Latin America

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THE by-laws of the Pan American Union make no provision for suspending a member government for political misconduct. Therefore, the Argentine government, though diplomatically unrecognized by sixteen of twenty American republics and openly charged with Fascism in domestic politics and unfriendliness to the United Nations war effort, has a foothold in inter-American affairs through its privileges as fellow clubman.

Just eleven days before our Presidential election, Argentina filed a proposal with the Union’s Governing Board that a conference of the American foreign ministers be called “to consider the situation existing between the Argentine Republic and the other American nations.”

But there was a joker in the proposal: Argentina informed the Governing Board — the Latin American ambassadors in Washington, presided over by Secretary of State Hull — that the “internal measures” of the Buenos Aires government would not be subject to international negotiations. This meant that the main causes for complaint against Argentina’s Fascism and her favors to the Axis could not be discussed at the conference.

The proposal was adroitly timed. The Argentines knew that the Roosevelt administration’s hands were partially tied and that its influence among the other American republics was weakened by election uncertainties. It was practically certain, then, that when the Pan American Union’s Governing Board held its regular meeting on November 1 — six days before the election — the United States would have to allow the conference proposal to be sent on its way to the other republics for reference, advice, and quite possibly consent. And this, as it turned out, was exactly what happened.

But the hitherto inept Farrell regime in Argentina showed signs of gambling for even higher stakes. In a way, its action was a huge election-wager on Governor Thomas E. Dewey. Shrewd diplomatic advisers had finally funneled it into the heads of the bungling generals in charge of Argentine foreign policy that, in dealing with “the situation existing between the Argentine Republic and the other American nations,” Mr. Dewey, as President, might come to bat with two strikes against him.

Instead of having behind him the prestige and the confidence which the Roosevelt administration has won throughout the Hemisphere by its eleven-year sponsorship of the Good Neighbor policy, a Dewey administration would have to build its prestige from the ground up. At the same time it would have to overcome the continent-wide distrust of Latin Americans generally for Republican regimes because of the imperialistic record of past Republican Presidents. In the second place, the notion had filtered into Buenos Aires that after the Dewey administration’suphill campaign struggle to prove its competence in foreign affairs, one of its first needs would be an outstanding action on the external front which could be represented as a diplomatic victory.

Argentina lost her bet

As things turned out on November 7, of course, Argentina lost her election bet. But her proposal still remains a considerable headache for the Roosevelt administration. The post-election situation shows one main improvement: even if the conference takes place with the Argentine question as the lead item on the agenda, a Roosevelt-appointed United States delegation should have a better chance to win Latin American support for its point of view than a delegation named by an expiring regime or by Mr. Dewey. Argentina set up a game, however, in which it was impossible for Washington to win a grand slam, or for her own government to lose everything.

Ambassador Espil’s fine Italian hand

Washington’s information sources give most of the credit for the new Buenos Aires strategy to Felipe Espil, Argentine Ambassador to the United States from 1931 until his recall shortly after the Farrell regime took control in the revolution of June, 1943. Although Espil was recalled because of his moderate pro-American sympathies, he has since worked himself back into official confidence to the point of having been appointed Ambassador to Brazil. But because of the present diplomatic non-recognition status between Brazil and Argentina, he has been unable to take up his residence in Rio de Janeiro.

Espil therefore has exceptional motives for trying to promote himself into the place of the Farrell regime’s top diplomatic expert — where diplomatic expertness is exceptionally needed. Washington, consequently, has expected that from now on the case for a settlement with Argentina will be pressed with much more energy and finesse than formerly. But it has little reason to hope that, in Espil’s present situation as a kind of hostage instructor in diplomacy to the military clique, his pro-American background can produce any serious concessions in Buenos Aires, either to American attitudes or to the United Nations’ war necessities.

A double-barreled dilemma

Obviously, when it came to handling the Argentine conference proposal at the Pan American Union’s Governing Board meeting on November 1, the State Department was working against an almost solid phalanx of embarrassments. The suggestion could not be tabled or pigeonholed. The four republics which have recognized the Argentine regime — Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Ecuador — were known to favor it.

Colombia and Venezuela added to the difficulties by coming through with further indorsements. Brazil and Peru were giving signs of being restive under the non-recognition status. With or without the election pending, the United States could hardly risk a showdown on an issue that might heighten the tensions over the Argentine question in South America.

There was, in fact, only one fortunate circumstance in the situation. A few days before the Argentine proposal was issued, Under Secretary of State Stettinius had announced at a press conference that some consideration was being given to the possibility of holding an inter-American conference to discuss plans for the world peace organization. This meeting would precede a general meeting of the United Nations to be held later in the winter to act on the recommendations of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

Under Secretary Stettinius pulled this proposal out of the hat the day after the Pan American Union had put it up to the republics to decide whether they wanted to settle the Argentine question in open meeting. At another press conference he announced that the question of a world peace organization would be discussed at an informal gathering of American ambassadors on November 9 — in the steadier atmosphere following the election.

Plainly, besides playing for time, United States policy was working toward a situation in which other questions besides the political respectability of Argentina can find a place on the agenda of the next interAmerican conference.

But the main danger can hardly be avoided by changing a few diplomatic emphases. Regardless of political administrations in the United States, and better than at any time since the Generals’ junta captured her, Argentina is in a position to force a choice upon the other American republics between accepting her regime and wrecking the Hemisphere front as a force for united political action.

Revolution on the prowl

The Argentine issue so much overshadows the interAmerican scene for the time being that most other developments below the Rio Grande seem relatively parochial by comparison. Nevertheless, in some of the smaller countries, bitter and bloody fighting is going on. The outcome may have a good deal to do with determining the type of post-war problems which will have to be dealt with in Washington’s field of influence in this hemisphere.

There has been a recent revolutionary cycle in Central America, for instance, which points these particular questions up. Between mid-spring and mid-summer, both Guatemala and El Salvador had revolutions, and Honduras and Nicaragua have hovered on the brink of revolutions against their current dictators ever since. The smarter malcontents have gathered courage from these omens, with the result that the forecasts predict the most exciting winter in the Caribbean since the Hoover depression became allAmerican.

Meanwhile, similar clouds began rising on the Venezuelan horizon, where President Isaias Medina Angarita has been forced to choose between Army and Labor support in the 1945 presidential election. Labor apparently has won the toss. But it should be mentioned, in considering the peace of the continent for the next few months, that the Army has yet to be heard from.