Playing Down the Bomb: Blackett Versus the Atom

by I. I. RABI

PUBLISHED in this country last month by Whittlesey House, Fear, War, and the Bomb appeared in England under the more restrained but less accurate title Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy. It created a minor sensation in England and a greater one at the UN Assembly meeting in Paris. There it served a most useful purpose, to the Russians, because in it they found almost all the arguments which they had used to frustrate all attempts at a reasonable international settlement of the problems of atomic energy set forth anew and with some novelties in addition.

The great windfall for the Russians was that Professor Blackett is no Soviet stooge from a satellite country, but an upper-class Englishman with a high scientific reputation made more popularly resplendent by the award of the Nobel Prize in Physics for 1948. Furthermore, Professor Blackett is an important authority on methods of antisubmarine warfare, so recognized by the United States Government by the award of the Medal for Merit. Support from such quarters is not easily obtained and was gleefully used by the Soviet debaters.

There is little question as to Professor Blackett’s attainments in physics or in military matters. 11 is credentials as an analyst of political and social and economic matters are more obscure, and not evident from his book. He is known to be politically well left of center, yet there is no trace of doctrinaire Marxism in the book. On international affairs he writes like the amateur which he is, with no penetration into the underlying causes of present tensions. In matters which concern political life and thought in the United States, he manifests the hopeless confusion of the average Englishman.

Actually, Professor Blackett’s book is an emotional and, indeed, almost hysterical personal reaction to the mounting tensions In world affairs, which have resulted in part from the development of the atomic bomb — hysteria disguised in the prose of the scholar. Although there is a great and ostentatious display of scientific objectivity, it is only a thin veneer which covers an extraordinary piece of special pleading.

A deep responsibility devolves on the scientist when he writes for a lay public in a field outside his special competence. The public is avid for conclusions. It cannot follow critically and in detail the arguments involved, particularly if important factors are suppressed or smoothly glossed over. The prestige of science is so great that the lay reader will naturally consider a high scientific reputation as a guarantee of intellectual honesty, objectivity, and general competence. A misuse of this prestige can

Copyright 1949, by The Atlantic Monthly Company, Boston 16, Mass. All rights reserved. lead to lamentable consequences when a wrong doctrine catches the fancy of the public or of lay persons in high places.

There have been many examples in recent years. The racial doctrines of the Nazis led to the slaughter of millions of innocents. The atavistic teaching of Lysenko has led to the suppression of Soviet genetics and now threatens other sciences as well. A more cogent example was the effect of the pronouncements of Lindbergh on the invincibility of the Nazi Air Force, which emboldened the tiermans and intimidated many groups in France, Frigland, and the United States.

It would be disastrous lor all, and for the Russian people in particular, if Professor Blackett’s book had the effect of making the Soviet rulers believe that the atomic, bomb would be of minor importance in a war between the Soviets and the West.

2

THE first half of Professor Blackett’s book is devoted to his analysis of the military consequences of atomic energy. Here he marshals his data on the general effects of bombing as revealed by the Allied experience in the bombing of Germany and Japan. His chief source is the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, an excellent U.S. Government report too little known in this country. His knowledge of atomic bombing is gleaned from official unclassified publications, newspapers, and magazine articles. He cites his ingeniously selected authorities chapter and verse and makes, superficially, a fair-minded and scholarly impression. As Professor Bancroft once remarked in a book review, “The author is at his best when quoting.

Some of the facts which Professor Blackett presents will be startling to the lay reader. The British and American bombing of Germany up to the end of 1944 did not seem to bother the Germans at all. Indeed, the graph reads as if they thrived on it. The British night bombing, in his opinion, was useless and wicked. The American daylight bombing had its chief effect in reducing the German air fighter force which rose up to intercept it. On the other hand, the use of air power in support of ground troops and its concentration on specific objectives like transportation is a paying proposition in a military sense, unlike the area bombing of cities. He cites the Russians as understanding these basic principles, whereas we and the British largely ignored them in a futile destruction of German cities.

In his opinion, the B-29 bombing of Japan was more successful, but largely unnecessary and cruel, since Japan was already beaten and its air force had been destroyed. The success of the blockade by ships, submarines, and mines had made the area bombing effort unnecessary.

It is clear from the foregoing that Professor Blackett takes a dim view of area bombing. Since the atomic bomb can hardly help being an area weapon (eight square miles is his estimate of severe damage), it too comes under his general condemnation as an effective military weapon. His syllogism runs: area bombing was no great shakes in the last war; the atomic bomb is a weapon for area bombing; therefore, the atomic bomb will not be decisive or even very important in the event of a war with the Soviets.

Let us examine the argument more closely. The early bombing of Germany was in driblets, and clearly permitted recovery when important centers were damaged in air raids. Other centers and alternative plants could be brought into play. There were places where refugees could be housed. But if the British or we could have succeeded in bombing Hamburg, Bremen, Hannover, Liibeck, and Rostock in one raid, that tale of recovery could have been quite different. Atomic bombing could have accomplished such a huge raid more easily than a single raid on Hamburg alone with ordinary bombs. This implication of damage causes a kind of supersaturation of defenses and recovery facilities and is a logical extension of the tactical idea of massive bombing introduced by the British in their air attacks on Germany.

Professor Blackett points out that a great improvement in the effectiveness of the bombing of German industrial centers occurred when the “pathfinder” technique was introduced. The pathfinders were specially selected Crews who accurately spotted the target with flares. The rest of the mission bombed on the flares. This expected increase in accuracy is most important since a large number of raids over Germany were really wasted on open fields. Because of the much smaller number of air crews necessary for atomic bombing, they could all be trained up to the quality of “pathfinders.”

There is, in addition, an important morale factor difficult to evaluate, but which the Japanese and those who have seen an atomic explosion are not likely to minimize. The omission of these three factors — supersaturation, target accuracy, and morale effect — entirely vitiates Professor Blackett’s elaborately constructed arguments, charts, and tables.

Strangely enough, even though he actually speaks of it, Professor Blackett nowhere seems to appreciate the possibilities of atomic warfare with a really large number of bombs. This is, unfortunately, a general tendency. People talk of the Bomb or of dropping a bomb somewhere. The American scientists have always warned of the effect of a large number of bombs. One of Professor Blackett’s odd points is that the atomic bomb is too big for many targets — as if that were an argument against the bomb, rather than a prediction of the complete annihilation of the target. Only few worth-while military targets cost less than an atomic bomb. This point is one which students of military aflairs would do well to consider. Atomic warfare is very different when considered in terms of dozens or hundreds or thousands of bombs.

The first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the second on Nagasaki on August 9, and on August 14 the proud Japanese Empire surrendered by radio! Many people, Professor Blackett included, have tried to shrug off that stupendous sequence of events. At this point Professor Blackett s objectivity as an operational analyst breaks down completely. His strong bins against strategic bombing, which dates back to the early war years, will not permit him to absorb this fact into his system of thought. His strong proSoviet or anti-American bias (it is hard to tell w hich is stronger) makes it impossible for him to live with the idea that the atomic bomb, an American monopoly, could play such a decisive role in a future war.

The impact of Hiroshima on Professor Blackett reaches its climax in Chapter X, “The Decision to Use the Bombs.” Here Professor Blackett permits himself to indulge in a dignified tantrum. The sum and substance of this chapter is to show that we dropped the bomb on Hiroshima on August 6 to steal the newspaper headlines away from the Russians, who were expected to invade Manchuria on August 8, and thus win a diplomatic victory! “The dropping of the bombs was not so much the last military act of the second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia now in progress.” That this statement can be put forth by a man of Professor Blackett’s intelligence is astonishing. He assumes that we knew that the Russians would win a quick victory in Manchuria — an assumption which is belied by the initial phases of the other two Russian campaigns in the last war, in Finland and against tiermany. Our own contacts with the Japanese did not give us reason to hold their military prowess in low esteem.

Professor Blackett argues further that if the use of the bomb was not the first act in the cold war, it was at least very tactless to steal the headlines away from the Russians, and showed a lack of the finer sensibilities. This argument had best be left to stand unanswered.

It is a plain fact that the United States had consistently pressed to have the war over in a hurry. We prodded a reluctant Churchill on the invasion of Europe and when that was over we went all-out for Japan. Europe was facing starvation and chaos. We could not delay a conclusion with Japan with the whole world degenerating into anarchy. We had the weapon to end the war and we used it, and it ended the war, even though, as Professor Blackett says, an atomic bomb is only equivalent to a raid of three hundred B-£9 bombers carrying ten tons of bombs each.

As a matter of actual fact, the bomb was dropped at the first opportunity. Depending on the weather, it could have come earlier or later than the August 6 date. Furthermore, the Russians were informed by Mr. Truman at Potsdam that we had an atomic bomb. Judging by their insistence on a second front, they certainly would have interpreted any delay on our part in using the bomb as a device to put more of the burden of the war on them.

Professor Blackett does not forgo the opportunity to castigate us on moral grounds for the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even though he proves to Ins own satisfaction that it is only the equivalent of an ordinary B-29 raid or the kind of bombing the British did so well over Hamburg, this particular raid gives him a special horror. He does not say why, but the reason is clear. Deep down he shares the view of other scientists that this raid could be the beginning of a new era of horror. This feeding he tries to talk away, but the vision remains as an afterglow.

The wailing over Hiroshima finds no echo in Japan. The Japanese know that Hiroshima was an important headquarters and staging area and a legitimate target. They are very glad that something, anything, happened to stop the insane war. However, with sufficient propaganda, they might m time be induced to feel that they were greatly wronged. Hiroshima, by the way, is largely rebuilt.

Professor Blackett is not alone in his views. There seems to be a general playing-down of the importance and effectiveness of atomic warfare.

That our own military people play it down is understandable. Owing to security restrictions, they know little about it and, further, it is difficult to defend UMT or expenditures for enormous conventional military installations, naval, air, and ground, if the atomic bomb is too strongly stressed. As a result of some of our misguided secrecy, we are not only paying for the atomic bomb but for a large conventional military setup which the atomic bomb has made obsolete. Congressional committees pass on military expenditures without a knowledge of how many atomic bombs we have on hand or how many we shall have in future years. What is the rate of production? To what figure can it be increased? How can it be used for maximum effectiveness? The Congress would not tolerate such ignorance in any other sphere of our activity. The mystic power of the atom secrecy has dulled common-sense perceptions not only in Professor Blackett but in many responsible people on this side of the Atlantic.

3

ALMOST half of Professor Blackett’s book is devoted to an attack on the majority plan which grew out of the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy within the UN. He does not pull his punches when they are directed at the United States. Although he does not strongly defend the Russian plan, he tries to show that the Soviets could hardly have taken any other position in view of the intransigence with which we pursue peace and security.

Although the negotiations in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission have so far produced no tangible results except for a sharpening of the division between the Soviet planetary system of states and the Western world, a certain moral glow, perhaps only of innocence, has dwelt in the breasts of most scientists and statesmen on our side of the “Iron Curtain.” Our plan, the Acheson-LilienthalRnruch plan, as modified by prolonged discussion to become the majority plan of the UNAEC was a great and generous gesture. It was an offer to surrender our greatest weapon of military power in the interest of the security of all nations. While guaranteeing solid adv antages to ourselves in terms of our traditional immunity from military attack, it aimed to achieve this end without depriving any nation or people of the legitimate use of discoveries in the field of atomic energy. It is a significant first step toward the ultimate abolition of armed conflict between peoples.

That the Soviets could not agree to this plan has been held variously to result from the Original Sin of Communism, the intrinsic inability of a totalitarian state to withstand impartial inspection from oulside, ignorance of the Kremlin of the fatal power of the atomic bomb, and lastly to plain cussedness. The result, in any event, has been a greatly heightened tension in the Western world, particularly here in the United States. The mounting fear and frustration have resulted in vastly increased military appropriations, a severe loyally check to weed out all leftist elements from any important phase of American life, and in general an effort to put the country and in fact the whole non-Soviet world in a state of preparedness for war.

Under such conditions, it appears that the two great ponderous machines are rolling on a single track to an inevitable head-on collision, which can bring only sorrow to hundreds of millions of wellmeaning innocent people and advantage to none.

Professor Blackett brings no new bridge with which to cross the chasm separating the Soviets and the West. He is fully aware, as some of our statesmen are not, of the advantages to us iu the proposals for an international authority to control atomic energy, but he implies a certain contempt for our profound desire for security to work out our destiny in peace and freedom from foreign interference. He sees nothing which the Soviets can gain from these proposals. They would he outvoted in any international body not subject to the veto. This assumes a continuation of the Soviet attitude of no compromise. They would give up the solid advantages of the Iron Curtain, which hides the location of their vital industrial plants and military installations, for the dubious attentions of foreign spies in their midst (this point had best be answered by the Central Intelligence Agency). Not the least of the Soviet objections, which Professor Blackett endorses, is the proposition that our policy of gradualness or “stages,” on which the whole system of international control would be set up, would deprive the Soviets of an early utilization of atomic energy for industrial power.

This last remark is not meant humorously by him; in fact, it is pointed up by facts and figures that the United States has more kilowatts per capita than any other country, including the Soviets.

Professor Blackett did not work on the atomic bomb project during the war, and his professional inleresl in recent years has not been primarily in nuclear physics. There are many points in the book which show that Ids thinking in this Held is that of an outsider. Our security has apparently been much better than many people expected. These points cannot be discussed in detail in this place. However, one conclusion has become quite clear and has been reiterated by members of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Atomic power is not around the corner. Atomic power which would be economical and competitive with coal or oil, even in Russia, belongs to the distant future, far beyond any time-scale envisioned in the principle of stages. The Soviets would lose nothing and gain years through the disclosure of American and British knowledge now necessarily held secure. In any event, the matter has never come up for negotiation because the Soviet Government has rejected the majority plan in tain.

The final chapter of Fear, War, and the Bomb is called “A Way Out?” The question mark is appropriate. It presents a rather frightening concept. According to Professor Blackett, the bright dawn will come when Russia has made a few atomic bombs. Although we will have many more, the Russian weapons will be more effective when used in conjunction with her vast land armies. Under such circumstances, Professor Blackett feels that the United States and the Western powers will be more in a mood to negotiate, to trade off reduction in the number of our atomic bombs and carriers against reductions of the Russian armies by so and so many divisions. (This is exactly the kind of dreaded armed truce which American scientists have sought to avoid.) At a much later stage, if no third world war intervenes, a proposal like the majority plan of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission could be taken up again.

This is the sum and substance of Professor Blackett’s positive contribution to the subject of the political consequences of atomic energy, and his advice to a world torn asunder by a battle of giants. He also agrees that it doesn’t amount to much.