Military Affairs

on the World Today

INTELLIGENCE is the eyes and ears of any military force, in peace or war. Unless its work is adequate, its findings shrewdly analyzed and coordinated, the task of safeguarding the peace is much more difficult and prospects for success in war are dark. What has Korea disclosed?

The fact is that the North Korean government published its intentions two weeks before the attack on June 24. Its statement was reported in a Tass dispatch to Izvestia in Moscow under date of June 10. This set forth the decision of the North Korean regime to “unify” all Korea before the fifth anniversary of Korean liberation, and scheduled a plan for elections throughout Korea between August 5 and 8, to set up a “unified” government. Such “unification” could be realized only by use of armed force. No other means lay at the disposal of the North Korean regime.

Did our intelligence services at Moscow forward news of the published intentions of the North Korean government to Washington? How was it possible for the Norlh Korean regime to concentrate between six and ten divisions of troops at eleven points along the 38th parallel, to gather at least 150 tanks in the same area, to complete t he logistical arrangements as to supplies for an army which, together with its reserves, mustered close to 80,000 men, without having such preparations noted and collated with the plans published in Izvestia two weeks before the invasion began?

In Washington, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, explained to Congress that an attack had been “expected for a year” but “you can’t predict the timing.” The Admiral was quoted further to the effect that though his agency constantly assembled and passed along vital intelligence data relating to Northeast Asia, such information was not “properly evaluated” by those receiving it.

In Tokyo, at General MacArt bur’s headquarters, the intelligence services were equally faulty. The fact cannot be explained away by official statements pointing out that Korea, until June 24, lay outside General MacAri bur’s allotted area of command and constituted a special, isolated military problem. Korea lies at the very doorstep of Japan and has long been described as a “dagger ” pointed directly at that nation from the Asiatic mainland. It is part of the whole military problem of Asia confronting the Allied Commander-in-Chief. North Korea is a satellite created under supervision of the power which has been General MacArthur’s greatest headache since the close of the Japanese war.

The admissions of CIA at Washington and the attitude disclosed in Tokyo suggest that the lesson of Pearl Harbor and the warning which was given three years ago by the President’s Advisory Committee, urging coordination of intelligence, have been neglected.

State Department versus Pentagon

Gaps in military intelligence were matched by lack of liaison between the Department of State and the armed services. Korea revealed this unmistakably. General MacArthur was ordered to defend South Korea without any forewarning from our policy-makers. Even the chairman of ihe Senate Foreign Relations Committee “wrote off" Korea as untenable as recently as mid-spring in a published interview. It is clear that lack of knowledge about any policy of intervention was general.

That the decision, when made, was correct and wise will not be disputed. The stakes of world policy at issue were at once identified by public opinion in this country and abroad. Why was not this possibility grasped earlier by our policy-makers? It was implicit in Secretary Aeheson s remarks last winter before Congress, when he pleaded for approval of the full appropriation sought by the Administration for Korean aid.

Lack of coordination between the Department of State and the Defense Department — the two most responsible for our national security— is a result of the tug of war over their respective roles in determination of foreign policy.

Secretary Aeheson is on firm ground when he insists that the shaping of high policy should not be a prerogative of the military. His position is consistent with this country’s traditions, with those of other nations, and with history. Intrusion of the military in the realm of diplomacy brings swift reprimand in Britain and France. But this view of State Department prerogatives carries with it weighty responsibility for keeping the military closely informed on decisions already made and those which are highly probable. Otherwise, policy lacks proper means of implementation when issues are joined.

The Navy and Marines

The presence of the Seventh Fleet, with its nine air groups, in Japanese waters has been of enormous help to the supply system. Even more significant has been its role of direct assistance to ground forces. The use of carrier air power in tactical operations—a service performed by our own naval fliers and their Australian and British fellows in arms — is an innovation in this war. What these fighters from carriers are doing over a narrow peninsula, whose coasts they control from both sides, suggests that naval air power in future may play a greatly expanded role in such regions as the Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, and the regions of the Indian Ocean.

Hitherto, much emphasis has been placed by naval men on the potentialities of the “movable air base” for strategic bombing. The Korean campaign demonstrates that substantial naval air power can pay dividends when coordinated with ground troops as a tactical makeweight.

The haste of Congress in moving to re-establish an adequate United States Marine Corps underlines another error made by a Defense Department very susceptible to oversold theories of strategic bombing. Under test of emergencies, the Marines long ago proved their value as a force immediately ready for action. That service jealousies and complacent policy should have cut this powerful fighting arm to two skeletonized divisions at a time when Army ground forces were too few and too widely scattered for swift concentration must be considered excusable misjudgment.

The facts about the tanks

It has been our Army policy on tanks, since World War II, to stick to medium and light machines rather than compete with Russia’s armada of giants. There are two reasons for this. The problem of shipping 60and 80-ton tanks—to say nothing of larger ones — across either the Atlantic or the Pacific is formidable. Moreover, with the guided missile developing in power and speed, vve are placing great dependence on antitank weapons.

This policy has its merits, but Korea has revealed its defects. During the first weeks of fighting, the American tank was outspeeded and outgunned. It could not compete with Russian tanks in negotiating swampland and rice paddies. The other great advantage enjoyed by the North Korean armored force was its numbers — constantly replenished at a much faster rate than could be matched by our Army.

The Russians have built up an estimated tank force of 40,000. A few weeks before the Korean explosion, General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, stated in the Army Information Digest that, compared with this vast accumulation of armor on the totalitarian side, “we have approximately 6000 combat-worthy tanks of light and medium varieties and, except for prototypes, we have purchased no new tanks since the end of World War II. We have, however, undertaken a long-range tank program based upon an exhaustive analysis of our own tanks and those of other nations. . . . We now have what we believe is the best light tank in the world, and we are awaiting delivery of a sufficient quantity to equip our divisions. . . . We also have the prototype of a new medium tank which we plan to bring into limited production at an early date. To round out our concept of a family of tanks, we have designs for a heavy tank. However, we are not going to build any heavy tanks until we are sure we cannot knock out the heaviest of heavies with the improved guns and ammunition of our new light and medium tanks.”

This is admirable policy provided we still have plenty of time for experiment. The new medium tank General Collins mentioned is still in the model stage. To counter Russian tanks of post-World War II construction, we have only World War II mediums, demonstrably inferior. If Russia has prototypes (as doubtless she has), she also possesses a powerful host of tanks “in being.” In war, what you have counts; what you hope to have doesn’t.

Brigadier General Thomas Herold, commanding the tank school at Fort Bragg, stated on July 13, three weeks after the fighting began in Korea, that he hoped “it won’t be long now before we have new equipment. Our family of tanks, when produced, will be better than any tank on the battlefield today. I’m sure that before long enough money will be released to get the new equipment we’ve hoped for in the past.” In short, what General Collins was discussing in the spring, General Heroic! was still hoping for in midsummer.

Our antitank weapons, also, were inadequate. Officials of the Army, quoted in the press, have explained that the new 3.5-inch bazooka, a hollow charge weapon, is replacing the old World War II 2.36 model. The Korean war shows that the old bazooka is a very deficient weapon against Russian tanks. Why were we producing the new bazooka only “in training quantities” in June?

Air power is not enough

Of many instructive lessons in air power taught by the fighting in Korea, two stand out. One is that our whole defense policy has suffered as a result of our dependence upon air power backed by the A-bomb. The importance of air power needs no emphasis, yet it is unfortunate that there was such a gross misjudgment of sea power and land power.

The second lesson drawn from Korea suggests that greater attention be given to tactical air power in support of ground troops. The Russians, it is well to remember, have carried on the experience gained during World War II in this matter. This will become evident if they uncover their hand in Korea.

Our discoveries in tactical air power have been made under necessity. In the fighting we have employed not only regulation B-26 light bombers and Mustang F-51s, but even B-29s which were supposedly unsuited for tactical operations.

Our “shooting star ” F-80 jets have become the sensation of the air war —to the pleasant surprise of the Air Command, whose spokesmen remark ruefully that these jets “were not built for this sort of job.” The performance of the “shooting stars” in tactical operations is certain to produce changes, particularly in relation to assault on tanks, front area supply transport, and artillery concentrations.

Rediscovery of the uses of the old Mustang F-51 emphasizes the modifications demanded of up-to-date tactical concepts of war, especially when overwhelming forces of massed infantry appear. Failure of our Air Command to appreciate the persisting value of propeller-driven slower aircraft in tactical operations was evident before the Korean episode opened. It explains why improvisation in the use of the “shooting star” F-80 occurred. The choice was made under duress. That it succeeded may soften the criticism that has been directed at both the Defense Department and the Air Force for junking literally hundreds of propeller-driven planes long ago as “outmoded.” Here was patent waste.

The North Korean air force has been no match for the United States forces either in numbers or in quality. The ratio of combat successes gives our fliers a four or five to one margin in the destruction of planes.

Congratulations are certainly in order for the Air Command’s performance in this phenomenal job of mobilization, which brought in transport, bomber, and fighter planes from as far away as Western Germany in a matter of a few days.

The utility of the plan of leasing transports to commercial air lines in the United States (so as to have them quickly available in emergencies) has been demonstrated emphatically. Most of the 130-odd DC-54s and DC-4s summoned to war duties were in Korea, adding their weight to the air lift, within three weeks, completely converted and restaffed with military personnel.

The risks of gadgetry

No one in his senses would suggest that our defense services should minimize the importance of research and continuous experimentation. We should beware, however, of falling into the traps that a passion for gadgetry can prepare for the unwary. The time consumed in moving new weapons, instruments, and equipment from the blueprint and test stages to standardization for production is often excessive.

Our army in the field today is still short of much essential equipment. Why? Expansion re-emphasizes the question. No doubt the crisis in Korea had already caused a speed-up in this important field. To continue to allow months to elapse between the certification of essential items in prototype form and their production in suitable quantity is a luxury this nation cannot afford.