The Future of Turkey and the Balkan States

I

When Constantine, by his defeat of Licinius in 330 A.D., gained for the Roman Empire control over the Balkan peninsula, he set himself the task of learning what was the best position in which to establish the capital of his empire. Finally, with a statesmanlike grasp of the question, he decided on Byzantium on the shore of the Bosphorus. It was in Europe, and while easily accessible from Asia Minor and the Ægean, could be made to command the trade, then in its infancy but already developing, from the Danube and the Black Sea. Thereupon Constantine made it the capital of the Empire, and on its formal inauguration he called it New Rome, though the more popular name of its founder has been more generally used. It is interesting to note that from that time to this, the Patriarch of the Holy Orthodox Church has described himself as ‘Patriarch of New Rome.’

The city steadily grew in importance, and this by reason of its then incomparable position. My friend Sir William Ramsay is fond of saying that while the English people have made London, and the Americans, New York and Chicago, it is the position of Constantinople which has made that city.

Two centuries later Justinian, ‘the Law-Giver,’ gained equal renown as a roadand bridge-maker. We can readily recognize what were the ideas in the minds of Justinian and his colleagues and successors in their system of roadconstruction. During many centuries, perhaps even millenniums, the countries which obtained the traffic between East and West have been the most prosperous. Justinian contrived that his roads should go up the Euphrates, some of them through Cilicia, others to the north of it, and that they should terminate either at Smyrna or at Ismidt for Constantinople. By this time the pax romana had largely cleared the Black Sea of pirates, and the enterprising Greeks were exploring its coasts and bringing down cargoes from the great rivers, the Danube, the Dniester, and others, which had to pass by Constantinople in order to be distributed in the countries of western Europe.

It was owing to these causes that Constantinople flourished and became, during the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, far and away the wealthiest city in Europe. She had many bad rulers as well as able ones, but her situation prevented her from losing her advantages, no matter how incompetent the ruler.

The first deadly blow to the prosperity of Constantinople was struck by the Latin Crusaders of the West, who in 1204 captured the city, enriched Western Europe from its plunder, and held it until 1258, when the Greeks recaptured it. Villehardouin, who was one of the chiefs of the Fourth Crusade, speaks of Constantinople as ‘a city at least ten times as large as Our Lord’s city of Paris.’ The Crusade in question was a filibustering expedition, and no layman could use stronger words in condemnation of its members than did Pope Innocent III. The great injury that the expedition did to the city was that it destroyed the security of commerce in the Black Sea, the Marmora, and neighboring waters. The government was weak and the destruction of the city was nearly complete. It recovered, however, much of its trade; but until 1453, when it was captured by Mahomet, the Ottoman Turk, it never attained to its former prosperity.

Since 1453 its position has always secured a share of commerce. But the absolute ineptitude of the Turk for everything commercial did everything that could be done, short of destroying the cit y, to render it of less importance. This state of things continued for upwards of three centuries. During the past hundred years, owing partly to the influence of foreign states, partly to that of the education of the Christian population and to a lesser extent of the Moslems, Constantinople has somewhat increased its commerce.

I have given the above general sketch of the growth of Constant inople to explain how its reputation as a great commercial city was obtained. The enormous commerce in hides, slaves, furs, and other produce which passed through the Bosphorus had enriched the city. This traffic was not merely in the heavy goods mentioned, but in spices, and objects of art and industry, produced in all the lands of south central Asia between China and the Black Sea, and coming through Asia Minor. For the continuation of such a trade absolute security was essential, and this no longer existed. It is not too much to say that during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and down even to 1800, the seas were unsafe. Pirates everywhere abounded. The Turk, after the battle of Lepanto in 1571, when Don John of Austria inflicted a crushing blow upon the Turkish fleet, seemed to have settled down into a singular apathy in reference to his power at sea, an apathy which is summed up in the Turkish saying which continues to this hour, that ‘ Allah has given power over the waters to the unbelievers, but over land to the faithful.’ The Turk also has never shown any inclination for commerce or appreciation of its advantages. To this day the number of Moslems in Turkey who engage in trade is surprisingly limited; and when an inquiry is made as to who are the Moslem traders in Turkey, it will generally be found that they are Arabs without any Turkish blood in them. In Constantinople and in all the harbors of the Empire any notion that assistance should be given to merchants in order that trade into or through the country should be facilitated is foreign to the Turkish idea. In my own experience I have known merchants who, dealing with Western Europe and America, have been compelled to find means to send their goods from Persia through Russia, or by sea via India, so as to avoid the obstructions placed in the way of commerce by the official Turk. The outrageous exactions of Turkish customhouses have been notorious for centuries, and even in the seventeenth century were proverbial.

In the matter of customhouse exactions, Turkey has changed little. Thirty years ago Sir John Gorst, an admirer, at a distance, of the Turk, was sent on a special mission to Constantinople by the British government, and determined to disprove the common allegation that even passengers’ luggage could not be got through without bribery. When he returned to England he related in the House of Commons how he had honestly tried to obtain his baggage by regular means, but how, having need of it, he had been compelled after some weeks’ delay to give the‘ bakshish’ demanded. Facts such as these, related by hundreds in books of English and American travel, lead to the conclusion that the Turk in matters of commerce is hopeless.

But it will be asked, supposing, as looks probable, that Constantinople passes into other hands, will not its incomparable position bring back its importance as a commercial city of the first rank? My answer is that it will not. Modern science has changed the situation. The steamer works under different conditions from the sailing vessel. Constantinople was for centuries a centre for the collection of merchandise. Many small sailing vessels collected even half a century ago their small cargoes in Greek islands, along the shores of the Black Sea and in the Danube, and discharged them at Constantinople into large steamers which conveyed them westward. Such steamers brought manufactured goods and other European products with which the small fleets obtained return cargoes. This procedure has been largely changed. Two facts have to be borne in mind in reference to sea carriage. First, that under normal conditions it is very much cheaper than land carriage, and second, that the great cost in the transit of goods is in their handling or manutention. To avoid the cost of manutention, fairly large ships now go round to the ports and collect or discharge their cargoes. In hundreds of cases ships passing through the Bosphorus do not stop at Constantinople, except to purchase necessaries, and consequently hardly enrich the city at all. The produce of South Russia, of the north coast of Anatolia, and of the Danubian states, can be shipped directly in steamers and carried to Western ports without stopping at Constantinople.

And though the Bagdad Railway follows the line chosen by Justinian for the transportation to the West of the produce of the East, it does not follow that results will be obtained by that railway such as had followed the efforts of the great road-makers of Justinian’s time. It is in the highest degree improbable that it will bring any considerable amount of traffic from India to Europe. The cost of carriage between Calcutta or Bombay and Europe by water will necessarily be much less than by railway between Bagdad and the Bosphorus. Steamers are yearly increasing their speed, and with ships that do their fifteen to twenty knots an hour, very little time would be saved if trans-shipment from the ports above mentioned were made at Basra and again at Constantinople. The cutting of the Suez Canal has made the route much shorter in time between India and the West than it could have been before the construction of railways, or than it is likely to be when the Bagdad Railway is completed. Readers will recognize that this is a case where land carriage cannot compete with that by water.

Lest it should be thought that I have any prejudice against the Bagdad Railway, I may mention that eight years ago I pronounced very strongly in its favor. Every mile of railway in Turkey is a gain for civilization, and a great trunk line, as the Bagdad Railway will be, will prove of immense value for the people of the country through which it. passes. For Constantinople its value will be comparatively slight.

II

Now comes the question, what is to become of Constantinople after the present war? The general opinion is that, if the Entente powers succeed, the Turk will no longer be allowed to hold it. I may recall here a statement made by General Grant on his visit to Constantinople, in the year 1879, I think. It was shortly after the time when a British fleet was anchored at Prinkipo, about ten miles from the capital. The general had visited Alexandria and various places in Syria and Asia Minor, and had formed a just estimate of Turkish government. The statement in question may have been published, though I have not seen it. ‘Had I been in command,’ said he, ‘of the Russian army at San Stefano, notwithstanding the protests of the British government and the presence of its fleet, I would have taken possession of Constantinople and disarmed Europe the next day.’ The question was naturally asked how the second part of such a task would have been accomplished. ‘I would have issued a proclamation which would have said to Europe, “ Here I am and here I remain until Europe has decided what shall be done with this city. I make only one condition: the Turk shall no longer reign here.” ’

The statement was a bold one, and worthy of General Grant’s reputation. Possibly he overlooked the fact that such conduct required the sacrifice of Russia’s dream of becoming the ruler on the Bosphorus. However this may be, it looks now as if Europe will consent to Russia’s becoming the owner of Constantinople. My own impression is that if Russia has set her mind upon having it, neither England nor France will make serious opposition. She has done so much in the present war and has been so loyal to her allies, —while on the other hand Turkey has thrown herself into the hands of the Germans, — that few would begrudge her the possession of Constantinople.

Nevertheless I sincerely hope that Russia will not put forward a claim to the occupation of the city. With an exceptional knowledge of the East, I do not believe that it is to her interest to do so. I admit that the sentiment among Russians is in favor of her taking possession. Every Russian seems to be born with the belief that it is the destiny of his country to occupy Constantinople. They claim that the rightful succession to Constantine is theirs. It is a sentimental claim; but, to explain or to justify it, it must be remembered that under the Greek emperors the imperial sovereignty was to a considerable extent in commission, as indeed was the case for long centuries with the Holy Roman Empire of the West. Just as the rulers of the latter were the Emperor, in things temporal, and the Pope, in things spiritual, so in the East the Emperor at Constantinople ruled in the first capacity, and the Patriarch of New Rome, though nominally only primus inter pares, shared the sovereignty in things spiritual. The insignia still possessed by the Patriarch are only one of many pieces of evidence in support of this view. The Russian Church, which, although autonomous, has always highly respected the traditional functions and position of the Patriarch, has largely aided in the development of the opinion, not only that the two churches are one, but that the temporal portion of sovereignty should be vested in the ruler of the most important state which adheres to the Orthodox Church.

There are many statesmen in Russia, however, who agree that it is not to the interest of the Empire that she should be in possession of Constantinople. The advantage of such possession is that she will have a free road to the Mediterranean for her men of war and merchant ships. If she were in possession simply on the same terms as the Turk, she could close the passage to all warships except her own, and there are publicists in Petrograd who boldly take up the position that Russia must have Constantinople in order that she may so secure the monopoly of the passage. Such a contention would inevitably lead to war and is not likely openly to be put forward.

The disadvantages to Russia are however great. She is respected by every Balkan state, and justly regarded by each one as its deliverer from the Turkish yoke. If she were at Constantinople, probably every Balkan state would look upon her occupation with suspicion. Greece believes, with a fervency even greater than that of the Russians, that she alone is the true heir to the Imperial City. It is alleged that Ferdinand of Bulgaria hoped to be crowned in Saint Sophia as emperor.

But a more serious disadvantage than those named will be seen from a glance at the map. If Russia were in possession of the city she could pass her troops there only by sea, which in winter is usually dangerous, or by land with the consent of Roumania and Bulgaria. There would certainly arise an attitude of hostility toward her on the part of Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Inasmuch as the desire of Europe is to provide a settlement in the Balkan Peninsula which will last a good many years, those who wish well for such a settlement hope that Russia will not insist upon being allowed to occupy Constantinople. For her it would be only an isolated port in a remote corner of her empire; it would be a constant source of irritation for her Balkan neighbors. Indeed the Russian occupation will be a European calamity. It will raise as many and as difficult questions as it will solve, and will therefore not conduce to European peace. The Emperor Nicholas saw the objections half a century ago; the present Czar sees them; and it may yet be hoped that the sager counsels of Russian statesmen will prevail.

When it is decided that the Turk shall no longer rule on the Bosphorus, the only practical alternative which has been suggested is that a small internationalized state should be created which should include the Marmora, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles—with a back country on the European side extending from Enos to Media on the Black Sea, and on the Asiatic side following the line known as the False Bosphorus, running almost due north from Ismidt and southward to a point near Adramyttium on the Ægean. This state should be governed by an international commission, corresponding to a similar commission which has regulated the navigation of the Danube with success during many years. Probably the powers would gladly consent to allow Russia the presidency of the commission. In the international agreement which would establish it, one of the most important provisions would be that no fortification of any kind should be erected on either the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus. The state itself would be under the guaranty of the European powers. Various suggestions have been made as to who should be at its head. King Albert of Belgium w as proposed. Another suggestion was that its government should be under the United States. The majority of those who are in favor of the creation of an internationalized state do not, however, see the necessity of having any permanent head. A president of the commission would be sufficient.

III

But now I come to the second part of my subject, — namely, what will be the probable results of the great war on the countries of the Balkan Peninsula? To answer this question, the ambitious aims of Austria must be stated.

Looking backwards over the history of the past forty years it is easy to recognize that Austria has been the great disturber of peace in the Balkans. Her statesmen seem to have concluded that for the development of the Empire it was essential that she should have possession of a port on the Ægean, and for her purpose the most advantageous was Salonica. As far back as the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, her statesmen had this purpose well in view. Though Bismarck never appears to have had any sympathy with it, Austria never lost sight of it. At the commencement of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, she made a secret bargain with Russia, whereby, in return for the latter power being permitted to enter the Balkan Peninsula and to establish a principality of Bulgaria, Austria was to be allowed to administer the large district known as Bosnia and Herzegovina. These provinces she administered until 1908, and then formally annexed them. It was generally believed that one of her main objects in obtaining this accession of territory was to secure a passage for her troops down the valley of the Vardar to Salonica. Her military experts, however, soon informed her that the difficulties of sending an army through in that direction were enormous, and she then directed her attention to obtaining a dominant influence over Serbia, through whose territory the military difficulties of reaching the Ægean would be less.

Five years ago I met in London the representatives of the leading Hungarian paper, of the leading Slav paper of Vienna, and of another published in the same place which represented the German element; and I was astonished to see their unanimity in believing that Serbia was then absolutely in the hands of Austria, who could take it whenever she pleased. During the past twenty years, dealers in land residing in Constantinople urged their clients to purchase in southern Macedonia, because within a short time Austrian rule would be there established and landed property would be multiplied in value.

With the object of rendering Serbia less powerful, Austria did her utmost to prevent the two Slav states, Bulgaria and Serbia, from coming to an agreement. After long negotiations, the ministries of the two countries established a commercial treaty between them, in reference to which, however, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, in giving his adhesion, expressed his belief that Austria would never consent to allow Serbia to sign it. His anticipation was right, and neither then nor on any subsequent occasion would Austria permit any step which tended toward an understanding between the two Slav states. Even in 1885, when Bulgaria had a difference with Russia, and the Czar, without previous notice, withdrew all Russian officers from that country, King Milan of Serbia suddenly attacked his neighbor. The Bulgarians, with no officers of their own above the rank of lieutenant, took the matter into their own hands, drove the Serbians back to the frontier, and would have chased them to Belgrade had not Austria intervened and declared that if they entered Serbia they would have to deal with her.

Austria’s policy and action were not limited to preventing the two Slav peoples from coming together. She wished to annex southern Macedonia in order to obtain Salonica, and entered upon the diabolical policy of thwarting every effort of reform made by the western powers in that province. England, France, and even Italy, neither of whom had an axe to grind, but each of whom desired security for life and property in Macedonia, urged the Porte to make reforms in that country which were in Turkey’s own interest, as well as in that of the inhabitants. Not only Mr. Gladstone, but Lord Salisbury and every British minister, wished that good government might be established under the Sultan, and labored hard to obtain it. Various projects were set on foot and were thwarted by Adbul Hamid, supported by Austria, and at a subsequent date by Germany. During all this period I was resident in Turkey, and no honest-minded man who knows the history of that time can doubt that the efforts made by England and France were unselfish ones, based on the desire to prevent wholesale murder, rape, and the plunder of the inhabitants. After many efforts, Abdul Hamid consented to send his own commissioner, Hilmi Pasha, to investigate, and to suggest improvements in a condition of things which the European powers regarded as intolerable. A recent grand vizier, who had read his reports and who was friendly to Hilmi Pasha, assured me that t hey contained stronger illustrations of Turkish misgovernment than any which had been presented to the foreign embassies, and that the recommendations he made for better government were of a drastic though careful character. These reports were never published, and no remedial measures were attempted.

The following incident illustrates the working of Austrian policy. In the biography published about 1907, after the death of a grand vizier of three years earlier, the Turkish biographer relates that the Vizier received a visit from the Austrian Ambassador, who informed him that he and all his colleagues had drafted a project of reforms which would be very embarrassing for the Turks; but that he, as a friend of Turkey, wished to inform the Grand Vizier of the fact, and to suggest that the Porte should draw up a plan which, in plain English, would deceive the powers and prevent the project of reforms from being presented. When he expressed his doubts as to whether the statement was true, the Vizier declares that the Ambassador produced the project itself, signed by his colleagues. In the biography is reproduced in Turkish a photographic facsimile of the letter which the Grand Vizier wrote to the Sultan on the subject. Duplicity indeed marked all the conduct of Austria in everything relating to Salonica and Macedonia.

In 1904 a project of reform, known as the ‘ Murzsteg Programme,’ was agreed upon between Austria and Russia. It failed, because, while Russia and the western powers supported it, it was opposed by Austria and Germany. A system of gendarmerie was instituted in Macedonia, under an Italian general who had had experience in such work. Russia, England, and France sent gendarmery officers and gave it every assistance. It failed for the same reason. Aust ria and Germany declined even to appoint officers. A further programme of reforms was agreed upon at Revel in January, 1908; but before it came into operation, the ‘ Young Turkey ’ movement began; and on July 23 of that year, the Turkish Constitution was proclaimed, and Europe agreed to wait and see whether the country could reform herself under the ‘Young Turkey’ party.

Readers will remember the formation in February, 1912, of the Balkan League, which at first included only Serbia and Bulgaria, although afterwards Greece came in. The Balkan allies were altogether successful in their first campaign. Bulgaria swept the Turks before her, through Luli Burgas to the lines of Chatalja. Serbia defeated them at Kumanova. Austria became alarmed. Her declaration regarding Albania deprived Serbia of her hope of obtaining a port on the Adriatic. The inspired Reichspost wrote with probable truth that ‘from the beginning of the formation of the Balkanic League, we set ourselves to break it.’ Unfortunately they succeeded in this attempt and led to the rupture between the allies. The idea of Austria was to keep the two Slav states quarreling and not to permit them to come together.

I am far from wishing to exonerate Bulgaria for her share in bringing about the terrible Second Balkan War. It is yet too soon to decide whether Ferdinand, with his Austrian tendencies, must not bear a large share of responsibility. There is a good deal of evidence both for and against such a contention, which space alone forbids me from presenting. But the rupture between the allies was undoubtedly a success for Austrian policy. When the second war was over and the Treaty of Bucharest was drawn up, to which poor Bulgaria was compelled to be a party, the Kaiser spoke of the treaty as ‘definitive,’ and claimed that he ‘fought, like a lion’ for his brother-in-law to obtain Cavalla. Greece had unfortunately allied herself with Serbia, and I suppose that one must take it as natural that a king would fight for his brotherin-law, but in so doing he was far from contributing to the peace of the Balkans. I have, however, to deal with facts as they are, and with the position which is likely to result from the present struggle.

IV

Let me pass to the countries of the Balkan Peninsula which are more directly concerned in the fate of Turkey, — countries all of which less than a century ago were under the rule of the Sultan. Roumania at the present time is the most populous, the wealthiest, and possibly even the most powerful. So long as she continues friendly with Russia she may remain the dominant state in the Balkans. The genius of her generals and the military spirit of her people saved the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. It is true that the Russian army is more powerful and better organized than it then was; but with the natural protection of her hills, Roumania could make an excellent defense even against Russia. Nor can it fairly be said that Roumania has shown herself an aggressive power. Her conduct in 1912 was not friendly toward Bulgaria; but as an observer who entertains more kindly feelings toward Bulgaria than toward any other of the Balkan states, I hold the opinion that she provoked the interference of Roumania by her foolish conduct in reference to Silistria. I regret the mistake that Roumania made in taking an additional part of the Dobrutsha, because it is to her interest to remain on good terms with Bulgaria.

We pass now to Bulgaria, ‘the Peasant State,’ as it is sometimes called. Bulgaria’s future will largely depend upon her conduct during the next three or four weeks. Her present government still declares its intention of being strictly neut ral as between the Entente powers on the one hand and Germany and Austria on the other. Such neutrality is distrusted for various reasons. King Ferdinand is known to have Austrian leanings, and the present Prime Minister, M. Radoslavoff, is the author of a policy which was judged in 1913 to have been in favor of Austria. Let me remark in passing that the royal houses of Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece are all suspect to the peoples which they govern. King Ferdinand of Roumania is a Hohenzollern, and though of the Catholic branch is believed to be greatly influenced by his family connections. His namesake of Bulgaria, as already stated, is believed to look to Austria.

King Constantine of Greece is married to the sister of the Kaiser, and very recently brought the country within measurable distance of a revolution, which would expel the dynasty, by quarreling with M. Venizelos, who represents the policy of probably at least three fourths of the Greek population, — in favor of the Entente powers.

But Greece is not the only country in which the majority of the people sympathize with the Entente. It is natural that the Greeks should do so. England, France, and Russia were the first powers to strike a great blow, in the battle of Navarino, for Greek freedom, that is, for the freedom of all Christian subjects of t he Sultan. When it is remembered that the famous English Ambassador, Stratford Canning, who was then in Constantinople, burned his papers and anticipated that, following the usages of Turkey for centuries, he and his colleagues would be sent as prisoners to the Seven Towers, it will be realized how great was the anxiety caused by their destruction of the Turkish fleet. In Bulgaria, Russia has always been spoken of as ' the Deliverer,’ and it was directly due to her that Bulgaria obtained her freedom. Wit h a folly which has constantly characterized Russian diplomacy, Russia attempted, immediately the war was over, to treat the Bulgarians as a subject race, and aroused the angry feelings of the nation which she had created. After the crushing results of a general election in England, which condemned Mr. Disraeli’s policy in regard to Bulgaria by an overwhelming majority, the Bulgarians have always recognized the friendly way in which their country has been treated by the British government. At the present time, if a popular vote could be obtained, the policy of neutrality would be swept aside, and the nation would declare in favor of the side to which Russia and England belong.

Bulgarian neutrality, at the present time, is, however, a menace to both her neighbors. So long as it continues, Serbia has always to keep a certain number of troops in readiness lest Bulgaria should take advantage of a temporary defeat by Austria. Roumania, when she joins in the war, — as she will probably do whenever t he Dardanelles are open to traffic, — will have to keep a number of troops on her Bulgarian frontier. Such at least is the fear both in Serbia and in Roumania. It is useless guessing what Bulgaria would do in such an event, but it is only fair to her to state that, in the months of November and December last, when the fortunes of Serbia were at their lowest ebb, when indeed the general belief in England and in Constantinople was that the Serbian army had been annihilated, Bulgaria declared to the British government that she was neutral and intended to continue so, and kept her word. In like manner all the intrigues conducted by the Turks at Sofia, and the attempt so to arrange matters that German troops should be sent across the Danube to join the Turkish troops in Adrianople, failed to induce Bulgaria to depart from her policy of neutrality.

At the present time the hostility between Bulgarians and Greeks, and between Bulgarians and Serbians, is intense. Bulgaria has a real grievance which ought to be removed and which will be. But if, forgetful of present conditions, we look into the future, we may anticipate that Bulgaria and Serbia are as bound to come together in friendly union as were England and Scotland. They speak the same language, are members of the same church, and are both Slavs. Russia for many years past has been occupied in thwarting the policy of Austria at Belgrade. The remark of a Bulgarian statesman to me is probably well founded, that ‘Of many things which are doubtful, two are certain. First, that no Bulgarian government could remain in power for a week which declared war against Russia; and second, that it is unthinkable that they should ever fight on the side of the Turks.’ The two states have been kept apart mainly by Austria.

In Roumania, with its population increased to nearly eleven millions by additions from Bukowina and Transylvania, all speaking the same language and nearly all belonging to the same faith, I foresee a country which will desire peace in order that it may develop its petroleum, corn, and other industries, and become self-supporting. In Serbia I see a larger state, including the populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and great accessions from the Slavic population to the west of the Danube. Once Bulgaria and Serbia are on good terms, a great Slavic state will have been created which will tend constantly to increase from accessions from the Czechs of Bohemia, and which will probably work harmoniously with Roumania.

At the moment of closing this article I can say lit tle of the attitude of Greece. The fact that the Queen of Greece is the sister of the Kaiser places the royal family in opposition to the great mass of the people. The great attack on t he Dardanelles is still going on. It would have been greatly facilitated if Greece had joined the Allies. In return for her assistance she would have obtained Smyrna and the vilayet of Aidin, of which Smyrna is the most important city. Probably at least two thirds of the population are Greek. The city of Smyrna and the neighborhood have been Greek in race for three thousand years. Smyrna, as your readers will remember, is one of the places claimed as the birthplace of Homer himself. The Seven Churches of Asia Minor — familiar to all readers of the New Testament—were composed largely of Greeks. Magna Graecia plays a large part in the history of Greek literature and art. The Greeks of the kingdom would dearly like to have it. Moreover, the persecution which the Greeks have suffered at the hands of the Moslem population during the last three years has been at once grievous and indefensible: houses and vineyards wantonly plundered and destroyed, people violated or driven from their homes. As punishment even for their crimes in that part of the Empire, the Turks ought to lose it. If Greece had been ready to lend her assistance to the Allies, Europe would have been glad to see her enter into possession. Her chance, however, is, I think, gone.

It is curious to observe that of the series of peoples occupying the Balkan Peninsula, the Roumanians on the east and the Greeks on the south, people of quite distinct races and language from each other, are each of them equally distinct from the two great Slavic peoples between them, the Bulgarians and the Serbians. The great difficulty before the Greeks in their future is that, of population. Greece is herself a naturally poor country, possessing few natural resources, and the inducements held out to her inhabitants, especially by the United States, are a temptation to emigration. One of the coolest and ablest Greek ministers declared to me that this question of emigration was for him far and away the most serious with which his country had to deal. The people are industrious, make excellent sailors, and are enterprising. Lord Kitchener said of them, some four or five years ago, that wherever he had penetrated into the interior of Africa, he had always found Greek traders. Greece has already obtained possession of most of t he islands of the Ægean, which she will be permitted to keep. But as those who have sailed among them will remember, they are generally barren lands which are incapable of supporting a large population. They may still remain the homes of patriotic Greeks who have made their small fortunes in distant countries. Even under Turkish rule the island of Chios had become, a century ago, an island well peopled by Greeks who had thus returned from foreign countries. Their wealth, indeed, was the chief inducement that led to the terrible massacre of 1825. One may well hope that under the government of their own people the Isles of Greece —

may once more justify their ancient renown.

Nor must it be forgotten that Greece has obtained within the past two years a large accession of territory in Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia. But these again allow little room for expansion. Greece, however, with her glorious traditions and her innumerable classic associations, will always remain a country dear to all civilized peoples.

With Austria’s ambitions defeated and the Turk expelled from Europe; with a contented Greece on one side of the peninsula and an enlarged Roumania on the other; and with a powerful Slav state, including Serbia and Bulgaria in alliance, holding the intervening lands, it appears to me that there will be good reason to hope that a peaceful and durable settlement of the Balkan Peninsula will be achieved. This hope will be increased if Russia wisely foregoes any intention of occupying Constantinople.