Wilson's Men

No members of President Wilson’s Cabinet exercised such varied and such vital functions as did Newton D. Baker and William G. McAdoo, nor were any others of that much-decried group subjected to so much abuse. As our war administration crosses from the field of politics into that of history, public opinion begins to recognize the size of the difficulties which it confronted and the range of its accomplishments. Whatever the cost and the waste, whatever the relative contribution of our government to Allied victory, it did accomplish the task undertaken when the United States entered the war. To this fact two recent books, one by a distinguished war correspondent, the other by Mr. McAdoo himself, bear ample witness.

To the historian it is immediately obvious that Crowded Years: Reminiscences of William G. McAdoo (Houghton Mifflin, $5.00) is of the lesser significance. As an autobiography, its tone is personal, and a large portion is devoted to Mr. McAdoo’s prewar activities, which, apart from the Hudson Tunnels, had little general importance. But no one can question its interest, for Mr. McAdoo writes cheerily and breezily, with great skid in condensation and explanation of complex situations. The book reflects the courage and good temper of a great promoter, never appalled by difficulties or confused by details or worse than slightly irritated by the tactics of his opponents. It reflects equally the never-failing youth of Mr. McAdoo and his zest for accomplishment. If the critic objects to the impression that the author was the giant that put over the Liberty Loans and rescued the nation from its transportation tangle, we must not forget that as Secretary of the Treasury and Director-General of Railroads he was the target of criticism, and therefore must receive the credit.

In general the tone is kindly, if rather Olympian. In treating weaker personalities, such as McCombs, the author is generous. In handling the bigger men this trait is not so evident, as appears in his belittling the work of Hoover in Belgium, which he describes as ‘a celebrity easily won, I fancy, as I judge from long observation that the job of giving away things requires very little wear and tear on one’s ability.’ The historian’s chief quarrel with Mr. McAdoo is one that arises with most autobiographers: he leaves out so many things that would spoil the picture. There is no hint of the financial snarl arising from the building of the Hudson Tunnels; no one would guess the share of Mr. Garfield in settling the coal crisis; the table of profits on page 494 gives as much significance to the ‘fly-bynight’ or ‘snow-bird’ companies as to the important corporations. The author’s rather casual and entirely optimistic treatment of his successful management does not leave the reader with perfect confidence in the accuracy or the comprehensiveness of the picture.

Mr. Newton Baker was neither casual nor optimistic, but he emerges from Frederick Palmer’s very important two-volume study, Newton D. Baker: America at War (Dodd, Mead, $7.50), with the characteristics of a statesman and a philosopher. Those characteristics, once the flood of war-time abuse subsided, have recently been attributed to him by opinion in many quarters. The change in popular estimation is justified by the historical documents. Although the book begins and ends on a personal note, the author has by no means followed the biographical method; if is hardly less than a comprehensive history of America’s war effort, attaining approximate but certainly not perfect unity through the central figure of the Secretary of War. Equipped with a broad sense of military and political background and provided with access to Mr. Baker’s personal correspondence with the President, the cablegrams between the War Department and the Headquarters of the A.E.F., the minutes of the War Industries Board, Mr. Palmer writes with authority, and his conclusions are impressive.

The first volume is devoted to the attempt to transform a great industrial democracy, possessing no effective coördinating organization, into a war machine, capable not merely of raising men and materials, but of delivering them in the quantities desired, at the time and place demanded. The size of the operation and the novelty of the task and the lack of an operating organization produced confusion, the second volume is devoted to the process of developing order and to the utilization of men and materials by the Commander of the A.E.F. Mr. Palmer does not have to emphasize the difficulties, he does not gloss over the mistakes. His impressionistic but quite unsensational style, characterized by leaps from one picture to another without transition, reflects the confusion: an existent but inadequate general staff, initial lack of funds, the draft versus volunteers, industry turned militant, lack of ships, aviation delays, quarrels with the Allies, the health of the soldiers, making and breaking generals, the battles, demobilization.

From it all Mr. Baker stands out as a man capable of extraordinary development, who grew in administrative capacity with the problems he confronted. The documents attest the multifarious character of those problems and his serenity in handling them, a serenity proceeding from no lack of appreciation of their significance, but from a capacity to delegate them to able associates. Above all, the documents attest the most unswerving support ever given to an American general in the field.

CHARLES SEYMOUR