Bosses and Machines

by EDWARD J. FLYNN

1

THE meeting will come to order. The Chair recognizes Mr. Brown.”

MR. BROWN: “I offer the following resolution and move its adoption.”

THE CHAIRMAN: “The Secretary will read.”

THE SECRETARY: “Resolved, That the Executive Committee of the Democratic County Committee of Bronx County offer to the enrolled Democrats of Bronx County at the primary election to be held on July 31, 1945, the following named persons for the respective offices to be filled at the said primary: —

“For Mayor of the City of New York: William O’Dwyer.
For Comptroller of the City of New York: Lazarus Joseph.
For President of the Council: Vincent R. Impellitteri.
For President of the Borough of the Bronx: James J. Lyons.
For District Attorney, County of Bronx: Samuel J. Foley.
For Justices of the Municipal Court, 1st Municipal Court District, County of Bronx: William Lyman, Christopher C. McGrath, Charles A. Loreto.
For Justices of the Municipal Court, 2nd Municipal Court District, County of Bronx: Michael N. Delagi, Agnes M. Craig.”

THE CHAIRMAN: “All those in favor of the resolution will kindly so signify by saying ‘Aye.’ The motion is carried and the resolution is adopted. The Chair recognizes Mr. Buckley.”

MR. BUCKLEY: “I move that the meeting adjourn.”

THE CHAIRMAN: “All those in favor of the motion to adjourn kindly so signify by saying ‘Aye.’ The meeting is adjourned.”

These are the minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party of Bronx County, New York. The meeting was called to present formally the Democratic organization’s slate to the enrolled Democrats of that county.

The Executive Committee of the Democratic Party in Bronx County consists of thirty-three men and women, who are Executive Members of the County Committee. They are the heart of the Democratic organization in the county. They are presided over by the Chairman, who happens to be myself. There you have, very simply, what is known as a “machine.”

It took only ten minutes to hold the meeting. There were no objections, for everything had been arranged in advance. The very smoothness of the proceedings exemplifies practical politics in action. For within the periphery of that meeting may be found, one by one, the axioms on which practical politics are based — beginning with the voter root and extending to the highest political office: the Presidency of the United States.

In discussing mechanism, and in trying to arrive at just what makes a political machine tick, I am calling on my own twenty-four years of political experience and the specific example of Bronx County. For more than a quarter of a century, Bronx County has elected only Democratic county officials. It has become, on percentage, the greatest Democratic county north of the Mason and Dixon Line.

Thus, by augmenting or reducing the model of Bronx County, and with due allowance for variations in state laws, one can get a picture of party workings in almost any part of the United States, for political divisions are substantially the same in fundamentals all over the country.

Before the meeting described at the beginning of this article, the nominations for the city-wide offices had already been agreed upon by the five County Leaders of the City of New York. Nominations for Bronx County offices were agreed to after a series of conferences between the Executive Members and the Chairman of the Executive Committee.

How, then, were these nominations actually arrived at? As Chairman of the Executive Committee, I am the controlling force, and any action I take must be one which I believe will benefit the people of the Bronx first and enhance the prestige of the organization second. I mention the people first because it is one of our political legends that bosses never pay any attention to the public. Of course the legend will not stand analysis, for obviously a political boss can survive only so long as he wins elections — and the only way to win elections year after year is to know what the voters want and give it to them.

The slate I gave at the beginning is an example. James J. Lyons was renominated for President of the Borough of the Bronx. He had been elected three times and was looking toward his fourth term. From the standpoint of the people generally, he had done a good job. There had been no scandals connected with his office, and the people believed him to be an honest official. For that reason, it was expedient for the organization to renominate him. If, however, he had been a failure, or if there had been any scandals in his administration, the organization and I, without any qualms, would have turned him down for renomination. For always the primary purpose is to win an election.

In the same resolution, Samuel J. Foley was offered as a candidate for re-election as Bronx County District Attorney. His office had a splendid reputation. Foley himself had been praised highly in many New York newspapers for the conduct of his office. In fact, rackets had been stopped in Bronx County long before the term “racket-buster” was invented. The criminal element knew that they could not exert political influence in the Bronx, and so they fought shy of the county. One instance will illustrate my point. Terrenova, one of the most notorious racketeers of his time, lived in Westchester County. Now one cannot reach Manhattan from Westchester without crossing the Bronx or crossing either the Hudson River twice or Long Island Sound and the East River. Yet Terrenova chose to cross the Hudson twice — over to New Jersey and back again — rather than risk being picked up in the Bronx. So it was to the advantage of the organization to offer Foley to the people again.

Four of the five Municipal Court Judges were also seeking re-election. The records of Lyman, McGrath, Delagi, and Craig were good, and they were renominated. The fifth, Charles A. Loreto, was being presented as a candidate for the first time. His nomination was agreed upon at a series of conferences between myself and some of the members of the Executive Committee.

2

WHAT factors were taken into consideration in this nomination?

The Bronx is a cosmopolitan place. The Jewish and Italian populations are large. There are also many Roman Catholics. These three groups make up the largest portions of the county. Therefore, when the organization is forming a ticket to present to the people, it is important that the candidates represent and come from these three large groups. It is curious how some “reformers” labor this point, arguing that it is “pandering to racial and religious blocs.” Our whole system of government is based on proportional representation. But of course the “reformers” in question are not always consistent, for just now they see nothing wrong with special appeals to organized labor, to take one example. (Neither do I — but the distinction is that I am consistent in my belief that special-interest groups have a perfect right to be represented in the bodies that govern us all.)

Today, there are more Jewish than Irish Catholic voters in the Bronx. Yet there is no such thing as a “Jewish bloc” — as Governor Dewey discovered in the last New York mayoral election. Dewey thought that by nominating Judge Jonah Goldstein, a one-time Tammany Democrat, for Mayor on the Republican ticket, he could ensure the Jewish vote of the city in his own gubernatorial race a year later. Goldstein had everything a Jewish candidate should have — except that not all Jews thought him the better-qualified candidate. The Jew is a discriminating individualist.

In the vacancy which Loreto was a candidate to fill, it was important to name a man of Italian extraction. This was so because Lazarus Joseph, candidate for Comptroller, was Jewish and came from the Bronx. Beyond this, it was important that every geographical section of the Bronx be represented. Neighborhood feeling carries great weight with a political organization. Men and women who are prominent in their own localities are recognized by being placed in public office.

Before the meeting I have described, I consulted with members of the Executive Committee who were from that particular part of the county and asked them to suggest names. Various leaders suggested different persons. The abilities and political strengths of each were looked into. Finally I myself decided that Loreto was the man.

Hence our ticket shaped up as a well-rounded one: Lyons and Foley were Catholics, Joseph and Lyman were Jewish, Delagi and Loreto were of Italian descent.

“Cynical!” the “reformers” will say. “Shocking!” “Calculating!” “So this is how a machine functions!”

Yes, this is the way a machine functions. How else could it function in the interests of all the people? It should be remembered that we were offering these names to the enrolled Democrats of Bronx County in a Democratic primary. It did not mean that there could be no opposition to them. Any person who wished to dispute our judgment had that right in the primary polling booth, where none could see him.

True, scattered individuals cannot successfully challenge the decisions of a machine. But if the machine is a bad one — if it deserves to be beaten because of its offensive political activities or because of the caliber of the men it nominates — opposition can be organized to fight out the issues in the primaries. I’ll admit it is not easy. It takes time, patience, money, and a lot of hard work to beat a machine in this way. Nor am I attempting to say that this is the best method. It just happens to be the only one provided under the election laws of the State of New York.

3

I HAVE been Chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee of Bronx County for a quarter century. In order to remain in that position, I must always have the Committee votes to support me. My control is entirely dependent upon this support. If a majority of the Committee decided they no longer wanted me, they could call a meeting tomorrow and supplant me. But during my entire service as Chairman, there has never been any serious threat to my leadership. There has been occasional scattered opposition, but never any real danger.

How do I maintain the majority support of the Executive Committee? To begin with, I always see to it that the key party workers have exempt positions, if they want them. Some of the salaries are small (particularly those given to women). They run from $2500 to $5000, with only one at $10,000. Still, to use the political parlance, all the District Leaders have been “taken care of” during my entire term as County Leader. In New York County, by contrast, there have been many changes among the District Leaders during the same period — because they were not put into exempt positions. The biggest turnover came about when the Democrats lost the county and borough offices in the Fusion heyday. Bronx County is the only county within the city that has never been defeated either for county or for borough offices.

The families also — sons, daughters, husbands, wives — of the District Leaders are taken care of in some way or other. Sometimes they are given exempt positions, and sometimes they get help from us in the line of civil service promotion. It is rather difficult to say if this is the real reason why I have had their support down through the years, but I cannot deny that it has been extremely important to my remaining as leader.

There is one other important factor in retaining the support of the Executive Committee, and although it has never been put to test, I am confident that it could be with perfect safety. I have the final word about who should be appointed to positions which control exempt jobs. The County Committeemen who elect the Executive Members know this. Also, it is inevitable that during the years of my leadership I have come to know these Committeemen well, and they in turn to know me. I feel sure that should I express to them a desire to have a District Leader removed, a new Leader would be selected immediately. Thus not only my long association with the party, but my absolute control of exempt positions, is a powerful influence in my control.

The importance of this business of patronage in the success of a party and a leader may be seen by studying the strengthening of the Democratic Party during Roosevelt’s terms as Governor of New York and his first terms in the White House. Because he paid attention to his leaders and made the party appointments they recommended (always after previously investigating the candidate’s abilities) Roosevelt built up the greatest vote-getting machine, both state and Federal, that has ever been known. When he began to accept the recommendation of the New Dealers of “non-political” appointments, there was a falling away of his votegetting ability. However, by that time Roosevelt’s name had such magic that he was able, notwithstanding, to maintain his leadership.

After so many years, the machine has become a more or less personal one. For several years past I have seriously considered resigning. The detail work in a county organization no longer has any appeal to me. Financially, the job has been expensive, for I myself contribute to the support of the party. But there is another item which can hardly be classed as a party contribution, but which goes hand in hand with the party job I hold. Whenever a member of the organization is in financial difficulty and comes to me for assistance, I usually lend him money. Some of these loans have even been paid back.

Because of my long association, however, I naturally feel responsible to men who have loyally supported me down through the years. If I resigned, these men would be left out in the cold. I do not say it in any spirit of vanity, but it is perfectly logical to suppose that an organization which has been kept so compact through all these years would disintegrate if the moving spirit died or resigned. This did happen in the case of Tammany Hall after the death of Charles F. Murphy. Tammany has never since been able to occupy the place it did under his leadership. There have been constant change and constant squabbling for power among the leaders. Undoubtedly the same situation would develop in the Bronx if I resigned.

4

I HAVE said that I never had any serious opposition. There is always some opposition. There is a group at the present time in Bronx County that has, for years, been seeking to unseat me as County Chairman. They have tried to do so in primaries, in the election of County Committeemen and Leaders, and in the election of candidates other than those named by the organization. But because of the closeness with which the organization is held together, they have not yet been able to score a single triumph.

Victory is easier for the organization than for the insurgent. The organization at all times has its own personnel in each small unit. An insurgent who questions the decisions of the machine must first place a man and woman Captain in every Election District. This is not an easy task. It is difficult to build up in two or three months what it has taken the organization years to achieve. Furthermore, under a good administration, it is not easy to find enough people who will disagree with the machine.

At various times, candidates for the Legislature have challenged the nominees of the organization. There have been primary fights. But in every instance, the organization has won, because all its forces could be centered in the troublesome district. The result has been that the insurgent not only was defeated, but overwhelmingly so.

Once a person who has been a member of the organization turns against it in a primary election, he is forever barred from any political preferment. Since most people who feel like fighting the organization have hopes for political advancement, their assignment to organization Coventry makes their political futures dubious, to say the least. This discipline inevitably turns up some malcontents who will stoop to anything to bring disrepute to the organization. There have been leveled against the organization in Bronx County — and perhaps always will be — charges of illegal registration and illegal voting. Some thirty years ago, such charges undoubtedly had some basis in fact. In those days, there was considerable laxity. Elections were not watched or checked as they are today, when each political party has its own poll watchers as well as its members on the Board of Elections.

Since we are speaking of the Bronx, let us consider the possibility that such a thing might take place. What would be the result? The total number of votes cast in the Bronx averages from 450,000 to 500,000. Should the Democratic organization attempt to conduct a campaign for illegal registration, it would have to be done within each Election District. In every Election District, there are one Republican man and one Republican woman Captain, and also a Republican man and a Republican woman member on the Board of Elections. Assuming the cleverest organization one could imagine, there could not be more than about five illegal registrations in each Election District without attracting attention. Certainly the Republican Captains and Inspectors of Elections would know of even that small number.

Suppose, however, they didn’t. There are 850 Election Districts in Bronx County. Multiplying the number of Election Districts by 5, you get a total of 4250 votes. At no time in my experience would even 10,000 votes have been enough to change the outcome of an election in Bronx County. Most certainly there would be no advantage to the organization in this type of campaign. It would not change the result.

There have also been charges that in many instances persons have been brought to places outside the districts in which they reside to take the literacy test required of first voters in New York State. First of all, most of the people who apply for literacy tests have recently become naturalized and admitted by the courts as citizens of the United States. It is very true that the organization will take these new voters to places where the test is not so severe as it might be in other places. Every other organization throughout the country does precisely the same thing. Indeed, an excellent argument can be advanced against requiring a literacy test. To begin with, the New York law presumes that anyone who cannot write English is illiterate, even if he holds a dozen degrees and is quite proficient in any number of other languages. Moreover, illiteracy is no excuse from paying taxes, and if there is anything to the business of “taxation without representation” being an evil, it can be argued that anyone who pays taxes is entitled to vote.

In any event, the record of the Bronx County Democratic organization is open for all to see. That the members of the party support it overwhelmingly is shown by its success, year after year, at the polls. That they take pride in its achievements, not only individually but as a whole, is beyond doubt.

A political leader or “boss,” however, must not only be able to pick his men, but he must be able to “guess right.” During my leadership, I have been lucky enough to do this in many political situations. The first big decision I had to make “on my own” was on the question of displacing Hylan as Mayor of New York City. I was lucky enough to be one of the two leaders who supported Walker. Had Walker lost, my reward would have been political oblivion. I supported Roosevelt when he was nominated and became Governor of New York, and when I was his Secretary of State (New York). In Chicago, I supported him again when he was nominated, and when he became President. In Albany, I supported Lehman, and he was nominated and elected. In each case, I risked the penalty for guessing wrong.

All these things together have helped to build up my strength as a leader. My District Leaders realize that I have usually guessed right. It has put the Bronx organization in the forefront in various campaigns, and my Leaders have taken pride in the fact that because of my friendship with Roosevelt I have become a national figure in the Democratic Party.

5

THE impression of secrecy which seems to veil the position of political boss exists for no other reason than that the idea has been handed down by one political generation to another. Most of the appearance of secrecy arises from the fact that the leader himself cannot make up his mind as to what course to pursue — or more often, because it is not propitious to announce his decision at the precise moment the newspapers clamor for it.

Political skill is mostly built on proper timing. The correct time to announce a candidacy or the support of a particular candidate is as important as the announcement itself. If it is badly timed, the whole effect can be lost. In this connection, Roosevelt often resorted to the “trial balloon” — that is, letting someone other than himself make a statement to see how it would be received by the public. If the time was not right, the statement would be criticized severely. If it was well received, Roosevelt would step in and “carry the ball.” I myself have never been completely convinced that this is a good thing to do, but I am considerably in the minority in that opinion.

Should a man announce his candidacy too far in advance of a convention or primary, he can easily kill himself off through the opposition which will tend to develop and crystallize. Therefore, in practical politics an announcement is delayed as long as practicable, to prevent such a situation. It is usually thoroughly understood between a candidate and a leader just what the leader intends to do, and the leader very seldom lets tho cat out of the bag until it is absolutely necessary to do so.

In the case of Presidential candidates, this is particularly important. Albert Ritchie of Maryland became known as a “perennial” candidate. He was always campaigning for the nomination, and although his background was good and his record as Governor of Maryland was excellent, he was never nominated because he came to be “old stuff.”

In the Republican Party, General Wood and Governor Lowden of Illinois were two candidates who destroyed each other by their too early timing of announcements and their long campaigns before the 1920 convention. This permitted a situation to develop which prevented the convention from naming either one. The resultant nomination was of Harding. The same thing happened to Smith and McAdoo in the 1924 Democratic convention, when John W. Davis finally emerged as the nominee.

Even in state politics, there is a concrete example of what bad timing does to a candidate. When John Lyons was Secretary of State of New York, he campaigned actively for the Republican gubernatorial nomination. By the time the convention rolled around, he had worn himself out and nullified any chance he might have had. The time is short between a primary or convention and the general election. But it is time enough to destroy a candidate. If he adds to that period a pre-primary or pre-convention campaign, his risk increases. The candidate gets shopworn.

Roosevelt was a master at timing, and in every case he made the most of this gift. Even though, to the average person, his timing of announcements for both his third and fourth terms may have seemed late (and admittedly this was partly due to the fact that he had not made up his mind), they were perfect under the conditions then prevailing.

Conversely, Governor Smith’s announcement in 1932 was too late in view of conditions. When Roosevelt first announced his candidacy, Smith persisted in his position that he would not be a candidate under any circumstances. Thus many delegates were pledged to Roosevelt who might otherwise have gone to Smith, had he been an avowed candidate at the time. This was particularly true in Bronx County and other counties in New York that were pledged to Roosevelt in the primaries.

Smith told me later that in his opinion it made no difference how the delegates were pledged in the primary — they should have changed their minds when his candidacy was announced. I did not agree. I told Smith that so far as the Bronx delegates were concerned, they were pledged to Roosevelt and they would “stay hitched.” The people of the Bronx know that once I pledge myself and the organization to a candidate, that pledge holds. I have maintained this attitude throughout my leadership. And it is because the majority of the Executive Committee agree with these principles that they continue to back my leadership.

6

AS LONG as we have a two-party system of government, we shall have machines. Whether they will be good or bad depends upon the interest of citizens in their party government, and upon whether that interest is just as strong and unflagging as their interest in their local, state, and Federal governments.

The reason more people do not accept the inevitability of machine politics is that whenever they think of machines and bosses, they seem to think only of the successful ones. In every county in New York City there is and always has been a Republican machine. To be sure, they call themselves “organizations,” but they are as truly machines as their Democratic counterparts in every respect save that of success at the polls. The nominations for the various offices in the Republican Party are dictated by the Republican County Leaders, who are, of course, the Republican county bosses.

The present Governor of New York, Thomas E. Dewey, accepts advice and even dictation from the Republican bosses in the various counties throughout the state. The newspapers favorable to Dewey (or to the Republican Party generally) describe this as “receiving suggestions from the leaders of the party.” It is only the “leader” you don’t like who is a “boss,” and the “organization” you don’t like that is a “machine.”

This is equally true throughout the United States. In practically every city and every state, there are a Republican machine and a Democratic machine, and there is always one man who is the boss of the machine. The final responsibility for nominations is wholly in his hands. Thus, when you condemn the “boss system” you condemn both major parties and indeed all political parties, because all operate in exactly the same way.

This system is a direct result of the election laws not only in the State of New York but in every state of the Union. The election laws provide the method under which parties are organized. The same laws that apply to the Democratic Party apply to the Republican Party.

If this is true, then what can be done and what should be done? One must work with the tools at hand. If a machine is bad, it can be reformed only by the members of the party concerned. Many people criticize government — and then announce that they are not affiliated with either of the major parties. This is ridiculous. They can never hope, through unorganized mass, to accomplish anything. If they wish to cure a situation, they must do it through the machinery that is set up by the election laws.

I do not want to minimize how difficult a job this is. It is difficult because in a successful machine the leaders have so well fortified themselves that it takes time to upset them. It cannot be done in a year. In some cases, it cannot be done for many years. But if the start is made, eventually the vicious element in an organization can be removed. Those who have the courage and persistence to survive early discouragements win out in the end.

An instance of this that probably is fresh in the minds of most is the so-called “Pendergast machine” in Kansas City, Missouri. This organization got so bad that Pendergast and others connected with it went to prison. This did not mean the end of Democratic organizations in Kansas City. There is still a machine there. It is a better machine because of the exposures that purged it, but it is still a machine. Its legal structure is exactly the same as before. But because the decent Democrats of Kansas City finally became sufficiently aroused to take part in the primaries and in the selection of County Committeemen and District Leaders, the Pendergast machine, as such, was destroyed.

There is no use periodically electing “Fusion” or “Good Government” candidates. They will either stay in power a short time, or they will set up their own machines, or — what is far more likely — they will merge back into one or the other of the two major parties. The Republican and Democratic parties have survived a good many “reform” movements in the form of third parties, the one over a period of ninety years, the other over a period of nearly a century and a half. Third-party movements have never succeeded nationally. They have succeeded about once in fifty times in the states. They have succeeded, all too briefly, about once in twenty times in the cities. These figures speak for themselves.

If we are to have uniformly good government, local, state, and national, I am afraid a lot of men and women will have to get down off their high horses and grub around in practical politics as active members of a party. I wish we had in our school systems required courses of training in citizenship which would send forth graduates by the hundreds of thousands who would assume such responsibilities as readily and as naturally as they assume the responsibility of earning a living. So far as I can see, the emphasis in whatever practical politics is taught is placed upon elections, rather than primaries. The so-called “independent” voter is all but deified, when he ought to be condemned as a shirker.

Waiting until after the candidates are nominated is waiting until you have missed the boat. Whatever is to be done must be done before the nominations are made. There is no machine — I do not care how powerful and well-intrenched it appears to be — that would dare to nominate a candidate for office it knew its own people did not want. Many poor candidates are named because of the fact that the so-called boss of the organization knew that the great majority of the members of his party would take no interest in the primary election anyway. Bosses get away with a good deal by default — your default.

7

TODAY, much criticism is being leveled at the Political Action Committee, because of tho fact that it is taking an active part in the primaries of the Republican and Democratic parties, seeking to have named on both sides candidates who are friendly to PAC — which is to say, to organized labor. PAC has become a very potent factor in national politics. In states like New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, Massachusetts, and some border states, its intensive work undoubtedly helped in the election of President Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944.

It is significant, I think, for the student of politics that PAC did not set out to form a third party and thus far has resisted the temptation to do so on a national scale. The tactics are fundamentally the same as those of people who choose to work within one of the older parties, in that the aim is to influence the selection of candidates before the choice has narrowed to two. That the results are sometimes more meager than those obtained by Republican and Democratic “regulars,” at least in New York City, has been indicated in several recent elections there.

In the last municipal election in New York City, for example, the Bronx Democratic organization did not accept the endorsement of the American Labor Party, which is a part of the PAC organization, although the other four counties did. In the Bronx, therefore, there were four tickets in the field: Democratic, Republican, American Labor, and Liberal. Each had its own slate of candidates. The Democratic Party made a better showing than ever before. Thus it will be seen that, to be successful at the polls, PAC usually has to make common cause with one or the other of the old-line parties and vote for its candidates.

A great deal has been made of this “balance of power” theory, and it is a fact that in many instances the endorsement of PAC has brought about the election of Democratic candidates who might not otherwise have won. But as far as New York is concerned, the American Labor Party’s claim to a “balance of power” role is at least open to question. For example, if Mayor O’Dwyer had run on the Democratic ticket alone in the last mayoral election, he still would have been overwhelmingly elected.

If the citizens whose interests are different from or broader than those championed by PAC would take as much pains to protect those interests as labor is taking to protect its interests, the story might be an entirely different one. Certainly there is no point in condemning PAC-endorsed candidates because of their obligation to organized labor. Unfortunately, however, the citizen with broad interests is rarely a party worker, or even an active citizen. Why, therefore, should he be surprised that more “independent” candidates are not elected to office? It would be a fine thing if all officeholders felt under obligation to all types of citizens, and hence based their judgments on the rule of the greatest long-term good for tho greatest number. But we shall never reach that Utopia unless or until all the citizens resolve to work 365 days a year at being citizens.

There, then, is the machine and its boss. While bosses are inevitable under our system of government, bad bosses are not. For, in the last analysis, the real boss is you.