Japan and the Philippines

AT a dinner of the Tokyo Harvard Club, more than a year ago, I turned to the Japanese vice minister for foreign affairs, and, in my capacity as an American sovereign, I made him this proposition : “ Give us those two cruisers you are building in the United States, and for them we will give you the Philippines.” The proposal itself is hardly worth noting, except as an index of Yankee confidence in the results of the war, as at that hour Commodore Dewey’s fleet was only just entering Manila Bay, and its now famous breakfast had not been eaten. Of far greater significance was the manner in which the offer was received, as showing a marked indisposition on the part of the Japanese to acquire the Philippines at any price.

The reply was of course diplomatic, and equally of course courteous; for he to whom the proposal was addressed was an Oriental and a Japanese gentleman. But apart from the jocoseness of a mere dinner-table colloquy, the surprising feature of the attitude, since ascertained, of many intelligent Japanese on the Philippine question is that it is precisely that of my distinguished neighbor at the Harvard feast. To Americans, especially those who gave ready credence to the absurd stories rife a year ago concerning Japan’s ambitious designs upon the Hawaiian group, this indifference to the acquisition of the far richer domain of the Philippines, a group geographically her own, must be surprising, if not incredible. It is certainly an extraordinary and at first sight inexplicable fact, that at the moment when a well-nigh irresistible wave of imperialism is sweeping over the great Western republic, which for a century has despised every ambition of the kind, this Oriental empire, to which, since its emergence into the modern world, ambition has been the very breath of national existence, is practically abjuring all imperial claims.

Dwellers in Japan, however, have become accustomed to extraordinary situations, and furthermore, to intelligent observers upon the spot, with any knowledge of the empire’s past history and of the present national consciousness growing out of that history, the modesty of its present mood is readily explicable.

It should be kept in mind, in any estimate of the disposition of these islanders, that they are a people who. to a greater extent than any other nation of the modern world, have had whatever advantage or enjoyment may come from the policy of attending exclusively to their own affairs and of living a wholly selfcontained life. Japan has indeed emerged from her long isolation, and is now living in the full tide of the rivalries and ambitions of the world’s great powers. But even the force of the eager current upon which she has embarked has not availed to sweep away the abiding influence of those two and a half centuries of strict seclusion in which she fashioned and perfected for herself a refined civilization, and gained for herself a unique happiness. In the present deeper national consciousness there lingers not only the tradition, but the actual memory of that self-contained, peaceful life, itself so lately swept away, and to that memory the nation’s real heart still clings with an abiding tenacity. Eager as are the leaders of the modern régime to learn and to appropriate whatever of Western thought and life may contribute to the success of the new career upon which the nation has entered, this one potent factor — its experience of isolation — is still of vital effectiveness, in spite of all outward change, and it must be taken into account in any intelligent estimate of the powers now shaping Japanese thought or influencing Japanese policy. There is a marvelous charm even to the foreigner in the thought of the singular felicity which this nation so lately enjoyed in its freedom from all disagreeable intrusions and all wearing ambitions ; and if the alien laments with such keen regret the swift disappearance of the old idyllic life, it is not surprising that the national consciousness continues to be vitally affected by the memory and the glamour of it.

It is this sub-consciousness which, perhaps more than aught else, has kept Japan so calm and dignified in the face of the deadly affront given to her pride in being forced by the alliance of European powers to give up the fruits of her victorious struggle with China. Justly incensed as the people were and still are, and great as has been the access of their indignation since the unworthy motives for the outrage have been revealed by later events, it may yet safely be said that the Japanese are to-day devoutly thankful that the Liaotung peninsula is not theirs. The conservative instinct of the nation was strongly opposed to its acquisition, even in the flush of victorious conquest, and since then that instinct has perceptibly gained in force and volume.

It is a notable fact that the only valid charge brought against the foreign policy of Marquis Ito was that, in the peace negotiations, by insisting on the cession of territory which Japan did not really need or want, he brought upon the empire sore humiliation, embittering its soul in the very flush of its triumph. The quiet dignity, also, with which, without a whisper of protest, the nation surrendered Wei-hai-wei to England, when it would have been so easy, on the European plan, to find pretexts for retaining it, is testimony to the same point.

Whatever ideal Japanese imperialism has in view, it is plainly not that of territorial aggrandizement. Its vision is intensive rather than extensive. It is the memories of old Japan of which the people are proud ; it is the glory of new Japan which they seek to enhance. It is the spirit of the old self-contained life which leads them to cherish and maintain. even in the rush and whirl of the new career on which they have entered, whatever they can save from the beauty and peace of their centuries of seclusion.

Reinforcing this a priori indisposition to enlarge the borders of the empire are the enormous practical difficulties and expense entailed by the administration of its newly acquired colony of Formosa. Valuable as the island is, from almost every point of view, it is taxing the resources and abilities of the home government to such a degree that doubtless there exists, though of course it is not expressed, a strong regret that the Triple Alliance did not include in its demand the surrender of all the territorial fruits of the Japanese victories. There is no gainsaying the fact that at present Japan looks upon Formosa as a burden, and as a hindrance to her own development.

Apart, also, from the consideration of the expense incurred by the new acquisition, unforeseen problems involved in its administration are proving a source of great perplexity to the government, as well as of concern to the whole nation. These problems are of much interest at this time, as furnishing an indication of what may be in store for the United States in the imperial policy upon which she now seems bent.

Already, for example, the status of the colony in relation to the empire has become a vexed question of party politics at home, bringing into acrimonious dispute the meaning and scope of the Constitution, which, it would seem, never had in view the acquisition of outlying territory. One of the chief underlying causes of the fall of the Matsukata Cabinet was the question brought up by the removal of Judge Takano, who had been chief justice of Formosa. Though proving himself to be an incorruptible judge, he was deposed and ordered home, for political reasons. He declined to submit to the decree of the Cabinet, on the ground that, under the Constitution, he could not be removed except by impeachment; but it is still a mooted question whether Formosa is an integral part of the empire under the guaranties of the Constitution, or whether it is subject to the practical despotism of the old régime, and to be governed by imperial ordinances. The theoretical problems growing out of such a situation seem at present insoluble, and many of the practical difficulties insurmountable.

Again, in its new rôle as a colonial administrator, the empire finds itself facing the task of managing a heterogeneous population such as has never before come under its sway, its supreme felicity hitherto having been the extraordinary homogeneity of its subject masses, arising from their long seclusion. Its hermit life gave this nation, originally composed of various racial elements, time and opportunity for the most thorough assimilation ; so that the Japanese are to-day essentially homogeneous, — perhaps, indeed, the only civilized people who can lay claim to that distinction. Herein lies, in great measure, the secret of Japan’s uniqueness and of the charm it exerts upon the foreigner. In these days of the flow and flux of races, a civilized nation, forty millions strong, compacted into a unity of thought and of custom nowhere else to be found, is an object of absorbing interest.

It will readily be seen that because of this homogeneity the task of governing the Japanese has heretofore been an easy one. There is probably no more docile or law - abiding community on earth than that to be found in this island realm ; and this is true largely because the ruling powers have had but one sort of material to work upon, and therefore only the simplest governmental problems to solve.

Idyllic conditions, however, have their disadvantages. They afford no training to meet change, and cultivate no power of adaptation to new circumstances. The Japanese, with all their eager zeal for adopting new things, are conspicuously lacking in the faculty of adapting themselves to them. The mere change of a time-table on one of their railroads results in throwing the line into almost inextricable confusion for days. So it happens that the government, suddenly confronted with the task of administering a colony made up of unusually heterogeneous elements, is all at sea in its Formosan policy, and has thus far made a dead failure of it. The situation has proved far too complicated for the Japanese mind to grasp. The population of the new territory is of too mongrel a nature to come within the scope of governmental vision or consciousness, and so its management has become a byword of reproach.

Whether the American commonwealth, with its power of swift assimilation, so efficient in compacting into national unity the Old World races who have flocked to its shores, and with its marvelous faculty of adapting itself to new conditions, will be successful in the solution of the vastly larger and more complicated problems involved in the government of the Philippines, is becoming a question of curious interest to the Japanese. In the contemplation of their own failure, it will be a most valuable object lesson for them.

On the other hand, the most serious outcome of the failure of the Japanese, the demoralization of their civil service, hitherto a service of the cleanest character, may well furnish an object lesson of the gravest significance to the American republic on its entrance into the field of colonial administration. The inevitable has happened. The incompetency of the officials sent to administer tlie new colony, the opportunities for corruption which have there been opened up as rewards for political service, have had the effect of bringing the Japanese to look upon the science of government in the modern and baleful light of the spoils system. So wholly, indeed, are their minds captivated by the vision of the new politics of which Formosa’s administration has proved so fruitful an example, that something like a tidal wave of political greed is sweeping over the whole nation. Cabinet changes, heralded as triumphs of the principle of party government, turn out to be simply mad scrambles for the spoils of office. For the first time in the history of Japan, old and tried officials have been displaced in obedience to the demands of a hungry horde of political “workers.” How far the colonial experiment is the direct cause of this lamentable state of affairs may be a matter of question, but at all events the coincidence is certainly significant.

Whether the Western republic, with a civil service by no means so clean as Japan has hitherto enjoyed, will be able to withstand the enormous access of corruption which its rich acquisitions in the East will inevitably engender, is sure to be also a question of most instructive interest to the Japanese, as well as of the greatest concern to the best minds of the republic itself.

While thus, from the a priori point of view, and also because of important practical considerations, there is on the part of Japan a decided and growing indisposition to acquire the Philippines for herself, there is a preference, no less marked, as to the nation which she wants for her neighbor in those islands. Curiously enough, the origin of the preference now to be noted, as well as of the indifference already dwelt upon, may be traced, like so much else in this queer land, to the influences of its long seclusion from the world. Japan came forth from that seclusion a nation of children. Babes in diplomacy, they were quickly overreached by the trained guile of the Western world, and only just now are emerging from the bondage in which they were then imprisoned. But ehildren though they then were, and in many regards still are, they have enjoyed, and in a great degree are yet enjoying, one inestimable advantage of childhood, namely, that keenness of perception by which the child can detect, as by a flash of lightning, the real character of those by whom he is surrounded. For quick and accurate intuitional knowledge of character, commend me beyond all others to this nation of children, so long kept from so-called knowledge of the world.

While the nation has been held in the diplomatic leading strings of the Western powers, and while many of these powers have been scheming for its favor and regard since it has been recognized as the coming potent factor in the Eastern situation, Japan has kept steadfast to her first and instinctive preference for the one power which has never gone out of its way to curry favor with her. She has, it is true, exploited the other nations, in her search for all the good things in the Western world which might contribute to her progress. She has seemed at times to coquet with England, with France, with Germany, but in each case it has been only for special ends. There has been all the time but one genuine love and preference, and that is for the nation which, in her early modern childhood, her quick perceptions recognized as her sincere and disinterested friend. It was not that America first discovered and opened Japan to the world ; it was not that alone of the Western powers she refunded her share of the ill-gotten Sliimonosiki spoils ; it was not even that, from the first, the Western republic was seen to have no “ axe to grind ” in its professions of friendship for the rejuvenated empire. It is for none of these things that Japan has so steadfastly cleaved to her first love. These were mere incidents in the course of that love, which has been continuously a deep undercurrent of real sentiment, based upon an instinctive recognition of American magnanimity. Russia, from the beginning, has been the object of an equally strong instinctive dread, which it is now and always will be impossible to overcome. England, admired and respected as the masterful nation of the world, has never won the Japanese heart. Because the people were quick to feel the unconquerable British prejudice against all Asiatics, no genuine affection has ever existed between the island empires of the East and the West. France, in turn, has appealed to the æsthetic sensibilities of the Japanese; but there the friendship ends, for it rests on nothing solid or enduring. Germany, with its impressive imperialism and its spirit of intense loyalty to the Fatherland, has struck a responsive chord in the Japanese breast, which always thrills at the watchwords of empire and loyalty. But apart from this sentiment, there is nothing in common between the German nature and the Japanese. Had there ever been, Germany, together with France, has forfeited all possible claims to the nation’s regard by joining hands with Russia to inflict upon Japan its bitter humiliation. England and America alone, among all the powers of the West, can now count the rising empire of the East as a friend; and as between the two, there is no shadow of doubt where the preference lies. Japan, for many reasons, would hesitate long before forming an alliance with England alone ; but should the latter join hands with America, instinct as well as policy would draw this nation with irresistible force into the triple compact which might dominate the peace of the world. And this friendship of hers, heartfelt toward America, diplomatic toward England, is far more than the result of mere instinct. It is based also upon an intelligent appreciation of the part which the AngloSaxon race is to play in the future development and destiny of the world. Japan, not only as the outcome of her own conspicuous failure as a colonial administrator, but even more largely from the development of her historic sense, from her keen observation of great world movements since she has come into the world, has not failed to note the fact that there is something in the Anglo-Saxon blood which makes the nations in whose veins it runs the benefactors of all lands that come under their sway. England is known to Japan, as to the rest of the world, as an eager and perhaps somewhat unscrupulous land-grabber. But Japan sees very clearly, what the rest of the world must acknowledge, that if England is a land-grabber, she is also, everywhere and always, a land-grubber and cultivator; that in some large and generous way she has blessed every people upon whom she has laid her powerful hand. She alone, thus far, has succeeded in the rôle of colonial administrator. She alone, among all the nations which have essayed the difficult task, has been guided by an intelligent self-interest to make her colonies integral parts of her empire, to grant them practical autonomy, and, taught by her early disastrous experiment with America, never again to exploit them for her selfish benefit, or to lay upon them the burden of taxation for the purpose of swelling the coffers of the home treasury.

Japan has also seen and weighed the fact that Russia, France, Germany, and Spain, all the other powers which have entered the field of colonial empire, have adopted the opposite policy. Now that Spain has met condign punishment for the inevitable but flagrant misrule of her dependencies, the merits of England’s wise administration stand out in bold relief to the keen eyes of the oldest and youngest of the empires, as it tries, for its own guidance, to learn the drift of the world movement upon the current of which it has embarked.

It is true, as Japan and all the world know, that America, Anglo-Saxon though she is, in entering the field of colonial empire, enters it as a novice, and is likely, therefore, to make egregious blunders at the start. It is also true, and patent to all acquainted with the present political condition of the republic, that its civil service, now in only the first stages of genuine reform, is almost wholly lacking in material for the new field of work ; that America has not, and cannot have for many years, anything like the corps of trained colonial administrators to whom England owes in large measure her splendid success. Yet Japan would much rather see America than England in possession of the Philippines. All the dangers just now pointed out as incident to colonial enterprise are recognized as merely incidental and temporary. Deep down under all these surface indications Japan sees the clear grit, the indomitable pluck, and the sober common sense of our race. The want of experience, the lack of material for administrative service, and the initial opportunities for corruption are shortcomings which she perceives must sooner or later disappear before the strength of the Anglo-Saxon nature reinforced by the ingenuity, the fertility of resource, the conscious freedom, and the eager enterprise which distinguish the American branch of that masterful race. It is for this reason that Japan, instinct with the spirit of progress as she now is, has a glad welcome for America in the East. Strong in her sympathies for a country which, like herself, has too long dwelt in selfish isolation, she longs to see America, so well fitted for the task by race and training, take up the new responsibilities thrust upon her, and give the impress of her character to this world of the Orient that is so greatly in need of such influence. Japan would not give one of her cruisers for the possession of the Philippines ; but she would lend America the whole navy of which she is so proud, could she have for her near neighbor the nation whose friendship she trusts.

Arthur May Knapp.