British Policy and the United States

by Reginald Maudling

IN THIS time of rapid change every nation, great or small, faces the need for adaptation. The United States has the supreme responsibility of adapting itself to the position of world leadership thrust on it by recent history. In the United Kingdom we are particularly subject to the changing currents of history. We recognize the growth of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, whose development has reduced the comparative military power of the United Kingdom to something much below what it was in the nineteenth century or the first half of the twentieth century. Second, we have seen a change in the whole composition of the British Commonwealth, a transition from Empire to Commonwealth, a voluntary relaxation of rule, on a scale and of a character never witnessed before in history. Third, we face across the Channel in Europe a new ferment and new developments of enormous significance, with the ending, as we hope to see, of age-old continental quarrels, and, in their stead, a new political and economic cohesion.

I always remember the analogy that Sir Winston Churchill used to describe the peculiar position of Britain in world affairs. He said that we were at the intersecting point of three great circles, the Commonwealth, North America, and Europe. These are the three great power groupings of the Western world, and we are implicated in all of them by our special position and traditional relationships, confronting us with both problems and responsibilities of a particular character. Our problem is to find a satisfactory basis of relationship with the Commonwealth, with the United States, and with Europe.

I look at this first in the economic context, as it has been with economic problems that I have been mainly concerned. The economic character of the Commonwealth relationship is changing very rapidly. The initial Ottawa concept was based on a system whereby the countries of the Commonwealth supplied the United Kingdom with raw materials and foodstuffs and we supplied them with manufactured goods in exchange. This fundamental basis has been moderated with the development of secondary industries in Commonwealth countries and the expansion of home agriculture in the United Kingdom, with its increasing efficiency and yields. The Commonwealth countries, naturally, have looked to wider world markets for their products as the capacity of the United Kingdom to absorb their increasing output in many commodities, such as cereals, for example, is clearly limited. The impetus to freedom in world trade and to multilateralism given by the post-war agreements on tariffs and trade, such as the G.A.T.T. and the International Monetary Fund, has accelerated this process. We can expect a continuing evolution of the economic relationship between the Commonwealth countries while their financial interrelationship steadily increases in importance. The sterling area system, which is about the most efficient payments union in the world, has been of growing importance to Commonwealth countries, and this factor, together with the significance of their access to development finance in London, is recognized by all of them. What we are seeking is ways in which to strengthen Commonwealth trade and financial links in the changing circumstances of the present day. In recent weeks, for example, a £20 million issue has been made by the Australian government on the London market, and the Commonwealth finance ministers have agreed to consider a British suggestion that a systematic collation of the development plans and forecasts of individual Commonwealth countries might well reveal new opportunities for the expansion of trade among them.

Our economic relationships with the United States are of a special character and involve both trade and finance. The United States is now our largest single market in the world, and I have no doubt that the potential for the development of our sales to the United States over the next decade is very great indeed. But possibly even more significant is the interdependence of our two currencies. The dollar and the pound sterling provide the reserve currencies of the world, and their strength, like their availability, is of fundamental importance to the economic health of the whole free world and to the prospects of stability and of economic growth. There have been many examples recently of the need for the managers of dollar and sterling to work together in every possible way, as at the time of the Cuban crisis or when there has been speculation in the London gold market. Their interests are in common, and they are interests of great importance to the whole Western world.

Finally, there is the problem of our economic relationship with the new Europe. It would be idle to deny that we have been disappointed in our hopes for the establishment of a single European economic system. The breakdown of the recent negotiations in Brussels came as a blow to us and, I believe, to the Western world as a whole. In the meantime, the European Free Trade Association is growing in strength and confidence, and we shall have to exercise effort and ingenuity over a period ahead to work out in the new circumstances of 1964 the proper relationships between ourselves and our E.F.T.A. partners, and the European Economic Community.

I HAVE so far been speaking in purely economic terms, but the political significance of the picture that I have been trying to draw is clear. Unless we can solve the economic problems of our participation in these three intersecting circles, then many political problems will remain unsolved and may indeed be aggravated.

Let us take a fresh look at the Commonwealth. Here is an association of free countries embracing more than a fifth of the entire population of the globe, more than 600 million people, a multiracial association of people of every creed and color and background. The importance of the political cohesion of the Commonwealth to the future of the free world cannot be exaggerated. If this great experiment — and it still is an experiment — can be shown to be continuously successful, then we shall have achieved something of lasting importance for mankind. And political success, success in maintaining the political cohesion of the Commonwealth, depends very intimately upon our economic relationships. Particularly with the underdeveloped countries of the Commonwealth, where life is lived so near the edge of subsistence, anything that clashes with their economic interest, anything that appears to be treating unfairly their claims to develop their own economies, is bound to have serious political repercussions as well.

Our economic relations with the United States, their scale and significance, find a direct parallel in the political field. By reason of culture, background, and adherence to the ideals of freedom and of democracy the relationship between our two countries is immensely close; and as the two original Western members of the so-called nuclear club, we share in matters of defense, finance, and foreign policy a reciprocity and trust which are of utmost importance.

In Europe economic and political factors must be interrelated. A strong economy is essential to a strong and positive foreign policy. No one listens very closely to a man who is going bankrupt. No country that cannot afford to pay for its own defense — no country, indeed, that cannot play its full part in aiding the developing countries of the world — can really hope to wield substantial and effective influence in world councils.

It is for these reasons that we attach the highest importance to international economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, and the G.A.T.T. We have made clear our determination to play our full part in the Kennedy round. We are producing our full share of the resources of the Bank. We regard the Fund as a particularly appropriate mechanism for expanding the resources that underpin world trade, it is the conviction of the Conservative Party that these three objectives — trade, more rapid development, and greater resources to sustain an expanding volume of international payments — are indispensable and interlinked. It is fortunate that the United States and the United Kingdom can share to a high degree a common outlook on all these problems.

Against this background I would define the main planks of British foreign and defense policy as follows: first, the closest possible cooperation with the United States — this by reason both of the power of the United States and of the traditions of cooperation between our two countries that have been and are so immensely valuable; second, full participation in NATO and in other alliances throughout the world. It is sometimes forgotten that the United Kingdom has responsibilities on a worldwide scale — in the Indian Ocean and the Far East, for example — which other European members of NATO do not have to shoulder.

Third, I believe we should retain our independent deterrent. I do not think it would be a good thing for us as a country to pass the burden of defending ourselves in modern conditions by modern weapons wholly onto the shoulders of someone else. Alliances are essential, but independence in the ultimate, however inconceivable the ultimate may be, may tend to strengthen the basis of alliance rather than to weaken it. Fourth, we must always consider the strain on our economy. Our ability to give aid overseas, our ability to maintain our position and maintain confidence in ourselves, and our willingness to defend ourselves depend very much on the extent to which our economy is under control. All expenditures overseas, in support of policy, on defense, on aid, on propaganda, on diplomacy, on trade promotion, should be regarded as one. But the strength of sterling is vital too, and the total of our overseas expenditure must in the long run be limited to what we can afford.

The strength of sterling and the prospects for growth without inflation in the British economy depend, in the Conservative view, not on more nationalization or state control, but on the cooperation of government, management, and unions within a free economy.

THE ultimate aim of our policy must clearly be complete disarmament and the establishment of the rule of law among the nations. I am convinced myself that this must come about eventually. The logic of history demands it. I am confident also that the processes by which it is achieved, the transition from individual to collective self-help, and from that to the establishment of the concept of central authority and universality of law, will be very similar to the processes that have taken place within individual communities. Of course, it is a far more difficult and complex problem on a world scale; and the time involved, despite the impetus given by the development of nuclear weapons and the threat of mutual destruction, must be very long. While we keep this ultimate objective in our minds, however, it is only realistic to recognize that the short-term problems must be solved, often by means that may well, on the face of them, seem inconsistent with our long-term objective. Partial disarmament is a step in the direction of complete disarmament; but partial disarmament incompletely controlled and without inspection may in fact prove to be a step in the wrong direction. It is of the highest importance for the Western powers to refuse to let down their guard in circumstances where they cannot be sure of reciprocity. Britain has learned very well the lesson of 1939 that a country or an alliance is only attacked when it is thought to be weak.

We must build for the short term on the realities of power. This contingency was recognized in the Charter of the United Nations; it provides that all nations are equal but that some, the permanent members of the Security Council, are “more equal than others.” In a way this conflicts with the concept of universal law, but any attempt to work on a different basis would have been doomed to failure and would have made progress toward our ultimate objective even more difficult. We must therefore build always on the facts of the East-West relationship. But these facts are changing, and changing fast. One of the difficulties for the West in dealing with Communist countries is the absence of public opinion and of individual contacts. I am sure this leads us to be slow to recognize changes that take place within Communist societies and to suspect the genuineness of such changes, which may not be justified. Clearly, Russian society is evolving quickly. I am sure that nothing can add more to the prospects of a peaceful world than improving living standards in the Soviet Union. It is no exaggeration to say that if Russian women could be allowed to buy Western clothes and Western cosmetics freely, a really substantial psychological advance would be made. But while Russian society is evolving in one way, the split between Russia and China is evolving in a totally different manner. This has developed so rapidly and so remarkably that I, for one, find it extremely difficult to assess the course that will be taken in the future relations between them. Yet upon Russia and China the whole pattern of relationships between the great powers in the next generation will depend.

I do not believe that the desire for world domination is the same as it was in the earlier days of Russian Communist imperialism. Of course, the Russians will not miss any opportunity of advancing their own interests and extending their own influence, whether against the Western powers or against the Chinese. But they seem more and more determined to strengthen their position in the world not so much by aggression and subversion — though these have not been abandoned — as by the assertion of what they confidently believe: namely, the logical superiority of Communism over any other form of human organization and its inevitable triumph in what Khrushchev has described as the peaceful struggle with capitalism. The dominant features of the Soviet outlook at the moment seem to be pride and suspicion. The Russians have an immense and genuine pride in their own achievements, which we can readily understand when we consider how far they have come in so short a time. They also have a deep suspicion of the West, and particularly of West Germany. This suspicion — and, indeed, fear — is more difficult to understand at a time when the power of Russia is so immensely greater than the military strength of West Germany. But, understandable or not, these are the two dominant motives in the Russian mind and in Russian policy, and we must frame our policies on this basis. We must be flexible and take account of their national pride as well as of our own. We must find means of reaching genuine agreements, yet realize that firmness will be recognized and respected as long as it is clear what we are being firm about and why. Suspicious people always look for deep and dangerous motives; that is why it is essential to make our own motives as clear as possible at all times.

In addition, the West must continue to carry a heavy burden of defense. The Russians, with their pride, would not understand or respect people who have not the pride to defend their own way of life. There is, as I have said, no inconsistency between maintaining an adequate defense and the long-term objective of disarmament. Indeed, the one is necessary to the other.

Within the defense field there is the special problem of nuclear weapons. We hold the view that NATO should have a nuclear force, and at the meeting of the Council in Ottawa early this year, the view was accepted that member countries should assign what they could to such a force. We have already done so by assigning our heavy bomber force to NATO. This development in Ottawa was a British initiative and shows our determination to support the growing strength of the alliance.

At the same time we recognize the great importance of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is one of the main reasons for the significance we attach to the success of the partial test ban negotiations. It is surely by building on this important measure of agreement that we can hope to find practical means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Conservative Party does not share the view that as part of the process we should abandon our independent nuclear deterrent. The position of the United Kingdom is a very special one. We have been in the nuclear business from the very start. Indeed, it is fair to say that the first work upon which nuclearweapon development was based during the war was done by British scientists. The Prime Minister and the President have an understanding not to use nuclear weapons anywhere in the world without prior consultation with each other if circumstances permit. I do not think it would contribute to the general objective, any more than it would contribute to the long-term interests of the United Kingdom, for us to abandon our independent deterrent. We have, as I say, assigned our nuclear forces to NATO, but we reserve our ultimate right to use them in our own defense if overwhelming reasons of national interest appear to demand this. The Conservative Party believes that the lessons of history and the responsibilities of the British government fully justify this reservation.

Underlying all this is the position of the United Nations. In its original constitution, with its approach to the universal rule of law combined with its realistic assessment of the position of the great powers, the United Nations affords the most helpful approach to our long-term objectives of peace and disarmament. I believe that this is still true. But one cannot fail to notice that some recent developments in the working of the United Nations have been of a disturbing character. There has been an attempt to stretch the rules of the Charter far beyond what was originally intended, and, in particular, there have been efforts to intervene in the internal affairs of member countries. These attempts to distort the rules and to carry the authority of the United Nations beyond its proper sphere, together with a feeling from time to time that different standards are applied by the Assembly to the actions of different countries, cannot fail to give rise to disquiet. The United Nations cannot afford double standards, and it cannot afford the manipulation of its rules to suit particular political ends. I believe that the United States and the United Kingdom have once again a common interest in supporting the United Nations to the full and in ensuring that the original purposes of the Charter, which are in the long-term interests of mankind, are progressively realized.