Mississippi and the Negro Question

THE negro problem is no longer strictly a party question. Candid Republicans at the North admit that domination by the ignorant blacks of the Gulf States is something to be dreaded. The suppression of the negro vote, wherever such a step is necessary to secure control of the government by the whites, is winked at, if not applauded. There is no longer a doubt that the Fifteenth Amendment is disregarded in practice where it is not nullified on the face of the state law. There is grave doubt if the burst of philanthropy which produced the last amendment did not overleap itself, and consign the negro to an illegal inequality where he might, have suffered legal disfranchisement. The Southern States have been feeling their way toward a solution of the problem under the forms and outward seeming of law. The time when force or organized manipulation of ballots may be called into requisition to keep the power in the hands of Caucasians seems about to give place to an epoch of statutory prohibition or control. The demand for national guardianship of elections has come from an appreciation of the fact that negro citizens are not allowed to vote ; but it is difficult to see how any force bill could prevent the false operation of certain laws that appear to have been drawn up with exceeding candor and indiscriminate fairness. An indication of this quasi-legal method of solving the question of negro suffrage is given by the Constitution of Mississippi adopted in 1890. Of course this may be but the act of a single State, and not indicative of a Southern tendency to escape from the devilish control of ignorance on the one side, or the deep blue sea of national legislation on the other. If it be an unrelated act, however, it is an interesting one, and brings up several very puzzling questions in law and politics.

Fortunately, the task which the convention set itself has been clearly put before us, and comparatively little is left for vague implication or shadowy inference. The president of the convention, on taking the chair, gave a short address to its members. He referred to various duties resting upon the convention, but the one upon which he dwelt almost to the exclusion of all others was the duty of settling the political relationship between the white and the black citizens of the State. The following words are perhaps the most salient and suggestive : —

“ This ballot system must be so arranged as to effect one object, permit me to say ; for we find the two races now together, the rule of one of which has always meant economic and moral ruin ; we find another race whose rule has always meant prosperity and happiness to all races.

“ What does the instinct of self-preservation compel us to do ? We have been twenty-five long years endeavoring to have strictly homologous political relations between these races. We have failed.”

He called upon the convention to determine upon some rule which would work for the full benefit of all. Now, the basic idea of this unimpassioned address is that there is a racial difference ; that political brotherhood seems an impossibility between members of these two races. The convention, therefore, is called upon to devise some method whereby one race may rule. The speaker did not say plainly that the task was to find a way of bestowing political authority permanently upon a minority of the people, but there is no other fair interpretation of his words.

As soon as the convention was fully organized and had fairly begun its work, the judiciary committee was requested to report upon the “ effect of the act of Congress readmitting Mississippi into the Union, limiting the right of the State of Mississippi to impose certain restrictions upon the right of franchise, and otherwise prohibiting the States from changing the Constitution of the State of Mississippi adopted in 1869.” The committee reported that in its opinion the State of Mississippi was “reinvested with all the sovereign powers possessed by any and all the other States.” The reasoning of the report may be summarized as follows: (1.) The Constitution originally left to the State the authority to determine qualifications for suffrage. (2.) The Fourteenth Amendment recognizes the same right. (3.) The Fifteenth Amendment simply forbids discrimination on account of " race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” (4.) However one may interpret the rebellion and the acts of reconstruction, when once Mississippi was reëstablished in full fellowship in the Union she was on an equality with other States, and at full liberty to alter her Constitution as she might deem best.

Acting in accord with the report of this committee, the convention adopted as a portion of the new Constitution a clause materially altering the basis of suffrage as established by the Constitution of 1869. Such an act is in direct conflict with the act of Congress in 1870 reconstituting Mississippi in her constitutional relations. This statute, which readmitted the State to representation in Congress, established as a “ fundamental condition ” that her Constitution should never be amended so as to deprive any citizen, or class of citizens, of the right to vote who had such right under the Constitution then recognized, unless such deprivation he because of crime. In the Constitution of 1890 we find the provision that every elector must be able to read any section of the Constitution of the State, or he must be able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof. In a State where the percentage of illiteracy is as high as it is in Mississippi, this clause places a great limitation upon suffrage, and is a material variation from the Constitution recognized by the act of 1870.

We may, therefore, stop to consider: (1.) Is the statute reëstablishing Mississippi in her full federal and legal relations still in force, and are its conditions binding upon her? (2.) Is there any portion of the national Constitution which would invalidate this suffrage clause in the Mississippi Constitution ?

(1.) The Supreme Court has decided that, from a legal point of view, the rebellious States were not out of the Union. The rebellion was an insurrection. The citizens of the Southern States were citizens of the United States, and were forcibly held to their allegiance. The States, after the war, must needs be held by the strong arm of the central government, and all the acts of reconstruction may be explained as the establishment of a republican form of government. If Mississippi, then, was not legally out of the Union, the act admitting her to her full federal relations was not an act passed by Congress under the clause of the Constitution which says, “New States may be admitted by Congress into this Union.” It was a portion of its work of repressing rebellion and establishing loyal and republican governments. It was an act directed against a State already in the Union. There seems now no good reason to doubt that Congress had the power to demand any condition precedent to the recognition that a Southern State was at peace with a legitimate government. To deny this is simply to deny that Congress had authority to carry on the war. But the act of February, 1870, includes a condition subsequent, a condition which is intended to be perpetually binding on the State. If this act is still in force, Mississippi is bound by limitations that are not in effect against the majority of her sister States, and we have a Union of unequal members. Such subsequent conditions are sometimes, without the least consideration, swept aside as illegal and void. It is not my intention to maintain that they are valid ; but it is worth our while to note the first manifest instance of disregard of these reconstruction limitations on the part of a State. It is also worth while to notice that for years Congress has acted upon the supposition that it has a right, upon admitting a State, to establish conditions subsequent as well as precedent. In other words, Congress seems to have adopted the theory that, our Union is not necessarily one of equal members ; and it has acted upon the hypothesis that, as the agent of the great sovereignty, the people of the United States, it has a right to establish a new State as may be deemed best. Congressional suppositions, theories, and hypotheses with no great difficulty pass into legalized construction of authority.

The Supreme Court, in a series of cases of comparatively recent date, has adopted the doctrine, seemingly, that conditions cannot be superimposed upon a State which would deprive it of the freedom of action possessed by other States. For a time the Ordinance of 1787 was held to be irrevocable in the portions intended to be permanent, unless revoked by common consent of the State and the United States. But now the reverse seems to be the settled decision of the court. If, therefore, such a fundamental compact as the Ordinance is to be disregarded, there can be little doubt that such a proclamation as that contained in the act reconstructing Mississippi would be of no effect. In fact, the problem becomes, on examination, a fairly simple one. Mississippi was in the Union ; can Congress, by an act that is in no sense a compact, quietly declare that the State shall not alter her Constitution in a particular manner ? If so, we no longer have the semblance of state rights, but a mere consolidated government. It must be remembered that the act in question simply stated that Mississippi was then (1870) entitled to representation in Congress, on the fundamental condition that she should not in the future change the Constitution in the way indicated. This condition is a mere threat, and in no sense a compact ; its legality must be determined in the light of the legislative competence of Congress.

(2.) Is there any portion of the national Constitution which would render illegal this suffrage clause in the Mississippi Constitution ? The Fifteenth Amendment forbids discrimination only on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. There is no indication on the face of the Mississippi law that it is intended to work such discrimination. If we are justified, however, in reading this law in the light of the words of the president of the convention, there was an intention to make race discrimination; for in that speech there is no mention of the evils that result from the suffrage in the hands of ignorant whites. The complaint is racial incompatibility. It is trivial to attempt to base a legal interpretation upon such words ; but it may be interesting, as showing how easily a clause of the Constitution which seems to make a breach depend on the intention of the lawmakers may be avoided.

Let us consider, in the next place, whether the United States may interfere, under the Fifteenth Amendment, in case this law, impartial on its face, is partially administered. That it may, and probably will, be put Into operation so as to preclude the negro from voting, while his equally ignorant white neighbor is allowed the privilege, appears from the fact that the inability to read does not constitute an absolute basis of exclusion ; for the inspectors may allow a person to vote who can understand or give a reasonable interpretation of a section of the Constitution when read to him. It is apparent that an inspector may very easily reject as unreasonable an interpretation from a colored man, and accept one no whit better from a white man. Such discrimination in practice would be very hard to discover. Yet that the United States government would have the legal right to prevent such virtual disfranchisement on account of race and color may be inferred, perhaps, from the decisions of the United States courts in the interpretation of the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids any State from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. The court has in more than one instance given relief where a law, valid on its face, has been so administered as to deprive certain persons of equal protection of the laws.

The judiciary committee, in making the report above referred to, spent little time in consideration of the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment precluded the convention from altering the basis of suffrage. It was rightly argued that the amendment was built upon the supposition that each State had the right to determine who should be entitled to the privilege. The committee declares that the clause of the amendment which relates to the franchise was inserted to give the State the choice of retaining the colored race as part of the electoral body with full representation, or its exclusion with diminished representation. The conclusion of the Committee, though not clearly expressed, seems to be that any law which does not directly disfranchise the negroes, or perhaps exclude any class from the suffrage, would not be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, no matter how many persons were actually deprived of the right to vote. In other words, the amendment is reduced to its lowest terms, and interpreted as simply an effort to compel, indirectly, the Southern States to grant suffrage to the negroes. There is even some indication that the committee thought that the alternative clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was made inoperative by the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, and that now any restriction may be placed upon the franchise, provided it is not a discrimination on account of race or color. Such an interpretation will bear investigation ; for if the judiciary committee did not mean to give such a judgment, there are many people who apparently do. On the other hand, the daily press occasionally seems even to argue that, while the last amendment covers directly the ground which the suffrage clause of the Fourteenth covers indirectly or in alternative, still a Southern State which has denied or abridged the suffrage on account of race or color may be punished by a reduction of its representative population. The truth is that it is the duty of Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, and it has not the right to recognize a breach by enforcing the alternative mentioned in the Fourteenth. If the suffrage clause of the latter is still in force, it has to do with cases where the denial or abridgment of the right to vote is for some other cause than race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

We come fairly to the question, therefore, whether or not this clause in the last Mississippi Constitution gives legal authority for Congress to interfere under the Fourteenth Amendment. And first we may inquire, Is the establishment of an educational qualification a denial or abridgment of the right to vote, and does a State, by adopting such a basis for suffrage, subject itself to a loss of representation ? Judge Cooley, than whom there can be no higher authority save the Supreme Court itself, seems to hold to the opinion that a reasonable educational qualification would not be a denial of the right to vote. Other authorities might be cited.

I desire to give a short historical statement, without a long argument, to prove that the history, as I read it, must be accepted as the final basis for construing the Fourteenth Amendment. It is certainly much to be doubted whether the Supreme Court would construe as an abridgment or denial of the suffrage an act which makes the right to vote dependent on ability to read. That tribunal has handled all the nationalizing legislation of the reconstruction period in a gingerly manner, and has persistently refused to be infected with the popular enthusiasm for centralization and vigorous law which was a natural consequent of the suppression of the rebellion. A bare majority of the court in the Slaughter-House cases put meaning upon the words “ privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ” which would have surprised many of the Republican members of the Congress which was responsible for the expression. The conservative tendencies of the court may even more palpably restrain it when it comes to interpret the clause the meaning of which we are here discussing. This, at least, seems certain, that no more vigor will be read into the words than what is necessary and inevitable.

Before entering upon an examination of the intention of the framers of the amendment as evinced by their words, it may be said that such testimony is not conclusive. In the first place, the Constitution needs careful construction, and must, so far as possible, be judged as a whole. Moreover, what the framers of the Constitution may have intended to say is of no great consequence if they actually said something else. And again, statements made in Congress when an amendment is proposed can form at the best but a small fraction of what was said concerning its adoption, and can give but comparatively slight evidence of the intention of its framers. For the members of Congress are not the actual makers or the lawgivers of a constitutional amendment, but the legislatures of the States, possibly even all the people who elect these legislatures, are the real constituting authority; and were one to base his interpretation simply on the intentions of framers extraneously expressed, he would have an interminable task to discover them. The original Constitution was not made the fundamental law of the land by the Philadelphia convention, but by the people who ratified it. And yet, if phrases are ambiguous, it is quite allowable to endeavor to discover their meaning from words used in debate. The statements of James Wilson or Alexander Hamilton are not decisive, but they are illuminating. The debates of the Philadelphia convention are constantly examined in search of aids to interpretation. The statements of Thaddeus Stevens, William Pitt Fessenden, Benjamin Wade, or Jacob M. Howard may not be read with the same reverence as are the words of the “fathers,”but these men played a great part in forming the Fourteenth Amendment. Beyond doubt, the Republican party throughout the country was actuated by much the same motives and moved by much the same arguments as were its leaders in Congress.

We of course remember that by the Constitution three fifths of all the slaves were included in the representative population of a State. A serious party and political problem faced the Republicans at the end of the war. If the Constitution remained unchanged, all the blacks would be counted. This would increase the representation of the Southern States, to the manifest detriment of the Republican party, and unjustly, it was claimed, inasmuch as the negroes, though now free, were not given the right to vote. The purpose of this suffrage clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was, in the beginning at least, to deprive the South of this advantage. Many did not believe the South would actually give the negro the right to vote ; but if it were not granted, the Democracy must not reap the political advantage of emancipation. As time went on in the discussion of the amendment, enthusiasm in the cause of freedom brought quite a number of the Congressmen under the spell of philanthropy and brotherly love. There was a serious desire to get the ballot for the freedman, and there was much declamation to prove his worth. It is difficult to tell how far this feeling, which ultimately produced the Fifteenth Amendment, had developed by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in Congress. It is plain, however, that the whole contest awakened a wide sympathy, if not sentimentality, and that the feeling was not all directed to the freedmen, but compassed the unenfranchised North and South. We find statements about the “ natural right ” to vote. Advocates of woman’s suffrage seemed to be winning converts.

The form in which the Fourteenth Amendment first passed the House was not that in which it was finally adopted. The crucial portion of the first form reads as follows: “Provided, That whenever ths elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons therein of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation.” A careful reading of this clause will bring out the full meaning of it. It compelled the Southern States either to give at once full suffrage to all the negroes, or to lose representatives. But some other ground for disfranchisement than one based on race or color might be discovered. This, it was apparent, was a grave objection. The Southern States might easily by law prevent the negroes from voting, and yet be entitled to their full representation on the ground that the discrimination was not made because of race or color. It was admitted by Mr. Stevens and Mr. Conkling in debate that this amendment did not prevent the establishment of any qualification whatever, provided it was impartial in its terms and actions. Mr. Stevens said, in response to a question, that a property qualification would not make a State liable to the penalty of the amendment, even though the result would be the practical disfranchisement of all the blacks. Now this was strongly objected to by many Republicans, who maintained that the Southern States could easily avoid the law. “ A State,” said Mr. Farnsworth, “may enact that a man shall not exercise the elective franchise except he can read and write, making that law apply equally to the whites and blacks ; and then may also enact that a black man shall not learn to read and write, . . . and thus prevent his qualifying to exercise the elective franchise according to state law. ... It seems to me, therefore, necessary that we should, by some provision in this amendment, settle this beyond a peradventure, so that none of these shifts or devices may defeat the purpose of the enactment.” Mr. Farnsworth voted for a substitute for the original article which made representation depend on the number of voters, and not on population. Twentyfive Republicans out of a total Republican vote of 129 supported this substitute. In addition to such remarks as these, special reference may be made to the speeches of Mr. Baker, Mr. Jenckes, Mr. Shellabarger, Mr. Eliot, Mr. Pike, and Mr. Ward. Many demanded an amendment that would exclude the negroes from the basis of representation, if for any reason whatsoever they were not permitted to vote.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Broomall, in the debate on the amendment in its first form, introduced an amendment of his own, the important clause in which is almost identical with the one in the Fourteenth Amendment as it now stands. Mr. Broomall was a Republican, and, his own amendment being rejected, voted for the amendment as presented by the committee. Advocating his own amendment, however, he used these words : “ If Massachusetts should declare by law that she will not let her citizens who cannot read and write vote, and if by that there is the one hundredth part of her male population denied the elective franchise, why, Massachusetts must submit to have that proportion of her population excluded from her basis of representation.”

The amendment in the form introduced by the joint committee on reconstruction (as quoted before) was passed by the House, but was rejected by the Senate. It is not perfectly evident why the Senate rejected it. A careful examination of the speeches of those Republicans who spoke in opposition to it fails to bring out any very clear line of reasoning or objection. Some believed that the amendment did not go far enough, and countenanced discrimination which in no way should be recognized by a national Congress. Many were in favor of going further, and establishing suffrage inviolably in the negro. It would appear as if the Republicans feared that the sentiment of the country was not yet in favor of complete and immediate negro suffrage. This action, then, ought not to carry undue weight; but I pass on to a consideration of the amendment in the shape in which, with a few immaterial changes, it became a part of the Constitution. (Introduced into the House April 30, 1866.)

Mr. Farnsworth, whose words are quoted above, supported the second section of the article on the ground that the objections to the first form were not applicable to this; in other words, that the Southern States could not reduce their voting population for any reason, and still be entitled to full representation in Congress. The most complete testimony as to the meaning of this section of the amendment is found in the debates of the Senate. Because of the illness of Mr. Fessenden, who was chairman of the committee of fifteen, Jacob M. Howard, a Senator from Michigan, introduced the resolutions, and explained with some care the meaning of their various provisions. He seemingly interprets " privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States ” much more liberally than did the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House cases. He declares that those words include the restrictions in the first eight amendments. It may be argued that if the Supreme Court did not consider itself bound by the statements of the committee in one case, it would not in another. It may, however, be said that there is some ambiguity in the first clause, and that there was in the Senate itself some confusion and misunderstanding concerning the general phrases there used. But no one can find, I believe, any difference of opinion as to the meaning of the second clause. The true basis of representation was acknowledged to be persons, and not simply voters ; but this principle was varied by the alternative clause, which it was thought would have the effect of compelling the Southern States either to grant manhood suffrage or to lose proportionately. Yet it is perfectly apparent that to avoid the appearance of rank partiality, and to win Northern voters by fairness and justice, the amendment was made general in its terms, including North as well as South, and directed against any kind of denial or abridgment. Mr. Howard discussed this subject somewhat thoroughly. He referred to the fact that the South had gained practically by emancipation. Two fifths of its blacks were no longer cut off from representation, and yet in reality none were allowed to vote. He continued as follows : " The committee thought this should no longer be permitted, and they thought it wiser to adopt a general principle applicable to all the States alike, namely, that where a State excludes any part of its male citizens from the elective franchise, it shall lose representation in proportion to the number so excluded ; and the clause applies not to color or to race at all, but simply to the fact of the individual exclusion. ... It will be observed, however, that this amendment does not apply exclusively to the insurgent States nor to the slaveholding States, but to all States without distinction. It says to all the States, ‘ If you restrict suffrage among your people, whether that people be white or black or mixed, your representation in Congress shall be reduced in proportion to that restriction.’ It holds out the same penalty to Massachusetts as to South Carolina, the same to Michigan as to Texas.” Now it is very difficult, in the light of such statements, to understand how the Supreme Court can ever interpret this portion of the Fourteenth Amendment as applicable to the black man alone, or as intended to accomplish only one purpose, the enfranchisement of the blacks, especially when we remember that the Senate had just rejected a proposed article of amendment which was directed only to the securing of negro suffrage by this indirect method of threatened reduction of representation. It may be a good rule to look at the remedy sought, and not to the interpretation of legislators; but, in order to discover the end sought, the history of these bills in Congress must needs be carefully studied.

Mr. Howard gave even a more explicit interpretation of the clause we are examining. Mr. Clark asked him the following question : " If the Senator will pardon me for a moment, I wish to inquire whether the committee’s attention was called to the fact that if any State excluded any person, say, as Massachusetts does, for want of intelligence, this provision cuts down the representation of the State.” Mr. Howard answered: " Certainly it does, no matter what may be the occasion of the restriction. . . . No matter what may be the ground of exclusion, whether a want of education, a want of property, a want of color, or a want of anything else, it is sufficient that, the person is excluded from the category of voters, and the State loses representation in consequence.” Further along in his argument, in answer to another question. Mr. Howard made a response precisely to the same effect. This interpretation of the work of the committee was not denied by any one of its members who listened to the argument. Mr. Wade objected to the amendment on the ground that if a State established an educational qualification for suffrage it would lose its full representation. " I believe the Constitution of that State [Massachusetts] restricts the right of suffrage to persons who can read the Constitution of the United States and write their names. I am not prepared to say that is not a wise restriction. At all events, a State has the right to try that experiment; but, under the report of the committee, she must lose, in the proportion that she has such persons among her inhabitants, her representation in Congress.” Mr. Henderson, referring to the amendment in the form in which it had been rejected by the Senate, said : “ The States, under the former proposition, might have excluded the negro under an educational test, and yet retained their power in Congress. Under this, they cannot. For all practical purposes, under the former proposition, loss of representation followed the disfranchisement of the negro only; under this, it follows the disfranchisement of white and black, unless excluded on account of ‘ rebellion or other crime.’ The former might have had the effect to keep the negro uneducated, in order that he might be permanently excluded under that pretension. ”

Such statements as these are nearly absolute proof that Congress intended to apply the penalty of loss of representation if the number of voters was cut down by means of an educational qualification. A denial of such conclusions as are given in the above extracts does not appear in any of the speeches of the session; at least a very careful search has disclosed none.

Possibly, the most curious part of the whole wearisome discussion over the Fourteenth Amendment is that its framers apparently never considered fairly how the clause for the reduction of representation was to be enforced. We know, in these latter days, that avoidance of the obnoxious amendment has presented no insurmountable obstacles to the South. How can it be determined what proportion of the population is excluded from voting by any clause denying or abridging the suffrage? Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the Fourteenth Amendment is aimed against such discrimination as that outlined in the new Mississippi Constitution, how can it be determined how many have been denied the privilege of voting? In order to be entitled to the suffrage, a person must be able either to read the Constitution, or to give it reasonable interpretation when read to him. Of course this alternative will allow the judge of elections to admit to suffrage those of his own party, and to exclude others on the ground that their interpretation of the Constitution is unreasonable. Aside from this, however, the practical difficulties are immense; for it will be hard to determine how many are prevented from voting because of this limitation, and how many do not vote for any other reason. The denial in its present shape cannot be said to apply to any except those who actually go to the polls and are there refused the right to deposit a ballot. When we come, therefore, to the practical application of this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and remember the labor and travail with which it was brought forth, we are reminded of the mountains in labor and their ridiculous offspring.

Had the alternative clause been omitted in the Mississippi Constitution, and the suffrage been confined to those who could read the Constitution, possibly the tables of illiteracy in the federal census might lawfully be taken as the basis of exclusion. The influence of Mississippi in national politics would be sadly curtailed if such a rule were applied. The census of 1880 gives the aggregate population of the State as 1,131,597. Of persons ten years of age and upwards there are enumerated 753,693, and of these 41.9 per cent cannot read. There are no tables showing the number of men over twenty-one years of age who cannot read; but of the colored men who have reached their majority 76 per cent cannot write, and of the white men 11.5 per cent cannot write. If we should count all who cannot write as also unable to read, we should find that 46 per cent of the male citizens over twenty-one years of age were included in the list. This would mean that the representation of Mississippi might be cut down nearly 50 per cent. Of course it is not fair to count all as unable to read who cannot write; yet few, perhaps, who have not mastered the penman’s art can read the Constitution, if they are expected to read it intelligibly. In another column of the census reports, we find that of persons enumerated over ten years of age 7.6 per cent can read who cannot write. It might be just, therefore, to decide that not far from 40 per cent of all males over twentyone years of age cannot read the Constitution. The recent registration in the State shows a greater practical disfranchisement than that indicated by the figures here given. Only about 30 per cent of the male citizens over twentyone years of age have registered under the new law.

This whole discussion may seem theoretical and profitless, for we recur to the question, What can be done about it when there is no legal evidence as to how many are actually disfranchised, inasmuch as the new Constitution allows to vote those who can understand the Constitution or explain it ? The provision is certainly a shrewd one.

It has been sometimes said that the Southern States could not thus cut down their voting population, because the negroes would vote down any proposition so to amend the Constitution. But the Mississippi convention avoided even that difficulty by refusing to refer the new Constitution to the people for their ratification. It was decided that reference was “ unnecessary and inexpedient.” This is, of course, a step backward in our constitutional history. From the adoption of the Constitutions in revolutionary times to the present, the tendency has been toward recognizing the necessity of popular ratification. An elaborate discussion of this Subject is here unnecessary. It is interesting to notice that since the beginning of the century almost the only Constitutions that have not been submitted are those of some of the Southern States before or after the rebellion. No Northern State has established or altered a Constitution without popular ratification since 1818, Does this point to a realization of democracy at the North which has not been reached in the South ?

If the Fourteenth Amendment is to be construed as Senator Howard explained it, Congress is called upon to ascertain the number of persons who are not allowed to vote in Mississippi, and to reduce the representation of the State proportionally. It is evident that there are serious difficulties in the way, but it is a serious matter to have the national Constitution silently nullified.

Andrew C. McLaughlin.