Berlin

ON THE WORLD TODAY

MOST Americans have only a vague idea of what is actually confronting our own people in occupied Germany. We realize that all is not well, that we find ourselves hamstrung in whatever it is we are trying to do. We realize that the Germans are not rushing into the arms of the “democratic way of living" so generously offered them by an army of occupation.

Why not? Are our Army officers incompetent to promote democracy? Or does the cause lie in the Germans’ obstinacy and continued, albeit well-disguised, attachment to militarism and conquest? Or are the “Communists” really behind it all, as General McNarney charged when he declared that both the Communists and the Russian-sponsored Socialist Unity party in Germany sought the establishment of a Socialist state with a classless society.

The truth of the matter is hard to get at. The Allied government in Germany is most complicated. At the top an Allied Control Authority, working through a Council and many committees, tries to arrive at unanimous decisions among the occupying powers. These decisions are then enforced by the four powers in their respective zones.

The military authorities in each of the zones are the final arbiters as to when and how the decisions are to be carried out. No inspectorate exists, and entry into each of the zones is hedged about by restrictions.

Markedly divergent patterns of political and social structure are emerging in the four zones, each corresponding to the aims and objectives of the particular occupying power and each bossed by a ruling class of German collaborators compounded of genuine supporters of the particular policy of the occupier, and of opportunists who are making the best of a difficult situation. Great Britain and the Soviet Union are shaping the economic activities in their respective zones in such a fashion that the zone’s economy, and as much of the rest of Germany as possible, wall be tied into their respective imperial domains.

The Soviets have allowed the Germans in their zone to score some remarkable industrial revivals — for example, in the coal industry, where production is reported to be 85 per cent of 1938 levels, and in cellulose, where it is 110 per cent of 1938. Much of this production goes to the Soviet Union, causing the British to protest sharply that, according to the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, current production of German plants was not to be taken unless and until there was a surplus balance in Germany’s foreign trade.

The French, on their part, have directed their policy toward retribution, tempered by the desire for annexation. They have also pursued an aggressive cultural policy of assimilation very gratifying to the native population, who cannot help being pleased at being taken as an aspiring partner in the French cultural universalism: la mission cirilisatrice de la France. The French have founded new universities, given much leeway to the old ones, held exhibits and festivals, put out postage stamps celebrating the German cultural past. The Germans like that.

How we would reform Germany

Conquest by ideological and party control, conquest by economic assimilation, conquest by cultural means — to these three types of conqueror tactics the United States has little to oppose. The plain truth of the matter is that we have no long-time conquest strategy which can compete with our friends’ and allies’ overt and covert endeavors. Yet in spite of this, we are fully engaged in transforming our role of conqueror into that of reformer.

BERLIN (continued)

Demilitarization, denazification, and democratization — the three big D’s of our reforming crusade — all carry for our own people a connotation of altruistic effort which our co-conquerors do not necessarily accept. Demilitarization is in a sense complete today. There is no visible German army. There are no arms factories. There are no organizations advocating universal military service or a big navy, or extolling the beauties of life in the barracks. All that has now been driven underground. If it thrives there, however, our whole demilitarization effort is worthless. What we want is to have the Germans love peace.

Two of the draft constitutions — those of Hesse and Württemberg-Baden — contain a provision that “war is no instrument of government policy,” and that “history must be taught to show the work of the great benefactors of mankind, and not wars, battles and generals.” If these provisions are adopted by the conventions and accepted by the people in these states, a small step forward in the direction of pacification will be achieved.

These provisions were not put in at our request; they were in the drafts when they came to us from the German commissions. The Social Democrats have always been pacifist, and they shaped a good part of the drafts. This small sign is a straw in the wind of reform that is blowing in our zone.

Getting rid of the Nazis

Denazification has been the peculiar American province. Our co-conquerors are inclined to look upon us as “hipped” on the subject. We have pushed the policy through the Allied Control Authority; we have pushed the policy dogmatically in our zone; and we have inveigled the Germans in the three states of our zone into agreeing upon an effort of their own through the “Law for the Liberation of the German People from National Socialism and Militarism,” which they adopted jointly in March.

Various provisions of this law have been severely criticized, and some of the severest criticism has come from those Germans who are most desirous of seeing its objective achieved. The biggest questions for the law and its enforcement are, first, Who is a Nazi? and second, What kind of Nazi is he?

The significant point in this issue is that we had to recognize that there is a difference between a Nazi and a German. That was a hard hurdle for us to take, because throughout the war our propaganda machine had assiduously cultivated the opposite view; that all Germans, or nearly all, are Nazis. We took the hurdle, and today only a rather small proportion of Germans, perhaps 15 or 20 per cent, are being adjudged Nazis.

We want to get rid of the Nazis. But in accordance with our central policy we want to see most of them eventually reformed into decent citizens. Being democrats, we insist that this reform must be attempted regardless of its apparent hopelessness. Even out-and-out Nazis who are virtual criminals must be viewed as capable of reform and reintegration into civilized society. This is the view of many modern criminologists. Hence the elaborate subdivision of Nazis into major offenders, activists, profiteers, militarists, probationers, and followers, all of whom are destined for eventual Liberation.

Our program of vigorous denazification had covered a great deal of ground by the end of January, 1946. Including the people in business and the free professions, over a million persons had been investigated in the American zone. At the same time, a scientific poll conducted by the Information Control Division ascertained German attitudes and reactions toward this process. About half of those interviewed thought the denazification program on the whole satisfactory, about 30 per cent criticized it as too harsh and bureaucratic, and about 10 per cent thought it was not thorough and stringent enough.

The report concerning this poll stated that the critics were mostly Germans personally affected themselves or through relatives by the provisions of the law. This rather roseate statement is misleading. The suggested implication that only those personally affected were dissatisfied is quite untrue. Among those favorably inclined toward denazification there were also a great many whose relatives and friends were affected by denazification procedures, simply because nearly every German had some Nazi relatives.

What is more important, however, is that leading anti-Nazis in positions of influence under our military government, who were and are strong partisans of denazification, sharply criticize our procedures, because they are both too harsh and too soft. The blanket rule providing for the elimination of all businessmen from managerial posts, if they had been Nazi party members, often had bizarre results. For example, a leading lawyer had committed a number of acts of political blackmail, extortion, and denunciation in order to secure private and personal advantages. But the man was not a party member, and he was free because all efforts to convince American military government authorities of the need of eliminating him had failed.

In another case a local judge, as chairman of a military tribunal, had condemned a man to death because he had committed an act of sabotage in an effort to aid the Allies. Under our denazification laws, the saboteur was removed from his position because he had been a party member, whereas the judge has remained in his post.

The Germans denazify themselves

It was inevitable that a law with results as awkward as these could not command the full support of the Germans. The execution of the new law is clearly and fully placed in their hands. We are watching them, to be sure. We may question their decision in individual instances. But the enforcement of the law for liberating themselves from national socialism and militarism is theirs. Throughout our zone there are sitting today hundreds of trial tribunals.

These tribunals and the appeal boards above them are hearing the thousands upon thousands of persons who possibly fall under the provisions of this law. A responsible official has estimated that there were approximately 75,000 such persons in the city of Stuttgart alone. Considering the million or more people our own denazification procedure covered, it is clearly a gigantic task.

The idea that such local bodies would know the personal background of the suspected Nazi, and would know how to evaluate his defense, received a severe setback when the hundreds of thousands of evacuees, Germans from Silesia, the Sudeten, and Austria, began to pour in. They have admittedly caused one of the worst problems.

The biggest job under this law is, of course, the cleaning up of the vast mass of small fry, followers and probationers (also called lesser offenders), who will pay their reparations and then be absolved. This job the officials in Bavaria expect to finish by the end of the year. One can only hope that they are right. For beyond that date looms the operation of constitutional government.

Democracy for Germany

Democratization follows denazification quite naturally and logically as our third major objective. We are making a great effort to bring to our conquered enemy the benefits of a sounder society. But our allies do not agree with us as to what is sound. We find the American authorities stressing the basic rights of the individual — free speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and the right of assembly — at the very time that the Soviet authorities refused to permit those Social Democrats who were opposed to the merger of their party with the Communist Party to organize and compete in the elections.

The complete destruction of Germany’s old order by the Nazis, who substituted their ruthless totalitarian controls, was followed by our complete destruction of the new order they had set up. Unless we want to leave a chaos to any comer from within or without, we must now stay to evolve a government that is of the people. But before that sort of government can function effectively, before we can say that the job is done, the German people themselves must be reconstituted. Upon the success of the denazification program depends a good part of our peace program.