The Middle East

on the World Today

No AMOUNT of ringing prose about Arab unity can conceal its elusive quality. Hard economic facts and persistent divisions plague the architects of a united Arab world. The first Arab summit meeting in Cairo last January, called by Gamal Abdel Nasser to deal with the alleged threat to the Arabs from Israel’s impending withdrawals of water from Lake Tiberias, seemed to break down barriers. Kings and presidents buried their differences and agreed on a common front in the face of the Israeli challenge.

They voted to set up a unified Arab army command under an Egyptian general, Abdel Hakim Amer. The richer states agreed to subsidize this force, including a unit to be recruited from Palestinians. A Palestinian entity, with headquarters in Jerusalem, was created. It too was promised a budget to sustain it in carrying the Palestine case to world capitals and the United Nations. It was agreed also that long-standing plans to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River, which rise in Lebanon and Syria, should be carried out. A technical committee was set up to execute these projects, with instructions to proceed as soon as the Unified Command gave the order.

All of this political activity served to postpone an actual confrontation with Israel over the Jordan River. The necessity for such postponement was obvious. Arab chiefs of staff had appraised the strength of the armies around the perimeter of Israel, and their report agreed with Israel’s own estimates of their weakness. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria would not stand a chance in any prolonged encounter with Israel.

In the face of this unpalatable truth Nasser offered two remedies. One was actual unification of Arab armies into a mixed force; the other was economic development. “Palestine,” he said, “is not the army alone ... it is the power of our production.”

Any attempts to unify the armies of the physically divided Arab world run at once into more than geographical snags. Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait receive their arms from Western sources. Iraq, Syria, and Egypt depend on the U.S.S.R. But even in the heyday of Khrushchev’s expansive generosity to Egypt there were fears in Cairo of being totally dependent on Moscow. There had been one bad moment in 1956 when the mere possibility of an Anglo-Russian agreement on an arms embargo to the Middle East had spurred Egypt to recognize the Peiping government.

Later, Egypt turned to West Germany for technicians to help develop Egyptian military planes and engines as insurance against overdependence on Moscow. Today, with a Labor government in London known to favor arms reduction, and an uncertain prospect in Moscow, Cairo must again take stock.

Uneasy alliance

Even if the arms issue were settled, Arab military unity is unlikely for political reasons. In Lebanon the delicate political balance between Christians and Muslims could not survive the appearance of a mixed Arab force, which would naturally be mainly Muslim. In Syria the sad experiment in premature unity with Egypt between 1958 and 1961 left indelible scars. The reappearance of Egyptian officers in Damascus would be the signal now for open civil war between the Nasserites and the nationalists, who presently control Syria.

Iraq today is uneasily tied to Egypt by an agreement to coordinate policy through a presidential council. But the country lacks the internal stability to support any basic decisions; and the regime could change at any time. Still convalescing from the anarchy of the Kassem era. Iraq has yet to turn up a leader who can win the confidence of the Kurds in the north and the Shi’ite Muslims in the south in a Baghdad government run by Sunni Muslims. The attempt of President Abdel Salam Arif to attach his country to Egypt and the presence of an Egyptian brigade in Iraq simply mean that Arif lacks internal support. Any plan for union could, if pushed too far, bring stronger separatist movements within Iraq itself.

Finally, Jordan presents an almost insoluble problem to advocates of unity. King Hussein’s regime provides the essential buffer between the Arabs and Israelis. There have been no major breaks in the armed truce along the Jordan frontier for ten years. But any disturbance of the status quo, any shift toward Egyptian hegemony in Amman or Jerusalem, would end this truce.

King Hussein’s survival and his ability to maintain at least a semblance of independence from Cairo are therefore crucial. His position is greatly complicated by the fact that two thirds of the population of Jordan today are Palestinians, and that the more activist elements among them look to Cairo for support in their unrelenting campaign against Israel. Hussein must maintain his own position as a leader in this struggle in the face of increasing pressures from the Nasserites, the Baathi nationalists, and the ever present Muslim Brother hood.

In spite of the delicacy of his position, Hussein has also been under heavy Egyptian pressure in recent months to enlarge his army and to accept Russian arms. His response has been to resist the Russian arms, but to retire many of his former officers, mainly the British-trained bedouin, who are targets of Nasserist derision. He has also appealed to Washington for supersonic jets to match the Mirages Israel gets from France.

American aid for Jordan

Washington’s reluctance to assist the arms race in the Middle East has made it hesitate over the request for jets. In every other way, Washington continues to bolster Hussein. United States aid to Jordan now amounts to about $33 million a year, down from a previous rate of $40 million because Jordan’s economy has improved. Technical assistance has gone into education, roads, phosphate production, tourism, and export administration. The East Ghor Canal, which carries Yarmuk River water into the Jordan Valley, was made possible with U.S. aid funds. The energy and hard work shown by the Jordanians have made these infusions of funds productive. Jordan is on the way to becoming a going concern in spite of its limited resources and its burden of population per irrigable acre.

Jordan has received fresh encouragement recently in the form of loans from Kuwait. The most important of these is $12 million to finance a dam at Mukeiba on the Yarmuk River. Its construction will not impinge on Israel’s present water conduit from Tiberias. But it will tend to confirm the partitioning of the Jordan River system which has taken place since the late Eric Johnston failed to get agreement on his unified plan for the system ten years ago.

As it now turns out, the final allocations under that plan, which gave the Arab riparians about 60 percent of the river and Israel the rest, have guided Israel and Jordan in their own water plans.

Still a burning issue today is the proposed diversion of Jordan headwaters, which rise in Lebanon and Syria. The Arabs contend that if they do not claim the main share of these streams, they will be permitting Israel to appropriate the upstream flood waters. Yet any move within Lebanon or Syria to dam up or divert these streams means a sure attack by Israel.

The question is particularly explosive in Syria, where jurisdiction over three demilitarized zones along the Jordan and Lake Tiberias remains unsettled. Fhe situation in these zones has been obscured so long at the United Nations that de facto occupation of them by Israel is protested only by Syria. As Jordan now starts its new dam at Mukeiba, two miles from the Israeli line in the southern demilitarized zone, new disputes aresure to arise.

The bitter refugees

Closely involved with the river question is the Arab refugee situation, due for full debate this year at the General Assembly because the United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s current mandate ends in June, 1965. It is fourteen years since UNRWA was set up to furnish minimal temporary relief to the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who left home during the fighting in 1948. Today, these refugees fall into three categories. Nearly half are still practically destitute and survive on the seven cents a day which UNRWA provides for food. An intermediate category — some 30 to 40 percent — are partially self-supporting. Between 10 and 20 percent are securely re-established.

Whatever their situation, the refugees hold the international community responsible for their exile. Time has increased their bitterness, and wherever they go, they carry this grievance with them. UNRWA operates on a budget of some $37 million a year. Of this amount the United States contributes about $27 million, and other Western powers much of the balance. In 1963-1964 the Arab host states contributed $6,574,000. A vocational-school program now reaches 3300 young men and women from refugee families and assures them a future livelihood. This program is credited with helping to reduce the relief rolls in 1964 for the first time in many years.

A second question affecting the future of the refugees is the issue of compensation for properties abandoned by them. In 1964 the Conciliation Commission for Palestine completed its inventory and appraisal of the immovable properties held by Palestinians in 1947. The list includes 453,000 separate parcels of holdings and covers 5 million acres of land. Repeated resolutions at the United Nations since 1948 have called for giving the refugees a choice between repatriation and compensation for their lost properties. The availability of the CCP inventory makes it inevitable that claims for income from these properties will be pursued on the Arab side.

Israel’s Jewish population is not likely to grow greatly in the coming years. Immigration from the West is a trickle, and from the Soviet Union impossible. Yet the rate of natural increase of the Arabs now in Israel far exceeds that of the Israeli Jews. Admission of any significant number of former Palestinians would only compound this demographic problem. The compensation issue is no simpler. If Arab property claims are honored, either with interest-bearing bonds or some other form of compensation, the refugees will still not relinquish their political status.

Cairo takes stock

At best Egypt faces a difficult year. Nasser had gambled on the tie between him and Khrushchev and had moved a long way to accommodate his policies to those of the U.S.S.R. without actually becoming a satellite. Now he must take his place in the line waiting to see whether Khrushchev’s promises, including some $300 million in further credits to Egyptian industry and agriculture, will be honored.

Even before Khrushchev’s downfall, Cairo was feeling the pinch. The World Bank took Egypt off the list of countries eligible for loans because of its expropriation policies. Other sources of funds were becoming inaccessible. Interest is due on the Aswan Dam loans. And there was evidence of hunger in Egypt.

The regime’s response to these difficulties has been action rather than talk. Negotiations are going on with Swiss and Belgian representatives over compensation claims for properties expropriated by Cairo after Suez. Imports from hard currency countries have been greatly restricted. The Suez Canal is to be deepened again, so as to accommodate even larger oil cargoes. Suez Canal tolls have been raised by one percent, to bring in more than the present $150 million a year in foreign exchange. A $98 million loan has been secured from Kuwait. And realistic bookkeeping and cost accounting are being introduced into state industries. At stake now is a renewal of the Food for Peace agreement, under which Washington has sold surplus grains to Egypt for the past three years.

Arab unity remains a dream. The Saud family, taking the lesson of Yemen to heart, has inaugurated unheard-of reforms and appears to be consolidating its hold on Saudi Arabia. Lebanon’s free market and political independence provide a showcase for laissez-faire. Yemen seems finally on the way to a truce and a compromise regime. But it has not been a glorious success, as wars go. It has taken too much blood and treasure and yielded meager political rewards to Cairo.