Unwritten History: Unpublished Correspondence of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George

FEBRUARY, 1919

I

THE way in which Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister of Great Britain will remain one of the most dramatic incidents in British history, and one of the great outstanding events in the direction of the world war. It was symptomatic of a time when the stress of war stirs men deeply and drives them to ruthless methods undreamed of in the calmer days of peace. The incident had a domestic as well as a worldsignification. It has meant the breakup of the historic Liberal Party for the time being, and the beginning of a new alignment in British politics which may have far-reaching effects. Political life would have been very different after the war in any case; but Mr. Lloyd George by his action and his policy has forced the pace and upset the old party traditions and policies. Whether the recreant leader of Democracy will return as a prodigal son to the fold among his former Radical-Progressives; whether he will veer to the right among his former antagonists; whether he will endeavor to organize a centre party round his own forceful personality, or make a bid for the leadership of Labor, no student of political conditions emerging from the war will venture with confidence to predict. It is doubtful if Mr. Lloyd George himself has at the time of writing decided upon the course which he will follow or the party he will lead.

Usually a change of government in Great Britain is brought about by the defeat of the Administration in the House of Commons, or by defeat at a general election following upon a dissolution of Parliament. The change was made from the Asquith to the Lloyd George Coalition in December, 1916, without either of these things happening. Mr. Asquith and all his Liberal colleagues retired without having been defeated in the House of Commons or having tested the opinion of the country on their war-policy. The Lloyd George Administration came into being as the result of political wirepulling and personal intrigue. The change may have been necessary in the course of the war, and the results may have justified the change; but the methods adopted to bring about that change were new in British political life.

No one can fully appreciate the incidents of the crisis from which the Lloyd George government emerged without understanding the internal conditions of political parties in Great Britain at the time, and without knowing something of the enigmatic and complex personality of the present Prime Minister. Mr. Lloyd George is and has been for the past few years the most picturesque personality in British public life. He has amazing intuition; he has vision; he is subject to impulses and frequently seeks the means to justify action after the action has taken place; he has flashes of political genius and the faculty of projecting himself into the future, of reading the undercurrents of public opinion. He has fascinating qualities. He radiates charm, but does not inspire trust. He cares more for the end to be achieved than for the means by which that end is to be attained.

In the war he played several great parts. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer when war was declared. He knew less of finance than any financial minister in the world. He knew nothing of the mechanism of exchange, and he exhibited the first bill of exchange which he handled as a rare curiosity — an awesome document carrying the hidden force round which the commerce of the world revolves. But Mr. Lloyd George is wise in his ignorance. What he lacks in training, knowdedge, and education he makes up by intuition, by a receptive, alert mind, by an uncanny aptitude for assimilation. So he promptly called to his counsel the greatest merchants, the ablest bankers and financiers in the City of London. He sought their advice and acted upon it. He averted a financial crash by the measures which he took. He was bold in imposing war-taxation. He was a success as War Finance Minister.

But he yearned for other spheres of activity. He wanted to get closer to the direction of the war. He interested himself in armaments. He learned much from the initiative and example of the French in rising to a great national emergency in the matter of munitions. He was appointed by Mr. Asquith first Minister of Munitions, when the ministry was created, leaving the Chancellorship of the Exchequer with regret and with the hope of returning to the position, as he, unlike Lord Kitchener, did not foresee a long war. This was at the end of May, 1915, when Mr. Asquith reconstructed his government by the admission of Unionists. As Minister of Munitions, Mr. Lloyd George mobilized the industries of the country more quickly than anyone else could have done. It was Kitchener’s striking personality that enabled England to recruit her new army — Kitchener’s Army; it was due to the energizing influence of Lloyd George that the industrial forces of the country were put on a war-footing in record time.

Mr. Lloyd George succeeded Lord Kitchener as Secretary for War in June, 1916. By this time he regarded himself as the nation’s war-leader, and his friends likened him to Cromwell and to Pitt. As War Minister he was not a great success as an office administrator, but he shone in other ways: in pushing on munition production, in organizing military railways in France, and in other directions. He was also among ministers the first and most insistent advocate of compulsory military service.

II

By the summer of 1916 rifts had arisen inside the Asquith Coalition. That coalition had been formed in May, 1915, over the Dardanelles crisis, and the shortage of shells and other munitions. Sir Edward Carson retired in October, 1915, mainly because the war was not going well in the East, and because the Allies did not coerce Greece. It was well known that Mr. Lloyd George was in general agreement with Sir Edward Carson and considered that Mr. Asquith’s War Committee was dilatory and inefficient as an instrument for waging war.

It was generally admitted that the machinery for directing the war was cumbersome and slow. The military chiefs regarded it as ill-fitted for the purpose. Two ‘ginger’ groups were formed in the House of Commons, one on the Unionist side, with Sir Edward Carson as its chief, and one on the Liberal side. The war was not going well for the Allies in the summer of 1916. There were continual attacks on the Cabinet from the outside, and Mr. Lloyd George was in permanent revolt inside.

The progress of disintegration which had begun came to a head on a subsidiary issue which had no bearing on warpolicy. It was on an economic question in which the United States was involved. Enemy properties in British dominions were being sold, and in the fall of 1916 the turn came to dispose of German interests in Nigeria. The Governor of the colony advertised the properties for sale in neutral countries, — including the United States, — as well as in Allied countries and within the British Empire. He did so because he considered that he was following the traditional British policy of acting in the best interests of the natives, of whom he regarded himself — in the absence of representative government — as the trustee. There was another reason why there should be foreign competition: the palm-kernel trade in Nigeria, had fallen into the hands of an English monopoly as soon as the German competition had stopped, and the price paid to the natives had fallen fifty per cent. The tariff party in the House of Commons fastened on this issue: they considered that Empire interests were being betrayed. British raw material for the British was their policy; ‘Alien hands off!’ was their cry. The issue was also raised to embarrass the Government and in the hope of defeating it.

These tactics were not discouraged by Mr. Lloyd George although he took no direct part in them. The running was made by the Ulster fire-eater, Sir Edward Carson. The government policy won, but Mr. Bonar Law, the Unionist leader, became alarmed about his own position. When taking office under Mr. Asquith in May, 1915, he had pledged himself to his party that, if ever he found himself in disagreement with them, if ever he lost their confidence, he would resign. In the division on the Nigerian sale sixty Unionists voted against the Government and the Unionist leader, and seventy-one voted on the other side, including fifteen office-holders. The margin was too narrow for safety. Mr. Bonar Law decided that ‘something should be done to give greater security to the Government,’ and he thought that the proper course lay in improving and quickening the machinery for directing the war — then a clumsy committee which had increased in numbers until it resembled a small public meeting; and the larger it became, the less work it accomplished.

Sir Edward Carson was all out for war against the Asquith Administration. Mr. Lloyd George was with him, and carried on his operations by occasionally speaking against the government of which he was a member, and by pursuing an aggressive policy inside the War Committee and the Cabinet — all from a genuine desire to make the war go better.

At this particular time, Mr. Lloyd George had drifted apart from Mr. Bonar Law; so had Sir Edward Carson — a feature of the situation which did not make the Unionist leader’s position more comfortable. Carson, the leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, was in close coöperation with Mr. Lloyd George, the leader of the Opposition inside the Cabinet.

This clash of personal interests made the position impossible: it could not last. Then entered upon the scene a gentleman almost unknown in English political life, who started to bring about a reconciliation. He knew the three. He was Sir Max Aitken, a Canadian financier who entered English politics a few years before, and who now hides his former identity under the title of Lord Beaverbrook. He had no influence in the House of Commons, but he had influence with Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson. He had had a profitable experience as a merger of industrial enterprises in Canada, and he now applied the same skillful diplomacy to bring together conflicting political personalities in England. He succeeded. First, he reconciled Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson. Next, he brought in Mr. Lloyd George; and the three spent the latter part of November in secret confabulation, with the Canadian financier acting as host and gobetween. Little progress was made toward reforming the War Committee, and consequently improving the direction of the war. At that time Mr. Bonar Law had not the same complete trust in Mr. Lloyd George that he had in Mr. Asquith, whom he still considered as the indispensable head of a government and the focus of national unity.

The first proposal for a new War Council was submitted by Mr. Bonar Law to Mr. Asquith on the 18th of November, 1916. It was simplicity itself. The Council was to consist of the trio themselves, working without portfolios under the supreme control of Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister. Mr. Asquith did not accept the scheme. Mr. Bonar Law produced an alternative a week later. This scheme was for a cabinet within the Cabinet: a body of civilian ministers who would sit daily, if necessary, together with naval, military, and other expert advisers. It was to be a real War Council. The members would have no other function than ‘to conduct the war.’ Mr. Asquith was to be the President and Mr. Lloyd George the Chairman, and President in the absence of the Prime Minister. The prerogatives of the Prime Minister were not encroached upon. He had power to refer any question, or all questions, to the Cabinet, and was left in supreme control, with his authority unimpaired and his responsibility not lessened. The scheme looked an admirable working arrangement — better than the War Cabinet, subsequently created by Mr. Lloyd George, which is not a War Cabinet at all, except in name. It is a body changing in personnel according to the subjects discussed, and dealing with the whole work of the Administration, military and civil. Mr. Asquith did not accept the revised scheme as presented by Mr. Bonar Law, nor was it approved by Mr. Bonar Law’s Unionist colleagues, who proposed a dual council separating the military from the civil administration.

III

In the meantime, Mr. Asquith was wrestling with all sorts of trouble. He could not find a food-controller, he was seeking a plan to speed up shipbuilding, he was preparing a ministry of national service, he was contemplating the organization of a civilian general staff to work on parallel lines with a reformed War Council. He did not take his trusted Liberal colleagues in the Cabinet into his confidence. His chief Liberal lieutenant, Mr. Lloyd George, was coöperating with the Unionist leader. Mr. Asquith was in great perplexity; he was sincere, honest, straightforward, but harassed with doubts. He studied and hesitated. But Mr. Lloyd George was in a hurry, and his restlessness made Mr. Asquith all the more anxious, as he never knew where demands would end or what Mr. Lloyd George’s last word would be. Mr. Lloyd George’s political and personal supporters kept up a perpetual attack on the Prime Minister; and while he did not know whether Mr. Lloyd George encouraged the assailants, he did know that he neither rebuked nor tried to restrain them.

At this point negotiations passed into the hands of Mr. Lloyd George. Then began a rapid interchange of letters between him and Mr. Asquith. The sequel of this correspondence was the downfall of the latter. The historic letters have been circulated among a select circle of friends of both men. One gentleman intimately associated with the negotiations has printed them privately. They have been read by a number of leading statesmen and publicists, including visitors from overseas, among them Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada. This correspondence reveals the working of the minds of two men who played great parts in the war at a time of stress and national crisis, and deserves wider publicity, not alone for its own interest, but for the development of which it was the prelude.

The first communication from Mr. Lloyd George was dated the first of December, 1916, in the form of a brief memorandum, as follows: —

December 1st, 1916.
MEMO. TO PRIME MINISTER
1. That the War Committee consist of three members — two of whom must be the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, who should have in their offices deputies capable of attending to and deciding all department business — and a third Minister without portfolio. One of the three to be Chairman.
2. That the War Committee shall have full powers, subject to the supreme control of the Prime Minister, to direct all questions connected with the War. 3. The Prime Minister in his discretion to have the power to refer any question to the Cabinet. 4. Unless the Cabinet, on reference by the Prime Minister, reverses the decision of the War Committee, that decision to be carried out by the Department concerned. 5. The War Committee to have the power to invite any Minister and to summon the expert advisers and officers of any Department to its meetings.

To this Mr. Asquith replied later on in the same day. He wrote: —

(Secret)
10, DOWNING STREET, S.W. 1st December, 1916.
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,I have now had time to reflect on our conversation this morning and to study your memorandum.
Though I do not altogether share your dark estimate and forecast of the situation, actual and perspective, I am in complete agreement that we have reached a critical situation in the War, and that our own methods of procedure, with the experience which we have gained during the last few months, call for reconsideration and revision.
The two main defects of the War Committee, which has done excellent work, are (1) that its numbers are too large; (2) that there is delay, evasion, and often obstruction, on the part of the Departments in giving effect to its decisions. I might with good reason add (3), that it is often kept in ignorance by the Departments of information, essential and even vital, of a technical kind, upon the problems that come before it, and (4) that it is overcharged with duties, many of which might well be delegated to subordinate bodies.
The result is that I am clearly of opinion that the War Committee should be reconstituted, and its relations to and authority over the Departments, etc., more clearly defined and more effectively asserted.
I now come to your specific proposals. In my opinion, whatever changes are made
in the composition or functions of the War Committee, the Prime Minister must be its Chairman. He cannot be relegated to the position of an arbiter in the background or a referee to the Cabinet.
In regard to its composition, I agree that the War Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty are necessary members. I am inclined to add to the same category the Minister of Munitions. There should be another member, either without portfolio or charged only with comparatively light departmental duties. One of the members should be appointed Vice-Chairman.
I purposely do not in this letter discuss the delicate and difficult question of personnel.
The Committee should, as far as possible, sit de die in diem, and have full power to see that its decisions (subject to appeal to the Cabinet) are carried out promptly and effectively by the Departments.
The reconstruction of the War Committee should be accompanied by the setting up of a Committee of National Organization, to deal with the purely domestic side of war-problems. It should have executive powers within its own domain.
The Cabinet would in all cases have ultimate authority.
Yours very sincerely,
(sd) H. H. ASQUITH.

Clearly Mr. Asquith was of opinion that the War Council proposed would undermine his authority, and he therefore wished to retain his right to be chairman. He could not very well have acted as chairman of a committee at daily meetings, and as chairman of a committee on national civil organization, have presided at general Cabinet meetings, and have continued to perform his parliamentary duties as Leader of the House of Commons.

Instead of pursuing the negotiations and trying to reconcile their differences, both Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George went into the country for the week-end. On Sunday morning, December 2, Conservative ministers met at Mr. Bonar Law’s house. These ministers were in favor of Mr. Asquith remaining; and in order, as they thought, to strengthen his position and give him a free hand, they advised him to resign and reconstruct his government.

The British Prime Minister in the matter of allocating offices is an autocrat. When he resigns or reconstructs his government, he invites all his ministers to return their portfolios and he re-allots offices, according to his own desires and interests, to so many of them as he wishes to retain.

Mr. Asquith, who returned to his official residence in London on Sunday afternoon, did not see how resignation would facilitate his task, and solve (he pressing problem before him. As a lever to bring Mr. Asquith into harmony with the policy of the Unionists, Mr. Bonar Law was authorized to resign and to tender the resignation of all his Unionist colleagues. He did not carry out this part of his mission. Mr. Asquith was in a conciliatory mood. He was willing to continue discussion in order to arrive at an understanding. Interviews took place between him, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Bonar Law, separately and together, on Sunday evening, and on the third a compromise was reached, and a scheme was agreed upon. The War Committee was to direct the war-policy, under the supreme and effective control of the Prime Minister. The Committee was not to consist of more than five: they would have a chairman, — Mr. Lloyd George, — and Mr. Asquith would attend the meetings at his discretion and preside when he did attend. The chairman would report to him daily. He would review the programme of business and have the power of veto.

This solution, almost on the lines of that proposed by Mr. Bonar Law in November, maintained the supreme control and responsibility of the Prime Minister. The question of personnel was not settled. Mr. Asquith agreed to Mr. Lloyd George (as chairman), Mr. Bonar Law, and a representative of Labor (Mr. Arthur Henderson), but he did not agree to Mr. Lloyd George’s suggestion that Mr. Balfour, then at the head of the Admiralty, should be excluded and that Sir Edward Carson should be included. He considered that Mr. Balfour had proved an efficient First Lord of the Admiralty, and that he had a right to be a member of the Committee, with or without portfolio. He had not been impressed with Sir Edward Carson’s ability as a cabinet minister, and, perhaps, he was also thinking of Ireland. At any rate, while the constitution of the Committee, as regards two men, was not settled on Sunday evening, Mr. Asquith was confident that this remaining difficulty would be overcome. He dined at the house of Mr. Edwin Montagu, now Minister for India and then Minister for Munitions, who had been trying to play the part of conciliator. So sure was Mr. Asquith that the way was clear for a settlement, that he issued a notice to the press from Mr. Montagu’s house, which read: ‘The Prime Minister, with a view to the more effective prosecution of the war, has decided to advise His Majesty the King to consent to a reconstruction of the Government.’ Probably the first knowlege the King had of this intention was when he read the announcement in the press next morning.

The next day— the fourth of December— the breaking-point was reached. The Times published an editorial which was intended to make an agreement between the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd George impossible. That journal had attacked Mr. Asquith severely and somewhat malignantly for two years or so. It misrepresented Mr. Asquith in many respects, and probably misled public opinion. Mr. Asquith was indifferent to personal attack or abuse, but what disturbed him in respect to this particular article was that the secret conversation of the previous evening had been conveyed to the Times within a few hours. Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law certainly had not communicated with the press, so the leakage must have been through Mr. Lloyd George.

During this period Mr. Lloyd George and the Northcliffe press had not been on friendly terms. As Minister for War, Mr. Lloyd George had not carried out the Northcliffe policy. There was a temporary estrangement. Here again came in the Canadian merger and proposed a reconciliation between Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Northcliffe. He pointed out that Lord Northcliffe’s support was better than his opposition. Therefore, as the price of peace, he had to be let into the confidence of Mr. Lloyd George. He was informed, either by Mr. Lloyd George or by an intermediary. The Times was put in possession of a weapon which it used, not to support Mr. Lloyd George, but to stab Mr. Asquith. It represented, or rather misrepresented, the agreement arrived at on Sunday evening as meaning the annihilation of Mr. Asquith. He was to be a mere roi-fainéant: he had not abdicated, but had been reduced to a nonentity and he was represented as being a consenting party to his own effacement — relegated, as he himself said, to the position of an ‘irresponsible spectator of the war.’ Consequently he wrote as follows on the morning of the fourth of December to Mr. Lloyd George: —

10, DOWNING STBEET, S.W. 4th December, 1916.
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,Such productions as the first leading article in to-day’s Times, shewing the infinite possibilities for misunderstanding and misrepresentation of such an arrangement as
we considered yesterday, make me at least doubtful as to its feasibility. Unless the impression is at once corrected, that I am being relegated to the position of an irresponsible spectator of the War, I cannot possibly go on.
The suggested arrangement was to the following effect: The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of War Policy. The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its Chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion attend meetings of the Committee. Yours sincerely,
(sd) H. H. ASQUITH.

Mr. Lloyd George, within a few minutes, sent the following reply: —

WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W. 4th December, 1916.
MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,I have not seen the Times article, but I hope you will not attach undue importance to these effusions. I have had these misrepresentations to put up with for months. Northcliffe frankly wants a smash. Derby and I do not. Northcliffe would like to make this and any other rearrangement under your Premiership impossible. Derby and I attach great importance to your retaining your present position — effectively. I cannot restrain or, I fear, influence Northcliffe. I fully accept in letter and in spirit vour summary of the suggested arrangement — subject of course to personnel. Ever sincerely,
(sd) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

Mr. Lloyd George might have known about the article or have been told about it, although he had not actually seen it. It is inconceivable that he did not know of its existence, as no one is a keener student of the press or has a better appreciation of its influence. He did not volunteer any explanation about the source of information upon which the article was founded. He admitted nothing and denied nothing. Lord Derby, then Mr. Lloyd George’s assistant at the War Office, was introduced as a party to the negotiations for the first, time. As a rule, Mr. Lloyd George ignored his assistant, who was absorbed in work which the Minister threw upon him; but he is an amiable gentleman, with a conciliatory and friendly spirit. Lord Derby’s published view on the situation was that

the Committee should consist of a small number of men; that the Prime Minister, whose duties were so great that he could not always preside over its deliberations, should not be required to attend all its meetings; and that the Committee should be able to sit all day, and every day if required. It would therefore be desirable, when it was impossible for the Prime Minister to preside, that the business of chairman should be delegated to someone else; and I am sure that you will agree that there was certainly one who would be designated by the country as the right man to fill that position. There was a further power given to the Prime Minister, and that was not only of attending, and, when he attended, presiding over the Committee, but of vetoing any proposal which that Committee might wish to put forward. That was the constitution of the Committee, and I thought, and still think, that it would have been possible to make such a change without overthrowing the Government.

Although Mr. Asquith was seriously perturbed, the door was not closed. In the meantime, he had consulted his colleagues, both Liberal and Unionist; he had regained confidence in himself; he felt that he could take bolder measures, and, without defying Mr. Lloyd George, bring his restless lieutenant into line. So he plucked up courage to send him this letter — still on the fourth of December: —

(Secret)
10, DOWNING STREET, S.W.
4th December, 1916.
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,Thank you for your letter of this morning.
The King gave me to-day authority to ask and accept the resignation of all my colleagues, and to form a new Government on such lines as I should submit to him. I start therefore with a clean slate. The first question which I have to consider is the constitution of the new War Committee.
After full consideration of the matter in all its aspects, I have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible that such a Committee could be made Workable and effective without the Prime Minister as its Chairman. I quite agree that it will be necessary for him, in view of the other calls upon his time and energy, to delegate from time to time the Chairmanship to another Minister as his representative and locum tenens; but (if he is to retain the authority which corresponds with his responsibility as Prime Minister) he must continue to be, as he always has been, its permanent President. I am satisfied, on reflection, that any other arrangement (such for instance as the one which I indicated to you in my letter of to-day) would be found in experience impracticable, and incompatible with the retention of the Prime Minister’s final and supreme control.
The other question, which you have raised, relates to the personnel of the Committee. Here again, after deliberate consideration, I find myself unable to agree with some of your suggestions. I think we both agree that the First Lord of the Admiralty must, of necessity, be a member of the Committee. I cannot (as I told you yesterday) be a party to any suggestion that Mr. Balfour should be displaced. The technical side of the Board of Admiralty has been reconstituted, with Sir John Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. I believe Mr. Balfour to be, under existing conditions, the necessary head of the Board.
I must add that Sir Edward Carson (for whom personally and in every other way, I have the greatest regard) is not, from the only point of view which is significant to me (namely the most effective prosecution of the War), the man best qualified among my colleagues, present or past, to be a member of the War Committee.
I have only to say, in conclusion, that I am strongly of opinion that the War Committee (without any disparagement of the existing Committee, which in my judgment is a most efficient body, and has done, and is doing, valuable work) ought to be reduced in number, so that it can sit more frequently and overtake more easily the daily problems with which it has to deal. But in any reconstruction of the Committee, such as I have, and have for some time past had in view, the governing consideration to my mind is the special capacity of the men who are to sit on it for the work which it has to do.
That is a question which I must reserve for myself to decide.
Yours very sincerely,
(sd) H. H. ASQUITH.

There was nothing new as regards Mr. Asquith’s attitude, but his views were firmly expressed, and his determination to ask for the resignation of all his colleagues gave him as he said ’a clean slate,’ with power to re-allocate offices as he chose, and to omit anyone whose coöperation he no longer desired.

Mr. Lloyd George did not expect this bomb-shell, and took more than a few hours over his reply, which was a masterly production, intended as a justification of his whole war-policy, and was written with a view to publication. This letter read: —

WAR OFFICE, S.W., 5th December, 1916.
MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,I received your letter with some surprise. On Friday I made proposals which involved, not merely your retention of the Premiership, but the supreme control of the War, whilst the executive functions, subject to that supreme control, were left to others. I thought you then received these suggestions favorably. In fact you yourself proposed that I should be the Chairman of this Executive Committee, although, as you know, I never put forward that demand. On Saturday you wrote me a letter in which you completely went back on that proposition. You sent for me on Sunday and put before me other proposals: these proposals you embodied in a letter to me written on Monday: —
‘The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of War policy;
The agenda of the War Committee willbe submitted to him; its Chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto, le can, of course, at his own discretion attend meetings of the Committee.'
These proposals safeguarded your position and power as Prime Minister in every particular. I immediately wrote you, accepting them ‘in letter and in spirit.’ It is true that on Sunday I expressed views as to the constitution of the Committee, but these were for discussion. To-day you have gone back on your own proposals.
I have striven my utmost to cure the obvious defects of the War Committee without overthrowing the Government. As you are aware, on several occasions during the last two years I have deemed it my duty to express profound dissatisfaction with the Government’s method of conducting the War. Many a time, with the road to victory open in front of us, we have delayed and hesitated whilst the enemy were erecting barriers that finally checked the approach. There has been delay, hesitation, lack of forethought and vision. I have endeavored repeatedly to warn the Government of the dangers, both verbally and in written memoranda and letters, which I crave your leave now to publish if my action is challenged; but I have either failed to secure decisions or I have secured them when it was too late to avert the evils. The latest illustration is our lamentable failure to give timely support to ROUMANIA.
I have more than once asked to be released from my responsibility for a policy with which I was in thorough disagreement, but at your urgent personal request I remained in the Government. I realize that, when the country is in the peril of a great war, Ministers have not the same freedom to resign on disagreement. At the same time, I have always felt — and I felt deeply — that I was in a false position, inasmuch as I could never defend in a wholehearted manner the action of the Government of which I was a member, We have thrown away opportunity after opportunity, and I am convinced, after deep and anxious reflection, that it is my duty to leave the Government, in order to inform the people of the real condition of affairs and to give them an opportunity, before it is too late, to save their native land from a disaster which is inevitable if the present methods are longer persisted in. As all delay is fatal in war, I place my office without further parley at your disposal.
It is with great personal regret that I have come to this conclusion. In spite of mean and unworthy insinuations to the contrary, -insinuations which I fear are always inevitable in the ease of men who hold prominent but not primary positions in any Administration,— I have fell a strong personal attachment to you as my chief. As you yourself said on Sunday, we have acted together for ten years and never had a quarrel, although we have had many a grave difference on questions of policy. You have treated me with great courtesy and kindness; for all that I thank you. Nothing would have induced me to part now except an overwhelming sense that the course of action which has been pursued has put the country — and not merely the country, but throughout the world, the principles for which you and I have always stood throughout our political lives — in the greatest peril that has ever overtaken them.
As I am fully conscious of the importance of preserving national unity, I propose to give your Government complete support in the vigorous prosecution of the War; but unity without action is nothing but futile carnage, and I cannot be responsible for that. Vigor and vision are the supreme need at this hour.
Yours sincerely,
(sd) D, LLOYD GEORGE.

Mr. Lloyd George, it will be noticed, in this communication accuses the Prime Minister, as his friends in the press had already done, of going back on his word on two occasions. The letters on the crisis, and the views of mere independent participators in the controversy, do not bear out this interpretation of Mr. Asquith’s attitude, which, it must be remembered, was influenced by the Times article, and by the fear that he had not heard the last word in Mr. Lloyd George’s demands.
There are severe strictures in Mr. Lloyd George’s letter on the general conduct of the war; but the one specific indictment of failure refers to Roumania. On the fourth of September, 1916, he wrote a memorandum on Roumania. Mr. Lloyd George was rightly proud of this document, and it has had a very considerable private circulation among his friends. Here it is: —

WAB OFFICE, 4. 9. 1916.
I have just seen the telegrams announcing the declaration of war by Bulgaria against Roumania. This is an additional ground for the anxiety which I expressed to you on Saturday as to the possibilities in the immediate future in the Balkans. I then expressed some apprehension that Hindenburg, who has strong Eastern proclivities and has always been opposed to the concentration of Germanic forces in the West, would direct his attention to the crushing of Roumania, and that we ought to be thinking out every practicable plan for giving effective support to Roumania in the event of her being heavily attacked. We cannot afford another Serbian tragedy. We were warned early in 1915 that the Germans meant, in confederation with the Bulgars, to wipe Serbia out. In spite of that fact, when the attack came we had not purchased a single mule to aid the Serbians through Salonika. The result was, when our troops landed there, owing to lack of equipment and appropriate transport, they could not go inland and Serbia was crushed.
I hope that we shall not allow the same catastrophe to befall Roumania through lack of timely forethought.
There are three disquieting facts in the situation: —
1. Hindenburg’s well-known Eastern inclinations. 2. The declaration of war by Bulgaria against Roumania. I cannot believe Ferdinand would have taken this risk where it was quite unnecessary, unless he had received substantial guaranties of German assistance in the attack on Roumania.

3. The slackening of the German attack on Verdun. Hindenburg will certainly give up this foolish attack at the earliest possible opportunity. The abandonment of this operation will release hundreds of heavy guns and hundreds of thousands of good troops. If in addition to this he were prepared gradually to give ground on the Somme, making us pay for it as he retires, he could transfer several more divisions from the West to the East. He could give up four or five times as much ground as we have won during the past two months without surrendering any vital positions. 4. I can hardly think that the equipment of the Roumanian Army would enable it long to resist an attack from an AustroGermanic-Bulgarian force, armed with hundreds of heavy guns and supplied with enormous quantities of heavy shell. The Roumanians are very scantily supplied with heavy guns, and I doubt whether their supplies of ammunition are sufficient to enable them to get through a continuous fight lasting over several weeks. I therefore once more urge that the General Staff should carefully consider what action we could, in conjunction with France and Italy, take immediately to relieve the pressure on Roumania if a formidable attack developed against her. There may be nothing in my fears, but no harm could be done by being prepared for all contingencies.
(sd) D. Ll.G.

We now know what really happened with regard to Roumania. Much of the munitions intended for her had been intercepted by Russia, although they had not been put to effective use by that country. Roumania was the victim of Russian inefficiency, incompetence, corruption, and neglect. As the Allies could help Roumania only through Russia, they were obviously at a disadvantage, unless they had foreseen the danger many months before they induced Roumania to enter the war; and at that time munitions were inadequate to go round. The military weakness of Russia helped to make Roumania an easy prey to the German legions. Mr. Asquith sent a brief and restrained reply to Mr. Lloyd George’s ultimatum, dated the same day — December 5. It ran: —

(Private) 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W.
5th December, 1916.
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE, I need not tell you that I have read your letter of to-day with much regret.
I do not comment upon it for the moment, except to say that I cannot wholly accept your account of what passed between us in regard to my connection with the War Committee.
In particular, you have omitted to quote the first and most material part of my letter of yesterday.

Yours very sincerely, (sd) H. H. ASQUITH.
In the meantime. I feel sure that you will see the obvious necessity in the public interest of not publishing at this moment any part of our correspondence.
Mr. Lloyd George still hankered after publicity and in reply said: —

WAR OFFICE, S.W., 5th December, 1916.
MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,I cannot announce my resignation without assigning the reason. Your request that I should not publish the correspondence that led up to and necessitated it places me therefore in an embarrassing and unfair position. I must give reasons for the grave step I have taken. If you forbid publication of the correspondence, do you object to my stating in another form my version of the causes that led to my resigning ?

Yours sincerely, (sd) D. LLOYD GEORGE. As to the first part of your letter, the publication of the letters would cover the whole ground.
A new situation then faced Mr. Asquith: he was threatened with the pub-

lication of letters which would have raised a fierce controversy and destroyed national unity at a time when things were not going well. The inner history of a split between the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd George, the revelation of the weakness of machinery for directing the war, would have caused consternation at home, alarm among the Allies, and have given welcome encouragement to the enemy. Placed in such a dilemma, Mr. Asquith took the only course which the gravity of the situation demanded: he resigned. He announced his resignation in his final letter to Mr. Lloyd George which was as follows: —
10, DOWNING STREET, S.W. 5th December, 1916.

MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,; It may make a difference to you (in reply to your last letter) if I tell you at once that I have tendered my resignation to the King. In any case, I should deprecate in the public interest the publication in its present form, at this moment, of your letters to me of this morning.
Of course, I have neither the power nor the wish to prevent your stating in some other form the causes which have led you to take the step which you have taken. Yours very sincerely, (sd) H. H. ASQUITH.

Although he had resigned, Mr. Asquith was confident that he would be recalled to power. The Unionists believed that he would be, his own followers in the Cabinet were certain that no one else could reconstruct the coalition; Liberal and Unionist Ministers predicted that Mr. Lloyd George could not form an administration. He did. How he accomplished this amazingly clever feat in political strategy is another story.