Nicaragua and the United States

IN 1907 the republics of Nicaragua, Salvador, and Honduras were at war. The war apparently differed in no wise from the frequent and, for the most part, inconclusive struggles that have at intervals convulsed the five states of Central America ever since their attainment of independence in 1821. It was not the first war between them, and there was no hope at the time of its being the last. For eighty years the history of Central America had been that of nations united by ties of common history, language, and geographical situation, inspired by identical aims and purposes, and for long periods bound together by treaties of union or alliance, only to fall apart or be rent asunder by factional disputes, with always war as a result, until over large areas the lands were left untilled, commerce languished, and the instability of their various political institutions had almost passed into a proverb.

But the close of the war of 1907 marked a change. As soon as actual hostilities had ceased there was called, on the initiative of the United States, acting in coöperation with Mexico, a peace conference, to which delegates from all of the five states of Central America were invited, which not only concluded terms of peace but also established a Central American Court of Justice, to meet in perpetual session at Cartago, in Costa Rica. This Court, composed of one member from each of the five states, was authorized to hear and determine all causes of complaint between them and, under certain conditions, between any one of them and an outside nation.

The wisdom and value of this institution were at once apparent, the first decision of the Court, in the year following its creation, preventing another war. But an even greater work of the Conference, in the hope that it offered of establishing a really permanent peace among the war-distracted nations of Central America, was the placing of the central state, Honduras, inclined by geographical situation to be the most belligerent as well as the greatest sufferer of all, in a state of neutrality, proposed voluntarily by itself and guaranteed by its neighbors. The purpose of this neutralization was to remove Honduras permanently from the realm of war and place her in the same situation as Switzerland, which latter Republic, safeguarded by the Congress of Vienna, has maintained her independence, integrity, and unviolated neutrality to this day.

The benefits expected from this first application of the principle of perpetual neutrality to a country of the new world were incalculable. It confirmed the hope that free and independent states might ask for and accept perpetual neutrality at any one of the numerous international conferences summoned in furtherance of peace, and pointed to the rôle of guarantor and friend which the United States might play in the future of neutralization in this hemisphere. No better beginning could have been devised than that neutralization should be applied first of all in warridden Central America, made contemporaneous with the creation of the Central American Court of Justice, and brought into being at a peace conference held in Washington under the auspices of the United States. It was but the natural result of such conditions that, ever since the declaration of the neutrality of Honduras, not only have no hostilities broken out between the five guarantors of the agreement, but also, up to a short time ago, it appeared that the danger of war between them had been reduced to a minimum.

Unfortunately, in the last six months an attack has been made upon both the Central American Court of Justice and the principle of perpetual neutrality, which threatens their existence and nullifies their usefulness. It is still more unfortunate that the attack originated in a treaty concluded between one of these Central American countries and the United States.

This treaty, with Nicaragua, known as the Nicaragua Canal Treaty, grants to the United States, in return for the payment of three million dollars, the exclusive right to build an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua. It also grants to the United States the right to establish a naval base on Point Coseguina, lying within Nicaraguan territory on the southern shore of the Bay of Fonseca, and the ownership of two small islands, Great Corn and Little Corn, situated to the east of Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea. Like all treaties, it requires ratification by the treatymaking bodies of the respective nations, to be of legal effect.

Many causes intervened to delay these ratifications. There ware revolutions in Nicaragua; there were protests from Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica that Nicaragua had no right, without consulting them, to transfer rights and powers affecting territories or waters not wholly her own, but controlled jointly with others; there was a slowly growing feeling that the treaty conveyed very valuable rights for an insignificant sum compared with what we had paid for Panama; and that this money was to go to a nation occupying a peculiar position of dependence on United States military and naval power; and there were the vociferous protests of individuals, for the most part in exile, to the effect that the present government of Nicaragua represented only a minority of the people and had been placed and maintained in power by American arms — an inference to which the employment of American marines in suppressing the insurrection of 1912, and their continued presence in the capital city of Nicaragua to this day, seem to lend a color of truth.

With these assertions no issue is here taken. The principles involved lie deeper and are only obscured by a too close attention to surface agitation. The main facts are that, under an international protest which should have given us pause, the disputed treaty was ratified by our Senate last March, and after a two months’ struggle with political opponents in the National Assembly, by the signature of the President and the approval of the government of Nicaragua.

Immediately following these ratifications, the Republic of Costa Rica brought suit in the Central American Court of Justice against Nicaragua, on the ground that the latter had not respected Costa Rican rights in concluding and ratifying the treaty with the United States. The Court by a vote of four to one — Nicaragua alone dissenting — returned a verdict in favor of Costa Rica. The decision was uninfluenced and fell in every way within the purpose for which the Court was created — that of the peaceful determination and settlement of disputes between the five nations, which might otherwise lead to war, and its decision was binding on all parties. Nevertheless, Nicaragua refused to accept the decision. Recently a similar decision in favor of Salvador has been rendered, this time with regard to the naval base on Fonseca Bay, and equally without effect. The Court is now threatened with dissolution by these states on the ground that its authority has been disregarded and its prestige impaired; a war involving at least four of the republics seems imminent; and, most unfortunate of all, the defiant attitude of Nicaragua, with her three million dollars in hand, and her manifest reliance on the support of this government as evidenced by our warships in her harbor and our marines in her capital, has a grave and disquieting meaning to those who follow, with hope deferred, the relations of the United States toward our smallest and nearest LatinAmerican neighbors.

That one of these states is more valuable to us than the others; that, internationally speaking, Nicaragua is more important to us than all of the other Central American states combined, might by some be urged in defense of our dealing with her alone. The Nicaraguan Canal undoubtedly will at some time be built, and by the United States. That route, in open competition with that over Panama, received up to the year 1902 a majority of the favorable reports of United States canal commissions, and would probably have been already adopted and built, had it been known at the time that there could never be a sea-level canal. But the heart of the matter is this: Nicaragua, whatever her own ideas about it, cannot by herself alone sell the exclusive right to construct a canal involving a lake and river in the lower waters of which, flowing in part through Costa Rican territory, the last-named republic has definite interests and at least equal sovereignty; and Nicaragua commits a grievous wrong, unsupported by international law, in contracting with a foreign nation, without the consent of her neighbors, for the establishment, even on her own territory, of a naval base that will dominate the territory of her neighbors and waters controlled jointly by herself and them.

Fonseca Bay is a great natural indentation in the land, eighteen miles deep by thirty wide, with a narrow entrance guarded by two volcanoes fourteen miles apart. Of these Conchagua, on the north, is in Salvador, Coseguina, on the south, in Nicaragua, while Honduras, with the volcanic island of Tigre, owns most of the shore line to the east. The three nations, each holding about one third of the coast-line, possess jointly the sovereignty of its waters. The bay itself is magnificent, and its possessor holds the key of naval power in the south Pacific and the Canal.

It is obvious that every square yard of this harbor, as well as the shores of the surrounding states, is within the range of modern artillery located at almost any point on the bay. More specifically, the coasts of Salvador and Honduras, and the principal seaports of those countries, La Unión and Amapala, would be within range of the proposed United States naval base located on Point Coseguina, and, vice versa, our naval base would be within range of guns placed on the islands of Manguera or Tigre, belonging to Salvador and Honduras respectively. The establishment of such a base is naturally a matter of concern to both of those nations. England in 1911 objected to the establishment by Germany of a naval base at Agadir in Morocco, — although such a base threatened not England, but the Straits of Gibraltar, two hundred miles away, — and would have gone to war to prevent it. Clearly in our case the situation is one demanding friendly coöperation between all parties concerned rather than a narrow assumption and assertion of rights.

Of even more importance, under the provisions of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, concluded in Washington on December 20, 1907, under our auspices and recorded in our book of Foreign Relations of that year, the Republic of Honduras was placed in a state of neutrality in which she can lawfully neither commit nor suffer any hostile act. Deprived of her power to wage war, she is obliged to rely on the guaranties of her neighbors that they will respect her sovereignty and resist its violation. Are not we, who summoned the Conference, bound in duty to listen to her complaint?

While there is not the slightest doubt that the establishment of a United States naval base on the Nicaraguan shore of the Bay of Fonseca would not only safeguard the Panama Canal and its adjacent waters, but also insure in greater measure the peace, integrity, and commercial development of Honduras and of the neighboring states, it is only right that in so doing we should become a party to a general agreement and act in harmony with all the countries concerned. Occasions for protests, lawsuits, and threats of war would not have arisen if the United States had regarded this important Central American situation from the point of view of a joint interest in the rights desired. In the treaty the United States deals with Nicaragua and Nicaragua alone, as if the latter had a full right to entertain and decide by herself the matters in question.

It is true that the Senate adopted a resolution to accompany the treaty, to the effect that under it the rights of Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica are not affected; but is that not a matter for those states themselves to decide? Their protest to the Court of Justice and the Court’s decision in their favor form so forcible an answer that the support of Nicaragua alone, voiced by a President guarded in his capital by United States marines, can bring small satisfaction to the friends of peace and fair play in the United States.

Just as it is unthinkable that our foreign policy should lend itself to abuses, so we should be more careful to avert threatened abuses from those whom we count as wards. Above all, we have no right to force our method upon others simply through consciousness of our excellent motives and the firm belief that our actions will result in their greater tranquillity and peace.

Before another controversy, similar to that of Panama and Colombia, has arisen, let us admit it if we have been in error in unduly pressing the establishment of our rights, or if desire has led us to become parties to a disputed treaty. It is not as if time were a pressing factor in the negotiations. Our relations with Central America, if founded on justice, are too strong to be affected adversely in a few short years; and there is still a way, through mutual agreement, of attaining the desired end without ignoring or overriding the selfrespecting objections of neighboring states, not one of which is at this time really opposed to entering into a conference for mutual protection, understanding, and advantage.

In the Central American situation there are obligations from the fulfillment of which no payment of money can absolve us: there is the authority of an honorable and important institution to uphold; there is the character of the United States as friend and mediator in Central America to confirm; and there is the first application of the principle of permanent neutrality in the Western Hemisphere now in our hands to overthrow or to establish beyond all question and for all time.