The Atlantic Fisheries Question

A RENEWAL of the ancient Atlantic Fisheries dispute is rendered imminent by the recent visit to Washington of Newfoundland’s Premier, with a proposal to revive the much discussed BondBlaine Convention. He may succeed in inducing the State Department to indorse a newly drafted instrument, but whether the Senate will prove equally amenable to reason is the crucial point. Matters of much greater moment than a mere economic arrangement between an obscure British colony and the United States are involved; the Convention is really the kernel of the whole fisheries difficulty, and no other issue of to-day so vitally affects Canada-American relations as that which a deadlock with Newfoundland may give rise to. The effect of Sir Robert Bond’s mission must be far-reaching, in one way or another; if he succeeds, the New England and Newfoundland fishing interests will be allied against Canada, while, if he fails, Newfoundland may make common cause with Canada and work great harm to the American fishing industry.

This Bond - Blaine Convention was framed in 1890, and provided for reciprocity in fishery products between the United States and the colony of Newfoundland, irrespective of Canada. Canada having sought a similar concession, and been refused, protested to the Imperial Cabinet against our being permitted to make such a compact without her inclusion, and the protest was so effective that the ratification of the treaty was postponed in order that Canada might have an opportunity of securing like terms. If she failed in this, after a reasonable interval, the embargo on our agreement was to be withdrawn.

The hiatus having lasted twelve years, and all Canada’s overtures during that time having been rejected, Newfoundland declined to remain quiescent any longer, and at the recent Conference of Colonial Premiers in London, Sir Robert Bond was permitted to reopen the suspended negotiations.

The other issues between the countries all hang upon this fisheries question, which antedates them in existence as it overshadows them in importance. Before the War for Independence, the British colonies in common enjoyed these fisheries, and by the treaty of 1783, the United States fishermen were continued the privilege, subject to certain restrictions. This treaty lapsed with the war of 1812, and the Americans failed to secure a renewal of the concession when the treaty of Ghent closed the war. Naturally, friction arose before long, and in 1818 a conference was held at Washington, when the treaty was signed, which represents the last official deliverance on the question, and fixes the status of the parties down to the present day. By it the United States abandoned all its claims to British North American waters in return for the right, on the same terms as British subjects, to catch fish on the west coast of Newfoundland and the shores of Labrador. But in modern times the scene of the fishing has changed, and it is now mainly carried on off the eastern coast of Newfoundland, near the Grand Banks, in which vicinity the American fishermen are not benefited by this treaty at all, as they have no coastwise rights there.

The question as we now understand it is one of peculiar difficulty because there are three parties to it, — the United States, Canada, and Newfoundland. The last named, strange as it may seem, is the predominant factor. This she owes to her inexhaustible bait supply, her proximity to the Grand Banks, and her political independence of Canada, which she has steadfastly refused to surrender. Were Newfoundland absorbed in the Dominion, the federal government would assume control of her fisheries, and then it would be a clear and well-defined issue, — the United States against Canada. But Newfoundland’s part in the dispute introduces the disconcerting element, and provides three parties, each with its own distinct and antagonistic interests.

The only fisheries at issue are those of the coastline within the three-mile limit. The deep-sea fisheries on the Grand Banks are free to all nationalities, and no power has any jurisdiction over them. At present they are prosecuted by the Newfoundlanders, Canadians, Americans, and French. But the coast fishes are used as bait for the larger denizens of the outer waters, and this bait is indispensable to successful offshore fishing. The bait fisheries are the property of the particular country in whose territorial waters they are obtained, and the finest bait supply of the North Atlantic is in Newfoundland.

The Americans are so dependent upon this that they are willing to concede us free entry for our fish to United States markets in return for unrestricted access to these bait fishes, yet Canada, on the strength of being a fellow colony, with kindred interests and a small bait supply herself, has been insisting upon sharing in the benefits of such a concession.

In order that a more intelligent understanding of the whole subject may be obtained, it may not be amiss to explain, first, the different fishery industries concerned, and, second, how these acquire an international aspect. The deep-sea fisheries of commercial importance, which exercise a bearing upon this question, are the cod, halibut, haddock, and mackerel fisheries, because they rely upon the coast fisheries for bait, and because they are sometimes pursued within the three-mile limit.

The mackerel are first hunted in American waters in the early spring, then in the Bay of Fundy later, whence they work their way along the Nova Scotia coast during the summer, the fishing ending off Cape Breton in the fall. It frequently happens that as the shoals or schools of these fish make their way along the Nova Scotia coast pursued by American fishing craft, they approach the shore too closely, only to be followed by the eager fishermen, who are pounced upon by the Canadian cruisers which patrol the coast for that purpose. This is the origin of the announcements from time to time in the United States papers of American fishing vessels being seized for violating the Canadian laws. The halibut fishery has two branches, —the “fresh” halibut fishery off the eastern coast of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the “fletched ” (partly salted for smoking) halibut fishery off Greenland and Iceland, which is declining of late. The haddock fishery is pursued all over the Banks and adjacent “Deeps.” The famous cod fishery is of course too well known to require detailed explanation. All these different pursuits employ about 400 American vessels, which fit out from Gloucester, Boston, and other New England ports, about one third operating on the fishing-grounds directly off that coast, while the other two thirds ply their calling on the Grand Banks.

The bait fishes are the herring, caplin, and squid. The herring are available during the winter and early spring, the caplin strike the shore in the early summer, and the squid follow them in August, and can be had until boisterous weather compels a cessation of the deepsea trawling in the autumn. The habits of all these fishes, both inshore and offshore, are almost a mystery to both fishermen and scientists. All that is known with certainty is that they appear along the coast or on the Banks at certain seasons, and that their coming can be counted upon at the stated periods, and fishing operations planned accordingly.

The fishing year for the Americans begins in November, when fifty or sixty of their vessels leave Gloucester for our southern bays, to load frozen herring. These fish are then abundant in the shallows, and are netted and exposed to the chill winter air, which freezes them solid. They are in large demand for food in New England, because during the winter no fresh herring can be got anywhere else in the world; and they are also the mainstay of the cod and halibut catchers on the southern Banks during the winter and spring, who use them as bait. We allow the Americans to conduct this winter herring fishery as a commercial venture; they merely buy the herring, which are really caught by our own people. Our regulations fix the minimum price at $1.25 a barrel, and the Americans take away about 200,000 barrels every season. It may be observed in passing that these herring are entered in American ports as the products of American fisheries, as having been taken by American subjects, assisted by Newfoundlanders, and thereby entitled to free entry. As a matter of fact they are sometimes frozen and stored before the ships leave Gloucester; yet if a Newfoundland vessel, with a cargo of frozen herring from the very same bulk, enters an American port, she has to pay an import duty of one half cent a pound on all the fish.

In April it is possible to fish on the Grand Banks without fear of the ice floes, and from then until November vessels of the countries previously mentioned will be found there pursuing their business as best they may. They have all to obtain their supplies of bait from our coast. Our bait Act requires every fishing vessel to procure a license after April 1. With our local schooners there is little trouble. The Canadians, being British subjects also, enjoy the same privileges. The Americans obtain bait through a modus vivendi arranged at Washington in 1889, granting them free access to our waters for this purpose by paying a license fee of $1.50 per ton of the vessel’s register. The French we exclude altogether, and they have to depend upon salted squid brought from the “French Shore,” or such meagre quantities of fresh bait as they can get smuggled to them from our coast.

The significance of Newfoundland’s attitude toward France should not be lost sight of in considering the American aspect of this question. France has fishing rights over our western seaboard, the same strip where the Americans are recognized, and commonly known as the “French Shore, ” or “Treaty Coast. ” But the fishing there is depleted, so that the French have virtually abandoned it, and concentrate all their efforts on the fisheries of the Grand Banks. They possess the St. Pierre-et-Miquelon islets, off the southern seaboard, as a shelterport and outfitting base, and their fleet numbers about 300 sail, with 7000 men. A decade ago the numbers were nearly twice as great. The explanation of the decline is that France, to make these fisheries a nursery of seamen for her navy, subsidized them so liberally with bounties and drawbacks, equaling almost the intrinsic value of the catch, that they could undersell us in every market in Europe, and came near driving us therefrom.

In self-defense we retaliated by passing an Act prohibiting the sale or export of bait by our people to the French, and we enforce it so vigorously every year that, in spite of the bounties, the French are being slowly but surely driven to the wall.

What gives Newfoundland such a predominant place in this CanadaAmerican fisheries dispute is the knowledge that we can cripple the American fisheries in the same manner by refusing bait to them. If we closed the winter herring business against the Yankees, their southern banking fleet would have to tie up at the wharves, and by canceling the modus vivendi we would force the northern fleet to abandon the Grand Banks. It is true that Canada has a trifling bait supply, and that American vessels sometimes avail themselves of it. But in addition to the 200,000 barrels of herring taken from our waters last winter, sixty-six out of seventy American vessels on the Grand Banks baited here during 1901, and ninety-nine Canadian vessels, out of a fleet of 146, also obtained their bait from us. This latter fact is the best evidence of the relative values of our bait supply and their own. The geographical situation will make this clearer. Our coast is but half a day’s sail from the Banks, while it is a week’s run to and from Nova Scotia. Our waters always abound in bait, while Canada’s coast is but sparsely stocked. Therefore both Americans and Canadians come to us, and only those vessels which follow the mackerel along the Nova Scotia seaboard visit the Canadian coast.

Further, it must be remembered that the Canadians are decidedly hostile to American fishermen, and only grant them the present concessions because we do so, as Canada has not wished to provoke too bitter a feeling with her southern rival, particularly as we could meet all the needs of the United States fishing interests. Our relations with them have been most friendly, and nobody in the island desires anything to the contrary. But we contend that for the valuable bait concessions we grant them we are very inadequately recompensed in the $6000 of license fees received by us each year. We maintain that in return for the immense stock of frozen herring the Americans take away, and the bait privileges they enjoy, we should be given free entry for fish products in their markets. Mr. (now Sir Robert) Bond convinced the late Mr. Blaine of the force of this argument in 1890, and it was upon this basis that they concluded the Convention which now bears their names, of which the revival is being urged upon Secretary Hay.

Mr. Blaine was influenced by several considerations of special moment in espousing the policy of reciprocal trade in fish between the republic and this island. First, he recognized that Newfoundland, by her bait, controlled the situation, and that if France, with a fishing base near our coast, was unable to cope with us, the Americans, who would be a thousand miles from their own territory, would be helpless altogether. Second, he was aware that Newfoundland, because of her insular position, her remoteness, and the varying character of her fishery pursuits, would not ship very largely to the American market. This demands its own cure of fish, which the Newfoundlanders do not practice. All the cod we take on Labrador and the northern coast is cured specially for the European markets, and is sent there direct, so that only the fish taken on our southern seaboard, and a portion of the lobster catch, would be forwarded to New England for sale. Third, he foresaw that by an arrangement with Newfoundland the American fishermen would be released completely from all dependence upon Canada, and be able to disregard any hostile enactments she might propose.

Canada’s protest against our Convention was the fullest admission of the superiority of our case. She declared the pact an injustice to her fishermen and their interests, basing this argument upon their right to enter our waters and procure bait on the same terms as our own people. Canada asserted that these bait fishes were the joint possession of all the British American colonies, which contention Newfoundland met by the obvious reply that as British subjects the Australians had an equal theoretical right to them. Yet, as a practical proposition, the bait fishes were ours, within our waters, and subject to our laws. We, and we alone, could make all regulations for the catching and conserving of them, and so long as we did not attempt to discriminate against the Canadians, they had no ground for complaint and no right to interfere. If we chose to admit the French or Americans to the same privileges as the Canadians, that was our own business, for we did not hamper the Canadians, nor deprive them of their rights. We might, indeed, prohibit all “baiting,” and none of these applicants could object. The logic of this was unassailable, and although, to placate Canada, our treaty was “ side-tracked ” for the time, Premier Bond’s present mission to put it in motion again, if the United States proves willing now, attests the soundness of the position Newfoundland assumed from the start. Canada was eager to secure access to the American market, and finding herself unable to accomplish this, was unwilling that we should be allowed to gain what she had failed to achieve.

Canada is unable to plead that her bait supply, her bonding privilege, or her coastwise advantages figure to any appreciable extent as an inducement for the United States fishermen. Indeed, every authority on the subject agrees that Canada has little or nothing to offer in exchange for reciprocity on the subject, especially as compared with Newfoundland. As the Americans only require a bait supply, and to the country alone from which they should seek this would they be called upon to offer a recompense, it is clear that there is no need for them to traffic in terms with Canada. For all the advantage the Canadian waters are to the New England fishing craft the Nova Scotia coast might be absolutely barred against them. So clearly was this recognized that Newfoundland was accorded the right of special representation on the AngloAmerican Joint High Commission of 1898, for the express purpose of safeguarding her own interests in this matter. Sir James Winter, then Premier, was our representative.

The position of the United States is easily understood from the foregoing. She is not yearning for reciprocity, but is willing to concede it to Newfoundland through fear that the latter will cut off the bait supply. But reciprocity with Canada is not palatable, because it would mean swamping the home product with the immense volume of Canadian fish that would then be let into American markets. In other words, the United States is in the position of having to choose the lesser of two evils. If she were satisfied that she could contrive an indefinite continuance of the present status of matters, that her fishermen could get bait and herring for a mere bagatelle, she would never consent to revise her existing fishery policy, but because it is a moral certainty that Newfoundland will adopt a new course if reciprocity fails, Uncle Sam may be inclined to accept the lesser obligation and make terms with the little colony from which he will gain most, and which yet will be his least formidable competitor.

The United States, like France, has been bonusing her fleet with the idea of making it a naval auxiliary. The assistance takes the form of an import duty of one half cent a pound on all foreign caught fish. This has sufficed to maintain a fairly vigorous activity in the home fishing fleet. The New England fisheries are valued at $10,000,000, being one fourth of the total valuation of the fisheries of the republic. The deepsea fisheries of the Atlantic, which involve this question, are themselves worth $4,500,000 to the United States. They maintain to a large extent the prosperity of the seaports which are the centres of the industry, and they provide an occupation for large numbers in the enterprise itself and its subsidiary pursuits. But the New England fisheries are declining steadily under the competition of the more modern canned foods. All this fish has to be brought home either fresh or partly salted, and in the spring and summer it is difficult to preserve and dispose of large stocks of such perishable commodities. Nor will the American people themselves continue to prosecute the industry now. It is too hazardous and toilsome; they find easier work on shore, and they crew their ships with Scandinavians and Provincialists. Newfoundlanders form their largest contingent. The naval nursery theory is not of much value in the light of these facts, but it serves to stimulate congressional sympathy, and the fishing ports — Gloucester, Boston, etc. — are a unit in opposing reciprocity with Canada, because they say that if such came to pass they “might as well put their shutters up.” They view the BondBlaine Convention differently, for the reasons I have already set forth, and may not oppose it therefore, certainly not so actively.

They have cause to fear Canadian competition, however. The Canadians can prosecute the industry much more advantageously than the Americans. The fishermen along the coast can secure fresh fish every day with their small boats and ship it by train across the border, so that it may be on sale in New York within twenty-four hours. The Canadian schooners can ply to and from the Banks every fortnight or so, running into their home ports and unloading their catch for shipment in the same way. The American coast fishers have no supply to depend upon, and their offshore fishers are hundreds of miles from home. The Canadians are also helped by their less expensive methods of fishing. Their vessels, outfits, and upkeep are cheaper, and their crews receive less wages, so that they would handicap the Americans not a little from this cause. They operate about one third cheaper than the Americans, and they have a sum of $180,000 distributed among them in fishing bounties every year. It is certain, therefore, that if the United States tariff did not “protect ” the home catch there would be much more Canadian fish marketed in New England.

Canada’s position with regard to this international dispute is becoming more untenable every season. Her existing markets are inadequate to absorb her yearly catch, and the American control of Cuba and Porto Rico has increased her difficulties by depriving her almost wholly of two large and profitable markets. Her fish in these territories must now face an adverse duty of eighty-four cents a hundred pounds, and this accentuates the congestion at home. Hence, Canada strives hard for reciprocity, alleging that the removal of the American tariff will cheapen fresh food for the American consumer, and thus increase the demand in the republic, not only for Canadian, but also for American fish. But the American treaty makers have not been satisfied that the advantages of free trade would outweigh the detriments of unlimited Canadian competition, and so have declined all overtures from the Dominion. This was the reason that the Joint High Commission failed in 1898 ; the United States, while willing to make terms with Newfoundland, would not treat with Canada, because this could not be done without crippling the New England fishing industry. The principle underlying the whole problem is the all-important one of preserving the home pursuit from disaster while yet providing some alleviation for the masses of fish consumers who pay so heavily for this edible.

It might be supposed from the fact of Newfoundland giving no bounties, like the Canadians, and having no protective tariff, like the Americans, that she would be unable to effectively compete with them. Yet the island is the greatest fishing centre in the world. Its advantages as regards bait have already been shown, its catches of cod near its coast are very large, and it takes immense quantities of fish from the Grand Banks, which are only a few hours’ sail from its southeastern seaboard. Its people are the most expert fishermen afloat, and the proximity of the coast enables them to use it to an unusual extent and as a convenience of decided advantage over other nationalities. The codfish, too, is all cured by being soaked in brine and then dried in the sun and air. The Americans and Canadians cure their fish differently, and have other markets for it. Practically none of the Newfoundland catch is exported fresh, because the insularity of the region forbids this being done advantageously. The catch of our rivals is partly marketed fresh, and it is this non-competition in foreign markets which enables us to approach the Americans and ask for terms which shall be mutually beneficial and avert clashing.

This is the complication which the Bond-Blaine Convention proposes to unravel in part. If a treaty is concluded, the United States and Newfoundland will have free trade in fish products, and Canada will be excluded from the compact. The United States fishermen will then be able not only to procure bait in our waters, but also to enter them in order to transport their catch by fast steamers, with cold storage chambers, direct to Boston and New York. The frozen herring industry can be developed in the same manner, and so far from reciprocity being detrimental to the New England fishery interests, it will be positively advantageous to them. We would, of course, compete against them to some extent, but the lessening of their expenses consequent upon being able to use our coast as an advanced base would enable them to meet us upon more equal terms. Canada will resent our success, if we do succeed, but the British government seem to be satisfied that Canada’s objections are not valid, else Premier Bond would never have been permitted to resume negotiations with the object he has now in view.

If, however, we fail to secure reciprocity, the result must be to throw us into the arms of Canada, ever open to embrace us. In such a contingency the Canadian federal government would take over the control of our fisheries from the provincial administration, and a united policy would be possible. The fisheries of British North America would be absolutely barred to the Americans, because Canada would then have in her own hands the lever by which to force them to grant her reciprocity, or else she would do her best to destroy the New England fishing industry. The existing modus vivendi, which was originally only intended to be two years, has been continued season after season in the hope that some transformation in the status of the problem might take place which would give an opportunity for effecting a compromise between the three contributories. Canada has already come to see that there is no prospect of her being able to make terms for herself, and she stands ready to denounce the modus vivendi as soon as she is satisfied that Newfoundland will do the same. If reciprocity fails, there will be no longer any reason why we should continue to recognize that makeshift, and our canceling it would leave the American fleet without a solitary means of procuring bait, or of availing itself of the facilities which, although not specifically provided for by treaty, Newfoundland nevertheless accords to the Yankee fishing vessels. The effects of this policy it is not difficult to forecast. The American fishermen, deprived of bait, would be but poorly able to maintain their maritime industry, and would gradually be driven from the Grand Banks. Neither Newfoundland nor Canada would suffer seriously, as their only loss would be the sums paid for licenses, and these would be very much more than offset by the prospect which there would be of securing a large slice of the American market by the decline of the New England fishery. As the latter condition would become acute, the price of fish in the United States would run high, so high that the import duty would become but a small matter, and with the cheaper maintenance of our vessels we should be able to hold our own even in the head centres of the American fishing business.

It can be seen from this presentation of the case that the Bond-Blaine Convention is of much greater importance than appears at first sight. Newfoundland, though she may be insignificant in other respects, has clearly the chief voice in this Atlantic Fisheries Question, and if the present negotiations are of no effect she will probably give a vigorous demonstration of this fact. While, for the sake of the better feeling which now manifests itself between Great Britain and the United States, it is to be regretted that any ill feeling should be provoked over the subject, nevertheless it is only just that Newfoundland should use her manifold advantages in order to secure larger concessions for herself.

P. T. McGrath.