carsun Chang.

These respected leaders proclaimed in Tokyo, on October 15, 1952, “China’s Fighting League for Free Democracy.” Their program is one to which the Kuomintang could easily subscribe except for the third point, which is directed against itself: “To uphold the principles that the armed forces belong to the state ...” The framers of this declaration believe that the armed forces belong to Chiang and that they are the ultimate guarantee of his authority. They also believe, though it is not too clearly stated in the Tokyo manifesto, that the Kuomintang intends to maintain a one-party dictatorship based on “democratic centralism.” The feeling among Chinese in Singapore and Manila is now generally anti-Communist but not enthusiastically pro-Nationalist. There is an attitude of watchful and not unsympathetic waiting.

What these groups are really waiting for is an indication that the Nationalist Government has the leadership to bring all anti-Communist Chinese together into a vast coalition. Now that Communism is an external rather than an internal threat, now that American support and assistance runs through all levels of Formosan economy and defense structure, now that there are as many Free Chinese living outside Formosa as there are on the island, the conditions may well have arisen which will make possible the emergence of such a mighty coalition. If it emerges, however, it will have to be based on the willing coöperation of many independent Chinese whose loyalty can neither be bought nor coerced.

That the Nationalists have some of the qualities of leadership cannot be denied. Men who had the money and connections to live out their lives in foreign lands, but chose to await what seemed, before the Korean war, to be certain death at the hands of their mortal enemies, have courage and tenacity. The task before them requires more than courage and tenacity; it requires patience, tolerance, and imagination.

The real conflict within Free China is only beginning to emerge because the possibility of political survival is so recent. It is not a conflict between the Kuomintang and other parties, but one which cuts across all groups. The conflict is between two opposing views of how to fight Communism. On the one hand there are those who think that Communism must be fought with Communist techniques. In this group are the Generalissimo’s son, General Chiang Ching-kuo, and the large group of ex-Communists employed by the government. The Kuomintang itself includes many men who do not hold these views, but the party is still organized much as the Russian advisers set it up, and “democratic centralism” is still to be reckoned with. The other group, which holds some but not many of the positions of power, is not so well organized. It feels instinctively that there is something wrong in using Communist techniques, and that democracy is the stronger of the two ideologies, but it needs spiritual support and sound advice to keep up its morale.

In a situation of this sort, one thing is certain. It is to our national interest that Formosa, which is the major center of resistance to Chinese Communism, should rally to its support the energies and enthusiasm of the Free Chinese all over the world. Whether or not the Nationalist Government will be equal to the task depends, in some measure at least, on the way in which American influence is brought to bear.