The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Iii. Into the World War. Iv. The Ending of the War

Arranged as a Narrative by Charles Seymour. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1928. 8vo. xviii+453, 552 pp. Illus. $10.00.

COLONEL HOUSE often said of President Wilson and himself, ‘Our minds run parallel.’ This parallelism was so close that it is extraordinary to see how often they came separately to the same conclusions, how completely the President continually accepted his friend’s advice, how fully he entrusted him with the most important missions without feeling it necessary to give him any definite written or verbal instructions. This mutual confidence and understanding gave the silent Texan a unique position as super-adviser and stiperambassador. It makes invaluable his record of American participation in winning the war and making the peace, which are the main themes of the third and fourth volumes of the Intimate Papers.

Though the thoughts of the President and Colonel House traveled toward the same ideals, they sometimes differed as to the most practical means of achieving them. When they differed, it was usually Colonel House who was shrewder, wiser, and more flexible. He was strongly opposed to any intervention in Russia after the Bolsheviki seized control, as was also the President at first; but, under continued pressure from the French and the British, the President finally consented to join Japan in the unfortunate Siberian adventure. When the Treaty of Versailles was before the Senate, House wrote two letters to the President advising him to let the Senate make reservations as the only way to assure ratification; the responsibility for accepting the reservations could be left to the other Powers. But the letters were left unanswered and the advice was not taken. In many cases House deterred the President from using phrases which he feared might cause needless friction in Europe. If he saw more clearly the realities of the European situation, it is to be remembered that he did not have upon his shoulders the great weight of domestic official business and could concentrate his attention upon foreign problems with which his missions to Europe had made him more familiar; nor did he have the burden of the final responsibility for decisions.

The volumes close with a note of sadness and regret that the achievements at the Peace Conference fell so far short of the ideals. As he watched the pageant of the signing of the Treaty, Colonel House says he ‘had a feeling of sympathy for the Germans who sat there quite stoically. It was not unlike what was done in olden times, when the conqueror dragged the conquered at his chariot wheels. To my mind, it is out of keeping with the new era which we profess an ardent desire to promote.’ He had been opposed to having the President come to take part in the Peace Conference, feeling that if he remained upon his lofty pedestal in Washington he would wield more power and influence in favor of their mutual ideals than if he descended to wrangle with the representatives of other States at Paris. ‘To those who are saying that the Treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it.'

It was during the latter part of the Peace Conference that there came a mysterious though hardly perceptible change in his relations with President Wilson. As Professor Seymour clearly shows, there was never any quarrel or break between them, but it happened that they never saw each other again after parting at Paris. Soon afterward the President’s health gave way. and with his sickness the intimate relations with his closest friend lapsed.

SIDNEY B. FAY